THE PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM

OF

ANTONIO ROSMINI-SERBATI

THE

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OF

ANTONIO ROSMINI-SERBATI

TRANSLATED, WITH A

SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR'S LIFE, BIBLIOGRAPHY, INTRODUCTION, AND NOTES

BY

THOMAS DAVIDSON

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TO

HER HIGHNESS

THE PRINCESS CAROLYNE

OF SAYN-WITTGENSTEIN,

Whose rank is inferior to her piety, intellect, and worth; whose devotion to her own creed is equalled only by her tolerance for all other creeds believed in sincerity of heart; who has always encouraged me to pursue clear truth without thought of compromise, and to whom I owe, among many other great benefits, my first acquaintance with Rosmini, I dedicate this work, as a slight token of gratitude and affection.

THOMAS DAVIDSON.

PREFACE.

THE purpose of the present work is threefold: *first*, to introduce the most important of modern Italian philosophical systems to the notice of English-speaking thinkers who have not had an opportunity of studying it in the original language; *second*, to present it fairly to those for whom it has been systematically misrepresented; and, *third*, to furnish an introductory handbook to the study of modern Italian thought, so little known outside of Italy.

With the exception of a small work edited by Father Lockhart, a brief notice in the American translation of Ueberweg's *Handbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie*, an essay by Monseigneur Ferrè, a few notices in Brownson's *Quarterly Review*, and a few sketches by myself in various periodicals, there exists hardly anything in English on Rosmini.* Of systematic attempts that have been made to stir up an *odium theologicum* against Rosmini's system, it would be inedifying to say anything more than is said in the Introduction. The present condition of thought in Northern Europe is such that no apology

* See Bibliography.

seems needed for directing the attention of English thinkers to a school of philosophy which professes, by combining ancient with modern thought, to find an absolute criterion of certainty, and to afford a firm assurance of much that more one-sided systems are constrained to abandon. Rosmini has exerted a wide and most beneficial influence on the thought of Italy, an influence equalled in degree only by that of Aristotle and Kant. Indeed, it may be safely affirmed that no one can read Rosmini's works without, voluntarily or involuntarily, being impressed by them.

When I first resolved to present an outline of Rosmini's philosophy in an English dress, three courses seemed open to me—either to translate some one of the numerous *résumés* of it, which have appeared in Italy, to write an original account of it myself, or in some way to introduce Rosmini as speaking in his own person. That the first of these courses was hardly feasible, I discovered on carefully examining the *résumés* referred to. Even those of Buroni, and of Calza and Perez, which would best have answered my purposes, I found open to grave objections. The former, as its title sufficiently indicates,* contains a good deal of irrelevant matter; while the latter is not only too extensive, but, thanks to underhand ecclesiastical influence, has never been completed, the third volume remaining unpublished. As to the second alternative, frequent attempts to

* *Dell' Essere e del Conoscere. Studii su Parmenide, Platone e Rosmini.*

convey the true meaning of Rosmini's thought to others in my own language convinced me that the difficulty of presenting it was far greater than I had supposed. Seeing myself, therefore, shut up to the third course, I came to the conclusion that I should best attain my end by adopting, as the basis of my work, the *Sistema Filosofico* or *résumé* of Rosmini's system, compiled by the author for Cantù's *Storia Universale,* accompanying it with explanations of my own and parallel passages from his longer works. In this way, I hoped to afford a general notion of the whole, and at the same time to impart a special knowledge of its more characteristic and essential features. The sections of the *Sistema*, therefore, correspond to the *Dictate* which German philosophers not unfrequently read to their students to be written down *verbatim,* while the notes or *excursus* answer to their *vivâ voce* explanations or lectures. The Introduction is intended to show the position which Rosmini's philosophy occupies with reference to other systems, ancient and modern, and in the universal history of human thought.

As far as possible I have allowed Rosmini to speak for himself. Only in a few cases have I introduced condensations, explanations, and criticisms of my own, and several of these last deal with the relation of Rosmini's doctrines to systems that have been promulgated since his death. In all ways it has been my aim to make clear what seem to me the essential points of the system, those points

which constitute it a remedy against the idealisms, materialisms, and scepticisms by which the thought of the present day is wasted.

In reference to the sketch of Rosmini's life, I ought to say that I have written it from a standpoint not entirely my own. This I deemed both courteous and permissible, all the more so that in an article in the *Fortnightly Review* I have dwelt with sufficient emphasis on what seem to me the limitations of his character and the defects of his religious creed.

The Bibliography is as nearly complete as I have been able to make it. Of its defects I have spoken in a note prefatory to it.

The footnotes, which are all due to me, will, it is hoped, be useful to the reader, and will not draw upon the writer the charge of excessive pedantry.

I have tried to turn Rosmini's somewhat diffuse Italian into readable English, and, I am well aware, with only partial success. Those, however, who best know the difficulties of rendering the philosophical style and terminology of one language into those of another, will, I am sure, be most indulgent toward my shortcomings. I would respectfully ask those who may feel inclined to blame me for employing such words as *intuite*, *exigence*, etc., to suggest other less objectionable words fitted to fill with credit the places of these. I would likewise ask those who, from an outside point of view, whether Hegelian, Comtian, Spencerian, or any other, may, at the first glance, feel inclined to cast aside Rosminianism as

merely resuscitated Scholasticism, to reserve their judgment until they are sure they have a full and complete comprehension of the system. It is difficult to comprehend: this ought to be frankly admitted. This difficulty, however, is due, not so much to the system itself, as to the fact that much of the terminology in which it is expressed has, in recent centuries, been so wrested from its proper use and meaning as to be now almost incapable of conveying truth. This is especially true with regard to such terms as *subject*, *object*, *intuition*, *perception*, *intelligence*, *feeling*, etc., which in the mouths of most modern thinkers have little or no intelligible meaning. For years I found it very difficult to enter into Rosmini's thought, and I feel quite sure that no one, without a most careful study of his terms, will be much more fortunate than I was. With a view to facilitating this study, I have included in my notes as many definitions as possible, and have placed an index of them at the end of the volume.

As the whole of the work, with the exception of the translation of the *Sistema* and a few parts of the Bibliography, was written in a remote village of the Piedmontese Alps, where I had access to few books beyond that portion of my own library which I had been able to transport thither, a few quotations and references had to be taken at second hand. For any inaccuracy that may occur in these I must crave the reader's indulgence.

In conclusion, I beg to return my most sincere

thanks to the members of the Rosminian Order for numerous acts of kindness and courtesy displayed to me in the course of my researches into the life and philosophy of their Founder, and to say that, though they have encouraged me in the publication of this work, they are in no way responsible for any opinion expressed by me in reference either to the doctrines of Rosmini or to the views and purposes of those who have attacked these doctrines. I am informed, on good authority, that they intend soon to publish an English translation of Rosmini's first important work, the *New Essay on the Origin of Ideas*. I have further to thank my friend, Dr. J. Burns-Gibson, for reading over the proofs of the work.

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SKETCH OF
THE LIFE OF ANTONIO ROSMINI.

If we consult any of even the most recent general histories of philosophy—for example, those of Schwegler, Erdmann, and Ueberweg—we shall naturally come to the conclusion that, since the days of the Réformation, when Scholasticism fell into disrepute and the apostles of new doctrines, such as Giordano Bruno and Lucilio Vanini, perished at the stake, there has been no philosophy in the Catholic countries, no fresh thought in the Church—indeed, no advance in speculation, except developments of Cartesianism, anywhere. Nevertheless, this is so far from being the case that Italy, the very centre and home of Catholicism, may be safely affirmed to have produced in the last hundred years more solid thought, more thought that will prove a lasting possession, than any other single country in Europe, and to be at the present day the only country blessed with a system of thought that still asserts its ability to furnish a rational basis for life according to the highest ideals.

It is, indeed, true that Italy, after the decay of Scholasticism, fell for a time into a condition of philosophic sterility; but this was in large measure compensated for by the scientific labours of such men as Galileo Galilei and Giambattista Vico, each of whom marked an epoch in the study

to which he devoted himself. When, in the seventeenth century, philosophy began to revive, it did so in the form of the subjectivism of Descartes and Malebranche and the sensism of Locke and Condillac. Of the two, the latter had by far the greater influence and the larger number of followers. This was due mainly to two circumstances: *first*, to the long residence of Condillac in Italy, as tutor to Prince Ferdinand of Parma (1758–1768); and, *second*, to the readiness with which the doctrine itself answered the ends of the Jesuit school of thought, ever ready to depreciate the powers of human intelligence and to find an excuse for claiming assent to its own incomprehensible dogmas. A third influence which favoured the spread of Condillac's doctrines in Italy was the almost universal popularity which everything of French origin enjoyed in his time. At all events, during the latter half of last century and the first quarter of this, the popular philosophy in Italy was sensism. It found its way into numerous text-books which, through the strong influence of the Jesuits, supplanted the old Scholastic manuals in nearly all the schools of the peninsula. But it was not only among the clergy that this doctrine found adherents. Among the laity, Gioja (1767–1829) and Romagnosi (1761–1835) embraced it and developed it in the direction in which it has always done most good, viz., in that of law and legislation. Towards the year 1820, criticism or Kantianism, the German development of Lockian sensism, began to make its appearance in Italy, especially in the works of Pasquale Galluppi, one of the most considerable of Italian philosophers; and from that day to this it has exercised a sensible influence on nearly all Italian thinkers. But neither sensism nor its development, criticism, is congenial to Italian natures or calculated to encourage their healthy unfolding. Sensism may free from

superstition, and criticism supplement the result by sharpening the intelligence; but neither or both could restore that balance between head, heart, and sense which makes the life of the virtuous Italian. Accordingly, the immediate effect of Transalpine philosophies was merely to start a fermentation, which, though, thanks to other influences, it produced in the end much good, was itself detrimental to faith, in its true and best sense, and, as a consequence, to science, art, and morals. Indeed, in the first three decades of this century, the condition of Italy, political, moral, social, and intellectual, was, through foreign influences largely, such as might well inspire distrust and despair in serious and high-minded men. It was at the end of this period and under these unfavourable circumstances that there appeared before the world a man destined to initiate a new era in thought. Of the life of that man, the following is a brief sketch.

Antonio Rosmini-Serbati* was born on the 25th of March, 1797, at Rovereto† in the Italian Tyrol. His father was Pier Modesto Rosmini-Serbati, belonging to an old, wealthy, and noble family, originally called Aresmino or Eresmino, and his mother a Countess Giovanna dei Formenti, from Riva on the Lake of Garda. Both, like many

* This sketch owes its materials mostly to Father Paoli's recently published work, *Della Vita di Antonio Rosmini-Serbati* (Torino, 1880); to Rosmini's own account, also recently published, of his mission to Rome, *Della Missione di Antonio Rosmini-Serbati alla Corte di Roma, negli Anni* 1848-49 (Paravia, Torino, 1881); and to frequent conversations with persons who knew Rosmini well.

† Rovereto is a picturesque town of some twenty thousand inhabitants, standing on the left bank of the Adige, a few miles below Trent. The house, or *palazzo*, in which Rosmini was born is one of the largest and handsomest in the place. Including some additions made to it recently by his followers, it contains about a hundred and fifty rooms, in which are stored a large part of Rosmini's library, some twenty thousand engravings, and many oil paintings, together with relics of every period of his life. An excellent statue of him by the sculptor, Vincenzo Consani, adorns the public square. See Paoli's *Antonio Rosmini e la sua Prosapia* (Rovereto, 1880).

of their ancestors, were cultivated, generous, and pious people, zealously devoted to the interests of the Church, but do not seem to have been in any other way remarkable. They had four children—Margherita, who became a nun and a remarkable woman, Antonio, Giuseppe, and Felice, the last of whom died in infancy. Antonio was a delicate and finely organized child, and very early showed signs of those virtues of head and heart for which he afterwards became remarkable, as well as of that religious and devotional tendency which gave aim to his whole life. His childhood and youth were full of "sweetness and light" (*lumen et dulcedo*, as St. Bonaventura says), full of quiet, pure, unconscious happiness, in whose sunshine all goodness and nobleness grew like trees beside a constant river. Reared amid scenes at once beautiful, grandiose, and suggestive of immensity, he became affected at an early age with a loving sense of the majesty and mystery of Nature. Being fond of study, he entered, when still very young, the gymnasium of his native town, and there so distinguished himself that the rector was able to predict, in no indefinite terms, the boy's future greatness. After leaving the gymnasium, he remained two years at home, studying privately, under the excellent Father Orsi, mathematics and philosophy, two subjects for which he early displayed great tendency and capacity. Father Orsi, like most Italian thinkers of his time, was in philosophy a Lockian, and tried to impart that system to his pupil; but the latter, having already conned the writings of the Schoolmen, so confounded his teacher by his subtle objections, that the good father was soon obliged to confine his instruction to the subject of mathematics. It was in the course of these two years (1815-16) that two of the most important events in Rosmini's life took place—the discovery of his philosophical principle, and his

determination to enter the priesthood. Of the former mention will be made afterwards; on the propriety of the latter, it is hardly competent for a non-Catholic to pronounce judgment. Certain it is that the step was taken with the best motives and the most sincere convictions, and that he never for a moment repented of it or was untrue to his faith and profession; but equally certain it is, from an outside point of view, that it narrowed his views, rendered him unjust to great and good men, who did not share his beliefs, and prevented him from becoming what he otherwise must have been—the most influential thinker of the nineteenth century. The truth is, as his biographer says, he seemed to be born with a boundless love toward God and his fellow-creatures, and this sentiment seemed to him to find fullest scope in the Church, wherein God and man meet and unite in love. Firm in his resolution, and after overcoming the strong opposition of his parents, he left Rovereto in 1817, and began his theological course at the university of Padua. While there, he made many friends, bought himself a large philosophical library, zealously pursued his philosophical studies, and became more profoundly religious than ever. In 1820 he lost his father, who left him heir to the bulk of his very considerable property. In 1821 he was ordained priest, and celebrated his first mass at St. Catherine's in Venice. Shortly after, he made a brief visit to Rome.

From 1820 to 1826 Rosmini spent the greater part of his time at his home in Rovereto, devoting himself for the most part to study, contemplation, and prayer, but sometimes exercising priestly functions in the neighbouring villages. It was during this time that the two great purposes which shaped his whole subsequent life became clear in his mind—the working out of a coherent system of truth which should be a basis for revealed theology, and the

founding of an institution which should train teachers, and especially priests, for the Church, in holiness, charity, and wisdom. With a view to the former, he read in these six years the works of Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus; of St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and St. Bonaventura; of Locke, Descartes, Leibniz, and Condillac; of Reid and Stewart; of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, not to mention those of minor philosophers.* As was natural in a young enthusiastic priest, deeply grieved at the declining condition of the Church, his thoughts at this time ran largely in the direction of constitutional law and the rights of the Papacy, and induced him to write the first draft of what afterwards appeared as two separate works, the *Filosofia della Politica* and the *Filosofia del Diritto.* Under the influence of the Marchesa di Canossa, who had founded an institution for *Daughters of Charity*, he was, in 1825, induced to take into serious consideration the idea of adding a new order to the Church. At first he meant that it should consist of laymen, but afterwards concluded that an association composed in part of priests would be more useful. In both his purposes he said he felt himself prompted by a "divine will."

From 1826 to 1828 Rosmini lived mostly in Milan, continuing his studies, superintending the printing of certain essays and criticisms, writing out some of his larger works, and drawing round him a few men to form the nucleus of his projected order, the plan of which had now become sufficiently clear to him. It was here that he met the energetic French priest Loewenbruk, by whom his naturally contemplative nature, prone to wait for mystical divine

* The amount of his reading is almost incredible. I have myself looked through his copies of many of the philosophers mentioned, and found them annotated on the margin from beginning to end. The Greek philosophers he read mostly in Latin, his knowledge of Greek being very imperfect, as is clear from his manuscripts. He did not read German readily.

promptings, was roused into immediate activity, and himself induced to take steps toward giving his order an actual corporate existence. In February, 1828, he left Milan and retired to Domodossola, a small but beautifully situated town in the Piedmontese Alps, taking up his abode in a ruined house adjoining a mediæval tower and a church, on the top of a hill, called Monte Calvario from its having a *Via Crucis*. Here he led the life of an anchorite, feeding on boiled herbs, frequently fasting, sleeping on a couch of leaves, and spending his time in prayer, meditation, study, and writing. Such self-mortification, coupled with exposure to the cold, soon told upon his naturally delicate constitution, and aggravated a liver complaint from which he had previously suffered, and from which he was never afterwards free. It was here that, kneeling before a crucifix, he wrote the *Rule* of his order, and here that he composed a large part of his first important work, the *New Essay on the Origin of Ideas*. In July, 1828, he left Domodossola, and after trying in vain to recover his health by using the mineral waters of Recoaro, he paid a visit to his mother at Rovereto, and then started southward, in order to pursue his studies and purposes under the influence of a more genial climate. He reached Rome on the 25th of November, and remained there till March, 1830. During this interval he made the acquaintance of many distinguished men, received great encouragement from the pope, Pius VIII., to pursue his philosophical studies, took steps toward obtaining the approval of the Holy See for his new order, and printed his *New Essay* (*Nuovo Saggio sull' Origine delle Idee*), which established his reputation as the ablest Catholic philosopher of his time, and which was almost immediately introduced as a text-book into many schools and seminaries, even, it should seem, into those under the control of the Jesuits.

Just as the year 1820 closed Rosmini's apprenticeship, if the expression may be allowed, so the year 1830 closed his journeymanship, in philosophy. His *New Essay* was his masterpiece, in the old and proper signification of that much-abused term. The rest of his life divides itself naturally into three periods: the first, from 1830 to 1837, during which he worked out into clearness the plan of his great system of truth, and partly executed it, at the same time labouring to find a footing for his order; the second, from 1837 to 1848, during which he enjoyed as much happiness as usually falls to the lot of mortals, all his plans seeming to promise realization; and the third, from 1848 to 1855, during which, though he pursued his schemes with unabating vigour, he was doomed to drink to the dregs the bitter cup of misrepresentation and slander, mixed for him by those whose influence his good threatened. But in all periods his character remained the same.

In May, 1830, Rosmini returned to Domodossola, and, though still infirm in health, resumed his life of privation. His hopes, however, were high, and new ways of usefulness began to open up to him. Having received, toward the end of the year, an invitation to found a house of his order at Trent, he betook himself thither, and from then until 1834 he lived partly in that city and partly at Domodossola, largely devoted to the care of his nascent order. While thus labouring to educate men for the Church, he was still occupied with the problems of her philosophical and disciplinary reform; for, though a zealous Catholic, he was too clear-sighted and too single-minded not to be alive to her unfortunate condition. In these years, accordingly, he wrote his *Principles of Moral Science*, part of his (still unpublished) *Supernatural Anthropology*, and (in 1832) his now famous *Five Wounds of Holy Church.*

In 1834 he was called by the clergy and people of Rovereto, his native city, to take charge of the Congregation of St. Mark's there. He accepted with reluctance; but, once on duty, he laboured with so much zeal and acceptance as to rouse the opposition of the Austrian Government, which dreaded his Italian and papal leanings. Being thereby hampered in his efforts to improve the moral and spiritual welfare of his parishioners, he resigned his charge in October, 1835, and at once returned to his previous mode of life. But the Austrian Government, having once had its attention called to his work in Rovereto, began to look with suspicion upon his efforts generally, and to endeavour to counteract them. With this purpose it first forbade all connection between his house at Trent and any foreign house, meaning the one at Domodossola, and finally succeeded in breaking it up altogether. The natural hostility of the Austrian Government to anything savouring of Ultramontanism was, in Rosmini's case, sharpened by the influence of the Jesuits and their friends, who saw in his enterprises possible dangers to their order. If at Vienna they accused him of Ultramontanism, at Rome they charged him with heresy, chiefly with the view of inducing the Holy See to withhold its approval from his proposed order. From that time until now the persecution of Rosmini and his followers at the hands of the Jesuits has never ceased even for a moment. Freed from parochial duties, Rosmini, during the years 1836-37, moved a good deal from place to place, trying to secure a footing and sympathy for his order, and to defend the groundwork of his philosophy, which was already vigorously attacked, not only by the Jesuits and their friends, but also by learned men of rationalistic or anti-Catholic tendencies.*

* Rosmini, it should never be forgotten, was a staunch supporter of papal infallibility and authority, temporal as well as spiritual. He was, indeed, an extreme Ultramontane.

St. Albert's College Library

In these years he was able to found a mission in England, and also to establish, at the *Sacra* of St. Michele, near Turin, a religious house, to which he transferred, for a time, the novitiate of his order. His most formidable opponent in philosophy was Count Mamiani, of Pesaro, a zealous Italian patriot, at that time living as an exile in Paris. It was in reply to this gifted man's criticisms that he wrote the large volume now familiarly known as the *Rinnovamento*, which may be regarded as a supplement, and a most important one, to his *New Essay*. By this work Mamiani was convinced of his errors, a fact which he has acknowledged in the most generous terms.

In 1837 Rosmini, tired of Austrian surveillance, took up his abode at Stresa, a charming little town on the western shore of Lago Maggiore, and here he remained during the rest of his life, going abroad only when business of extraordinary moment called him. For the eleven following years he enjoyed as much happiness as usually falls to the lot of humanity. His institution, in spite of bitter opposition, received, in 1839, the formal approval of Pope Gregory XVI., his old and steadfast friend, and continued to increase in strength and numbers. He was able to pursue his studies with vigour, to prepare a large number of volumes for the press,* and to work out with great clearness the plan of his whole system. He was surrounded by loving and admiring friends, such as Manzoni,† Tommaséo, Gustavo Cavour, brother of the statesman, Bonghi, etc.; visited by the wise and great of many nations; and elected member of numerous academies at home and abroad, not to speak of other honours. He experienced what few men ever know, the

* See list of Rosmini's works in Bibliography.

† Manzoni's *Dialogue on Invention* is written altogether in the spirit of Rosmini's philosophy.

delight of exercising every one of his faculties to the fullest extent for the sake of the highest aims he could conceive.

Toward the end of this period his philosophy was violently attacked by Vincenzo Gioberti, the great priest-patriot and patriot-philosopher of Italy, in a work entitled *The Philosophical Errors of Antonio Rosmini.* Rosmini replied with great calmness, dignity, and effect, and Gioberti lived to admit that he had altogether misjudged him. This was in 1848, that year of so many changes, when Italy was struggling to free herself from the bonds of the hated Austrian. The position which Rosmini assumed in this struggle, and his efforts to bring it to the conclusion he desired, show, in a very marked way, how consistent he was in his devotion to the interests of the Catholic religion. He is usually spoken of as one of the initiators of the movement which ended in the emancipation and union of Italy, and in a certain sense he deserves to be so considered. Nevertheless, the freedom and unity which Italy has now actually attained were, of all things, those which he least desired and most earnestly laboured to prevent. It is true that he sincerely longed to see Italy delivered from the Austrian, but, like a good, consistent Catholic, he hoped that this deliverance would result in placing the country under the control of the pope. It was this longing and this hope that stirred up the interest which he felt in the political movements of that troubled time, and induced him to take part in them. If his efforts were, from his point of view, most unfortunate, leading to a result exactly the opposite of what he desired, that was no fault of his.

When, in 1846, Pius IX. ascended the papal throne, and, new to his position, began to show signs of liberalism, Italy felt as if her day of regeneration had come, and the Vicar of Christ had once more taken the lead in civilization.

This went so far that when, in 1848, for the purposes of concerted action, a movement was set on foot to bring about a confederation among the states of Italy, there was a pretty general understanding that the pope should be its perpetual president. No proposal could better have accorded with Rosmini's plans and wishes, and he at once felt that his *Constitution according to Social Justice,* the plan of which he had sketched out some seventeen years before, was about to be realized. He was, therefore, exceedingly desirous that the pope should heighten the prestige of the Holy See by taking a prominent part in the emancipation of Italy. Great, accordingly, was his disappointment when the pope, in an allocution, declared his intention of taking no part in the war against Austria, on the ground that, being the common father of all the faithful, he could not consistently make war on any of them. Rosmini, seeing both that this argument had a certain force, and that, having once been publicly announced, it could not again be withdrawn, was more eager than ever to see the proposed confederation effected, for the reason that, inasmuch as the power of making peace and war would then rest with the federal congress, and not with the princes whose states were represented in it, the papal troops might engage in an offensive war, and yet the pope, no longer responsible for their action, be able to go on declaring himself the prince of peace and the father of charity. Rosmini did everything in his power to prevent the pope from placing himself meanwhile in opposition to the political aspirations of his subjects and of Italy, and when the Romans, impatient of dictation, at last demanded a constitution, in order that they might have some voice in the management of their own affairs, he wrote out and forwarded to Rome a copy of his *Constitution according to*

Social Justice. His purpose in this was to prevent the granting of a constitution on the French model, a possibility which he dreaded above everything. The *Constitution* arrived too late to be of any service; but Rosmini shortly afterwards published a somewhat enlarged copy of it. About the same time also, he gave to the world his *Five Wounds of Holy Church*, written as early as 1832. The immediate aim of the former work was to induce the Italian states to adopt constitutions practically conferring all authority on the Church and the nobility; that of the latter, to induce the Church herself to submit to such reforms as would enable her to exercise her authority more freely. The ultimate aim of both was to procure for the pope an inalienable preponderance in the government of Italy, and to make Catholicism a leading article in her constitution.

It was very shortly after the publication of these works that an opportunity was offered to Rosmini of performing an active part in the affairs whose course he had tried to influence. The Piedmontese Government, needing, for the prosecution of the Austrian war, the countenance and aid of the pope, offered Rosmini, whose influence in Rome was supposed to be great, an appointment as special envoy to the Holy See, in order to obtain these objects. Rosmini, thinking that in such a position he might subserve the interests of the Church, accepted the mission with readiness. Unfortunately, however, his views of its nature and purpose were very different from those of the Government which appointed him. What the latter contemplated was an armed alliance of princes capable of offering immediate resistance to the Austrians; what Rosmini meant to labour for was a permanent confederation of states, with the pope as *ex-officio* president. The Government, however, was induced by Gioberti to adopt for a moment Rosmini's plan,

and, with a vague understanding to this effect, the latter started on his mission.

On his arrival at Rome Rosmini was most graciously received by the pope, appointed a consultor of the Congregation of the Index, and promised a cardinal's hat. Indeed, at first everything seemed to augur success. Meanwhile, however, the Piedmontese Government having, on reflection, become conscious that its purposes were incompatible with those of Rosmini, delayed sending him instructions. In spite of this, he at once began to carry out with vigour the object of his mission, as he was fain to understand it. Finally, the Piedmontese Government, fearing that his plan, which was approved by the pope and the Duke of Tuscany, might prove successful, sent him instructions to abandon it and confine himself to the project of an armed alliance. Rosmini remonstrated; but finding the Government firm, and the pope's minister, the unfortunate Rossi, in direct opposition to him, he resigned his mission, having held it for seven weeks, and devoted himself entirely to the cause of the pope and the Church. The effect of Rosmini's influence upon the former had been to prevent him from listening to the proposal for an armed alliance, and to confirm him in his resolution to take no direct part in the war.

The result of his adherence to this resolution was to bring about a crisis, which began with the foul assassination of minister Rossi and ended in the pope's being obliged to flee from Rome and take refuge at Gaeta, in the territory of Naples. In the brief interval which elapsed between these events, the Romans endeavoured to compel the pope to appoint a Liberal ministry, and suggested Rosmini, whom they believed to represent the views of patriotic Piedmont, as one of its members. The pope, reluctantly yielding to

force, nominated the ministry desired, conferring on Rosmini the presidency of it, with the portfolio of public instruction. Had Rosmini had as much force as purity of character, and been as brilliant in action as in thought, there is no doubt that here an occasion was offered to him for realizing his most cherished schemes, and, to a large extent, deciding the future fortunes of his country. But his almost morbidly scrupulous conscience, his sense of incapacity, and, more than all, his fear that his appointment had been made under pressure and would place him in a false position with the people, induced him to decline the nomination and to keep himself out of the way. For whatever reason, his influence with the pope ceased from that moment. Nevertheless, he continued to watch with interest the course of events; and when, a few days later, the pope fled in disguise to Gaeta, Rosmini followed him, for the purpose of aiding him in his difficulties. At Gaeta he found himself in a very difficult position, unable to influence the pope or the course of events, and exposed to the malign suspicions of Antonelli and the party then in favour. He was finally rendered so uncomfortable that he left Gaeta, betaking himself to Naples, in order to superintend the printing of certain ascetic works. By this step he left the field open to his enemies, who were not slow to profit by the advantage. With the aid of the Neapolitan Government, which, for reasons of its own, persecuted him during the whole time he remained within the limits of its jurisdiction, they succeeded in calling at Naples an irregular meeting of the Congregation of the Index, to examine and pronounce upon his recently published works, the *Constitution according to Social Justice* and *The Five Wounds of Holy Church.* Though a consultor of said Congregation, Rosmini did not hear of this meeting, or of its decree prohibiting these works, until several months after-

wards. Even when he returned to Gaeta and with great difficulty obtained an audience of the pope, the latter merely remarked that the two works were under examination, without dropping a hint that he had already signed the decree prohibiting them.

Shortly afterwards, Rosmini, treated contemptuously by the members of the pope's suite and annoyed in every possible way by the Neapolitan Government, left Neapolitan territory, and, after a brief visit to Monte Cassino, withdrew to Albano, where he remained several months. Here he received the news of the prohibition of his two political works, and knew that his enemies had succeeded in their most malignant purposes. The cardinal's robes which the pope had ordered him to prepare, he was destined never to wear.

The way in which Rosmini accepted what was meant to be his disgrace, conscious as he must have been of its source, was highly characteristic. He not only submitted to it without protest, but rejoiced in it as a divine dispensation, sent to test the strength and sincerity of his fidelity to the dictates of the Holy See. Though he knew that his two books had not been prohibited on account of any heretical opinions contained in them, he offered to withdraw them from circulation. This, however, was deemed unnecessary. His enemies had succeeded in surrounding his name with an odour of heresy, and they were satisfied. He shortly afterwards returned to his home at Stresa, to resume his former life, sadder, wiser, saintlier than before. He lived but seven years more. During these he devoted himself almost exclusively to the care of his institute and the composition of works forming part of his great system of truth. The convincing nature of this system, its coherency, and the rapidity with which it was now approaching logical com-

plction, once more roused the hostility of his enemies, whose purposes, besides, had been somewhat baffled by his hearty submission to the decree prohibiting his two patriotic works. Thinking that, having taken the first step, they would find the rest more easy, they began a systematic process of calumniation, giving out that Rosmini's works were full of all kinds of heresies and damnable doctrines, and not even taking care to see that their accusations were compatible with each other. Their object was to accomplish by mere reiteration what would have been impossible by evidence fairly adduced, namely, to make clear to the pope that Rosmini was a heretic and a man dangerous and hostile to the cause of the Holy See. To their dismay, however, they soon found out that they had overshot their mark. The pope knew Rosmini personally, and before that knowledge calumny fell dead. Besides, the pope, being now restored to his throne and free to think for himself, saw that he had deeply wronged Rosmini. Accordingly he resolved to make what reparation was in his power, by giving him a fair hearing. Indeed, the whole of the pope's conduct in regard to Rosmini and his works from this time forth was thoroughly judicious and praiseworthy. He first enjoined silence on Rosmini's enemies, and then had the whole of his published works submitted to the most careful scrutiny. This is not the place to relate the story of this most interesting process,* which lasted for nearly four years (1851–1854). Suffice it to say that at the end of that time the Congregation of the Index met, and, with the pope in person presiding, declared that all the works of Antonio Rosmini-Serbati, lately subjected to examination, were to be dismissed as free from

* See Paoli's *Vita*, already referred to; *Cenni Biografici di Antonio Rosmini* (Milan, 1855); *Antonio Rosmini e la Civiltà Cattolica dinanzi alla S. Congregaz. dell' Indice*, by G. Buroni (Turin, 1880).

censure, and that, on account of said examination, no obloquy should attach either to their author or to the institution founded by him, "de vitæ laudibus et singularibus in ecclesiam promeritis." The pope then enjoined perpetual silence on all Rosmini's enemies, whose fury, in consequence, knew no bounds, and from that day to this has not exhausted itself.* No doubt, Rosmini's satisfaction was great; but he did not live long to enjoy it. He died the death of a saint, at Stresa, on the 1st of July, 1855, not without suspicion of having been poisoned.† Though he laboured assiduously to the last day of his life, sometimes employing even two amanuenses, he was compelled at last to leave unfinished many important works, among them, unfortunately, the *Theosophy*, which was to be the crown and keystone to his whole system, and which remains a colossal fragment.

A list of Rosmini's works, with their dates of publication and arranged according to subjects, will be found upon pp. lii.–lxxii., and a brief sketch of the nature of his philosophy in the *Introduction*. A few words may be said here regarding his person and the institute founded by him.

His person is thus described by his biographer, who knew him well. "He was of middle stature, lithe, and, with the exception that the head seemed too large for the body,

* During the lifetime of Pius IX., these enemies, though as disobedient as they dared to be, were kept in check by repeated warnings and injunctions of silence; but since the accession of Leo. XIII. to the papal throne, they have had full scope, and now freely repeat all the old accusations, which the sentence of the Congregation of the Index ought to have buried for ever. Thus there is growing up a literature of calumny very far from edifying. Fortunately it is defeating its own ends.

† His remains rest in the crypt of the Church of the Holy Crucifix, which he built. Over it is a handsome monument by Vela, representing Rosmini on his knees, in the attitude in which he wrote the *Rule* of his order. In the college attached to the church is the working part of his library, his manuscripts, and many interesting relics of him.

well proportioned. His forehead was high and expansive, his hair almost black, his nose somewhat aquiline, his chin slightly protruding, his complexion delicate, his eye full of fire softened by an expression of bashful modesty, his lips wreathed with a perpetual smile of benevolence. His manners, rooted as they were in a fine nature carefully developed by home education, were full of ease, dignity, and kindness to all persons, of whatever rank in life." His face, to judge from his portraits, must have been exceedingly handsome, but there was a curious want of symmetry about his head, which in form reminds us of those of the Medici family, being apparently short from front to back, and of what may perhaps be called the Etruscan type.

When we say that Rosmini was a saint and a thinker of the very first order, we have given in brief the main features of his character. Sainthood, as hitherto understood, implies a living faith rejoicing in the consciousness of God, a heart surcharged with love to God and all that He has made, and a free, complete submission of the will to Him. Faith, love, submission were to Rosmini but three aspects of the same blessed act, of that holy and hallowing enthusiasm which was the mainspring of his life. His biographer, indeed (vol. i. p. 84, n.), is careful to inform us that he never was an enthusiast in the ordinary acceptation of that term; and this is true. Rosmini was never a *Schwärmer*, gushing hysterically over the passing shows and gaudy accidents of things; but in the old Greek, Platonic noble sense of the term (ἐνθουσιασμός, from ἐν and θεός, inspiration of God), he was an enthusiast of the first rank. He knew little, indeed, of love (ἔρως) in the ordinary sense of the word, that is, the desire to absorb and perpetuate a good in its nature transient: hence, the ties of home and family, as such, were never strong in him; but his whole

nature was bathed in self-surrendering love to God, and in what the author of *Ecce Homo* felicitously calls the enthusiasm of humanity, the true Christian charity, which seeketh not her own, but rejoiceth in the truth. God, man as the image of God, and nature as the shadow of God, were the objects of his love, and the contemplation of any one of them was sufficient to move him to tears, and, in the language of Wordsworth, to "thoughts that do lie too deep for tears." His highest blessedness he found in rapt communion with God, his chief happiness in cordial interchange of thoughts and feelings with other pure souls, and his keenest pleasure in repose of spirit among the lonely grandeurs of nature. His letters to his friends, especially those written in the earlier part of his life, remind us of those of Hegel to Hölderlin and Schelling, and his poetry also has a strong resemblance in tone to that of the great German thinker.* As we have already said, this attitude of self-surrendering love and faith was in Rosmini coupled with a complete submission of his will to God through freedom. In his *Anthropology* (Book iii., *On Spirituality*, p. 329) he defines Freedom as "the faculty which determines the will to a volition contrary to its own," whereas "Will is the faculty which tends to a known object."

Æschylos had a profound insight when he wrote, "No one is free save Zeus" ("Ἐλεύθερος γὰρ οὔτις ἐστὶ πλὴν Διός" *Prometh. Vinct.*, 50), and since his day many a one has felt the direct conclusion from this to be, that whoever else wishes to be free must seek to identify his will with that of the supreme power. "Our wills are ours, to make them Thine," says Tennyson. This was one of Rosmini's central doc-

* See Rosenkranz's *Life of Hegel*, pp. 62–80, and compare the poem on pp. 78–80 with Rosmini's youthful effusion quoted on pp. 5–8 of Nicolò Tommaséo's *Antonio Rosmini* (Turin, 1855).

trines, and it explains a great deal in his character. He was not a man of executive ability, or indeed of enterprise in the sphere of practical activity. Having surrendered his will, he became entirely passive, waiting in complete faith for the prompting of the Divine Spirit, before entering upon any grave undertaking. This attitude of passivity was an entirely conscious one with him, so much so that as early as 1825 he laid it down as the guide and principle of his life. In his diary of that year he wrote: "I, most unworthy priest, have resolved to shape my conduct in accordance with two principles, which are these:

"(1) To devote myself seriously to setting myself free from my most enormous vices [!] and purifying my soul from the iniquity with which it has been loaded since my birth, without going in search of other occupations or enterprises for the good of my neighbour, feeling as I do my utter powerlessness to do anything of myself for their good.

"(2) Not to refuse any offices of charity toward my neighbour, if ever Divine Providence shall offer or present them to me, inasmuch as God is able to make use of any instrument, and, therefore, even of me, for His purposes; and should this happen, I will preserve perfect indifference as to the nature of these offices, and perform those laid upon me with the same fervour as if I had assumed them of my own free will."

However we may regard such principles, it was, after all, love and intellect, and not faith or submission of will, that made Rosmini great; and so closely, indeed, are the two former elements bound up together in him, that it is almost impossible to treat them separately. Love deepened, without narrowing, intellect, and intellect broadened, without attenuating, love. To his consciousness,

more perhaps than to that of any other man that ever lived, might be applied the inimitable lines of Dante—

> "Light intellectual, filled full of love,
> Love of true good, filled full of gladsomeness,
> Gladsomeness transcending all things sweet." *

Light and love, distinguishing subtlety and combining force, these are the fundamental characteristics of high intelligence, and the balance of the two is the infinite joy of contemplation which, as Aristotle says, we sometimes enjoy, God always † (Metaph. Λ. 7). Both elements the intellect of Rosmini possessed in a very high degree. His surprising analytical subtlety, which reminds us of that of Aristotle, enabled him to unravel perplexities of thought that had puzzled centuries, while his synthetic power, which never for an instant lost sight of the absolute whole in the relative parts, made it possible for him to build up a system of ordered truths which, had he lived to complete it, would have in vain sought for an equal. True, his dogmatic faith narrowed his field of vision, and consequently his sympathies; but this was in great measure atoned for by the care with which he distinguished faith from science, and the intense enthusiasm which the former lent to his mind.

In regard to the institution founded by Rosmini, a few words must suffice. Its proper title is the *Institute of the Brethren of Charity* (*Istituto dei Fratelli della Carità*); but its members are better known by the shorter name Rosminians. The fundamental idea of it is the principle of passivity, already spoken of, and its aim the moral perfec-

* "Luce intellettual, piena d'amore,
Amor di vero ben, pien di letizia,
Letizia che trascende ogni dolzore."
Paradiso, c. xxx.

† "Ὡς ἡμεῖς ποτέ, ὁ θεὸς ἀεί" (1072 b, 25).

tion of souls, through obedience to every law, human and divine, natural and revealed. Moral perfection implies and supplements the two other forms of perfection, that of essence and that of intelligence, and is synonymous with holiness.* The essential part of the life of the Brother of Charity is, therefore, the *elective* or contemplative, whose aim is his own perfection; but this only prepares him for the *assumptive* or active part, whose aim is the well-being of others, and which he is bound to undertake, whenever he feels himself called to it by God, without any regard to his own preferences. The principle of all action is to be *charity*, material, moral, intellectual, "the love of the good, of all the good."

The Brethren of Charity undergo a two years' novitiate, take the three monastic vows of obedience, poverty, and chastity, wear no distinguishing habit, and conform to the laws of the country in which their lot may happen to be cast. Each retains a sort of title to his own property, but makes a continual sacrifice of it, by disposing of it as the general of the order enjoins. The order, as such, owns no property.

The *Institute of Charity*, containing, as it does, both clerical and lay members, and claiming no special vocation, is the most considerable attempt that has been made to adapt the principles of Catholic Christianity and monasticism to the needs of the present time. If its success has not been marked, this is due, not to any defect in its principles or constitution, but to the determined opposition which, from the first, it encountered at the hands of that party in the Church whose chief aim is despotic power, such as can be maintained only through distrust of human intelligence and the substitution of blind obedience for the

* See §§ 212, 219.

conviction that comes of insight. In spite, however, of all unscrupulous opposition, the *Institute* is in a fairly prosperous condition, and, if its members are not numerous, those who have entered it are among the most human-hearted men and the truest Christians that the present world has to show. They are almost exclusively Italians or Englishmen. The order has two novitiates, one at Domodossala in Piedmont, and one recently removed from Rugby to Wadhurst in Sussex. It has also several colleges and religious houses in various parts of Italy and England.

Such is a very meagre account of the life of one of the most remarkable men of this century, a man who, without courting publicity or fame, laboured for forty years, with all the force that was in him, to do the good as he understood it. The good which he sought to do met with many obstacles in his lifetime, and many more since that came to a close; but his order still keeps alive his spirit of piety, hope, and charity, and his works, in spite of all wilful misinterpretation, calumny, and denunciation, are slowly, but surely, extending their influence in every direction where influence is desirable. If a certain hostile body of men sharing his own creed have made it one of their special aims to oppose his good and his truth, their loss is greater than his, and this they will in time discover to their cost. As for us who do not share his creed or its intolerance, we can, with a charity even greater than his, overlook the fact that he held it, and, in spite of it, do him justice. We may differ with him in many, even fundamental, views and beliefs; we may think he wasted his powers in pursuing impossible aims; we may admit that he was in certain things far too credulous; we may see that he did not understand or appreciate some of the most manly and humane movements of his time; we may feel that he was frequently

unjust in his estimate of men who differed with him in opinion; we may even doubt the propriety of some of his acts; but we need not, and certainly shall not, thereby be prevented from admiring his purity of heart, his unselfishness and tenderness, his singleness and indivertibility of aim, the vastness of his knowledge, and the penetrating force of his intellect. Neither need we be deterred by theologic prejudice from examining his works, and respectfully accepting the truth they contain. By such acceptance we shall be hastening the justice which time is certain, sooner or later, to accord to him and them.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

THE following Bibliography is divided into two parts, the first comprehending Rosmini's own writings, the second, works bearing on Rosmini's life and philosophy. The former is, I believe, tolerably complete, although I have not been able to give the dates of all the editions of the various works. The latter, although I have spared no labour on it, is, I fear, far from complete. I ought, moreover, to state that I have omitted from it many essays and criticisms of whose existence I was well aware. I could not bring myself to search through the *Civiltà Cattolica* and other Catholic journals for articles whose aim is not truth or clear statement, but calumny, in the interest of religious dogmatism and party power.

Many of the books, whose titles I have given in whole or in part, I have not seen. Of those which I have been able to read or examine I have given full particulars, number of pages, etc. I shall be particularly grateful to any one who will in any way aid me in making this first attempt at a Rosminian bibliography more complete.

As there is much probability that Rosmini's works will one day appear in English, I have translated their titles, leaving those of the rest in the original Italian.

A. WORKS BY ANTONIO ROSMINI-SERBATI.

INTRODUCTORY.

1. *On the Purposes of the Author* (Degli Studi dell Autore. Discorso a' suoi Amici e a tutti quelli che gli sono benevoli e indulgenti). Casuccio, Casale, 1850, 8vo, pp. 226.

2. *The Characteristics of Philosophy* (I Caratteri della Filosofia). Originally published as prefaces to the two volumes of *Opuscoli Filosofici*, Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1827–28; afterwards by Casuccio, Casale, 1850; 8vo, pp. 26.

3. *Philosophical System* (Sistema Filosofico). Originally written for Cesare Cantù's *Storia Universale*, and inserted in the volume, *Documenti sui Sistemi moderni*, Piomba Turin, 1845; reproduced by Fumi, Montepulciano, 1846, and by Casuccio, Casale, 1850, 8vo, pp. 84. There is an edition, with an introduction and marginal notes by Professor C. P. Paganini, printed by Benedini-Guidotti, Lucca, 1853, 8vo, pp. x., 156. This work was translated into German with the rest of Cantù's *Storia Universale*, and also by Biberbach, G. G. Manz, Regensburg, 1879. This is also the work translated in the present volume.

4. *On the Essence of Cognition* (Sull' Essenza del Conoscere: Lettera a Benedetto Monti). Published in the *Pragmatologia Cattolica*, Lucca, 1847; Casuccio, Casale, 1850; 8vo, pp. 13.

5. *How to conduct Philosophical Studies* (Come si possano condurre gli Studi della Filosofia). First printed in

the Abbé Fontana's *Manuale di Educazione Umana*, Milan, 1834; reproduced at Città di Castello, 1845; Casuccio, Casale, 1850; 8vo, pp. 15.

6. *On the Classification of Philosophical Systems and the Dispositions necessary for arriving at Truth* (Sulla Classificazione de' Sistemi Filosofici e sulle Disposizioni necessarie a ritrovare il Vero). This consists of four letters—the first (Rovereto, October 1st, 1825) to Luigi Bonelli, first printed in the *Opuscoli Filosofici*, vol. ii., Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1828; the second (Stresa, August 12th, 1845) to Alessandro Pestalozza, first printed in that writer's *Elementi di Filosofia*, Milan, 1850; and the third (Turin, December 26th, 1836) and fourth (Turin, February 6th, 1837) to Baldassarre Poli, first printed in the *Progresso*, No. 33, Naples, 1837, then in the *Raccoglitore*, Milan, 1837. All four reproduced by Casuccio, Casale, 1850, 8vo, pp. 26.

7. *On the Language of Philosophy and some Objections made to the Philosophy of the Author* (Sulla Lingua Filosofica e di alcune Obbiezioni fatte alla Filosofia dell' Autore). This consists of five letters—the first (Trent, December 5th, 1831) to Pietro Orsi, on *The Language of Philosophy and some Objections proposed by a German Journal*, first printed in the *Messagier Tirolese*, December, 1831, then in the *Prose Ecclesiastiche*, Lugano, 1834; the second, a fragment without date or address, on *The Primitive Judgment;* the third (Stresa, January 14th, 1842) to Don Paolo Barone, on *The Diverse Forms of Being*, first printed in Barone's pamphlet *Sulle Dottrine Filosofiche di Vincenzo Gioberti*, Turin, 1843; the fourth (Stresa, April 23rd, 1842) to Carlo F. Sola, on *The Way to avoid Pantheism*, first published in the *Messagier Torinese*, No. 43, 1842; and the fifth (Stresa, March 16th, 1846) to Alessandro Pestalozza, on the question,

Can Being be predicated univocally of God and Created Things? published by Pestalozza in his *Elementi di Filosofia*, Milan, 1845, 1849. All five were printed by Casuccio, Casale, 1850, 8vo, pp. 35.

8. *On French Eclecticism* (Sull' Eclettismo Francese, Lettera al Dottore Luigi Gentili, Turin, February 13th, 1837), printed in the *Indicatore*, Milan, 1837; *Propagatore*, Turin, 1837; Casuccio, Casale, 1850.

The above eight treatises are printed in one volume, under the title *Introduzione alla Filosofia*, Casuccio, Casale, 1850, 8vo, pp. 470.

CLASS I.

Ideology and Logic.

9. *New Essay on the Origin of Ideas* (Nuovo Saggio sull' Origine delle Idee). First printed by Salvucci, Rome, 1830, 4 vols. 12mo; then by Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1836-37, and 1838, 3 vols. 8vo; Batelli,* Naples, 1842-43; Piomba, Turin, 1851; and finally, with an excellent index, by Bertolotti, Intra, 1875, 3 vols. 8vo, pp. lxiv., 429, 539, 485. The first volume was rendered into French by the Abbé C. M. André. Waille, Paris, 1844.

This work was begun in 1825 at Rovereto, continued at Milan in 1826, and finished at Domodossola in 1828. For analysis see under §§ 10, 15.

10. *The Restoration of Philosophy in Italy* (Il Rinnovamento della Filosofia in Italia, proposto dal Conte Terenzio Mamani della Rovere ed esaminato da Antonio Rosmini-

* It may be remarked that the Batelli edition of Rosmini's works, which consists of fourteen handsome volumes, was really pirated and printed without Rosmini's consent. It is, nevertheless, a very handy edition of the principal works.

Serbati). Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1836, 1841, 8vo, pp. 704; Batelli, Naples, 1843.

See above, p. xxxiv., and below, under § 10. This work, which may be regarded as a supplement to the *New Essay*, was written in a very few months. The Dialogue entitled *Moschini* was published separately.

11. *Aristotle Explained and Examined* (Aristotele Esposto ed Esaminato). Società Editrice di Libri di Filosofia, Turin, 1857, 8vo, pp. 676. This work is sadly disfigured by typographical errors.

Though on several occasions unjust to Aristotle, Rosmini has in this work furnished one of the best criticisms of the works and system of that philosopher. The preface to the work was published separately in the *Poliantea Cattolica*, Turin, 1855.

12. *The Idea* (L'Idea). Bertolotti, Intra, 1869, 8vo, pp. 268. This fragment is printed as the second half of the fourth volume of the *Theosophy* (see No. 15), to which it really does not belong.

13. *Logic* (Logica, Libri III.). Piomba, Turin, 1854; Bertolotti, Intra, 1868; 8vo, pp. lix., 663. The last edition has a most valuable index by Dr. de Vit.

The first book of this work treats of *Assent*, and is almost entirely original; the second, of the *Theory of Inference;* and the third, of *The Criterion of Truth and Certainty* and of *Probability*.

CLASS II.

Metaphysical Sciences.

14. *Psychology* (Psicologia). Miglio, Novara, 1846-48 (1850), 2 vols. 8vo, pp. 549, 796; Batelli, Naples.

This, perhaps the best of Rosmini's works, has for many years been out of print. It is divided into ten books, of which the first treats of

the essence of the human soul; the second, of certain properties of the human soul; the third, of the union of soul and body and their reciprocal influence; the fourth, of the simplicity of the human soul and questions therewith connected; the fifth, of the immortality of the human soul and the death of man; the sixth and seventh, of the activity of the human soul; the eighth and ninth, of the laws that govern the activity of the human soul; and the tenth, of the laws of animality. Besides, the first volume contains a preface to the whole of the metaphysical works and an appendix of 151 pages, *On the Opinions of Philosophers in regard to the Nature of the Soul*, an amplification and continuation of the first book of Aristotle's *De Animâ*.

15. *Theosophy* (Teosofia). 5 vols. 8vo. Vols. I.–III. Società Editrice di Libri di Filosofia, Turin, 1859, 1863, 1864, pp. xvi., 727; x., 551; 435. Vols. IV., V., Bertolotti, Intra, 1869, 1874, pp. 588, 636.

The plan of this posthumous work was several times recast in the mind of the author, and the parts that remain do not all belong to the same plan. The first volume contains three books—the first on *The Ontological Problem;* the second on the *Categories*, the supreme classification of beings; and the third on *Being in its Unity*. The second and third volumes treat of *Being in its Trinity* (L'Essere Trino). The fourth is made up of two distinct works, *The Divine in Nature*, dedicated to Alessandro Manzoni, and the treatise on *The Idea*, already named, No. 12. The fifth volume deals with *The Real*, that is, the most difficult problems of space, matter, and body and its movements, and may be considered as a fragment of Cosmology. Perhaps of all works written in modern times this is the most suggestive. *The Divine in Nature* and the treatise on *The Real* furnish many elements for a new *Weltanschauung*. An index to the first three volumes by Severino Frati has just appeared, Paravia, Turin, etc., 1881.

16. *Historico-Critical Treatise on the Categories* (Trattato Storico-Critico delle Categorie). A small work, of the nature of Trendelenburg's *Geschichte der Kategorien lehre*.

17. *Dialectics* (La Dialettica). Begun on 5th December, 1846, and finished 26th June, 1847: never revised or printed.

18. *Theodicy* (Teodicea, Libri III.). This work is made

up of parts written at different periods of the author's life. The second book, under the title of *Saggio della Divina Provvidenza nel Governo dei Beni e dei Mali temporali*, was first printed by Visai, Milan, 1826, then at Mendrisio in 1839; the first and second appeared together, under the same title, in the *Opuscoli Filosofici*, in 1827–28, and the three together, with the title *Teodicea*, were printed by Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1845, 8vo. There is an edition printed by the Società Editrice di Libri di Filosofia, Turin, 1857. 2 vols. 16mo, pp. xv., 215, 415.

On the contents of this work, see below, under § 188.

19. *Vincenzo Gioberti and Pantheism* (Vincenzo Gioberti e il Panteismo: Lezioni Filosofiche). Printed as a reply to Gioberti's polemical work, *Gli Errori Filosofici di Antonio Rosmini*, in the *Filo-Cattolico*, Florence, 1845; Bonardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1846; Tramater, Naples, 1847; with additions, Giusti, Lucca, 1853.

CLASS III.

Philosophy of Morals and Right.

20. *Principles of Moral Science* (Principi delle Scienza Morale). Milan, 1831; Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1837; Batelli, Naples; Bertolotti, Intra, 1867; 8vo, pp. 127.

21. *Comparative and Critical History of the Systems that treat of the Principle of Morals* (Storia Comparativa e Critica de' Sistemi intorno al Principio della Morale). Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1837; Batelli, Naples; Bertolotti, Intra, 1867; 8vo, pp. 360.

These two works are in the Intra edition included in one volume, which has an excellent preface of twenty pages.

22. *Anthropology in aid of Moral Science* (Antropologia in Servigio della Scienza Morale, Libri IV.). Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1838; Batelli, Naples; Miglio, Novara, 1847; 8vo, pp. 568.

This work, in spite of its title, might, with perfect propriety, be placed under Class II., as preliminary to the *Psychology*. The first book treats of *Man;* the second, of *Animality;* the third, of *Spirituality;* and the fourth, of *The Subject Man.* It is one of the best of Rosmini's works.

23. *Treatise on the Conscience* (Trattato della Coscienza Morale). Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1839, 1844 (revised), 8vo, pp. 474; Batelli, Naples.

This work is quite as much theological as philosophical, and called out much criticism, especially from the Jesuits.

24. *Exposition of the Catholic Doctrine with reference to Original Sin* (Esposizione della Dottrina Cattolica intorno al Peccato Originale). Printed in the *Opuscoli Morali*, Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1841.

25. *The Notions of Sin and Fault Elucidated* (Le Nozioni di Peccato e di Colpa Illustrate). Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1842 and 1843. Two parts. Part I., 8vo, pp. 80; Part II., 8vo, pp. 94.

Most of the copies of the second part of this work were withdrawn from circulation by the author himself; but it has just been republished. Only the first appears in the *Opuscoli Morali*, Milan, 1842.

26. *On the Definition of the Moral Law and on the Theory of Ideal Being* (Sulla Definizione della Legge Morale e sulla Teoria dell' Essere Ideale. Risposta alle Osservazioni del R. P. Gius. L. Dmowski della C. d. G.). Bellotti, Arezzo, 1841; Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1842, 8vo, pp. 51; Batelli, Naples.

27. *Reply to the Pretended Christian Eusebius* (Risposta al finto Eusebio cristiano). Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1841, 8vo, pp. 304, in *Opuscoli Morali*, 1843; and Batelli, Naples.

This is the work which gave so much pleasure to Pope Gregory XVI., who said that Rosmini, with blood in his veins, could hardly have refrained from writing it.

28. *On the Principle*, THE DOUBTFUL LAW DOES NOT BIND, *and the Proper Application of it* (Sul Principio, *La Legge dubbia non obbliga* e sulla retta Maniera di Applicarla. Lettere di Antonio Rosmini-Serbati, con una Risposta di Monsig. Scavini ed una Replica alla medesima). Casuccio, Casale, 1850, 8vo, pp. 107; Pirotta, Milan, 1851.

This volume contains letters to several persons, collected from various periodicals, *e.g.* the *Florilegio Cattolico di Fede e Patria*, and the *Pragmatalogia Cattolica* of Lucca, years 1847–48. They were called forth chiefly by attacks made upon Rosmini's *Treatise on the Conscience* (No. 23).

29. *Philosophy of Right* (Filosofia del Diritto). Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1842, sq.; Batelli, Naples; Bertolotti, Intra, 1865–66 (from the copy annotated by the author); 2 vols, 8vo, pp. 804, 1000.

CLASS IV.

EDUCATION AND METHODOLOGY.

30. *The Necessity of Cultivating Human Reason* (Necessità di coltivare l'umana Ragione). A dissertation written as early as 1813, and never published.

31. *On the Supreme Principle of Method and some of its*

Applications in the Service of Education (Del Supremo Principio della Metodica e di alcune sue Applicazioni in Servigio dell' Educazione). Società Editrice di Libri di Filosofia, Turin, 1857; 8vo, pp. 365.

For the contents of this work, which is posthumous and incomplete, see under § 244.

32. *Essay on the Unity of Education* (Saggio sull' Unità dell' Educazione). Tofani, Florence, 1826. Reproduced in the *Opuscoli Filosofici*, Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1827-28.

33. *On Freedom of Instruction* (Sulla Libertà dell' Insegnamento). A series of fourteen articles published in the *Armonia* of Turin in 1854. Never finished.

34. *On the Cause of the Errors into which Young Men so readily fall on leaving College, and the Way to prevent them* (Sulla Cagione del facile Traviare de' Giovanetti usciti appena di Collegio e del Modo di ripararvi. Lettera a Don Paolo Orsi). In the *Cattolico*, Lugano, 1836. A second edition appeared in the *Educatore Primario* of Turin, 1846.

CLASS V.

Political Philosophy.

35. *On the Summary Cause why Human Societies stand and fall* (Della Sommaria Cagione per cui stanno e rovinano le umane Società). Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1837, 8vo, pp. 62; Batelli, Naples, 1842.

36. *Society and its End* (La Società e il suo Fine). Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1839, 8vo, pp. 392; Batelli, Naples, 1842.

37. *Essay on Statistics* (Sulla Statistica. Quesiti). Printed in the Strenna, *Non ti Scordar di Me.* Redaelli, Milan, 1844.

38. *On Communism and Socialism* (Il Comunismo ed il Socialismo. Ragionamenti). Libreria Nazionale, Naples, 1849; Fernando, Genoa, 1849, 8vo.

39. *On the Definition of Wealth* (Sulla Definizione della Ricchezza). Printed in vol. ii. of the *Opuscoli Filosofici*, under the title *Saggio di Economia Politica sulla Definizione della Ricchezza.* Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1827–28.

40. *On Public Amusements* (Sui Divertimenti Pubblici).

These six essays are now printed in one volume, bearing the title of *Filosofia della Politica.* Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1858, 8vo, pp. 564.

41. *Constitution in Accordance with Social Justice* (Constituzione Secondo la Giustizia Sociale). Redaelli, Milan, 1848, 8vo, pp. 112. With an appendix, *On the Election of Bishops*, Ducci, Florence, 1848.

The appendix appeared, under the title *Lettere Sopra le Elezioni Vescovili a Clero e Popolo*, in the *Florilegio Cattolico di Fede e Patria*, Libreria Nazionale, Naples, 1849.

42. *The Five Wounds of Holy Church* (Le Cinque Piaghe della Santa Chiesa. Trattato dedicato al Clero Cattolico. Veladini, Lugano, 1847; Bastia, 1849; Genoa, 1849; Bartelli, Perugia, 1849; Batelli, Naples.

The above two works were in 1849 *prohibited* by the *Congregation of the Index* (see Sketch of Rosmini's Life, p. xxxix. sq.). In opposition to the latter Father Theiner wrote in German a scurrilous book, which was translated into Italian under the title, *Lettere storico-critiche intorno alle Cinque Piaghe del chiarissimo Sacerdote D. Antonio Rosmini, scritte in Alemanno dal P. Agosto Theiner, Sac. dell' Oratorio e tradotte in Italiano dall' ab. D. Ferd. Mansi.* Canavaccuoli, Naples,

1849, 8vo, pp. 201. Rosmini wrote a reply, which was printed, but, out of respect to the Congregation of the Index, never published. It bore the following title :—

43. *Reply to Father Theiner* (Risposta al P. Theiner contro il suo Scritto, intitolato : *Lettere storico-critiche, etc.*). Casuccio, Casale, 1850.

44. *Poetical Doctrines of Dante's "De Monarchia"* (Doctrine Politiche della Monarchia di Dante). A juvenile work written in 1813 and never published.

45. *Political Economy* (Economia Politica). A large number of manuscripts never printed. The matter of part of them was worked into the *Philosophy of Politics.*

46. *The Construction of Civil Society* (Costruzione della Società Civile). An unfinished work, begun in 1827 and intended to be divided into four books. A part of one of these, written in 1848, exists in manuscript, bearing the title *Tribunals* (Tribunali).

47. *The Principal Politico-religious Questions of the Day briefly answered* (Le principali Questioni politico-religiose della Giornata brevemente risolte). A series of articles published in the *Armonia* of Turin in 1853. Their titles were : I. *The State's Independence of the Church* (Independenza dello Stato dalla Chiesa) ; II. *Separation of the State from the Church* (Separazione dello Stato dalla Chiesa ; III. *Autonomy of the State* (Autonomia dello Stato) ; IV. *Harmony between State and Church* (Armonia tra lo Stato e la Chiesa) ; V. *Godless Law* (La Legge Atea) ; VI. *Civil Marriage* (Matrimonio Civile) ; VII. *Liberty of Conscience* (La Libertà di Coscienza) ; VIII. *Uniformity of the Laws* (Uniformità delle Leggi) ; IX. *Licence* (La Licenza). The last was never printed, and the series remained unfinished.

CLASS VI.

Philosophy of the Supernatural.

48. *Supernatural Anthropology* (Antropologia Soprannaturale). Of this unpublished work, intended to be very extensive, only a few books were ever written. These bear the title of *Moral Anthropology*. The second part, entitled *Theologica* (Teologica), was meant to consist of six books, bearing the following titles:—I. *The Confines of Philosophical and Theological Doctrine* (written in 1832); II. *Man as perfectly constituted;* III. *Man as sinful by Nature* (1833); IV. *The Sanctified Man* (consisting of two parts, of which the first is entitled *Sacraments in general;* the second, *Sacraments of the Law of Grace in particular*); V. *Man as Redeemer;* VI. *Woman, Mother of the Redeemer* (containing a chapter entitled *On the Evidence rendered by the Koran to the Virgin Mary*).

49. *Introduction to the Gospel according to St. John* (Introduzione del Vangelo secondo Giovanni commentata. Libri III). Begun in 1839 and continued until 1849. Unione Tip.-Editrice, Turin, 1882, 8vo, pp. 310.

CLASS VII.

Ecclesiastical Prose.

50. *Sermons* (Discorsi Parrocchiali). Pirotta, Milan, 1837. These, with the exception of ten, had been previously printed at various times, *e.g.* the *Discourse on Pulpit Eloquence* (Discorso dell' Eloquenza Ecclesiastica), Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1832, Lugano, 1834; *Sermon*

preached on the occasion of taking possession of the Parish of St. Mark's at Rovereto (Discorso pronunziato in occasione di prendere il possesso della Parocchia di S. Marco in Rovereto), Marchesani, Rovereto, 1834; *Discourse on the Celibacy of Priests* (Discorso sul Celibato Ecclesiastico), printed in the *Messagier Tirolese*, Rovereto, 1835, in the *Annali delle Scienze Religiose di Roma*, and in the *Propugnator Religioso* of Turin. All these discourses were reprinted, along with several others, in one volume, bearing the title of *Preaching* (Predicazione), Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1843, 8vo, pp. 471. Among the additions was a *Panegyric of St. Philip Neri* (Panegirico di S. Filippo Neri), printed by Battaggia, Venice, 1821, and at Lugano in 1834.

51. *The Way to Catechize Dullards* (Del Modo di catechizzare gl' Idioti, libro di sant' Aurelio Agostino, volgarizzalo col testo a fronte). Marchesani, Rovereto, 1821; Battaggia, Venice, 1821, 8vo, pp. 83; Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan; Batelli, Naples, 1843.

52. *Letters on Christian Instruction* (Lettera sul Cristiano Insegnamento). Addressed to Don Giovanni of Val Vestina. Marchesani, Rovereto, 1823; Florence, 1826; Lugano, 1832; Milan, 1838; Batelli, Naples.

53. *Rules of Christian Teaching* (Regole della Dottrina Cristiana dei fanciulli e delle fanciulle). Pirotta, Milan, 1837 (along with No. 55); Batelli, Naples, 1843.

54. *Catechism arranged according to the Order of Ideas* (Catechismo disposto secondo l'Ordine delle Idee). Batelli, Naples, 1849 (in the *Operette Spirituali*); Nistri, Pisa, 1854; Ducci, Florence, 1856; Batelli, Naples, 1843; Bertolotti,

Intra, 1877, 16mo, pp. 166; Speirani, Turin, 1880 (in *Prose Ecclesiastiche*). Translated into English by Agar, and published with a dedication to Bishop Ullathorne. Richardson, London, 1849, 32mo, pp. 216.

55. *Catechetical Instructions* (Istruzioni Catechetiche). These were copied down from Rosmini's *vivâ voce* examinations while he was rector of St. Mark's in Rovereto, and reduced to a compendium by Father Francis Puecher. Printed (along with No. 53) by Pirotta, Milan, 1837.

These five works appeared in one volume, with the title of *Catechetics* (Catechetica). Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1838, 8vo, pp. xiii., 462.

56. *The Exerciser's Manual* (Manuale dell' Esercitatore). Batelli, Naples, 1844; Bertolotti, Intra, 1872, 8vo, pp. 294.

This volume is taken mostly from the works of St. Ignatius Loyola, the founder of the Jesuit Order, and forms a science of ascetics.

57. *Spiritual Lessons* (Lezioni Spirituali). Appeared originally with the title, *Maxims of Christian Perfection for Persons of every Condition* (Massime di Perfezione Cristiana ad ogni Condizione di Persona). Salvucci, Rome, 1830; Berina, Rome and Milan, 1831; Feraboli, Milan, 1833, with an Appendix, *An Easy Method of Meditating well* (Un Metodo Facile per ben meditare) and *An Exercise for the Examination of Conscience* (Esercizio per l'Esame della Coscienza); Marietti, Turin, 1837 (twice), with the title *Spiritual Lessons*, and three new lessons; Ibertis, Novara, 1840 (along with No. 88); Batelli, Naples, 1849 (in the *Operette Spirituali*); in French, Burdet, Annecy, 1836; in English, Murray, Prior Park, 1836; Richardson, London, 1849.

A new translation in French has just appeared, with the title *Maximes de Perfection Chrétienne et Explication du Magnificat.*

68. *Short Discourses on the Eucharist to Children at their First Communion* (Discorsetti sull' Eucaristia a de' Fanciulli che fanno la prima Comunione). Two in number. Only in manuscript.

69. *Elucidations of the Gospels* (Spiegazioni Evangeliche). For Sundays and chief feasts of the year. Written between 1821 and 1835. Only in manuscript.

70. *Brief Meditations* (Brevi Meditazioni). On separate cards for the use of persons meditating alone. Only in manuscript.

71. *Praises of the Priesthood* (Lodi del Sacerdozio). An unpublished juvenile work, written in 1813.

72. *Praises of St. Philip Neri* (Lodi di San Filippo Neri). Written in 1813. Battagia, Venice, 1821, small 8vo, pp. 62.

CLASS VIII.

MISCELLANEOUS.

73. *Day of Solitude* (Giorno di Solitudine, di Simonino Ironta). This is the earliest of Rosmini's works, having been written in 1813. Its subject is the education of a poor outcast boy by Friendship, Philosophy, and Religion. It attempts to imitate the style of the *trecentisti.*

Simonino Ironta is an anagram for Antonio Rosmini.

74. *Epistle to S. di Apollonia* (Epistola a Sebastiano di Apollonia). In blank verse. Subject, Praise of country life and repose as a preparation for new duties. Bettoni, Padua, 1881.

75. *Epistle to N. Tommaséo* (Epistola a Nicolò Tommaséo). On Friendship ; in blank verse. Marchesani, Rovereto, 1820.

76. *Letter to P. A. Paravia, on the Italian Language* (Lettera a Pier Alessandro Paravia sulla Lingua Italiana). Bettoni, Padua, 1819 ; Valadini, Lugano, 1834, in the *Prose, ossia diversi Opuscoli del Cav. Ant. Rosmini-Serbati.*

77. *On the Principles which a Writer ought to follow in regard to the Manner of expressing Himself* (Dei Principii che deve seguire uno Scrittore circa la maniera di esprimersi). Unpublished.

78. *The Idyll and the New Italian Literature* (L'Idillio e la Nuova Letteratura Italiana). In vol. i. of the *Opuscoli Filosofici*, Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1827.

Treats of the three Laws of Art, *Probability*, *Facility*, and *Beauty*.

79. *Discussion on Beauty* (Ragionamento intorno alla Bellezza). See under 82.

80. *Literary Amenity* (Galateo dei Literati). Modena, 1826 ; Sartori, Ancona, 1830, 16mo, pp. 186, in vol. i. of the *Opuscoli Filosofici*, Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1827 ; 8vo, pp. 187.

This work, which gave great pleasure to Pope Pius VIII., was written in reply to Gioja's *Galateo*, and was an attempt to show how polemics ought to be conducted.

81. *The Card of Excuse* (La Carta di Scusa). A dialogue published in the *Prose, ossia diversi Opuscoli del Cav. Ant. Rosmini-Serbati*, Valadini, Lugano, 1834.

82. *Preface to the Translation of the Life of St. Jerome* (Prefazione al Volgarizzamento della Vita di S. Girolamo). Marchesani, Rovereto, 1824.

This translation was published under the title *Volgarizzamento della Vita di S. Girolamo, testo di lingua emendato con varii MSS.* Rosmini was the chief co-operator in the publication.

The above four works were published in one volume under the title of *Literature and the Fine Arts* (Letteratura e Arti Belle). Bertolotti, Intra, 1870, 8vo, pp. iv., 350. A second volume, edited by Father Perez, and made up of passages relating to literature and art from Rosmini's various works, appeared in 1873, 8vo, pp. 830.

83. *Various Treatises on Christian Marriage.* Cellini, Florence, 1862, 16mo, pp. 567. This volume is made up of various treatises, most of them previously published. The most important is that *On the Civil Laws relating to the Marriage of Christians* (Sulle Leggi Civili che riguardano il Matrimonio de' Cristiani), consisting of a number of articles addressed to Bishop Moreno of Ivrea, and printed in the *Armonia* of Turin. Reproduced in book form at Turin, 1851.

84. *On the Siccardi Law* (Sulla Legge Siccardi). A series of articles in the *Armonia* of Turin, 1850.

85. *Charity* (La Carità, discorso). Casuccio, Casale, 1852.

86. *Rules of the Institute of Charity* (Regole dell' Istituto delle Carità). Latin and Italian. Marietti, Turin, 1837.

87. *Constitutions of the Institute of Charity* (Costituzioni dell' Istituto della Carità). In Latin. Printed in England, but not published or accessible. Quarto.

88. *Rules of the Adscripts to the Institute of Charity* (Regole degli Ascritti all' Istituto della Carità). Printed, along with No. 57, Ibertis, Novara, 1842.

89. *Statute for the Missionaries of the Institute of Charity at the Sacra of St. Michael* (Statuto pei Missionarii dell' Istituto della Carità). Marietti, Turin, 1847.

90. *Notices of the Institute of Charity* (Notizie dell' Istituto della Carità). Cibrario, in the *Calendario degli Ordini Religiosi*, 1847.

91. *Common Rules of the Sisters of Providence* (Regole comuni delle Suore della Provvidenza). Bianchi, Lugano, 1842.

92. *Rules of the Pension Mellerio at Domodossola, managed by the Brothers of Charity* (Regole de' Convittori del Collegio Mellerio di Domodossola, retto dai Fratelli della Carità). Marietti, Turin, 1838.

93. *On the Existence of Religious Communities* (Sull' Esistenza delle Comunità religiose). Incomplete manuscript.

94. *History of Humanity* (Storia dell' Umanità). Of this only a small portion, containing some original views on the origin of the primitive language, was ever written. Manuscript.

95. *Synoptical Table of the Natural and Supernatural Powers* (Tavola Sinottica delle Potenze Naturali e Sopranaturali). Part of this was used in the compilation of the table printed in *Vincenzo Gioberti e il Panteismo* (No. 19), Lucca, 1853.

96. *Sketch of Modern Philosophy* (Schizzo sulla Filosofia Moderna). Speirani, Turin, 1880, 8vo, pp. 23. Reprinted from *La Sapienza.*

97. *On the Spirit of the Institute of Charity* (*Sullo Spirito dell' Istituto della Carità*). Four discourses, meant to be followed by a fifth on *Sacrifice* (Sacrifizio), which exists only in manuscript. Bertolotti, Intra, 1871, 18mo, pp. 282.

98. *Correspondence* (Epistolario). Of this, two volumes have been published with the title *Epistole Religioso-familiari.* Paravia, Turin, 1857, 8vo.

There still remains unpublished an immense mass of correspondence, amounting, it is said, in all to about fifteen thousand letters. Many of these refer to Rosmini's Institute and Philosophical System.

99. *The Mission of Antonio Rosmini-Serbati to the Court of Rome in the years* 1848-49 (Missione di Antonio Rosmini-Serbati alla Corte di Roma negli Anni 1848-49). Paravia, Rome, etc., 1881, 8vo, pp. 418.

B. WORKS RELATING TO ROSMINI'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY.

ACRI, Prof. Francesco. Abbozzo di una Teoria delle Idee. Palermo, 1870.

ALLIEVO, G. Hegelianismo, la Scienza e le Vita. Turin, 1868.

ANGELERI, Prof. Francesco. Della Libertà del Pensiero. Discorso. A. Merlo, Verona, 1864, 8vo, pp. 24.

——— Antonio Rosmini. Discorso. Inst. Turazza, Treviso, 1871, 8vo, pp. 55.

——— Elementi di Morale. Inst. Turazza, Treviso, 1874, pp. 118.

——— Trattato di Filosofia Elementare, proposto agli Alunni de' Licei. Drucker and Tedeschi, Verona and Padua (3rd edit.), 1877, 12mo, pp. 532.

——— Sull' Odierno Conflitto tra i Rosminiani ed i Tomisti. Spagliardi, Parabiago, 1879, 12mo, pp. 48.

——— Un Articolo della Voce della Verità sul Dialogo intitolato "Il Verbo Essere." Spagliardi, Parabiago, 1879, 12mo, pp. 32.

ANNALES DE PHILOSOPHIE CHRÉTIENNE, Paris, 8vo. Series IV., Vol. X. (1854), pp. 254 sqq.; Series V., Vol. I. (1860), pp. 206 sqq.; New Series, Vol. IV. (1881), pp. 797–800 (Review by De Bonniot of Paoli's Life of Rosmini). At p. 485 of Series IV., Vol. X. (1859), there is a list of articles on Rosmini which I have been unable to see.

BAROLA, Prof. Paolo. Rassegna dell' Opera, "La Sommaria Cagione."

BARONE, Prof. Francesco, Orazione funebre di Antonio Rosmini.

BARTHOLMÈSS, Ch. J. B. Histoire Critique des doctrines religieuses de la Philosophie Moderne. Paris, 1855, 8vo.

BERNARDI, Monsignor Jacopo. Giovane Età e primi Studii di Antonio Rosmini. Lettere a Pier Alessandro Paravia. Chiantore, Pinerolo, 1860, 12mo, pp. 278.

BERTACCHI, A. Sopra un Frammento d' Articolo della *Civiltà Cattolica.* Benedini-Guidotti, Lucca, 1855, 8vo, pp. 11.

BERTAZZI, Prof. Girolamo. Sistema Ideologico di Antonio Rosmini. Frigerio, Verona, 1858.

BERTOLOZZI, Monsignor Gian Paolo. Lettera sul Finto Eusebio.

BEVILACQUA, Sac. Vigilio. Spechietto della celebre quistione tra Neo-Tomisti e Rosminiani. Paroni, Vicenza, 1881, 12mo, pp. 173.

BOISTEL, Alphonse. Cours Elémentaire de droit naturel ou de philosophie de droit, suivant les principes de Rosmini. Thorin, Paris, 1870, 8vo, pp. 458.

BONGHI, Ruggiero. Le Stresiane.

———— Della Relazione della Filosofia colla Società. Prolusione. Vallardi, Milan, 1859.

BOTTA, Vincenzo, Ph.D., in Appendix II. (Historical Sketch of Modern Philosophy in Italy) to the American translation of Dr. F. Ueberweg's *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie* (History of Philosophy from Thales to the Present Time. Translated by Geo. S. Morris, A.M. Scribner, Armstrong, and Co., New York, 1874, 2 vols. 8vo). Vol. II. pp. 489–496.

BROGLIALDI, Prof. Adolfo. Elogio di Antonio Rosmini.

BROWNSON, Orestes A. *Quarterly Review*. Sadlier, New York, 8vo. In the volume for the year 1864, Rosmini is noticed at pp. 304, 309, 310, 311; in the volume for 1874 on pp. 27, 154, 496, 502, 503,

BURONI, Sac. Giuseppe. Dell' Essere e del Conoscere. Stamperia Reale, Turin, 1877, 8vo, pp. 50 (*résumé* of the following work).

——— Dell' Essere e del Conoscere. Studii su Parmenide, Platone e Rosmini. Stamperia Reale, Paravia, Turin, 1878, 4to, pp. iv., 439.

——— Risposta al Padre Cornoldi di C. di G. in difesa delle Nozioni di Ontologia secondo Rosmini e S. Tommaso. Paravia, Turin, 8vo, pp. 200.

——— Rosmini e S. Tommaso. Nozioni di Ontologia, per Introduzione allo Studio della Teologia. Confronti tra la Teosofia del Rosmini e delle Somme di S. Tommaso. 2nda. Edizione, accresciuta di una lettera sulla Teorica del Progresso infinito. Paravia, Turin, 1878, 8vo, pp. viii., 173.

——— La Trinità e le Creazione. Nuovi Confronti tra il Rosmini e S. Tommaso, dedicati alla Civiltà Cattolica, con un appendice sulla Necessità di liberare la Chiesá dalla Calunnia. Paravia, Turin, 1879, 8vo, pp. ii., 180.

——— Antonio Rosmini e la Civiltà Cattolica dinanzi alla Sacra Congregazione dell' Indice, ossia Spiega

zione del *Dimmittantur Opera A. Rosmini-Serbati*, secondo la *Sollecita* di Benedetto XIV. Edizione Seconda, cresciuta di molte aggiunte e di una parte seconda di ciò che e seguito di poi pubblicata la prima. Paravia, Turin, 1880, 8vo, pp. viii., 218 (First Edition, Speirani e Figli, Turin, 1876, 16mo, pp. 210).

BURONI, Sac. Giuseppe. La Ragione e la Fede secondo l'Enciclica *Æterni Patris*. Tipografia S. Giuseppe, Turin, 8vo, pp. 40.

——— Cesare Cantù e Giuseppe Buroni. Della Nuova Dichiarazione quasi ultima della S. Congregazione dell' Indice sulla formola *Dimittantur* e del libro novissimo di G. M. Cornoldi di C. d. G., *Il Rosminianismo sintesi di Ontologia e Panteismo*. L'ultimo Capo inedito del detto libro del Cornoldi, rimaso nella *Civiltà Cattolica*. Unione Tipog-Editrice, Turin, 1882, 8vo, pp. 32.

CALZA, Sac. Giuseppe. Saggio di Filosofia delle Matematiche. Collegio Artigianelli, Turin, 1869, 12mo, pp. 275.

——— Scienza dell' Aritmetica. Porta, Domodossola, 1872, 8vo, pp. 510.

——— Discorso letto il 26 Aprile, 1878, nell' occasione della Distribuzione dei premi agli Alunni del Ginnasio Mellerio pareggiato ai regi. Porta, Domodossola, 1878, 4to, pp. 20.

——— e PEREZ, Sac. Paolo. Esposizione della Filosofia di Antonio Rosmini con uno Sguardo al luogo ch' ella tiene fra l'antica Scienza e la nuova. Bertolotti, Intra, 1878, 3 vols. large 8vo, pp. vii., 467, 543 (third vol. not published).

——— Elementi di Botanica con Appendice sull' Origine

degli Enti Organizzati. Parte I. Botanica Generale. Porta, Domodossola, 1881, pp. 210.

CAPANORI, P. Bernardo. Lettera al Sig. Abate Alessandro Pestalozza, estratto dalla *Cronaca*, Nos. 15–17. Guglielmini, 1857, 8vo, pp. 12. An answer to some strictures made by the *Civiltà Cattolica*.

CAROLI, Gian Maria. Del Magnetismo Animale, ossia Mesmerismo in ordine alla Ragione e alla Rivelazione. Bologna, 1858, 2 vols. 8vo.

——— Corso di Pedagogia.

CASARA, Sebastiano. Sul Carattere Battesimale. Studio. Istituto Turazza, Treviso, 1876, 8vo, pp. 64.

——— La Verità per la Carità. Memoria del Prof. A. Fontana esaminata. Tip. Arcivesc., Milan, 1878, 8vo, pp. 13.

——— I Rosminiani e l'Ontologismo del P. Cornoldi della C. d. G., con Risposta all' Opuscolo: "Una Questione Lombarda e una Questione Piemontese," del Prevosto Ruffoni. Tip. Arcivesc., Milan, 1878, 8vo, pp. 26.

——— La Luce dell' Occhio corporeo e quella dell' Intelletto. Parallelo illustrato con Dottrine del S. Dottore Aquinate, a cui son dimostrate conformi quelle dell' illustre abbate Antonio Rosmini. Terza Edizione, riveduta e accresciuta di qualche Nota e di Appendice con Dottrine del Santo Dottore di Bagnorea. Spagliardi, Parabiago, 1879, 12mo, pp. 100.

——— Il Sistema Filosofico Rosminiano, dimostrato vero nel suo Principio fondamentale con lo Studio e Sviluppo di un solo Articolo della *Somma Teologica* di S. Tomaso d' Aquino. Tip. Vescov., Casale, 1879, 12mo, pp. 88.

CAVOUR, March. Gustavo. Fragmens Philosophiques.

Fontana, Turin, 1841, 8vo, pp. 398. Rosmini is treated on pp. 139–213.

CAVOUR, March. Gustavo. Della Proprietà Ecclesiastica.

——— Sur la Religion e la Morale.

CORNOLDI, Sac. Giov. Maria, S. J. Il Rosminianismo sintesi dell' Ontologismo e del Panteismo. Befani, Rome, 1881, large 8vo, pp. 450.

CORTE, Pietro Antonio. Logica Generalis et Metaphysices Elementa. Favale, Turin, 1846, 8vo, pp. 226.

——— Elementa Philosophiæ in usum Seminariorum. Marietti, Turin, 1874, 3 vols. 12mo, pp. 291, 166, 243.

——— Prodezze dell' *Osservatore Cattolico* di Milano (Estratto della *Gazetta Piemontese*, Nos. 254, 258, 259). Favale, Turin, 1875, 16mo, pp. 24.

——— Gentilezze della *Civiltà Cattolica* di Firenze (Estratto della *Gazetta Piemontese*, Nos. 301, 306). Favale, Turin, 1875, 16mo, pp. 42.

——— I Rosminiani secondo l' *Osservatore Cattolico* (Estratto della *Gazetta Piemontese*, No. 101). Favale, Torino, 1876, pp. 11.

——— Ermeneutica della *Civiltà Cattolica* (Estratto della *Gazetta Piemontese*, Nos. 31, 32, 33, 39, 40). Favale, Turin, 1876, 16mo, pp. 45, 7.

——— I Punti Fondamentali del Sistema Filosofico del Rosmini, discussi e dichiarati per servire all' Intelligenza del *Nuovo Saggio sull' Origine delle Idee*. Favale, Turin, 1876, 12mo, pp. iv. 350.

DAVIDSON, Thomas. Domodossola e l' Istituto Rosminiano. Traduzione dall' Inglese del Prof. Giuseppe Bormida. Bertolotti, Intra, 1880, 8vo, pp. 35. (Translation of letters written to *The Boston Daily Advertiser*, in June, 1880.)

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INTRODUCTION.

PERHAPS the strongest objection that can be urged against revolutions and the selfish conservatism that makes them necessary is that, in overthrowing vicious and burdensome systems, they likewise destroy, or cast into oblivion, much of the good which originally rendered these systems possible and, in their day, useful. This was particularly true of that revolution which took form in the philosophy of the seventeenth century, and which overthrew the Scholasticism of the Middle Ages. No doubt, the later Scholasticism, that of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, deserved most of the contempt which fell to its lot; but it was a mistake to confound in a common rejection this degraded, empty, flatulent system with the vigorous thought of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. This mistake was committed by modern thought, when it revolted entirely from Scholasticism. This result, indeed, was almost unavoidable; for a thorough-going temporary breach with Scholasticism was necessary, in order to deprive it of that tyrannical and morbid influence which, as the handmaid of theology,* it had gained over human intelligence. Nevertheless, the reactionary spirit of modern thought caused it

* "Theologia non accipit sua principia . . . ab aliis scientiis tanquam a superioribus, sed utitur eis tanquam inferioribus et ancillis" (St. Thomas, *Sum. Theolog.*, i. q. 1, art. 5, *ad fin.*).

to overlook much that was valuable in Scholasticism, and, from pure ignorance, to set out with principles so false and one-sided, that they developed into systems as unwholesome and undesirable as those which they supplanted. The cause of the decay and consequent rejection of Scholasticism was, at bottom, its incapacity to deal with the questions to which the subtlety of its own methods and the revival of ancient learning, in many ways hostile to its results, had given birth. This incapacity was due to a defect, inherited by Scholasticism from the philosophers of Greece—the entire lack of a consistent theory of cognition. In spite of the deftest efforts of a Parmenides, a Plato, an Aristotle, and a Plotinus, ancient thought never succeeded in finding any but the crudest material image to express the mode of cognition, or in discovering any principle to vouch for truth. Parmenides, who first found a way out of the absolute scepticism of the system of Herakleitos, by distinguishing being from becoming, placed the former, as the sole object of knowledge, in an ideal world by itself, and accounted for its being known by the rude and childish device of calling it identical with intelligence.* At the same time he abandoned the entire real world of things to contempt, as merely the delusive object of opinion. This theory, in consequence, contained the two greatest defects which a theory of cognition can have: *first*, it confounded cognition with being, or assumed identity of subject and object; and, *second*, it utterly failed to account or vouch for our knowledge of reality.

In spite of these two cardinal defects, Parmenides' theory of cognition, by a kind of right of primogeniture, which first explanations not unfrequently enjoy, maintained itself, with little or no modification, throughout the whole

* "Τὸ γάρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι" (*Fragmenta Parm.*, edit. Mullach, l. 40; cf. Buroni, *Dell'Essere e del Conoscere*, pp. 55 sqq.)

course of Greek thought, exercising a determining influences upon it, and even outliving it. Plato, who enlarged Parmenides' ideal world of being, by placing in it the pure forms of things, can hardly be said to have had any theory of cognition or any principle of certainty. His doctrine of reminiscence merely shifts the difficulty, without in the least helping to solve it; for it is no more easy to conceive how disembodied spirits can cognize ideas having an independent existence, than to conceive how embodied spirits can cognize things. Plato followed Parmenides in maintaining the world of particulars not to be an object of knowledge. Aristotle, who drew Plato's ideas down from their shadowy heaven and placed them in particular things, as forms universalized through combination with individuating matter, returned, in the most pronounced way, to the two positions of Parmenides, maintaining that there was no science save of universals,* and that the cognition of these was reached by the subject's becoming identical with them.† That Aristotle should have held these views is all the more astonishing that, according to another doctrine of his, the universal exists only in the particular, and the particular, therefore, is the only true existence.‡

Although Aristotle made no contribution to the theory of cognition, or in any way made clear the mode of it, he saw, much more clearly than any of his predecessors had done, what was necessary in order to make cognition valid, viz., some first principle of truth presented directly to the mind, in some such way as to place it beyond the possibility of error, and entering as the essential element into every

* "Ἡ ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου" (*De An.*, ii. 5; 417 b, 22).

† "Ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον" (*Ibid.* iii. 4; 430 a, 3).

‡ "Οὐσία δέ ἐστιν ἡ κυριώτατα καὶ πρώτως καὶ μάλιστα λεγομένη, ἣ μήτε καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται μήτ' ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τινί ἐστιν, οἷον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὁ τὶς ἵππος" (*Categ.*, 5; 2 a, 11 sqq.).

process by which cognition is reached. He saw plainly that demonstration could never lead to true and satisfying knowledge, if either it had to be continued backward, from ground to ground, *ad infinitum*, as the sceptics asserted it must, or revolved in a circle of interdependent, mutually supporting hypotheses.* He accordingly concluded that, in order to the possibility of demonstration, there must exist certain principles known to the mind without demonstration, that is, directly and intuitively.† Unfortunately, he nowhere expressly says what these grounds are, or in what particular sense (πώς) ‡ they identify themselves with the mind in order to be intuited. He does, indeed, tell us that the intelligence of indivisibles is free from error,§ whence it follows that they must be known through intuition and not judgment; and he also says that the most certain of all principles is that of contradiction, from which we may conclude, with St. Thomas,‖ that he held the ultimate principle of all truth, and the essential ground of all judgment and demonstration, to be being. At the same time, he never developed this doctrine so as to show that all truth at last rests on a direct intuition; consequently, he left philosophy involved in the vicious circle which he had shown to be fatal to the attainment of truth.¶

It need hardly be remarked, after what has been said, that the ancient theory of the mode of cognition was based

* Who they were that held this opinion in ancient times is not clear – perhaps the Herakleiteans. It has been revived in modern times by Hegel (see under § 11). It is fully refuted by Aristotle, *Anal. Post.*, i. 3; 72 b, 25 sqq.

† "Ἡμεῖς δέ φαμεν οὔτε πᾶσαν ἐπιστήμην ἀποδεικτικὴν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν ἀμέσων ἀναπόδεικτον. Καὶ τοῦθ' ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον, φανερόν· εἰ γὰρ ἀνάγκη μὲν ἐπίστασθαι τὰ πρότερα καὶ ἐξ ὧν ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ἵσταται δέ ποτε τὰ ἄμεσα, ταῦτ' ἀναπόδεικτα ἀνάγκη εἶναι" (*Anal. Post.*, i. 3; 72 b, 18 sqq.).

‡ "Ταῦτα (τὰ καθόλου) ἐν αὐτῇ ΠΩΣ ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ" (*De An.*, ii. 5, 6; 417 b, 23 sqq.).

§ *De An.*, iii. 6, 1; 430 a, 26 sqq. See below, under § 62.

‖ See under § 15.

¶ See under § 10, where the way is shown out of this vicious circle.

upon purely material conceptions, assimilation and interpenetration, and that it offered no principle to vouch for the objective truth of cognition. The results of these defects, though not fully developed until later, are sufficiently apparent even in Aristotle's philosophy, which, with all its wonderful breadth and acuteness, was so influenced by the childish doctrines of Parmenides, as never to rise above pantheism and materialism, or, more correctly speaking, pantheistic materialism. At bottom, Aristotle's doctrine is this. From all eternity there have existed matter and form in a state of combination. Matter is indeterminate and by itself unknowable.* Form exists as a qualitative multiplicity held together and moved by a unity. This unity is intelligence (*νοῦς*), which is, so to speak, the place and form of forms (*τόπος εἰδῶν, εἶδος εἰδῶν*). By means of matter, which is the principle of individuation, these forms universalize themselves, that is, *appear* in a multitude of individuals, not any of which are permanent. Since the *Nous* is God,† it follows that God is the form of forms, continually actualizing Himself as intelligence through matter, which, being essentially receptive, passive, and changeable, renders impossible any permanent individual. Since matter is non-being, the sum of being is God. All that is permanent is form or species (*εἶδος*).‡

This pantheistic-materialistic doctrine, which was, after

* According to St. Thomas, it has not even being, and is, therefore, a non-being: "Materia secundum se neque esse habet neque cognosci illis est" (*Sum. Theolog.*, i. q. 15, art. 3, 3 m).

† "Ὁ θεὸς ἢ νοῦς ἐστὶν ἢ ἐκέκεινά τι τοῦ νοῦ" (Aristot., *Frag.* 46; 1483 a, 27 sq.: cf. *Metaph.*, xi. 7; 1072 b, 18: 9; 1074 b, 21, etc., etc.)

‡ Cf. Tennyson's mournful lines—

> "Are God and Nature then at strife,
> That Nature lends such evil dreams?
> So careful of the type she seems,
> So careless of the single life."
>
> *In Memoriam*, liv. 2.

all, only the legitimate outcome of the Parmenidean materialistic theory of cognition, wrought its natural debilitating effect upon Greek thought and life. Some of the later philosophic schools, by a desperate appeal to Platonism, endeavoured to combat it, but in vain. They were even so far from seeing the real source of its defects, that they emphasized more strongly than ever the identity of thought and being—that is, of subject and object—in cognition.* From the Greeks the doctrine passed to the Arabs, by whom it was logically developed to all its pantheistic and materialistic results, and among whom it wrought its baneful effects. Since the days of Scholasticism, it has been currently held that the Arabs misinterpreted Aristotle, foisting upon him pantheism, materialism, and other objectionable doctrines, whereas the Schoolmen, for the most part, correctly developed his doctrines. Hardly anything could be farther from the truth. To be sure, the Arabs did draw from the writings of Aristotle consequences which he probably never dreamt of, and, no doubt occasionally, misunderstood his meaning; but, after all, their interpretation of Aristotle is much more correct in its main tendencies than that of the Schoolmen—to the religious credit of the latter be it said. The Muhammedan priesthood knew what it was doing when it suppressed Averroistic Aristotelianism. Aristotle, correctly interpreted, will shortly undermine any religion.†

From the Arabs the ancient theory of cognition passed, along with Aristotelianism, into Christendom, and there at once began to make such havoc of faith as to call for the

* Plotinus says, "Μία μὲν οὖν φύσις τό τε ὂν ὅ τε νοῦς" (*Enneads*, v. 9, 8, edit. Kirchhoff, vol. i. p. 56: cf. Richter, *Neuplatonische Studien*, iii. p. 26; Kirchner, *Die Philosophie des Plotin*, p. 49; Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, vol. iii. pt. ii. p. 456 sqq.).

† See Zell, *Aristoteles in seinem Verhältnisse zur griechischen Volksreligion*; also *De Aristotele Patriarum Religionum Æstimatore*.

serious attention of the Church. At first the ecclesiastical authorities prohibited the writings of Aristotle; but, finding that such prohibition was of little avail, and also discovering that a very large portion of true Aristotelianism might be accepted with great polemical advantage to Christianity, and the rest, involving the objectionable consequences, made innocuous by a careful interpretation and adaptation, they subsequently permitted, and finally recommended, the study of them.* The task of interpretation and adaptation was undertaken by the most powerful intellects of the time, men like Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, by the latter of whom it was most successfully performed. For this reason St. Thomas has always justly been regarded as the best representative of Scholasticism.

In St. Thomas's writings we must carefully distinguish three things: *first*, what he borrowed from Greek and Arabic philosophers, especially from Aristotle; *second*, what he accepted as authoritative from Holy Writ and the doctors and Fathers of the Church; and, *third*, what he himself added. Speaking in Aristotelian language, we may call these elements, respectively, the material cause, the final cause, and the formal cause of his writings, himself being their efficient cause. The aim of his writings, as he himself has told us,† was to shape philosophy (and by philosophy he meant especially that of Aristotle) into a pillar of support for Christian doctrine. This was by no means an easy task; for Aristotelianism, in the first place, is not a logical or consistent system, and, in the second, it tends fundamentally toward pantheism and materialism, both of which are radically opposed to Christianity. St. Thomas, however, did his best, and that best was the enormous body of

* See Jourdain, *Recherches critiques sur l'âge et l'origine des traductions latines d'Aristote*, pp. 202 sqq.; Rosmini, *Aristotele Esposto*, pp. 51 sqq.

† *Summa contra Gentes*, lib. i. cap. ii.

doctrine known as Thomism. He had a profound respect for the teachings of Aristotle, and, though he not unfrequently, partly from ignorance of Greek and partly from prejudice, misinterpreted them,* he never willingly departed from them except where they stand in pretty direct and evident conflict with Christian teaching.† When the conflict was not over manifest, he frequently accepted principles which, if carried to their logical conclusions, are not only incompatible with each other, but fatal to Christian theology. In this way he built up a system which, although displaying an almost marvellous acuteness in the parts, is nevertheless, as a whole, without logical completeness—a fact which is at present rendered only too apparent by the war which has been waging over his meaning, since the recent rehabilitation of his system in the Church through the papal encyclical *Æterni Patris.*

Among the doctrines which St. Thomas accepted from Aristotle without sufficiently considering their consequences, was that relating to the mode of cognition. Hence, he not only affirms that "the sensible in act is the sense in act, and the intelligible in act the intellect in act,"‡ but says distinctly that "knowledge is assimilation to the thing known, and the known is also the perfection of the knower."§ He does, indeed, seemingly depart from the doctrine of the ancients in maintaining that we may have a knowledge of particulars; but, after all, he is obliged to admit that such knowledge is merely reflexive, and, as a consequence, a knowledge of a universal.‖ Now,

* Examples of such misinterpretation might easily be adduced.

† On the extent of these departures, see Talamo, *D'Aristotelismo della Scolastica nella Storia della Filosofia*, and Schneid, *Aristoteles in der Scholastik.*

‡ "Sensibile in actu est sensus in actu, et intelligibile in actu est intellectus in actu" (*Sum. Theol.*, i. q. 14, art. 2, c.; q. 55, art. 1, 2 m.).

§ "Scientia est assimilatio ad rem scitam, et scitum est etiam perfectio scientis" (*Ibid.*, q. 14, art. 2, 2).

‖ "Cum non contingat intelligere nisi secundum abstractionem a materia,

these doctrines are not only palpably false, but they utterly fail to render intelligible what they were invented to explain. Indeed, instead of explaining intelligence and sensation, they would prove that both are impossible. If the subject and object of intelligence should become one, their relation as subject and object, that is, intelligence, would instantly cease. In like manner, if the principle and term of sensation should become identical, their relation as principle and term, that is, sensation, would be annulled. That such results would follow from the Greek theory of the mode of cognition, the Schoolmen never discovered—a fact which was due to their never clearly understanding the conditions of cognition.

If St. Thomas, notwithstanding all his distinctions between the active, possible, and passive intellects,* with their various faculties or lights, utterly failed to arrive at any rational or theologically admissible theory of cognition, he certainly did something to develop the Aristotelian principle of truth, by showing that the principle of contradiction ultimately depends upon the intuition or direct intelligence of being;† and he only required to apply this principle, so based, in order to place the reliability of objective cognition beyond doubt. This application he, unfortunately, never made; and so Scholas-

impossibile est singularia ab intellectu apprehendi directe, sed tantum secundum quandam reflexionem. . . . Id quod cognoscit sensus materialiter et concrete (quod est cognoscere singulare directe) hoc cognoscit intellectus immaterialiter et abstracte, quod est cognoscere universale" (*Ibid.*, q. 86, art. 1, concl. and 4 m.). It will be seen from this that St. Thomas attributes cognition to the senses! Indeed, he elsewhere says that "Sensus est quedam deficiens participatio intellectus" (*Ibid.*, q. 77, art. 7, c.). What a text for the Evolutionists and Darwinians!

* These distinctions were derived from the Arabs and later Greek Peripatetics. Of the three human intellects of the Schoolmen, only one, the passive, is known to Aristotle.

† See under § 15, and compare Casara, *Il Sistema Filosofico Rosminiano, dimostrato nel suo Principio fondamentale*, pp. 27 sqq.

ticism remained, not only without a theory of cognition, but also without a universal principle of truth.

It must be admitted that these two defects were not without their immediate advantages. They made it possible to introduce into Scholastic systems any doctrine regarded as wholesome, without detriment to any logical consistency, as well as to find grounds to refute any doctrine assumed to be dangerous. They likewise left abundant room for the exercise of logical subtlety in the way of reconciling incompatible doctrines. Still, these advantages were not without corresponding disadvantages. In virtue of them, Scholasticism grew up, or, rather, was heaped up, into that unorganized mass of loosely connected doctrines which we find it to be in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries; while, at the same time, it developed a logical acuteness which, in view of its want of any all-embracing principle of truth, could not fail, in the long run, to be fatal to it. The consequence was that, in the sixteenth century, Scholasticism fell into disrepute, and left the thinking world in a state of universal philosophical doubt.

This doubt, though originally born among men who, like Pomponazzi, Bruno, Vanini, had been schooled in Scholasticism, found its first universal expression in Descartes, who had rather drunk it in from the prevailing scepticism of his time than been led to it by the direct study of philosophy. Under these circumstances it was natural enough that Descartes' scepticism should be indiscriminating, and that he should ignore not only the weak points of Scholasticism, but also its strong ones. The weak points of Scholasticism, philosophically considered, were, as we have seen, its want of a true theory of cognition, and its failure to apply the universal principle of truth to cognition, albeit it had really discovered that

principle. Its strong points were that it adhered to the Parmenidean distinction between the ideal and the real, and that, in spite of its childish theory of cognition, it accepted in practice the dicta of common sense. Descartes, as we have said, rejected or ignored the strong points of Scholasticism along with the weak. He not only cast aside its theory of cognition and its unattested doctrines, but he ignored the distinction between the ideal and the real, and called in question the deliverances of ordinary consciousness. Moreover, instead of developing the ground of the principle of contradiction, as recognized by St. Thomas, into a principle of all truth, and so placing cognition upon an irrefragable basis, he so far misunderstood the nature of such a principle that he set up, as the ground of all certainty, a mere fact, of which he had entire subjective persuasion, and which not only did not vouch for anything beyond itself, but could not even justify itself to intelligence. "Cogito" he began, and thought he had found the most certain and fundamental of all truths, forgetting that he had not made clear to himself the nature and grounds of certainty, and that "cogito" is a judgment, a mental operation very liable to error, and, therefore, requiring some certain universal principle to vouch for its correctness. He was, moreover, so ignorant of the complicated nature of judgment as not to see that all judgments, except those primitive synthetic ones in which being is predicated of feeling in order to form concepts, imply concepts previously formed and a faculty for holding them together and yet asunder, and that, in setting out with a judgment as the basis of certainty, he already assumed, without proof, many of those processes of intelligence about whose nature and validity we are least certain. All these defects become apparent as soon as Descartes began to use his one certain truth as the basis

for other truths. He found at once that it refused to act as the basis of anything. Accordingly, he first exchanged it for the other more extensive judgment "sum" (I am), thereby tacitly admitting the certainty of the concept of being, and falling into the Parmenidean error of identifying being with thought. Finding that, even after this change, he had advanced no farther than to be sure of his own existence, he next, in order to get beyond himself, assumed the whole content of thought, without attempting to explain how the existence of such a content had come about or was possible. But the validity of this content was the very thing towards which he had cherished systematic and principial doubt; therefore it could not be accepted without some ground. As the fact of his own existence furnished no such ground, he was obliged to lay down the general and arbitrary law, that whatever is as certain as the judgment "I am" is equally true, and, therefore, beyond doubt. In this way his metamorphosed first dictum, instead of being a principle of truth, became a measure of certainty. But, inasmuch as certainty, so long as it is not objectively defined, has no fixed limits, this standard remained utterly subjective, arbitrary, and vague. Descartes himself soon found out its defects, the chief of which was that it gave him only formal truths, and in no way vouched for the objective reality of phenomena. In order to reach this reality he was obliged to have recourse to the old rejected Scholastic paralogism of Anselm, refuted even in Anselm's own time by Gaunilo,* that the idea of God involves His real existence, and then to base his proof for the reality of phenomena on the justice and truthfulness of God.

That Cartesianism, in spite of its author's determination

* Cf. St. Thomas's refutation, *Sum. contra Gent.*, lib. i. cap. xi.; *Sum. Theol.*, i. q. 2, art. 1, 2 m. Gaunilo's refutation occurs in his work *Liber pro Insipiente.*

to accept nothing without rigorous proof and in spite of his far-famed method, is based upon a series of unreasoned facts, vague arbitrary rules, and subtle paralogisms, and that, as a philosophy, it is vastly inferior to Scholasticism, are facts which nowadays hardly require to be noted. Its good effects were almost purely of a revolutionary and negative kind,* while its evil effects were very positive. Of these latter the most momentous was, that it introduced into thought subjectivity persuasion, as the test and warrant of truth, thereby returning to the long-refuted position of Protagoras, that man is the measure of all things (*πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος*). Most of Descartes' other doctrines, after stirring up a brief enthusiasm in such men as Geulinx, Malebranche, and Spinoza, were consigned to the great limbo of departed error, into which men "look and pass on"; but this one has affected the whole of modern philosophy even to our own day.

Among the early students of Descartes was Locke, who replaced the doctrine that our warrant for the truth of cognition is the veracity of God, by a new theory of cognition, and thus saved Cartesianism from the early fate to which that doctrine would otherwise certainly have condemned it. According to this theory, the mind is a *tabula rasa* (*γραμματεῖον ᾧ μηθὲν ὑπάρχει ἐντελεχείᾳ γεγραμμένον*), upon which all knowledge is written by experience, that is, by internal reflection on external sensation. It is needless to enter into the groundless assumptions, paralogisms, and absurdities of this superficial system. Suffice it to say that it abolished the distinction between the ideal and the real,†

* This remark does not, of course, apply to Descartes' mathematical and physical doctrines, some of which are of permanent value.

† It is true that Locke continues to use the word *idea*, but with a new signification. Instead of meaning, as it did in ancient times, an object of thought, it means a notion, or term of sensitive perception.

thereby merged intelligence in sensation, and introduced *impression* as the explanation of the mode of cognition. Thus, through the united labours of Descartes and Locke, the ancient warrant for truth, viz., the principle of contradiction based upon the intuition of pure being, was replaced by subjective persuasion, and the ancient explanation of the mode of cognition, viz., the identity of subject and object, by the metaphor of an impression made on a wax tablet; while at the same time the distinction between ideality and reality, between intelligence and sense, was completely abolished. These changes or innovations explain the whole difference between ancient and modern philosophy, and amply account for all the achievements and failures of the latter, as compared with the former.

Modern philosophy set out with subjectivism and sensism, and its task has been to develop these to their ultimate consequences. And just as ancient philosophy, with its false doctrine of cognition and its undeveloped principle of truth, found its true expression in the inconsistent pantheistic materialism of Aristotle, so modern thought, with its subjectivism and sensism, found its actualization in the consistent scepticism of Hume. Moreover, just as ancient philosophy, instead of abandoning its first principles when it saw their consequences, eked out an existence in trying to avoid these consequences, by the introduction of mythical and poetic elements into thought, and thus continued to produce romantic systems like those of Plotinus and Jamblichos; so likewise modern thought, instead of turning its back on subjectivism and sensism, when Hume demonstrated their true nature, merely modified them a little by the introduction of common sense or innate mental forms, and thus made possible the fact-philosophy of the Scotch school and the philosophic romances of Germany.

When Hume, following upon the heels of Berkeley, had reduced the principles of Descartes and Locke to patent absurdity, philosophic thought in Northern Europe came for a moment to a sceptical standstill. Soon, however, it began to look about for some means which might enable it to move forward toward truth. In Scotland, Reid flattered himself that he had found such means in the data of common sense, but forgot that these data, being the very things which philosophy is intended to explain, must not be assumed. The acceptance of the data of common sense is always necessary in order to enable us to arrive at *facts;* but is always fatal to any attempt to reach truth as truth. In Germany, Kant imagined that he had found a way out of scepticism, by adopting, as his metaphor for mind, instead of a *tabula rasa*, a complicated mould, capable, in some unexplained way, of being rendered conscious of its own shape, and thereby also of the shape of what might be put into it. In these shapes Kant thought he had found a way to avoid at once the dogmatism of ancient thought and the scepticism of developed Cartesianism. But Kantianism, in spite of its good intentions, profound earnestness, and consequent permanent value, is in reality only systematized scepticism, a putting into positive form of the negative results arrived at by Hume. Instead of explaining the data of common sense, it merely makes an effort to explain them away, denying to man all knowledge of things as they are in themselves, that is, all knowledge of anything objective, and calling upon him to be content with the assurance that his subjective persuasions and imaginings hang consistently together.

Kant, although he did not see how cognition, whose forms he believed to be all subjective, could ever arrive at certainty of the existence of a world of reality (*Dinge an sich*) external to the mind, nevertheless did not venture

to deny the existence of such a world. Fichte, his disowned successor, was bolder. In order to get rid of the scepticism involved in the admission of an unknowable existent reality, and the illogicality of claiming to know that an unknowable exists, he assumed the standpoint of pure subjectivism, and, in despair of discovering how a subject can know an object without being that object (the old puzzle of Parmenides), he endeavoured to show that the *Ego*, in positing, that is, in creating itself, necessarily creates, also the *non-Ego*, or external world. This was annihilating scepticism with a vengeance, but it was likewise annihilating common sense and truth of every sort!

After Fichte came Schelling, who continued in the same direction. By identifying Fichte's *Ego* and *non-Ego*, he arrived at the Absolute, whose evolution, according to him, is the Universe. This doctrine does not differ from that of Herakleitos, except in being expressed in more abstract terms, *e.g. absolute*, instead of *fire* (πρηστήρ). After Schelling came Hegel, who, going a step farther, identified the Absolute with thought, and set himself the task of showing how this absolute thought, which he calls *The Idea*, proceeds to evolve or create itself into a universe of thought and things. The process is an eminently simple one: it is dialectic, and dialectic means the necessary substitution of one word for another. It proceeds in this wise. Thought, in its undeveloped form, is but another word for being, and being is but another way of saying nothing. When you begin a system with nothing, you begin without presuppositions, and your whole business, as a philosopher, is to watch nothing become the universe and yourself. Nothing, under this name, combines with itself under its other name, being, and forms nothing-being or being-nothing, just as you please. But for either of these you may—no, indeed! by dialectic necessity, you must—

substitute becoming. But becoming, as every clodhopper knows (and the clodhopper, when his testimony is needed, is a great authority), is a process, and a process is all that is necessary to explain the universe, with all its energies, including God. Nothing, under its new name of becoming, has only to keep on combining with itself under its older name, in order to produce all the categories. It has then only to walk out of itself, in order to create the universe of things, and then to come home again to its own bosom, in order to be God, and conscious of itself, as such a universe. In fact, God's universe may be defined as nothing combining with itself and moving in a circle.

Divested of its mountains of verbiage, this is what the system of Hegel really means in plain language. *Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus.* Its incredible absurdity for a time hypnotized people, especially susceptible young men, into believing that, by repeating over its phrases or terms, they were identifying themselves with truth and the absolute—in fact, playing God; for Hegel does not hesitate to say that thought, the absolute and the infinite, is the product of his own spirit, and that the *Ego* is the universal.* But this state of intellectual mesmerism soon passed away and men woke to find that philosophy, instead of leading them to truth, had landed them in Absolute Nihilism. Then followed a state of calm philosophic despair.

Since the collapse or explosion of Hegelian nihilism, whereby the subjectivism and sensism of modern thought were reduced to utter absurdity, there can hardly be said to have been any philosophy among the Northern nations. It is true that, in many places, we still find men who have not

* *Encyclopædie*, pt. i. §§ 20, 23; cf. below, under § 18. By a most vulgar and transparent paralogism, Hegel everywhere substitutes his *idea* of his own *Ego*, in the shape of an *individuum vagum*, for the concrete reality of the absolute *Ego*. But, of course, when by sensism the distinction between things and the ideas or notions of things is wiped out, such absurdities necessarily follow.

followed with open eyes the logical development of thought, clinging, with a kind of religious fondness, to old systems, and trying to resuscitate them, and that we not unfrequently see men who still rejoice in intellectual boyhood, propounding long-exploded doctrines in the naïve belief that they are proclaiming new truth ; but nowhere do we find a firmly grounded system of thought, advancing triumphantly, like the physical sciences, from truth to truth. Meanwhile earnest men, in despair of finding a theoretical explanation of the system of things, are devoting themselves, with manly resignation, to practical pursuits or the discovery and classification of facts, while their more frivolous brethren, rejoicing in their nothingness, find an excitement, that pays for the trouble of living, in the pleasurable waste of nervous strength. The sustained efforts of the former class of men sometimes shape themselves, on a more or less ample basis of facts, into social or moral theories, such as Comtism and Spencerism, which, in the absence of grounded philosophic truth, offer to assume its place and duties ; but, though they contain much that is valuable, and will yet be more valuable when illuminated with the light of truth, and though they, therefore, meet with much well-deserved respect, they are all rendered practically powerless and ineffective by the despair and scepticism which, however well concealed and ignored, nevertheless lie at the bottom of them.

While such has been the course and condition of philosophy in the Northern nations, England, America, France, and Germany, its history among the Southern nations, and especially in Italy, has been very different. Here Scholasticism, though much neglected for the last two hundred and fifty years,* has, on account of its close connection with

* Francis Suarez, the last of the great Scholastics and the pride of the Company of Jesus, died in 1617, twenty-one years after the birth of Descartes.

Catholicism, never entirely died out. Toward the middle of last century it received a rude shock from Lockian sensism, introduced into Italy by Condillac, and favoured and propagated by the powerful Jesuit Order. The effect of this philosophy, which was expected by its propagators to leave free and ample room for faith, was to open wide the doors of intelligence to doubt and scepticism of the most demoralizing kind. Hence, in the first quarter of this century, Italy, without having passed through so many phases of subjectivism as the Northern nations, Humeism, Kantianism, Hegelianism, found herself in very much the same condition of philosophic despondency as they, and with perhaps less moral earnestness to carry her through it. And yet it was from Italy, where the philosophic darkness was greatest, that the new philosophic light was destined to rise and shine. That light was the philosophic system of Antonio Rosmini-Serbati, a Roman Catholic priest, whose first great and fundamental work appeared at Rome in 1830, about a year before Hegel's death. Thus for the last half-century, while the rest of Europe has been groping about in philosophic darkness, lit only by the last reflected rays of old suns already sunk beneath the horizon into the lap of history, or by the first dim dawn of new suns yet unrisen, Italy has been sitting in the full light of a new philosophic day—almost without being aware of it!

In order to understand the true bearing and importance of Rosmini's system, we must recall to mind the defects which proved fatal to the two great previous systems, that of ancient and that of modern times. As we have seen, the defects which destroyed the first were a false theory of cognition and the failure to reduce to a working form its principle of truth and certainty, while those that undermined the latter were the merging of intelligence in sense and the setting up of subjective persuasion as the criterion of

truth. Rosmini, who was better read in philosophy than any original thinker of modern times, was well acquainted with these defects and their results, and thought out his system for the special purpose of remedying the former, and thus getting rid of the latter, so that he might then develop truth upon a firm basis.

In a work written in 1850, Rosmini informs us that his aims in philosophizing were four: *first*, to combat error; *second*, to reduce truth to a system; *third*, to lay a solid basis for the special sciences; and, *fourth*, to erect a ladder by which to ascend to the heights of theology.* These aims he purposed to reach through the free use of reason and an unprejudiced examination, comparison, and, where possible, reconciliation of all previous philosophies, and he spared no labour in order to accomplish the enormous task he thus imposed upon himself. There have been men as well read in the external history of philosophy, and there have been men who were more minutely acquainted with particular parts or epochs of it; but no man ever better understood its inner essence and development, and no one ever more firmly grasped it as a whole. He enjoyed the very rare advantage of being equally well acquainted with ancient, with mediæval, and with modern philosophy, and of thus being able to do justice to all, and derive aid from all. That he should have found more that was valuable in the first and second than in the third was only natural. His opinion of the worth of the philosophy which grew out of the subjectivism of Descartes and Locke was, justly enough, very low. The only thing which he derived from it was the Kantian distinction between the form and the matter of thought, and, indeed, this may be said to be the only positive thing of permanent value that

* *On the Purposes of the Author*, a discourse now printed as an introduction to his entire system.

philosophy produced from Descartes to Hegel.* Most of its other products may be assigned to the storehouse of history, where the philosopher, in his proper capacity, may, without disadvantage, leave them undisturbed. "From Locke to Kant," says Rosmini, "philosophy, in spite of all restraining efforts, went ever farther and farther astray, becoming ever more entangled, until, at last, men got weary of following, one after another, guides that led nowhere. Hence the schools of our time seem more inclined to narrate the adventures of philosophy, a long amusing story of the voyages and wanderings of the human mind, than to teach any philosophy. If philosophy is ever again to be restored to credit among men, I believe we must once more take up the opinions of the ancients, adapting them, as far as possible, to the method and easy style of the moderns, and giving them a fuller and closer bearing upon human life. Moreover, we must never forget that the Scholastics, now so deeply reviled, were, after all, the connecting link between ancient and modern philosophies. For although, toward the close of its history, Scholasticism became degraded, puerile, and ridiculous, yet it was not so in the works of its great writers, among whom it may suffice to mention Thomas Aquinas, the prince of Italian philosophers and the one in whose dear footsteps it always has been, and always shall be, our endeavour to follow." †

As a matter of fact, the starting-point and the central principle of Rosmini's philosophy was reached through the development of a thought which St. Thomas had expressed, but whose full bearings he had been prevented, by Aristotelian prejudices, from recognizing. We have seen that St. Thomas asserts the first object of intelligence and the ground of the principle of contradiction to be being, *ens* or

* He was always unwilling to acknowledge that he borrowed even this. See below, under § 122.

† *Theodicy*, bk. i. cap. xxix.

ens commune. Pondering upon this thought, Rosmini suddenly came to see that being is the very essence and form of intelligence, as distinguished from sensation, and that this form is not subjective, but objective. In other words, he saw that it is the essence of intelligence to have an object, and that that object is being. In this manner he not only got rid of the identity-theory of cognition maintained by the ancients and the impression-theory held by the moderns, but he likewise did away with subjectivism, drew a clear line between intelligence and sensation, between the ideal and the real, and found the principle and criterion of truth in the essential unity of being as manifested under these two forms. In a word, he found in being itself, in the very object without which we cannot cognize or even doubt anything, not only the true explanation of the mode of cognition, but also the indefeasible warrant of all truth. His whole system is merely a working out of the idea of being into all its ramifications and principles, necessary and contingent.

If Rosmini drew the bare notion of his first principle from the writings of St. Thomas, almost every other great system of philosophy was laid under contribution in order to determine it. Indeed, every other system was made to give up whatever it had of truth in order to arm the principle of the new doctrine. Rosmini agrees with Parmenides in holding that being, one, indeterminate, eternal, is the sole object of intelligence, the essence and form of truth; but refuses to conclude from this either that being is identical with knowing, or that the Many is unknowable. According to Rosmini, the Many is knowable as a series of objectified subjects. He agrees with Plato that the ideal is inconfusible with the real; but he denies that ideas subsist separate from the mind and things. According to him, ideas are determinations which the mind, through

subjective sensations derived from the real mode of being, makes in ideal being, which is its constitutive object. He agrees with Aristotle that ideas or forms exist in the mind and in things, and not in a state of separateness; but he denies that they exist in mind and in things in the same mode. In the former they are objective, ideal, and, therefore, universal; in the latter, they are subjective, real, and, therefore, particular. Moreover, the intellect and the intelligible (*νοῦς καὶ νοητά*) are so far from being identical, that they belong to two absolutely distinct modes of being. He makes the same concessions and objections to St. Thomas, but further agrees with him that the principle of contradiction rests on the intuition of being. He agrees with the school of Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, that subjectivism and sensism cannot furnish a ground for truth, but denies that these are the sources from which truth ought to be expected, and affirms that it is the very form and essence of objectivism and intelligence. He agrees with Kant that the form and matter of thought have to be distinguished; but he denies, *first*, that thought has a plurality of forms; *second*, that its form is subjective; and, *third*, that its matter is objective, before it is made so by thought itself. He maintains that the real, as purely such, is always subject (*ὑποκείμενον*), while the ideal is always object (*ἀντικείμενον*) of intelligence. He agrees with Reid* that perception differs from sensation; but denies that the former is due to an inexplicable instinct in the mind. He holds that perception is due to the very nature of mind, whose term is necessarily an object. He agrees with Fichte that the *Ego* implies the *non-Ego*, but he utterly denies

* Rosmini has great respect for the sane, serious philosophy of Reid, and really owes it a great deal. Indeed, the Italians are almost the only philosophers that have done justice to Reid, whose very soberness and simplicity have exposed him to unmerited neglect in more romantic countries.

that the former creates either, and shows that the *Ego* is a compound, consisting of a subject and an act whereby that subject affirms itself as an object. He agrees with Schelling that there is something infinite in the mind, but denies that the mind is for that reason the Absolute. He maintains that the object of the mind is necessary, infinite, and eternal; whereas the subject is contingent, finite, and, but for its union with the object, transient. He agrees, lastly, with Hegel, that the starting-point of philosophy is being; but he denies that the ideal being, with which such start is made, produces the real and moral forms of being, that is, develops into the universe and God. He, moreover, denies that being, though immediate, is an hypothesis, and shows that it is reached through a direct intuition, a form of cognition not liable to doubt or error, since for it *phenomenon* and *noümenon* are necessarily one.

Rosmini, having discovered the nature of ideal being and its necessary relation to intelligence, was thus able to collect, as determinations of it, all the truths of previous systems freed from their errors, and so, for the first time in the world's history, to lay a solid basis upon which true science might be built up and philosophy brought to stability and repose, after its twenty-five hundred years of weary circling, like that of the carnal spirits, driven by "the infernal hurricane, that never rests." * Upon this basis he proceeded to build up three orders of science: *first*, sciences of intuition, or of the object; *second*, sciences of perception, or of sensible subjects; and, *third*, sciences of reflection, or of those subjects which, though beyond the reach of sense, may, through integration of the subjects of sense by means of the object of intelligence, be known in an ideal-negative way, and in part made real by intelligence itself acting through volition. But, after all, when intelligence has

* "La bufera infernal, che mai non resta" Dante, *Inferno*, v. 31).

exhausted its powers of intuition, perception, and reflection, there will still remain an infinitude of reality, of which it has only a negative knowledge, so long as this infinitude does not reveal itself, by imparting to it some new faculty, capable of feeling an infinite reality. When this takes place, intelligence will recognize that it has at last found the necessary real subject of its necessary ideal object. This subject is God, whose reality, according to Rosmini, can be known only when He reveals Himself by imparting to the finite intelligence such an increase of objective light—the Light of Grace—as enables it to recognize, in a higher or lower degree, this infinite perfection. Thus Rosmini finds in the limitation of human intelligence a necessary place for revelation and the action of divine grace, and a formula for this revelation and action, such as is certainly not to be found in any other system of thought but his own. Whether or not we follow him in maintaining that Christianity is such a revelation of God, we must admit that he has, philosophically speaking, made a much better case for it than ever was made before. His system has, accordingly, made Christianity acceptable to many who otherwise would have rejected it. The table on the next page will show Rosmini's classification of the Sciences.

Of Rosmini's contributions to the different sciences, the most important are unquestionably those which he made to Ideology, a science toward which he stands in the same relation as Aristotle does to Formal Logic. His *New Essay on the Origin of Ideas,* by which he put an end to subjectivism and sensism, will take the place of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (by which, according to Hegel, an end was put to objective dogmatism, as he contemptuously calls truth *) as the second great philosophic work of the world,

* *Gesch. der Philosophie*, vol. iii. p. 564 (edit. 1836).



beside and before Aristotle's *Logic*, by which a period was put to sophistry. Next to his contributions to Ideology, Rosmini's most important work was in Psychology, in which he showed, for the first time, the true nature of the *Ego*, its double relation to being and sensation, and the necessary nature of the term of the latter. His two works, *Anthropology* and *Psychology*, which deal with this subject, are acknowledged as marking an epoch in its history, even by those who are most bitterly opposed to the rest of his system. Next in importance to his contributions to Psychology are those which he made to the inferential Science of Morals, for which he discovered a rational and objective basis in the same principle which furnishes the criterion of theoretical truth, showing that right is merely truth accepted as a standard of action. Besides these, he made many and great contributions to other sciences, especially Logic, Law, Politics, Cosmology, Ontology, and Natural Theology. His great work, the *Theosophy*, which was intended to deal exhaustively with the last three subjects, he did not live to complete, and the same is true respecting several other great works, including one on

Mathematics. Many of his writings still remain unpublished.*

From what has been said, it will be easy to understand the relation of Rosminianism to the other systems of our time. To the various sensistic systems, whether calling themselves materialistic or idealistic, it stands in the relation of a corrector and complement; to the spiritualistic systems, in the relation of a guide and foundation. It completes the former, by showing them the way out of mere subjectivity and persuasion into a world of objectivity and truth; it imparts strength and vision to the latter, by placing them upon a basis of rational insight. To the special sciences it furnishes unity and aim. Doubtless, Rosminianism will in many points undergo modification or correction, and in many more receive extensive development; but that it supplies a basis for a new and unprecedented progress in philosophy, will hardly be doubted by any one who, with sufficient knowledge of previous systems and sufficient freedom from prejudice, will give it a thorough examination.†

If such is the nature and importance of Rosmini's system, it may well be asked why, having been before the world more or less completely for half a century, it has thus far made so little impression upon it, that, outside of Italy and the circle of Rosmini's religious order, its very existence is almost unknown. The answer to this is very simple. Rosmini was an Italian and wrote in Italian; he was a Catholic priest and a very sincere one; and, worse than all, he was a staunch opponent of the narrow policy which a certain party in the Church has followed for the last fifty

* See the list of his works, pp. lii.–lxviii.

† Some people, fond of finding brief names for things, rather discredit Rosmini's system by calling it *Objective Idealism*. It is one great merit of the system that, not being one-sided, it is not covered by any one name. If we must call it something, then, to be just, we ought to name it: *Objective Idealism*, *Subjective Realism*, and *Absolute Moralism*.

years. The first of these circumstances renders his works inaccessible to the greater number of persons who are fitted to appreciate them; the second prejudices against them the majority of the remainder, who differ from him in creed; and the third rouses against them the *odium politicum* of by far the larger number of the thinkers of his own confession. Scholars who have been wont to believe that all modern thought deserving of consideration must come from Germany, France, or England, are not inclined to learn Italian, in order to study the works of a Catholic thinker whose name does not occur in most of the histories of philosophy; Protestants and Rationalists are not prepared to believe that a profound and rational system of philosophy can originate with a devoted priest of the Catholic Church; and Catholics of the ordinary stripe are not prepared to look with favour upon the works of a man who did his best to reform and purify ecclesiastical discipline, and to lead the Church back to her primitive simplicity, humanity, and faith. Hence Rosminianism, having nothing but truth in its favour, has thus far struggled almost in vain against a world of prejudice. Not altogether in vain, however; for the system has, especially in Italy, a small but select number of very warm adherents, who, in the long run, will do more to propagate it than ten times the number of lukewarm disciples. Truth at last is sure to prevail, and therefore Rosminianism can afford to bide its time without haste or fear. When that time comes, the system will be found to contain not only all the truth of ancient and of modern philosophy, combined and systematized, but also a groundwork on which philosophy may henceforth advance, like the other sciences, instead of continuing to be held in scorn as a baseless phantom for ever whirling aimlessly in a vicious circle.

PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM.

PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM.

I.

PHILOSOPHY is the science of ultimate grounds. What is Philosophy?

It will be seen, by reference to the tabular view of the sciences in the Introduction, that Rosmini draws a clear distinction between the terms *philosophy* and *metaphysics*, employing the latter in the limited sense of Science of the Real, which, according to him, includes Cosmology, Ontology, and Natural Theology. Thus the term *metaphysics*, while narrower than *philosophy*, is wider than *ontology* (cf. *Preface to Metaphysical Works*, in *Psychology*, vol. i. pp. 5–16, where these distinctions are treated at length).

The above definition of Philosophy does not differ materially from that of Leibniz, who calls it "the science of sufficient reasons"; or from that of Descartes, who makes it "the science of things evidently deduced from first principles" (cf. Hamilton's *Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic*, vol. i. pp. 48–53, where a list of the more famous definitions of philosophy, ancient and modern, are given). It approaches, perhaps, still more closely the definition which Aristotle gives of wisdom (σοφία), "the science which considers first principles and causes (ἐπιστήμη τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν καὶ αἰτιῶν θεωρητική." *Metaph.*, i. 2, 982 b, 9); and it coincides with the definition of *first philosophy*, which St. Thomas in part borrows from Aristotle. "The philosopher," says he, mean-

ing Aristotle, "determines it (*i.e.* first philosophy) to be the science of truth, not of truth in general, but of that truth which is the origin of all truth, that is, which relates to the first universal principle of being (*primum principium essendi omnibus*)" (*Summa contra Gent.*, cap. i.; cf. Aristotle, *Metaph.*, i.[2] 1, 993 b, 20). Rosmini condemns several other definitions of philosophy, especially those of Hobbes, Galluppi, Plato, and Wolf. Hobbes had defined philosophy as "a knowledge, acquired by correct reasoning, of effects or phenomena from their conceived causes or generations, and also of possible generations from known effects" (*Computatio sive Logica*, cap. i.). In regard to this Rosmini says, "Since from effects alone or from phenomena alone, without the aid of the ideal object, we can know only the proximate causes, or, more properly speaking, the laws, according to which sensible things change, philosophy is destroyed by this definition, and there remain only physics and the natural sciences, usurping the title of philosophy" (*Pref. to Metaph. Works*, § 14). Of Galluppi's definition, which makes philosophy "the science of human thought," he says, "But human thought is only the instrument wherewith philosophy finds and contemplates its objects, and these, among which the greatest is God, cannot in the smallest degree be reduced to thought. It would be a most manifest absurdity to say that the science of God, which certainly belongs to philosophy, treats of nothing but human thought" (*Ibid.*, § 15). In regard to the remark of Plato, that the philosopher "devotes himself always to the idea of being" (τῇ τοῦ ὄντος ἀεὶ προσκείμενος ἰδέᾳ. *Soph.* 254, A), he says, "On the contrary, the idea of being must guide the human mind to discover the absolute and most real being, this being the end of all its speculations—an end which it reaches, not through any idea, but through affirmation and intuition" (*Ibid.*, § 16). To Wolf's definition of philosophy as "the science of things possible," he objects: "Possibilities do not by any means constitute the grounds of things in their completeness, being but a single element of those grounds. Contingent things, for example, do not exist merely because they are possible, but because, being

possible, a first cause has created them" (*Ibid.*). These objections help to make clear Rosmini's view of the sphere and functions of philosophy, and the cardinal distinction which he makes between ideal being, which is in itself intelligible, and real being, which is intelligible only through the other. When he asserts (*Theosophy*, vol. i. § 6) that "the real, as merely real, signifies nothing, not going beyond itself or expressing anything but itself," and that it "goes beyond the power of natural signs, altogether beyond the power of any spoken word, however eloquent, and of any writing, however learned, elegant, and sublime it may appear," he comes very near drawing that distinction which, at first sight, seems to involve an absurd paradox, but which is, nevertheless, strictly true—the distinction, namely, between thought and knowledge. Thought being the mere instrument of knowledge (the *quo cognoscimus*, as the Scholastics say), and knowledge being that which thought accomplishes (*quod cognoscimus*), it follows that thought and knowledge are absolutely exclusive with respect to each other; that what is known cannot, as such, be thought; and that what is thought cannot, as such, be known. It is the failure to observe this distinction that has led Herbert Spencer and others into their strange muddle respecting the unknowable, by which they mean the unthinkable. Ideas are thinkable but absolutely unknowable; things are knowable but absolutely unthinkable.

In regard to Science, the genus of which philosophy is a species, Rosmini approves of the view expressed by Aristotle in the *Later Analytics*, where he says, "We think we know a thing absolutely (ἕκαστον ἁπλῶς), and not in the sophistical, accidental way, when we think we know the cause which produced it, know that that is the cause of that thing, and know that it must be the cause of that thing" (cap. ii. 71 b, 9 sq.). He, moreover, distinguishes between the subjective and objective senses of the term. "The word *science*," he says, "has a universal sense, equivalent to that of cognition; but it is also employed in a more restricted sense, to signify a particular mode of cognition. In this limited sense it may be regarded either

subjectively, that is, as possessed by man, the knowing subject, or *objectively*, as knowable, as that which is intuited by a mind" (*Logic*, § 825). In the former view it is equivalent to philosophy; in the latter, it means "an entire system of demonstrated cognitions, depending upon a single principle" (*Ibid.*, § 836).

It is instructive to compare with these views respecting science and philosophy, the definitions of these terms given by Herbert Spencer. "Science," says that writer, "is *partially unified* knowledge; Philosophy is *completely unified* knowledge" (*First Principles*, Part II. cap. i. § 37). It follows from this that we have not at present any philosophy, and indeed, that only omniscience is philosophy, and God the only philosopher.

2.

Ultimate grounds.

Ultimate grounds are the answers which satisfy the last *why's* put by the human mind to itself.

It thus appears that the final, self-sufficient test of truth is perfect mental satisfaction, the cessation of all desire for further evidence or explanation. This satisfaction, being of the nature of a feeling, is immediate, given, and, therefore, incapable of explanation. Why does truth satisfy? is a foolish question. We may, nevertheless, discover and state the conditions under which such satisfaction is felt, and, in so doing, we shall discover and state the conditions of truth itself. It is almost unnecessary to say that by *grounds* (*ragioni*) Rosmini does not mean causes. Indeed, he finds fault with Aristotle for confounding the two terms. "What Aristotle calls cause (*αἰτία*)," he says, "ought more correctly to be called ground, the term properly belonging to the order of the knowable, with which he is dealing" (*Logic*, § 827). The passage referred to is the one quoted above, p. 1. According to Rosmini, a ground is "that light which enables the mind (*spirito*) to know that what any given judgment affirms in the order of possibility, IS"

(*Ibid.*, § 188). "A ground is always an *idea*, simple or complex; but the terms *ground* and *idea* differ as two different modes of regarding the same thing. *Ground* indicates the logical *necessity* which the mind feels of assenting to a possible judgment. It is, therefore, a virtue which emanates from the intuition of the necessary nexus between two or more ideas, which nexus, however, as intuited by the mind, may likewise be called an *idea*" (*Ibid.*, § 192). "The grounds which justify assent to any possible judgment are either intrinsic or extrinsic. A ground is intrinsic when the judgment requires no other proof, foreign to it, in order to appear true to the mind of any one who examines it with sufficient care. . . . A ground is extrinsic when the mind, in order to be convinced of the truth of a possible judgment, is obliged to have recourse to some judgment different from the first" (*Ibid.*, §§ 193, 195). In reference to the relation of grounds to reality, we have the following statements:—"Things real must be treated in the doctrine of *ultimate* grounds. *First*, because *ground* is a word whose signification is relative to that whose ground is sought, and that whose ground is sought is the real. Hence it follows that real things, as such, do not constitute the object of philosophy, but merely its occasion and condition. Philosophy deals with them, because it deals with their possibilities and their ultimate sufficient grounds. *Second*, because the first ground requires a reality coessential with it, . . . and hence cannot be fully known without the knowledge of that first reality which constitutes it, not as a ground, but as a complete and absolute being containing within itself the ground of all things" (*Psychology*, Pref., § 13). It is needless to say that *ultimate* grounds are, of necessity, intrinsic, immediate, and self-evident. Rosmini, in common with Aristotle * and St. Thomas,† and in opposition to Hegel,‡

* "Ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐξ ἀληθῶν τ' εἶναι καὶ πρώτων καὶ ἀμέσων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων καὶ προτέρων καὶ αἰτίων τοῦ συμπεράσματος" (*Anal. Post.*, ii. 71 b, 20 sq.).

† "Per se, et directe intellectus est universalium, sensus autem singularium" (*Summa Theol.*, p. i. q. lxxxvi., concl.).

‡ "Logisch ist der Anfang, indem er im Elemente des frei für sich seienden

whom he calls the "foe of all immediateness" (*Theosophy*, vol. i. § 10), maintains that all ultimate knowledge is of this kind. Of the nature of ultimate grounds, Rosmini speaks at length in his *Logic*. "If we wish to determine the meaning of this expression, *ultimate grounds*," he says, "we must take into consideration certain distinctions, for the reason that grounds may be called ultimate which are such, not in themselves, but with respect to the limits of human nature. Whatever these limits be, it is clear that we cannot speak of any ultimate grounds except with respect to these, because absolutely ultimate grounds, if they go beyond the confines of human nature, cannot be desired or sought by it, and hence the want of them cannot cause it any disquiet. In order, therefore, that the human mind, when it has reached the ultimate grounds, may be conscious that these are ultimate for it (supposing that they are not likewise ultimate in themselves), it must recognize its own limits, and clearly understand that, in carrying its researches further, it would be attempting the impossible" (§ 1163). "We must, therefore, consider that there are three supreme grounds, categorically distinct. These may be called the *formal ground*, the *real ground*, and the *moral ground*. The supreme formal ground is given to man in the idea of being, and is the principle of all formal logic. It is also that which enables him to cognize *real* and *moral grounds*. But the supreme real ground is not given to man by nature, since this reality is God Himself, and by nature man does not perceive the reality of God. Possessing, then, the *supreme formal ground*, and, in it, the power of knowing all real grounds, even the supreme one, if they were given to him—that is, if they were communicated to his feeling—he has the faculty of recognizing his own limits, in other words, of recognizing that it is not granted him to know all that he could know, and hence he concludes that there may and must be, beyond these limits, something unknown to him. If now we give to this act (*slancio*), by which the human mind

Denkens, im reinen Wissen gemacht werden soll" (*Logik*, vol. i. p. 61; cf. Trendelenburg, *Logische Untersuchungen*, vol. i. pp. 36, sqq.).

divines that there is something beyond all that it knows, the name of *human superintelligence*, we shall see clearly that this is not a *faculty* (*potenza*), but a *function* of reason, whereby, comparing the field of the possible, given to it in the idea, with the field of the real, given to it in feeling, it sees that the former is infinitely more extensive than the latter, and that the portion of reality which it can touch does not contain the supreme ground; that is, the *being which is real in its essence*, which alone can be the type of all reality, and hence also alone can be the ground of all finite realities. Again, as regards the supreme moral ground, this lies in the essential and total order of being, inasmuch as being, thus intrinsically ordered, is in itself a good to all the wills that cognize it. Now, man, in the idea, possesses this order *virtually*, but it does not become actual to thought except in real being. Of this real being he knows a part *positively* through feeling, and that part which he knows by nature in this way implies infinite being; then, through the function of human superintelligence, he knows, negatively and confusedly, infinite real being, in which alone the supreme moral ground is actualized, because in it alone is the essential and total order of being. Hence, according to nature, man cannot know the supreme moral ground, except in a negative and virtual way. Hence the imperfection of morality in his actual existence. There are, therefore, two main limits to human intelligence. *First*, it cannot know the supreme real ground, and, therefore, cannot have a single material criterion for all realities. It is for this reason that we have been obliged to lay down the rule that *every specific perception* of reality is a criterion for that species whereof that perception is assumed as the type. *Second*, it can know only virtually the supreme moral reason" (§§ 1163, 1165). Of course, it follows directly from this, that, in our present life, we find no entire intellectual satisfaction, at least in a natural way. "Since man," says Rosmini, "knows the supreme formal ground, and, through it, these two limits, he aspires to extend himself to the infinite, and desires a state in which these limitations shall cease. However,

when a man reaches the clear conviction that such limits cannot be removed in the present life, he resigns himself to this necessity, and thus finds that satisfaction of intellect which is possible in mortal life." In other words, to quote the famous saying of Goethe, "Man is not born to solve the problem of the universe, but to find out where the problem begins, and then to keep himself within the limits of the knowable."

3.

Philosophy general and special.

Ultimate grounds are either absolute or relative. The former are, strictly speaking, alone ultimate, and, as such, constitute the scope of *General Philosophy;* whereas the latter are ultimate only in reference to a determinate branch of science, and hence form the scope of *Special Philosophies*, such as those of mathematics, physics, history, politics, art, etc.

Though Rosmini prefers the term *ultimate grounds*, he does not object to calling them likewise *first grounds*. "*Ultimate grounds*," he says, "and *first grounds* are equivalent expressions, because what is last in the one direction of thought is first in the other" (*Purposes of the Author*, § 9, n.). Compare the Aristotelian doctrine, that what is first in essence or nature is last in generation,* or, as St. Thomas puts it, "What is first and better known in its nature is last and less known relatively to us." †

Of the relation of Philosophy to the other sciences

* "Ἐναντίως ἐπὶ τῆς γενέσεως ἔχει καὶ τῆς οὐσίας· τὰ γὰρ ὕστερα τῇ γενέσει πρότερα τὴν φύσιν ἐστί, καὶ πρῶτον τὸ τῇ γενέσει τελευταῖον" (*De Part. Anim.*, i. 1; 646 a, 24 sq.). Cf. *Physica*, viii. 7; 261 a, 14: 9; 265 a, 22 sq.; and Eucken, *Die Methode der Aristotelischen Forschung*, p. 13.

† "Quæ sunt priora et notiora secundum naturam, sunt posteriora et minus nota secundum nos" (*Sum. Theol.*, i. q. 85, art. 3, 1). Cf. Aristotle, "Οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν πρότερον τῇ φύσει καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς πρότερον οὐδὲ γνωριμώτερον καὶ ἁπλῶς γνωριμώτερον" (*Anal. Post.*, i. 2; 71 b, 35 sq.).

Rosmini says, "The ultimate grounds outside of the world and the ultimate grounds in the world, these form the object of philosophy, which thus occupies the last two and highest steps of the pyramid we have described. Hence philosophy remains clearly separated from, and elevated above, the other sciences, as the guide and mother of them all. These form the lower steps of the pyramid, depending upon the highest two and receiving their light from them" (*Purposes of the Author*, § 9; cf. St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.*, ii.[1] q. 6, art. 1, 1 m.).

4.

Point of departure.

In attempting to discover the ultimate grounds which shall satisfy its own last spontaneous *why's*, the human mind must, of necessity, begin by recognizing the state of its own cognitions and of its own persuasions. It must then go on and endeavour to supplement and complete these cognitions in such a way as to satisfy the intelligence, which imperatively demands a ground for everything it knows, and allows the mind no rest until it has found a self-sufficient ground, that is, a ground which calls for no further ground.

The gist of this section is, that philosophy sets out with simple, direct, unquestioning observation of the present facts of consciousness, and then proceeds to search for another fact of consciousness, a ground or idea, which shall so unite and supplement all others as to relieve the mind from the discomfort which disconnection and incompleteness always cause it. Philosophy, in this view,—and it is a correct one—may be defined as an explanation of the facts of consciousness; for even God and the Universe, *in so far as they require or admit explanation*, number as objects among these facts. That which is not known requires no expla-

nation. To explain existence *in itself* is a task beyond the reach of philosophy. Indeed, the phrase is self-contradictory ; for it means, to explain a fact of consciousness, which, by the very hypothesis, does not exist. This doctrine does not involve the conclusion that some would draw from it, that therefore we do not *know* things. The opposite conclusion is the true one. We do know things, and it is precisely for that reason that they do not require or admit explanation. We do not, indeed, *think* things ; but, as has been already remarked, knowledge and thought are mutually exclusive.

This section shows how different Rosmini's starting-point was from that of Hegel. Indeed, there are few things which Rosmini so strongly opposes as the doctrine of a "presuppositionless beginning" in philosophy. His refutation of this doctrine (*Logic*, §§ 43–50 ; *Theodicy*, i. §§ 10, 19, 20) is, in many points, superior to that of Trendelenburg (*Logische Untersuchungen*, i. pp. 36–140, and *Die logische Frage in Hegel's System*, Leipzig, 1843 ; cf. §§ 11, 53). Rosmini cordially agrees with Kant and his school (cf. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Einleitung, i.) in holding that "all our knowledge begins with experience ;" but he finds grave fault with them for not clearly showing what they mean by experience. His strictures on this omission are worth quoting. "Modern philosophers," he says, "generally admit that all human knowledge comes from experience ; but they do not trouble themselves to ask, What is experience ? Is it meant that experience is the facts ? The facts by themselves cannot form experience, because, until the facts are known by me, they are, with reference to my knowledge, as if they did not exist. By experience, therefore, is meant the facts *cognized* by me. If this is the meaning of the word 'experience,' we must go on and inquire what kind of cognition is here meant. Is it meant that experience is the facts cognized by the senses alone ? The question is absurd : with the senses alone they cannot be *cognized*. When I say that I know a fact with my senses alone, I have removed from that fact the whole of my thought regarding it. The facts, as they then remain, are

sensations and nothing more. There is no comparison between them, or relation of any kind. These facts, *cognized*, as the very improper expression is, by the sense alone, can neither be written nor spoken, because language has no individual words fitted to express them, and because, if I joined them to some sensible sign, in order to make them speakable, I should be obliged to make some reflection on them, which is contrary to the hypothesis that I know them through my senses alone. Experience, therefore, must be the facts as really known. But into this knowledge there enters necessarily *intelligence*, which adds to the facts a certain universality, considering them in relation to being, and, through being, in relation to each other, and, in this way, forming classes or species. This is certainly the only kind of experience that can or does produce our cognitions. But if this is the experience which we mean when we say that all our cognitions come from experience, we must, first of all, inquire, What is *intellectual cognition of facts?* What is that *intellect* with which we form, or at least complete, this experience? How must such a faculty of cognizing be constituted, in order that it may be able to produce such experience? This last question is equivalent to, What must the intellect have that is innate? or, What are the conditions under which the experience we speak of is possible?" (*New Essay*, vol. ii. § 398). What would Rosmini have said to those philosophers who define Logic as "the science of the laws of thought," without ever inquiring, What is thought?

5.

Different forms of mental quiet.

The mental rest or quiet here meant is only a *scientific quiet*, which the inquiring mind reaches when it finds scientific replies to its own inevitable interrogations. But it must not be supposed that the mind always puts such interrogations to itself. Many minds never do so at all, or, if they do, at

least put far fewer than they might put. The mind which does not question itself at all enjoys rest and quiet. The same is true of the mind, which questions itself up to a certain point and no further, as soon as it has found replies to its limited number of interrogations, although it may not have arrived at ultimate reasons, these not being essential to its quiet. Hence the science of ultimate grounds, that is, philosophy, is not necessary to the mental quiet of the majority of mankind, who content themselves with a much more limited kind of cognition. Such cognition, though not philosophical, may be true and certain, and may thus afford a most reasonable persuasion.

The distinction here drawn between the two kinds of mental satisfaction is a most important one, involving not only the whole distinction between reason and faith, but the whole question of the nature of assent. To this latter subject Rosmini devotes the first book of his *Logic* (pp. 9–85), the most original part of the whole work. A few sentences from this treatise will make the distinction clearer. "Assent is the act with which a man adheres voluntarily to the object which stands before his intelligence. To assent to an object means to affirm it with subjective authority" (*efficacia*, § 85). "Assent is not one of those acts of the spirit which produce new cognitions, but it is an act by which a person *appropriates* the cognitions which stand before him. We are in the habit, nevertheless, of saying that assent produces cognitions, because by means of it a person makes cognitions his, and obtains persuasion * of

* *Persuasione.* After some hesitation, I have concluded to render this word by its etymological equivalent, although in many cases *conviction* would have read better. Rosmini distinguishes the two. "*To convince*," he says, "is to give a man demonstrated cognitions, and regards the intellect; *to persuade* is to move the will to assent" (*Logic*, § 1144).

them" (§ 86). "Assent is a species of *judgment;* but not all judgments are assents. Judgments are of two kinds, *ideal* and *real. Ideal judgments* are those which present themselves to the mind as possible, without assent or dissent on the part of the person to whom they are presented. *Real judgments* are those which, after being presented to the mind as possible, receive assent" (§ 87). "Possible judgments are of two kinds, those which are composed of mere ideas, as, The genus is more extensive than the species; and those which are composed of ideas and realities, as, Rome exists" (§ 88). "Hence, assent is that act whereby a man produces real judgments, . . . which he does only after having discovered by intuition the possible judgments" (§ 89). "Between the possible judgment and the assent there lies the *question*, Shall I assent to the possible judgment?" (§ 93). "So long as the question lasts, . . . and is not answered by assent, there is a mental condition which is termed *ignorance*" (§ 96). "The effect which assent produces in the mind (*animo*) is *persuasion*, that is, persuasion that the judgment assented to, whether positive or negative, is true. *Persuasion* is not cognition. On the contrary, there are erroneous persuasions produced by assents given to ideal judgments" (§ 102). "This appropriation of cognition, termed persuasion, and performed by means of assent, is usually denominated *subjective cognition*, the term *objective cognition* being reserved for the cognition, properly so called, which precedes the assent" (§ 103). "*Subjective cognition* adds nothing to objective cognition, but it adds something to the *subject*, namely, the persuasion of that cognition" (§ 104). "To what faculty does assent belong? To the *will* or to the understanding?" (§ 129). "We reply that the power of assent is a special function, which must be accurately distinguished from both understanding and will" (§ 130). "The subject performs certain acts by means of its faculties, others directly through itself, without employing any faculty. . . . The act of affirming what it understands the subject performs directly through itself, since in that act it does nothing but accommodate itself

to what it understands" (§ 131). "A man cannot give assent to a possible judgment present to his mind (*spirito*), unless he sees an efficient ground which attests its truth. What then is a ground? By ground we mean, that light which enables the mind to know that what any given judgment affirms in the order of possibility, IS" (§ 188). "Be it observed that this IS signifies the truth of the affirmation, because, if a thing is, it is true" (§ 189). "This light is logical necessity" (§ 191). "The grounds which justify assent to any possible judgment are either intrinsic or extrinsic" (§ 193). "Evident judgments are those which are made in regard to the idea of *being* and its *immediate applications*" (§ 196). "The extrinsic grounds which show the truth of possible judgments and render assent to them obligatory are—(1) primitive judgments with respect to all judgments which are not primitive but *derivative;* (2) an infallible authority" (§ 212). "Authority, in its proper sense, means the external testimony which a trustworthy person renders to the truth of a possible judgment" (§ 215). "That which induces a subject to give an assent is (*a*) either an instinct, not guided by any *ground,* as when the assent is determined by the instinct of the marvellous; or (*b*) a purely spontaneous act of will, such as takes place in perceptions and in all voluntary assents given without reflection; or (*c*) an act of free will, which chooses between the ground for assent and that for non-assent, a choice which always takes place in the order of reflection; or (*d*) an act of free will, which creates or forges a reason, in accordance with which the assent is given in the same way as happens in formal errors, which likewise belong to the order of reflection" (§ 221). "By means of *reflection,* the *will* becomes free from necessity. The force of free volition, under certain conditions, overpowers instinct and voluntary spontaneity. By means of this force, a person may prevent *instinctive assent*" (§ 222). "*Gratuitous assent* is different from that assent which a man gives without being able to assign a *ground* to himself or to other people. . . . The really gratuitous assents . . . are those which have no *ground,* but are determined by *blind cause*" (§ 226).

"There is error every time that there is attributed to a subject a predicate which does not belong to it. Hence the point where the error lies is the *nexus* between the predicate and the subject" (§ 244). Much to the same effect may be found in Dr. Newman's *Grammar of Assent.*

6.

Popular and philosophical knowing.

But this lower form of mental quiet is not necessarily lasting. A mind possessed by strong and firm convictions, of which it has never examined the ultimate grounds, may suddenly find itself confronted by an ultimate *why*. Will it then remain in a state of unquiet and uncertainty, until it has found the needed reply? Here we must distinguish between repose of mind and repose of spirit. The former demands demonstration, the latter only persuasion; and these are two widely different things. Demonstration has something necessary, almost fatal, about it, while persuasion has much that is voluntary. Hence it is that a man may have firm persuasions, without being able to assign the precise grounds of them. Moreover, among these unreasoned convictions there are some that are blind, and some that are rational. Blind convictions are arbitrary, groundless, and often erroneous, although, by accident, they may be true. Rational persuasions, which a man holds, without being able to assign the grounds of them, are such as rest upon really solid grounds, known indeed directly, and comprehended sufficiently to command assent, but not sufficiently analyzed by reflection to enable him

to express them either to himself or others, if he is questioned about them. The mind, the persuasions of such a man lack something, namely, the development of reflection; nevertheless, he possesses truth and a persuasion of the truth, strong enough to produce repose of spirit. He may even enjoy repose of mind, if, by refusing attention to his inner questionings, he succeed in stifling them. He is then in the same condition as if the questions had not been put.

7.

Philosophy the restorer of repose of intellect.

But the mind of such a man, that is, his faculty of demonstration, considered with reference to itself, and not with reference to persuasion and quiet of spirit, or to the possession of truth and certitude, has not satisfied its own demands, and, hence, has not found repose. Philosophy is what restores scientific repose of intellect.

8.

Difference between demonstration and persuasion.

There is, therefore, a *popular knowing*, sufficient for the purposes of ordinary life, and there is a *philosophical knowing*, calculated to satisfy the demands of the faculty of demonstration. The latter is the work of *reflection*, carried forward to the discovery of ultimate grounds.

Rosmini devotes a considerable number of pages in his *New Essay* to clearing up the distinction between direct, popular, and philosophical cognition. "*Direct cognition*,"

he says, "consists of intellective perceptions and the ideas which detach themselves from perceptions. Reflection, set in motion by language, then comes forward, and its first steps are those whereby it marks the *relations*, *immediate* or almost immediate, of the things perceived and apprehended. This first operation of reflection does not yet analyze the single perceptions and ideas of things. It leaves them entire * as they were when it first acquired them, merely contemplating them together. It is still a synthetic operation of which all persons are capable. Hence, it forms a large part, not to say the whole, of common or *popular science*. *Philosophical science*, on the contrary, begins with the analysis of simple objects. When things perceived submit themselves to analysis, they acquire a singular light, which is what ennobles the wisdom of the wise. This analysis may be considered the starting-point of philosophy. Setting out from it, philosophy proceeds to confirm those great relations between beings (*esseri*) which the great mass of mankind have already observed, and, we might almost say, intuitively noted. Hence, popular science occupies an intermediate position between direct science on the one hand, and philosophical science on the other. It springs from a first reflection, whereas philosophical science requires a second reflection. The *first* strong *reflection* of popular cognition adds no new matter to cognition, but merely discovers new immediate relations in it. The reflections which follow bring out other relations between the preceding cognitions. If *direct cognition* enjoys immunity from error, the case is very different with *popular cognition*, which is already partly the fruit of reflection, not to say also partly of imagination. *Philosophical cognition*, moreover, is, of all the forms of cognition, the most liable to error, being the offspring of a more remote reflection" (§§ 1264–1267). Rosmini's distinction between the three kinds of knowing is almost exactly the same as that which Aristotle draws between perception (αἴσθησις), experience (ἐμπειρία), and

* Συγκεχυμένα, as Aristotle says: see *Physica*, i. 1, 184 a, 21 sq.

theory (τέχνη) or science (ἐπιστήμη).* To Aristotle's distinction between theory and science, viz. that the former deals with production or becoming, the latter with being ("Ὃ ἂν ἐν ἅπασιν ἓν ἐνῇ ἐκείνοις τὸ αὐτό, τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἐὰν μὲν περὶ τὴν γένεσιν, τέχνης, ἐὰν δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐπιστήμης." *Anal. Post.*, ii. 19, 100 a, 7, seq.), Rosmini has nothing corresponding. The distinction between special sciences and philosophy comes very near it. St. Thomas, of course, follows Aristotle, as do the Scholastics generally. Kant's distinction between experience (*Erfahrung*), understanding, and reason† is equivalent to the one made by Aristotle, since Kant's experience corresponds to Aristotle's perception. Even Hegel's distinction of the stages of knowing into consciousness, self-consciousness, and reason is not essentially different,‡ although under the term reason are included religion, which, according to Rosmini, is, as such, no part of philosophy at all (§ 151), and absolute knowing, which he would attribute only to God (*Theosophy*, i. § 11). It is needless to say that Rosmini totally rejects Hegel's *process*, as well as the identification of reason and spirit (*Geist*) which results from it§ (*Theosophy*, vol. iv. p. 459).

Rosmini has treated, at great length, of the nature of persuasion, the difference between it and certainty, truth, and conviction, and the part which the will plays in it (*Logic*, §§ 136 sq., 1099 sq.; *New Essay*, §§ 1335 sq., 1044 sq.).

He treats also, at considerable length, of the nature of mental satisfaction (*appagamento*). "We distinguish," he says, "*satisfaction* from *persuasion*, considering persuasion as an effect or state which remains in a man every time he adheres and assents to any truth, but which does not necessarily take away his curiosity to discover a further ground, whereas satisfaction is a more universal effect or state of the mind, causing it to search no further, and

* *Metaph.*, i. 1; cf. the commentaries of Schwegler and Bonitz.
† *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Einleitung.
‡ *Phænomenlogie des Geistes*, throughout.
§ *Phæn. des Geistes*, pp. 327, sqq.

leaving it without the thought that there is anything further to search into. . . . Satisfaction may be absolute or relative" (*Logic*, § 1161). "Absolute satisfaction arises when these two extremes are realized: (1) That the mind shall have succeeded in knowing the ultimate grounds of things, so that no further research remains possible; (2) That it shall be conscious of having thus succeeded. If it did not recognize as ultimate grounds those which it has discovered, even though they really were such, it would still feel as if it ought to continue its search and therefore would not be satisfied" (§ 1162). Inasmuch as absolute ultimate grounds are inaccessible to man on account of the limitations of his nature, he must content himself with grounds that are ultimate with respect to these (see note to § 2). "For satisfaction of mind, therefore, it is necessary, *First*, that a man consciously, and therefore reflectively, succeed in reaching the ultimate formal ground; *Second*, that being unable to find the last real ground, he make allowance for his impotence and resign himself to the necessity of the limit imposed on him by nature" (*Logic*, § 1168). But as such satisfaction is only relative, it follows that this is the only form of mental satisfaction possible in this life.

9.

The first questions put by Philosophy, and their consequences.

In endeavouring to discover these grounds, a man must set out from the intellectual condition in which he finds himself (§ 4). And the first question he puts to himself takes this form: "I imagine I know many things, but what is my knowing itself? May I not be deceived? Why may not all that I think I know be a delusion?" These questions lead him to the discovery of *Ideology* and *Logic*, which, as having ideas for their object, are Sciences of Intuition.

Rosmini distinguishes between *regressive philosophy*, which, "by way of reflection, conducts the mind to find the principle from which the science of being is derived; *progressive philosophy*, or *Theosophy*, which is that same science of being, derived from its principle; and *mediate philosophy*, which furnishes the conditions, formal (*Logic*) as well as material (*Psychology*), of the passage of the mind from regressive philosophy (*Ideology*) to progressive philosophy (*Theosophy*)" (*Theosophy*, i. § 16). Schelling made the same distinction between regressive and progressive philosophy. This whole subject is treated at considerable length in the *New Essay*, vol. i. Preliminary, §§ 31–35.

The starting-point of the man who begins to philosophize is one of four starting-points which are frequently confounded, but which Rosmini distinguishes with care. These are—(1) man's starting-point when he first begins to develop; (2) the starting-point of the human spirit; (3) the starting-point of the man who begins to philosophize; and (4) the starting-point of philosophy as science, or of the system of human cognition. The first he considers to be external sensation; the second, the *notion* of being; the third, the point of mental growth which the man has reached; and the fourth, "that luminous point from which all other cognitions derive their clearness of certainty and truth, viz., the *idea* of being" (*New Essay*, vol. i. Preliminary, § 5; more at length vol. iii. §§ 1468–1472). In regard to the third of these starting-points, which is the one that at present concerns us, he says, "When a man begins to philosophize, he is already developed. . . . Now he cannot set out from any other point than that at which he is. To do anything else is impossible for him. Condillac and Bonnet, in their discourses, pretend to transport themselves to the first beginning of cognition and imagine a statue with one sense. But in doing so, no matter whether well or ill, they take an immense leap; they seek to cross an abyss in trying to forget, all at once, the intellectual condition in which they are, in order to watch, as spectators of another nature, the effect of the first sensations which a man feels. The time for that is past for them, for ever past" (*New Essay*, vol. iii. § 1471).

Philosophy conducts from the certainty that things *seem* to the certainty that they *are;* in other words, from subjective persuasion to objective conviction. If being and knowing were the same, as Parmenides and Hegel allege, there would be no place for philosophy, inasmuch as there would be no distinction between an hallucination and a true cognition. It is curious that Tennyson, in the later editions of *In Memoriam*, has altered *seems* to *is* in the lines (cxiii. 6):

> "And what I am beheld again
> What *seems*, and no man understands."

Sciences of Intuition.

(*Ideology and Logic.*)

Rosmini defines *intuition* as "the (receptive) act of the soul, whereby it receives the communication of intelligible or ideal being," and adds, "This act is called intelligence by Aristotle, who says that 'intelligence is of indivisibles,'* calling indivisibles the essences of things which are seen in ideas. Hence, in the language of the Schoolmen, *cognitio simplicis intelligentiæ* means the same thing as cognition of possibles. For this reason it is clear that Kant perverted the language of philosophy, when he usurped the word *intuition* to mean sense perception. In making this alteration in the meaning of the word, he gave proof of the sensism which lies at the basis of his system, attributing to sense the act which specially belongs to intelligence" (*Psychology*, vol. i. § 53). Kant defines *intuition* thus: "Through the medium of sensibility objects are given to us, and it alone furnishes us with intuitions."† It is against this doctrine, than which nothing can be more false, that Rosmini's system is specially directed. Rosmini most emphatically denies that objects are given to us through the senses. Intelligence alone has an *object:* the

* This is not strictly correct. Aristotle merely says, "Ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων νόησις ἐν τούτοις περὶ ἃ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ψεῦδος" (*De An.*, iii. 6, 1).

† *Kritik der rein. Vern., Die transcend. Æsthetik*, § 1.

senses have only *terms*.* When he says that "to have before the mind the essence of things, without any affirmation on the part of the subject, is called *to intuite*" (*Logic*, § 320), he agrees exactly with St. Thomas, who says, "*Intelligere dicit nihil aliud quam simplicem* INTUITUM *intellectûs in id quod sibi est præsens intelligible*" (*Sent.*, dist. iii. art. 5, q. 5).

1. *Ideology.*

10.

Ideology and Logic.

Ideology undertakes to investigate the nature of human knowledge; Logic, to show that the nature of this knowledge is such as not to admit the possibility of error. Hence error must be looked for elsewhere than in the nature of knowledge. Error is not knowledge.

Ideology forms the subject of Rosmini's earliest important work, the *New Essay on the Origin of Ideas*, as well as of the voluminous treatise, *The Restoration of Philosophy in Italy*, the treatise on *The Idea*, forming the second half of the fourth volume of the *Theosophy*, and the polemical work, *Aristotle Explained and Examined* (see Bibliography). As Ideology is presupposed in every science, it is frequently touched upon in every one of Rosmini's works. "*Ideology*," he says, "treats of being, the object of the mind; *Psychology*, of the soul, which is the principle of human feeling. These, therefore, are the two sciences which furnish the rudiments of all the others. All the others, in the last analysis, resolve themselves into these two" (*Psychology*, vol. i. § 46).

As Rosmini's chief philosophical merits lie in the direction of Ideology, it will be necessary here to point out what he did for that science, as well as what that science, as developed by him, does for philosophy.

* See under §§ 15, 18, 74.

Aristotle, in the first chapter of the first book of his *Psychology*, calls attention, in concise terms, to a fundamental difficulty incident to all philosophical research. "It is difficult," he says, "to determine whether we ought first to investigate the different parts of the soul or their functions, the intellective principle or intelligence, the sensitive principle or sensation. And even if we begin with the functions, there remains still another perplexity, whether we ought not to investigate the terms of the principles before the principles themselves, the intelligible before the intellective principle, and the sensible before the sensitive principle." * In other words, if we consider merely intelligence and its conditions, it is difficult to know whether philosophy ought to begin with a theory of cognition, with logic, or with metaphysics. With whichever of the three we set out, we soon find that we have presupposed the other two. As Hegel puts it, "A beginning, in so far as it is an immediate, makes an assumption, or, rather, is itself an assumption." † If we begin with logic, we find that we have presupposed the main truths both of the theory of cognition and of metaphysics. Without the former, the nature of the form of concepts would be unintelligible; without the latter, the nature of their content. In regard to the former, Jaesche, the editor of Kant's *Logic*, says, "Kant never thought of trying to find a ground for the logical proposition of identity and contradiction, or of deducing the logical forms of judgments. He accepted and used the principle of contradiction as a proposition carrying its own evidence with it, and requiring no deduction from a higher principle. . . . Whether, however, the logical propositions of identity and contradiction, absolutely and in themselves, admit and require

* "Χαλεπὸν . . . διορίσαι . . . πότερον τὰ μόρια χρὴ ζητεῖν πρότερον ἢ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν, οἷον τὸ νοεῖν ἢ τὸν νοῦν, καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ τὸ αἰσθητικόν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. εἰ δὲ τὰ ἔργα πρότερον, πάλιν ἄν τις ἀπορήσειεν εἰ τὰ ἀντικείμενα πρότερα τούτων ζητητέον, οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ καὶ τὸ νοητὸν τοῦ νοητικοῦ" (*De An.*, i. 1, 6, 7; 402 b, 10 sqq.). When Belger (*Hermes*, xiii. p. 32) proposes to read in the last sentence αἰσθάνεσθαι for αἰσθητικοῦ, and νοεῖν for νοητικοῦ, he only shows that he does not understand the passage.

† *Encyclopædie*, Einleitung, § 1, *ad fin.*

a deduction from a higher principle, is another question, which leads to the important inquiry whether there is at all any absolutely first principle of all cognition and science. . . . But since, on the other hand, these highest principles of knowledge, considered *as* principles, with equal necessity presuppose the logical form, the result is a circle, which cannot, indeed, be resolved for science, but may be explained." * In regard to the dependence of logic upon metaphysics, Trendelenburg says, "Thought, with its forms, will hardly be known without an examination of the reciprocal action between it and the nature of its objects." † If, on the other hand, we begin with a theory of knowledge, we find that it involves both logic and metaphysics. As F. A. Lange says, "The theory of cognition is based upon logic, metaphysics, and psychology, and, therefore, has no unifying principle. It will appear farther on that this science is resolvable into a (Kantian) purely *à priori* search for the postulates which cognition presupposes, and the psychological theory of cognition, which is of a purely empirical nature. Both branches of the science presuppose an accurate investigation of the logical forms." ‡ Again, if we set out with metaphysics, we plainly presuppose logic, and, therefore, also a theory of cognition. Zeller is perfectly correct when he says, "Logic, as scientific methodology, must precede all investigation of the real; and this is true with regard not only to all those sciences which deal with particular branches of the real (nature or the human spirit), but even to metaphysics and the most general portion of them, viz. ontology. Even ontology will never be successfully treated until we come to an understanding in regard to the mode of its treatment; that is, until we know whether it is to be handled in an *à priori* or in an *à posteriori* manner, by reflection upon something given or by dialectic construction." § It is thus plain that science, and

* *Imm. Kant's Logik*, Vorrede, pp. 7, 8, edit. Kirchmann.

† *Logische Untersuchungen*, vol. i. p. 17.

‡ *Logische Studien*, p. 1, note.

§ *Ueber Bedeutung und Aufgabe der Erkenntnisstheorie. Ein akademischer Vortrag* (Heidelberg, 1862), p. 8. An admirable discourse!

especially philosophy, have, as regards their method, been from the first involved in a vicious circle, which, at best, might be explained in some mystical, ontological way, but out of which it has seemed impossible to get. Wherever science has begun, it has always had to assume something, which had to be demonstrated by a process dependent upon that assumption. Under these circumstances we need hardly wonder if scepticism with regard to the validity of all knowledge has appeared at many times and under many forms. Science, from the days of Aristotle to our own, has been moving, for the most part, in a circle of correlates, not one of which contains any self-evident truth, but each of which appeals for support to the others.

Rosmini's great and chief merit in philosophy was that he found a way out of this vicious circle—found, by mere observation, and without assuming the truth of the method of that observation, a luminous point in thought, which clearly shone with its own light and defied all attempts not only to find, but even to seek for, an origin or ground outside of and beyond it. This luminous point was *ideal being*, at once the form of thought, the principle of truth, and the essence of objectivity. By means of this discovery he was able to lay the basis of a new science, which not only takes precedence of all others, but upon which all others, including logic itself, depend for their truth and their principles. This is the Science of Ideology, to have discovered and elaborated which is a merit not inferior to that of the father of logic. If finding an irrefragable basis for all truth is the greatest of scientific merits, then that merit unquestionably belongs to Rosmini.

"Ideology," says Rosmini, "is the science of the intellective light, whereby man renders intelligible to himself the sensible things from which he draws the sum total of knowledge. Of course, Ideology neither creates nor invents this light, which is found in the idea, or rather is the idea itself; neither does it impart the intuition of it, for the power to do this belongs solely to the creator and framer of human nature; but it does transport this light from the order of intuition into the order of scientific reflection, and thus forms the science of it.

"The sciences are the product of the reflex free thought, whereby man renders himself conscious of that which he already knows, and renders more explicit, orderly, and tractable, or applicable to action, the knowledge of which he is conscious. Order not only binds together the parts of each science, but even the sciences themselves.

"This order, which binds together all the sciences, renders conscious human knowledge not only useful but beautiful, and is what constitutes the Encyclopædia of the Sciences, that is, an encyclopædia, not in the sense of a mass of material flung together at random and distributed according to the letters of the alphabet, but in the sense of a whole, organic, one and harmonious.

"And as soon as Ideology has made scientifically known what is the natural light of the mind, the principle of such an encyclopædia is found, and, when the principle is found, there is found also the encyclopædia itself, that is, the natural order of the sciences, which is virtually contained in that principle and may be deduced from it. This is a new ground which proves that Ideology must be placed at the head of the sciences, since from it these derive their principal distribution. As soon as this is done, the position of every other science may be assigned. And we believe that all those persons who undertake to treat any science, ought first to take the trouble diligently to determine the place which belongs to that science in the great body of the knowable; because, when we know what place belongs to it, and what member it forms, in the great body, it receives completeness and beauty, its sphere may be defined and its limits assigned. And this is an indispensable condition of systematic progress in the treatment of the sciences" (*Logic*, Preface, §§ 1–3).

Ideology, which transports ideal being from the region of intuition into that of reflection and consciousness, is the science which accounts for and explains the origin of those concepts which logic necessarily uses and accepts as given, but which it has been wont to refer for explanation to a succeeding system of metaphysics dependent upon its own method of dealing with these concepts. It is, therefore,

the true fundamental science of knowledge, and furnishes the true solution of the problem so clearly stated, but so poorly solved, by Aristotle.*

II.

Internal observation the method of Ideology.

The following is the method of Ideology. We cannot know the nature of human knowledge unless we observe it as it is. Hence internal observation, which fixes the attention upon cognitions and brings them clearly into view, is the instrument of ideology, and the *method* to be pursued in dealing with it.

In other words, the instrument of *regressive philosophy*—that whereby it seeks to reach a principle of certainty—is observation of the phenomena of consciousness, apart from any theory respecting them, their truth or falsehood. Nothing is assumed in regard to these phenomena. That they *are* is not an assumption, but a certainty, which the most determined sceptic in the world cannot rid himself of. Their existence cannot even be denied without being first admitted. Of course, since the truth of the method cannot be assumed, so neither can that of the result. If the result is to be accepted as unconditionally true, its truth must be immediately self-evident. The process of observation is like that of finding one's way out of a labyrinth to the light of day. My certainty that I see the light, when I emerge, is in no way dependent upon the gropings and wanderings by which I escaped from the darkness. Observation is attentive groping. It is not the beginning of philosophy, properly speaking, but the starting-point of the

* Aristotle placed logic at the head of the sciences, but was obliged to treat its fundamental principle, the law of identity and contradiction, in the *Metaphysics* (iii. 3; 1005 b, 19). The difficulties herein involved were so great that his followers had to say that logic was not a part, but an instrument, of science. Hence the term *organon*. See Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, vol. ii. pt. ii. p. 182, n. 5.

man who means to philosophize (see under § 9). It involves no presupposition, and in this respect differs from all other possible starting-points. It ends in the discovery of a principle of certainty, from which philosophy may begin.

Philosophy, therefore, sets out with a certainty, and not with an hypothesis, and Rosmini on several occasions combats Hegel, who held the opposite view. Speaking of the question, With what must philosophy begin? he says, "Hegel felt the importance of this question, and replied that whatever philosophy may begin with, that beginning must always be an hypothesis, since all immediate knowing is purely hypothetical.* This doctrine was suggested by sensism, from which the German school could never purge itself, although it assumed the title of Transcendental Idealism. In fact, it recognizes as immediate nothing but sense-experience, and this it calls the starting-point of philosophy.† It accepts the Aristotelian dictum, *Nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu*,‡ and its system consists in adding that *Nihil est in sensu quod prius non fuerit in intellectu.* Hence it admits the two dicta as reciprocally true, and sums itself up in these words: 'What is rational is actual, and what is actual is rational.'§ Now, it is plain enough that, if philosophy have no other point of departure than sense-experience, internal or external, inasmuch as pure sense is non-cognition, and the cognition of sensible things presents itself to the mind of the philosopher as so many subjective cognitions, he must regard these as hypotheses, as data not yet fully verified. But is it true, as this philosopher asserts, that the starting-point of philosophy is experience? This is, indeed, an *hypothesis* of his, and it is a curious thing to see, while he refuses to admit anything that is not demonstrated, and

* Hegel, *Encyclop.*, vol. i. p. 4, § 1; p. 25, § 17.

† *Ibid.* §§ 1–12.

‡ "Μὴ αἰσθανόμενος μηθὲν, οὐθὲν ἂν μάθοι (ὁ νοῦς) οὐδὲ ξυνείη" (*De An.*, iii. 8, 3; 432 a, 7: cf. *De Sens.*, 6, 445 b, 16, and Leibniz, *Nouv. Essais*, ii. 1). Hegel is hardly right when he says that this dictum is falsely attributed to Aristotle (*Encyclop.*, Einleitung, § 8).

§ "Was vernünftig ist, das ist wirklich; und was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig" (*Philosophie des Rechts*, p. 17; cf. *Encyclop.*, vol. i. p. 10, § 6).

denies philosophical value to all immediate knowledge, with what confidence he sets out with this assertion, supposing it to be an infallible truth that experience is the starting-point of philosophy, and not only omitting to prove it, but even neglecting to subject it to any examination. This habit of placing the starting-point of philosophy in sense-experience is peculiar to that class of philosophers who begin with the subject, that is, the soul. But Hegel, by admitting that to begin with experience is to begin with an hypothesis, admits, at the same time, that this is not truly the beginning of philosophy, which is not an hypothesis, but is, on the contrary, as we have said, a necessary doctrine. For this reason, it is only where the necessary begins that theoretic philosophy can begin.

"Moreover, when Hegel, assuming that philosophy sets out from experience, lays down the universal dictum, 'Whatever philosophy may begin with, that beginning must always be an hypothesis,' he only takes a leap from the particular to the universal, drawing one of those illogical conclusions so frequent in our philosopher, who persuades himself that there cannot be anything but what presents itself to his imagination, and that is very little. If he had reflected that external and internal sense, the sources of experience, as well as the other faculties of the human subject and the human subject itself, are merely *material conditions*, necessary, not to the existence of the truth, but to making possible its communication to man (it could not be communicated to a subject which did not exist or had not the power of receiving the communication), he would have readily understood that these material conditions cannot constitute the principle of the required theory of truth, albeit the search for the truth presupposes them, exactly as a scaffolding, though necessary for the construction of a building, is neither the principle of the building nor even the smallest part of it. How afterwards experience and the subject of it enter into the theory of the whole, which absorbs them without being the principle of them, remains to be seen from the theory itself" (*Theosophy*, vol. i. §§ 19, 20; cf. § 53).

Rosmini distinguishes *internal* from *external observation* thus: "Internal observation has for its matter intuition and the objects intuited, the feelings, the perceptions, and all that a man perceives within himself. Hence internal observation is the source of the initial sciences of philosophy, Ideology and Psychology. External observation is the starting-point of all the physical sciences. To the faithful, practical application of this principle must be ascribed the wonderful progress made by the physical and mechanical sciences in modern times; and it is to the neglect of internal observation that is due the backward condition of those sciences which rest on it. The strangest feature in the case is, that these sciences were even dwarfed and loaded with most superficial prejudices by those very persons who with most ostentation proclaimed the method of observation and experience. The reason was that they prized *external observation*, but did not know *internal observation*. They preached and lauded observation in general, at the same time ignoring that species of observation which would have been most useful to them. Directing their attention only to external observation, which is valid only for material things, and not for mind (*spirito*), they arrived at two unfortunate results: (1) They sterilized the metaphysical sciences by rejecting certain things not supplied by external experience; (2) They materialized and wasted these sciences, transferring to the sphere of spiritual things what was derived from external observation, and could belong only to material things" (*Logic*, § 951).

12.

Objection to the validity of observation answered.

It will perhaps be objected that, until the validity of observation be demonstrated, it cannot be used as an authority. Such objection, however, has no force, inasmuch as we do not set out by assuming observation as a means of de-

monstration, but merely accept it provisionally as a means of fixing what is to be demonstrated further on. Then the results of observation, assumed at first as mere appearances, will show themselves to be true and certain, carrying with them a proof of their own truth, so irrefragable that the contrary of them shall be impossible.

13.

Human cognitions, though innumerable, have a common element.

Let us, then, carefully observe human cognitions. These are innumerable, so that, if we were to consider them one by one, the task would be infinite. However, we are not looking for that wherein they differ, but for that wherein they coincide. Now, they all coincide in being cognitions, and what we are trying to observe and study is neither more nor less than the nature of cognition itself. We must, therefore, first of all, try to find out what all our cognitions have in common, since this common element will be the essence of cognition.

Rosmini here calls into play a faculty entirely different from that of observation, viz., abstraction. It is, of course, only by abstraction that we can discover a common element in any class of things or thoughts. However, as the validity of the whole process is not assumed, and, indeed, is indifferent, the subsequent reasoning is not vitiated. That we do abstract is as much a fact as that we observe, whatever its meaning and conditions may be.

14.

Cognition of real entities is an internal affirmation or judgment.

When the problem is thus narrowed down, I see that, in the case of a very large number of cognitions at least, I can have them only by means of an act by which I *affirm* something. For example, I know that I exist; I know that there exist other beings similar to me; I know that there exist extended bodies, having length, breadth, and thickness. For the present I do not ask whether my knowing deceive me or not. I have what *I call* a knowledge of all these things, and I am trying to discover how I came by it. Now, I see that I should not know that there exists even a single entity, if I did not say, or had not sometime said, to myself that that entity exists. To know, therefore, that an entity exists, and to say to myself that it exists, are one and the same thing. My cognition, therefore, of real entities is only an internal *affirmation* or *judgment*. Knowing this, I have only to analyze this judgment and observe what are its elements. In this way I shall, perhaps, have advanced a step toward the discovery of the nature of cognition itself.

This section contains the pith of what is distinctive in Rosmini's philosophy, viz. the doctrine that in thought synthesis must precede analysis, virtual judgment go before actual conception or particular cognition. Most previous systems of philosophy and logic had assumed the order of thought to be—(1) Ideas, (2) Judgments, (3) Reasoning or syllogisms (see *New Essay*, vol. i. § 227, n. 1). Even Kant, who admitted that "we can reduce all the acts of the understanding to judgments, so that the understanding

may be conceived generally as the faculty of judging,"* nevertheless assumed concepts as given through the spontaneity of thought, and therefore as not requiring explanation. "All intuitions," he says, "as sensible, are based upon affections [*i.e.* πάθη]; concepts, therefore, upon functions. I mean by function the unity of the act which arranges diverse presentments (*Vorstellungen*) under a common one. Concepts, therefore, are based upon the spontaneity of thought, as sensible intuitions are upon the receptivity of impressions."† According to this doctrine, the formation of concepts is not a rational act, but a spontaneous function of the thinking faculty. In other words, the synthesis which is the necessary prior condition of all analytical judgments, is a primitive, given fact, and the only question requiring or admitting explanation is, how it is that in judging we are often obliged to predicate of these concepts attributes not contained in them, or, to use Kant's language, how synthetic judgments *à priori* are possible. Rosmini takes exception to this view of the matter. "Kant," he says, "propounded the problem of ideology in this way: How are synthetic judgments *à priori* possible? that is, those judgments in which the predicate is neither contained in the concept of the subject nor supplied by experience. Hence the problem in question may be likewise expressed thus: How is it possible that we sometimes attribute to a given subject a predicate neither derived from experience nor contained in the concept of the subject? When the question is presented in this form, it seems to be assumed that, if we could find the predicate either in the *concept of the subject* or in *experience*, there would remain no further difficulty to overcome. But, in the first place, even if we could find the predicate in the

* "Wir können alle Handlungen des Verstandes auf Urtheile zurückführen, so dass der Verstand überhaupt als ein Vermögen zu urtheilen vorgestellt werden kann" (*Kritik der r. Vernunft. Transcend. Log.*, Bk. I. pt. i. § 1).

† "Alle Anschauungen als sinnlich beruhen auf Affektionen, die Begriffe also auf Funktionen. Ich verstehe aber unter Funktion die Einheit der Handlung verschiedene Vorstellungen unter einer gemeinschaftlichen zu ordnen. Begriffe gründen sich also auf der Spontaneität des Denkens, wie sinnliche Anschauungen auf der Receptivität der Eindrücke" (*Ibid.*).

concept of the subject, we should have to suppose that we already had that concept. It is a pity that the difficulty consists precisely in forming to ourselves the concept of the subject, in thinking things *as* existing, in making them become *objects* of the mind, and, in that way, the subjects of our judgments. When we have once supposed the concepts of things already formed, what difficulty can there be in analyzing or connecting them in any way? The whole knot of the difficulty consists in clearly showing the manner in which we form the concepts of things. Plainly, we cannot form the concepts of things, if we do not think existence in them, and this supposes that we already have the *idea* of existence, which idea cannot come either from mere sensations, because these are particular, nor from the concepts of the things, since these are not yet formed.

"In the second place, the manner in which Kant presents the problem of ideology assumes that, whenever we can find the predicate through sense-experience, there remains no further difficulty. It is true, indeed, that sense-experience may, in a certain fashion, supply us with a predicate; for example, when I judge a wall to be white, I am induced to apply to it the predicate *white* from the experience of the senses. Nevertheless, I must first have the concept of this particular subject to which I apply the predicate of whiteness, that is, I must have first thought it as a thing existing. Therefore the difficulty above alluded to returns: How can I think a being [ὄν τι]? in other words, conceive a real as existing? The idea of existence, which I always require in order to form the concept of anything, cannot be derived by abstraction from the concept itself, since nothing can be derived from a concept which is not yet formed. . . . The difficulty, therefore, cannot consist in finding a predicate to attribute to a subject whose concept is already formed, but in finding the origin of the concept of the subject" (*New Essay*, vol. i. §§ 353, 354). Rosmini takes up, one after another, the examples of synthetic judgments *à priori* offered by Kant: *first*, the arithmetical one, 7 + 5 = 12; *second*, the geometrical one, A straight line is the shortest distance between

two points; *third*, the physical one, In all the changes of the physical world the quantity of matter remains unchanged; and *fourth*, the metaphysical one, Every event must have a cause;* and shows, by a careful analysis, that every one of them is analytic (*New Essay*, vol. i. §§ 346–352). He then proceeds to demonstrate that our only really synthetic judgments *à priori* are those by which concepts are formed, and that these presuppose nothing innate in the mind save the idea of being. In this way he shows that Kant's whole scheme of subjective categories—Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality, with their subdivisions—was invented to explain something which does not exist.† According to Rosmini, the order of thought is—(1) Intuition of being, (2) Sensation, (3) Synthetic judgment, resulting in (4) Concept, (5) Analytic judgment, (6) Reasoning.‡

"The problem: How is the object of thought formed?—the object which becomes the subject of subsequent judgments—or, more briefly, How are concepts formed?—is the entire object of our investigation. Let us then analyze it under this form. . . .

"In order that we may form a concept of a thing, we require an intrinsic judgment, by means of which we consider that thing objectively, or in itself, not as a modification of ourselves; in a word, we consider it in its possible existence. Now, as in every judgment (supposing it already formed) there must be a subject and a predicate, we must inquire, first, what is the subject and what the predicate in the judgment in question; and then, whence we obtain that subject and that predicate.

"Now, in the present instance, the predicate is merely *existence*, since to perceive a thing intellectually is merely to perceive it in itself, or in the existence which it may have. The subject, on the other hand, is the thing as

* See *Kritik der r. Vernunft*, Einleitung, vi.: *Prolegomena*, Vorerinnerung, § 2 (*c*). Rosmini's treatment of this last judgment is masterly.

† Cf. under §§ 18, 35.

‡ Cf. under § 43, where 2–5 are united as judgment, involving perception of the real and conception.

having affected our senses, that which has acted upon them. . . .

"In the analysis, therefore, of the primitive judgment, whereby we form the *concepts* of things, *i.e.* ideas, there are found a *subject* (if, thus isolated, it may be so termed) given merely by the senses and of which we have not yet any intellectual concept, and a *predicate* (the idea of existence) which cannot in any manner be given by the senses, and of which, in consequence, no explanation can be afforded by those philosophers who undertake to derive all human knowledge from the senses. The problem, therefore, of Ideology is: To know how that primitive judgment whereby we intellectually perceive things felt [*sensa*], and so form concepts of them, is possible" (*New Essay*, vol. i. § 355).

15.

The notion of being in general is a necessary condition of the cognition of particular real beings.

When I say to myself that there exists any particular real being or entity, I should not understand my own meaning if I did not know what entity was. Therefore the *notion* of *being* or *entity* in general must be in my mind before I can pronounce any of those judgments whereby I affirm the existence of any particular real entity.

In this section and in the preceding one, Rosmini draws that distinction which is fundamental in his philosophy—the distinction between real and ideal being, or between reality and ideality. These terms are explained further on. At present it will suffice to say that by the real is meant that which affects the senses or the sense; in other words, the *felt* subjective and extra-subjective.* By the ideal is meant that which is purely objective, pure objectivity. The former is the *term* of feeling; the latter, the *object* of intelligence (cf. under §§ 18, 74). The following definitions, taken from the *Theosophy* (vol. i. § 211),

* Cf. under §§ 35, 78.

may be useful here. They are explained at length, *Theosophy*, §§ 213–239.

"*Being* [*essere, esse, εἶναι, Sein*] is the act of every being (*beënt?*) and every entity.

"*Being* [*ente, ens, ὄν, Seiendes*] has two definitions:

(*a*) A subject having being (*essè*);

(*b*) Being (*esse*) with one or another of its terms.

"*Entity* [*entità, entitas, οὐσία, Wesen*] is any object of thought, regarded by the thought as one.

"*Essence*, [*essenza, essentia, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, Wesenheit*] is being (*esse*) possessed by a subject, but abstracted from the subject which possesses it (cf. under § 18).

"*Subject in general* [*subjetto in universale, subjectum, ὑποκείμενον, Gegenstand*] is that which in a being (*ens*) or in a group of entities is conceived as the first container (*primum continens*) and cause of unity."

The second sentence of this section expresses a cardinal doctrine of Rosmini's system, which is, that, since all concepts are the result of a judgment requiring a subject and a predicate, and since only subjects are supplied directly by the senses, therefore the first, most simple predicate—that is, being, *the pure essence of objectivity*—must be present in the mind prior to the first particular concept. It may be said that the whole of the *New Essay* is devoted to the establishment and development of this doctrine. In the first volume, the author, after stating the purpose of the treatise and the difficulties surrounding its subject, enters into a criticism of the more important previous systems which have attempted to explain the origin of knowledge. These systems he arranges in two classes. In the first he places those that err from assigning to the mind too small a share in the production of concepts; in the second, those that err in the opposite direction. In the first he includes the systems of Locke, Condillac, Reid, and Stewart; in the second, those of Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz, and Kant. His criticisms of Stewart and Kant are especially remarkable. In the second volume, after showing that we have the idea of being and explaining its nature, he proceeds to show that it cannot be derived either

from bodily sensations, from the feeling of individual existence, from reflection in Locke's sense, or from the act of perception, and concludes that it must therefore be innate. The remainder of the volume is devoted to showing how, through this one innate formal idea and the material derived from sensation, all other ideas may be formed and explained (§ 471). The third volume treats of the criterion of certainty and its application to human cognitions and reasonings.

Sir William Hamilton (*Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic*, vol. ii. p. 366 sq.) says, "I pronounce Existence to be a NATIVE COGNITION, because I find that I cannot think except under the condition of thinking all that I am conscious of to exist. Existence is thus a form, a category of thought." This, so far as it goes, is precisely the doctrine of Rosmini, who, however, goes farther and asserts that existence or being is the *only* form native to the mind, the only idea that can be thought by itself, and the only one necessary in order to explain the origin of all others (*New Essay*, §§ 410–412). That we cannot think without the idea of being, that being is contained in every other idea and category, is a self-evident fact. The idea of being, which forms the universal condition of thought, Rosmini finds to be *objective*, merely *possible* or *ideal, simple, one, identical, universal, necessary, immutable, eternal,* and *indeterminate*—attributes not one of which belongs to sensation. It cannot, therefore, be derived from sensation. Similar reasoning shows that it cannot be derived from any other external source open to man. Indeed, if man were placed in front of all the possible sources of knowledge, he could not draw from any of them without first having the idea of being, since without it he could not make anything an *object*, and therefore could not know anything. It follows from all this that the idea of being is innate.

Rosmini quotes a very striking passage from St. Bonaventura, to show that that philosopher held the same doctrine: "Mira igitur est cæcitas intellectus, qui non *considerat* illud quod prius *videt*, et sine quo nihil potest

cognoscere. Sed sicut oculus intentus in varias colorum differentias, lumen per quod videt cætera, non videt, et si videt, non tamen advertit ; sic oculus mentis nostræ intentus in ista entia particularia et universalia, IPSUM ESSE EXTRA OMNE GENUS, licet primo occurrat menti, et per ipsum alia, tamen non advertit (*Itiner. Mentis in Deum.* cap. v.)" (*New Essay*, § 472, n. 2). The difference between Rosmini's view, however, and that of St. Bonaventura is very great, inasmuch as the latter does not conceive being to be an innate idea, or, indeed, an idea at all. Many philosophers, besides and before St. Bonaventura, held that the first thing known or revealed to the mind was universal being, or *the* universal, which is the same thing. Aristotle, for example, repeatedly says that the first in reason is the universal, whereas the first in sensation is the individual (κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸν λόγον τὰ καθόλου πρότερα, κατὰ δὲ τὴν αἴσθησιν τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα (*Metaph.*, iv. 11 : 1018 b, 32. ; cf. *Phys.*, i. 5 : 189 a, 5). And the same thing is asserted, though indirectly, still more strongly, in *Metaph.*, iii. 3 : 1005 b, 19 sq., in the principle of contradiction, which Aristotle regards as the most certain of all principles. Rosmini himself also quotes from St. Thomas the assertion that "the object of the intellect is common being or truth," * and he might easily have found even a stronger statement of the same doctrine in that philosopher's commentary on the passage from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* last referred to. "Cum duplex sit operatio intellectus : una, qua cognoscit quid est, quæ vocatur indivisibilium intelligentia : alia, qua componit et dividit : in utroque est aliquod primum : in prima quidem operatione est aliquod primum quod cadit in conceptione intellectus, *scilicet hoc quod dico ens ;* nec aliquid hac operatione potest mente concipi, nisi intelligatur ens. . . . Hoc principium, impossibile est esse et non esse simul, dependet ex intellectu entis" (*Comment. in Metaphys.*, lib. iv. [iii.], sect. vi.). It is plain that, according to St. Thomas, the intuition of being is innate. A large number of passages of like import will be found collected in

* "Objectum intellectûs est *ens* vel *verum commune*" (*Sum. Theol.*, i. q. 55, art. 1, concl.).

Casara's little work, *La Luce dell' Occhio Corporeo e quella dell' Intelletto*, pp. 17 sq.

16.

Being in general is known by intuition.

This consideration shows me that it is one thing to know what being in general is, and another to know that there is a particular real being. To know that there exists a particular real being, I must make an affirmation; while to know simply what being is, I require no such *affirmation*, but another act of the mind, which I shall call *intuition*. These two modes of knowing are clearly and fundamentally different, and are so related that intuition must precede affirmation.

Two great classes of human cognitions.

Human cognitions, therefore, are divisible into the two great classes, those arising from affirmation and those arising from intuition.

"*Being* alone is cognizable *per se*, and constitutes cognizability itself. Hence, as our fathers said, things are cognizable in so far as they participate in being.* When we attentively consider our cognition, we discover a manifest and infinite distinction between the *intuition* of being and the *perception* of real things, the traces of which all resolve themselves into the feelings caused in us; we see that it is impossible to intuite being without understanding it, since to intuite it is to understand it: on the contrary, we see that our feelings cannot be understood by themselves—indeed, that they begin to be understood only when we regard them in relation to being, that is, as terms of being itself" (*New Essay*, vol. iii. § 1224). The affirmation alluded to is the *affirmation* of being, which Rosmini distinguishes from the *apprehension* of the being affirmed

* "Unumquodque cognoscibile est in quantum est ens" (St. Thomas, *Comment.* in Aristot. *Physica*, i. 1).

(*Logic*, § 1072). Every such affirmation must, of course, be a self-evident judgment. Among such judgments Rosmini classes "those in which being is directly applied to feeling, in which feeling is apprehended and affirmed, and which are called *perceptions*" (*Logic*, § 197). Thus perception involves apprehension and affirmation.

17.

Order of the two classes.

The order of these two classes of cognitions is directly manifest from what has been said. Affirmative cognitions all presuppose an intuitive cognition. The latter, therefore, must precede the former. I repeat, therefore, that before we can know a particular, real being, we must know being in general (*in universale*).

"Being in general," or "being *in universale*," is perhaps hardly what the author here means; for it is not necessary that we should know being *as* general or universal, before we can know a real being. Indeed, it is only in its application to real beings that the universality of ideal being or of any idea manifests itself. Rosmini is by no means ignorant of this. Indeed, on more than one occasion he states the true doctrine admirably. "I take a universal idea," he says, "and submit it to analysis. This analysis gives me two elements from which my idea results: *first*, the quality thought; *second*, the universality of the same, which St. Thomas distinguishes by the name of *intentio universalitatis*. To the *quality thought* I say there corresponds a reality in the individual thing; to the *universality* of the quality thought I say that there is no corresponding reality in the thing, the *universality* being solely in the mind. The *universality* is not properly the quality thought, but is a mode which it assumes in the mind. This distinction must be carefully marked.

"Now, how does it happen that the quality thought is

in me universal? When my mind (*spirito*) has perceived any quality, it has the power of repeating this quality in an indefinite number of individuals, by means of so many acts of its own thought, whereby it thinks that quality successively or contemporaneously in an indefinite number of individuals. And this power results from two principles, viz., *first*, from the intuition which my mind has of the *possible;* and *second*, from the reiterability of the acts of the mind. This power of repeating the acts of thought, and hence of imagining a quality repeated indefinitely, is a property and faculty peculiar to the mind. It is, therefore, the mind that, by means of this faculty, adds to the qualities which it thinks the character of universality. This universality means nothing more than the possibility which any quality has of being thought by us in an indefinite number of individuals" (*New Essay*, vol. i. § 196 n.; cf. § 381).

It is a fundamental doctrine with Rosmini that all universality belongs to the mind or intelligence—that there is no universality in sensations or things. He consequently denies that any universal can be derived from things or through sensation. "It is absurd," he says, "to say that a *sensation* transforms itself, because a sensation is essentially particular, and would, in order to transform itself, be obliged to destroy itself. Thought, on the contrary, has an object, or idea, furnished with both universal and particular elements. In so far as this idea is universal, it may be determined and particularized variously, and this may be called taking another form" (*New Essay*, vol. i. § 197, n. 1). This doctrine is treated at great length in the criticism of Stewart. In this, Rosmini shows that all proper names are originally common, and not *vice versâ*, as Smith and Stewart had supposed. "That a name be proper," he says, "does not depend upon its designating one individual or more, but on the manner in which it designates them. If it designates them by marking them with a common quality, as the word *man* does, which marks all men with humanity, it is a common name. If, on the other hand, it names them without marking them

with a common quality, but directly as individuals, and without any other relation between the name and them than the caprice of the inventor of the name, it is a proper name" (*New Essay*, vol. i. § 146). This is the distinction that Bain and others now make between *connotative* and *non-connotative* names (cf. Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic*, vol. ii. pp. 319 sqq.; and Max Müller, *Lectures on the Science of Language*, First Series, pp. 356 sqq.). The truth is, that all ideas, in so far as their content (*Inhalt*) is concerned, are singulars; it is merely their application that is universal. To speak of a *universal idea* is to utter an absurdity. Even if the notion of *white* were inborn, I might have it to all eternity without its becoming universal, unless I could find or imagine a number of objects whereof to predicate it. It is the failure to observe this obvious distinction that has caused all the aberrations in the treatment of logic from Aristotle's day to our own, when they have reached a maximum in the logic of the English school. It is strange that it should still be necessary to utter such a truism as this. Since formal logic deals with the necessary relations between ideas, and all ideas are singulars, quantity or quantification cannot appear in that science. *All* and *some* are words absolutely forbidden in deductive logic, and, indeed, in all sciences, in so far as they are deductive. When I say, "All equilateral triangles are equiangular," I am putting what expresses the necessary relation between two singular ideas in the form of the result of an exhaustive induction, such as, in this case at least, never could be made. What I really mean is: The equilateral triangle is necessarily equiangular, *equilateral triangle* expressing a singular idea. The Greek form of expression is much superior to the English: τῷ ἰσοπλεύρῳ τριγώνῳ ὑπάρχει τὸ ἰσογώνιον; and, indeed, this form of expression is frequent, though by no means universal, in Greek Geometry. The universality of the truths of mathematics is entirely due to the fact that these truths express relations between singulars, which no more cease to be singulars when applied to particular real objects than a knife ceases to be singular when it

is used to cut a dozen sticks. The Greeks quantified the subjects of their propositions, and that was bad enough; what shall we say to those who quantify the predicates also? Simply that the entire doctrine of the quantification of the predicate is one huge blunder. If modern logicians had adhered to the Aristotelian mode of expression, incorrect as that was, they never could have fallen into such a snare. It is, indeed, possible, without talking *evident* nonsense, to say, All equilateral triangles are all equiangular ones; but it is plainly absurd, using the Aristotelian *every* (πᾶς) instead of *all*, to say, Every equilateral triangle is every equiangular one. If the doubly quantified proposition means anything more than the entirely unquantified one, it is this: The sum of equilateral triangles is equal to the sum of equiangular ones, which again is an unquantified singular proposition. It is, moreover, both meaningless and useless; for there is no such thing as a sum of equilateral triangles, and, even if there were, the fact would be of no value, so long as I did not know that each particular equilateral triangle is necessarily equiangular; in other words, that *the* equilateral triangle is equiangular (see Jevons, *Elementary Lessons in Logic*, pp. 184 sq.).

18.

Being in general and particular being.

Let us now examine the difference between *particular real being* and *being in general*. So long as I know only what being is, I do not know that there exists any particular or real being, and yet I understand what being is. The phrase "to understand what being is," expressed in philosophical language, means, to understand the *essence of being*.

By intuition we know the essence of being.

By intuition, therefore, we know the *essence of being*.

The next section deals more particularly with *real being*. In regard to the essence of being, otherwise *ideal being*

or *universal being*, Rosmini says, "Being in universal is *idea*" * (*New Essay*, vol. ii. § 534). "Besides that form of being which is possessed by subsisting things, and which we have called *real*, there is another, entirely distinct, which we have called *ideal*, and which forms the basis of the *possibility* of these things. Yes, ideal being is an entity of a nature entirely peculiar, such that it cannot be confounded either with our minds, or with bodies, or with anything else belonging to real being. It would be a grave error to conclude from this that *ideal being*, or *the idea*, is nothing, on the ground that it does not belong to that kind of things that enter into our feelings. On the contrary, *ideal being*, the *idea*, is a most true and noble entity, and we have seen with what sublime characteristics it is endowed. It cannot, indeed, be defined; but it may be analyzed and its effect upon us stated, viz., that it is the *light* of the mind. What can be clearer than light? When this light is extinguished, there remains only darkness. Finally, from what has been said we may form a conception of the mode in which the idea of being adheres to the mind: it may be known without any assent or dissent on our part. It is *present* to us as a pure fact. The reason is this. Such an idea does not affirm and does not deny; it merely constitutes in us the possibility both of affirming and denying" (*New Essay*, vol. ii. §§ 555–557). "Even if the *reality* and *ideality* of things were identical, which is not the case . . . still things would never confound themselves with the act of the mind, nor with the subject which possesses them, because *idea*, as such, is object, distinct from the thinking subject and opposed to it" (*Ibid.*, vol. iii. § 1192). "Every one who attends to what takes place within himself may observe the difference existing between a thing which he thinks as *possible* and a *real* thing. It is easy to observe, and there is no one in the world who does not observe, that a *thing* or a *being* simply *possible* does not act on our senses. For example, a possible food does not satisfy our

* According to Rosmini, "The word *idea* expresses a mode of being, that is, indicates being in so far as it is intelligible" (*Psychology*, vol. i. § 18, note; cf. *Restoration of Philosophy*, Book iii. cpp. 39–51).

hunger, however long we think of it, even if we contemplate it for entire days, and the poor philosopher would die of hunger, if he had no other nutriment than this object of his mind. In order, therefore, that a real action may be exerted upon us, there must be a real being, because nothing *acts really* but that which *is really*. Nevertheless no one calls that which is not real, but merely possible, *nothing;* nor can it be so called; for, if it were nothing, it could not call into exercise, as it does, the activity of our minds. This obvious observation, which everybody makes continually, and according to which everybody speaks and acts, leads us to the evident conclusion that being, taken in the widest sense, has two modes, the *ideal* and the *real;* that is, that being manifests and communicates itself to us in two ways, by that of the *mind* and that of the *sense*. Nor must we suppose it possible to reduce these two modes, in which being acts upon us and reveals itself to us, to one. The qualities of *ideal being* are different from, and opposed to, those of *real being*, and the *sense*, which perceives the latter, does not reach or attain to a knowledge of anything that the mind, which perceives the latter, sees. In fact, the sense does not perceive anything that is merely possible, but only that which is real, and the mind, as the faculty of knowing, perceives nothing of the real, but only the possible. In the faculty of knowing there are only *ideas; things* do not enter it" (*La Sapienza*, ii. 7, pp. 399 sqq.).

Rosmini criticizes Aristotle and the German school, from Kant to Hegel, for neglecting this obvious distinction between ideal and real being, or, which in his language is the same thing, between object and subject. Aristotle certainly is guilty of this neglect, or rather of a deliberate confusion and identification of these necessarily distinct elements of cognition. He tells us that "intellect and the intelligible are the same thing," * and that "the intellect is potentially, in a certain sense (πώς), the intelligibles." † Rosmini is very severe upon the word πώς ("in a certain

* "Ταὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ νοητόν" (*Metaph.*, xi. 7, 1072 b, 20; cf. Bonitz' note).

† "Δυνάμει πώς ἐστι τὰ νοητὰ ὁ νοῦς" (*De An.*, iii. 4, 11 : 429 b, 30).

sense"). "In respect to Aristotle," he says, "it is to be observed that . . . he continually interlards his discourse with exceptive and diminutive particles, which he nowhere explains, and which, nevertheless, furnish him with a convenient excuse for accepting a proposition when it suits him, and rejecting it for its contrary when the case is otherwise. Thus, when he says that 'the mind is potentially, in a certain mode (πώς), the intelligibles,' the whole knot of the question lies in the particle πώς, a particle of such very small bulk that it escapes the reader's attention, as if it were nothing, whereas it is the very point of the whole system, if system there be, and if there be not, is that which makes us believe there is. Now, this particle is just the one most neglected by our philosopher. He leaves the interpretation of it to the reader, and, supposing it perspicuous in itself, gives no explanation of it. Nevertheless, from this proposition, conditioned and limited by πώς 'in a certain mode,' he draws an absolute conclusion, namely, that the mind can think of the intelligibles when it chooses, which presupposes that the intelligibles are in the mind, not merely in a certain mode, but absolutely; otherwise the consequence, keeping within the limits of the premises, ought to be, that the mind can think of the intelligibles when it chooses, in a certain mode. When, however, the proposition does not suit him, he takes its contrary, and affirms that the intelligibles are in a certain mode outside the mind. And there he is at once among real things, in defiance of his previous supposition" (*Aristotle Explained*, § 94). The work from which this passage is taken is, for the most part, devoted to showing the errors into which Aristotle fell, from not distinguishing between ideal and real being. Rosmini, had he not been specially lenient to St. Thomas, might easily have shown that that philosopher sometimes falls into the same fundamental mistake as Aristotle, accepting unreservedly the doctrine that "*In his quæ sunt sine materia, idem est intellectus et quod intelligitur*" * (*Sum. Theol.*, i. q. 55, art. 1, 2, con.); in other

* "Ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης, τὸ αὐτό ἐστι νοοῦν καὶ νοούμενον" (*De An.* iii. 4, 12: 430 a, sq).

words, confounding the subject with the object of thought. St. Thomas, indeed, is careful to say that "*Non oportet quod efficiantur unum secundum esse simpliciter, sed solum quod fiant unum quantum pertinet ad actum intelligendi*" (*Supp. Qu.*, xcii. 1, 8.) This, however, only makes matters worse; for it is precisely in the act of intelligence that subject and object are *not* one. Indeed, while there is no reason for believing that subject and object are not one really, κατὰ μέγεθος, as Aristotle would say, it is perfectly plain that, unless they are distinct ideally, κατὰ τὸν λόγον,* there can be neither thought nor cognition. However, it must be admitted that neither Aristotle nor St. Thomas had a consistent theory of cognition.

Speaking of Kant, Rosmini says, "The fundamental error of criticism lies in this, that it makes the objects of thought subjective. These objects result from sensations (matter) and intellectual forms. The sensations are modifications of our own feeling, and, according to Kant, are not sufficient to justify us in believing in the existence of an external cause that produces them, because, in order to draw this conclusion, we should have to admit the validity of the principle of cause. But the principle of cause, and all the other forms that do not come from the sensations, emanate from our minds (*spirito*), and they emanate from these, says Kant, precisely because they do not come from sensations. Kant therefore finds no alternative for the source of a cognition, or of an element of cognition, other than sensation or our own minds. But such an argument *per exclusionem* is manifestly arbitrary and false, because the enumeration of possible cases is incomplete. Such is the fundamental error of this school, and the original sin of all the German philosophies which have appeared since Kant, all having gone astray in the same way. The supposition upon which Kant rears his system, but of which he does not furnish the slightest proof—the supposition, I mean, that whatever there is in our intelligence that does

* See *De Animâ*, iii. 4, 1; 429 a, 13. Cf. *Ibid.*, 9, 1; 432 a, 20: and 10, 8; 433 b, 24 sqq. Also Trendelenburg's note, *Aristotelis De Animâ, Lib. III.*, p. 527 sq.

not belong to sensation must of necessity come from the intelligent subject—had its origin in his failing to observe that being has two modes, the one *subjective*, the other *objective*, and that being is identical in the two. Being, in its objective mode, is being which makes itself known, and makes itself known as it is, even as subjective. Inasmuch as the being is identical, the cognition is valid and true" (*New Essay*, vol. i. § 331).

Rosmini calls those philosophers who identify ideal with real being *Unitarians*, in contradistinction to those who do not see the need of ideal being at all, and whose system he calls the *absolute anoetic*. Among the chief of the former he includes Hegel. "Among the absolute unitarian and dianoetic systems, that which in our times has made most noise is the system of Hegel. According to this great-grandson of Kant, the concept is the form of things, and this free and infinite form itself constitutes universal matter (all diversity of matter is declared by Hegel an illusion).* How a speculative mind can fall so easily into this error, which to common sense seems incredible, has been explained above. . . ." After clearly setting forth the nature and fecundity of ideal being, as distinguished from real being, Rosmini proceeds: "This immense virtuality of indeterminate or initial being, if not considered with the greatest care, may easily impose upon the mind. The philosopher who discovers its fecundity may rashly conclude that everything, even reality, issues from the idea, like water from a spring, and that the concept, as Hegel put it, is the form from which matter issues. But the illusion of these philosophers arises from their not having sufficiently considered that, although the cognition of real things consists in apprehending these as terms of that being which was previously intuited without it, nevertheless, such cognition cannot take place, if such terms are not given to us, and that, whatever effort a man may make with his

* "Die tiefere Anschauung ist dagegen diese . . . einerseits, dass der Materie als solcher keine Selbstständigkeit zukommt, und andererseits dass die Form nicht von aussen an die Materie gelangt, sondern als Totalität, das Prinzip der Materie in sich selbst trägt, welche freie und unendliche Form sich uns demnächst als der Begriff ergeben wird" (*Encyclopädie*, § 128, Zusatz).

mind, he can never succeed in bringing anything real out of the bowels of the idea. The latter remains for ever barren, if being be not presented under the other, that is, the real form. Hence the two forms must be admitted as for ever coexistent, the one irreducible to the other, and such that the one can never render itself productive of the other. Not only is this true, but even when man, having the feeling of the real, knows it—that is, has it as the term of intuited being—and when the same intuited being is applied to the feeling, the two forms remain completely distinct and unconfused, so that no person of sane mind will ever say that the idea of the felt is the felt, or that the felt is merely an idea. Even if he did say so, he would be refuted by language itself, in which the two things stand altogether distinct.

"Hegel here falls into an *antinomy*, takes it for a true contradiction, and not being able to extricate himself from it, makes peace with it and declares it to be the foundation of philosophy. The antinomy is this. On the one hand, he sees that pure being, as a universal first act, is empty, having no content of any kind. He hastily concludes that pure being and nothing are exactly the same, and thus introduces into philosophy the *avidyâ* of the Buddhistic systems.* On the other hand, he sees the infinite virtuality of pure being—of this nothing of his—which is also pure form, and therefore he brings forward various arguments to show that even the reality of things issues from the form of thought. Of course, if we carefully follow the steps by which Hegel proceeds in this argument, we shall find him continually tripping. Indeed, he sometimes, as in the *Introduction to the Science of Logic*, tries to show that, if reality is not made to come from the womb of the idea, it falls asunder into absurdities; at other times, as in the *Encyclopædia*, he tries to depict before the eyes of his readers the manner in which this external reality issues from the idea itself, calling them to witness the marvellous birth. Everywhere his reasoning is based upon equivocation and the most vulgar prejudices.

* See Max Müller, *Chips from a German Workshop*, vol. i. p. 248, American edit.

"In the *Introduction* alluded to, he remarks that 'it is foolish to say that *Logic* prescinds from all content, that it teaches only the rules of thinking, without paying any heed to what is thought. . . . For since thinking and the rules of thinking must be its subject, it has at once in these its particular content.' * But, with Hegel's permission, no one has ever denied that the rules of thinking are the subject of Logic, and therefore no one has ever asserted that Logic has not its own proper content. The equivocation here is between *Logic* and *pure being*. Logic has certainly a content, and this content is formed of pure being, ideas, and the ideal principles which it teaches how to handle. But we assert that this being, these ideas, and these principles remain indeterminate, and, in this sense, they are devoid of content, because they do not contain the ultimate determinations, much less reality. Hegel, therefore, makes a puerile criticism upon the logicians who preceded him, a criticism due solely to his own misunderstanding. Even if his criticism were just, it would not follow that the form of thought, of itself, produced the matter. But let us listen to a somewhat more serious argument. 'It is supposed,' he says, 'that the matter of cognition exists outside of thought as a distinct, full-fledged world; that thought, in itself empty, adds itself externally, as form, to this matter, fills itself therewith, and only then obtains a content and so becomes a real cognition. According to this assumption, these two elements . . . stand to each other in this order. The object is something in itself finished and complete, which, as far as its reality is concerned, can entirely dispense with thought, whereas thought is something imperfect, requiring to complete itself by means of a material, and must even, as a soft, undetermined form, adapt itself to its matter. Truth is the agreement of thought with its object, and in order to bring about this agreement (which

* "Vors Erste aber ist es ungeschickt zu sagen, dass die Logik von allem *Inhalt* abstrahire, dass sie nur die Regeln des Denkens lehre, ohne auf das Gedachte sich einzulassen. . . . Denn da das Denken und die Regeln des Denkens ihr Gegenstand seyn sollen, so hat sie ja daran ihren eigenthümlichen Inhalt" (Einleitung, p. 27, edit. 1833).

does not exist essentially), thought must adapt and suit itself to its object.' *

"These words contain a criticism, in part just, of the absolute anoetic system; but they contain, besides, many inaccuracies, and not the least force to injure the true system proposed by us. This will be clear from the following considerations :—

"(1) First of all, the argument is based upon an abuse of the word *object*. We have observed that reality has not the nature of object, and that objectivity belongs exclusively to intelligible being, and hence to the idea; so that the real, which is not object, becomes object through that act of being, which is seen in the idea whose term it is. Hence we do not admit that truth 'consists in the agreement of thought with its object,' for the simple reason that there is no thought without an object, and that thought can never do otherwise than agree with its object, since between thought and object there is an essential synthesis.

"(2) Much less is it true that, in our system, in order to bring about an agreement between thought and its object, thought must accommodate itself to its object, because this happens always, and must happen always, if we mean by *object* what the word signifies, viz., that which stands opposite to the act of thinking, that which is present to the understanding.

"(3) The truth, therefore, as held by us, by Aristotle, and by the ancients generally, is not what Hegel supposes it to be, or what he founds his vain censure of the old logic upon. Man always possesses the truth, when, with

* "Es wird erstens vorausgesetzt, dass der Stoff des Erkennens, als eine fertige Welt ausserhalb des Denkens, an und für sich vorhanden, dass das Denken für sich leer sey, als eine Form äusserlich, zu jener Materie hinzutrete, sich damit erfülle, erst daran einen Inhalt gewinne, und dadurch ein reales Erkennen werde. Alsdann stehen diese beiden Bestandtheile . . . in dieser Rangordnung gegen einander, dass das Object ein für sich Vollendetes, Fertiges sey, das des Denkens zu seiner Wirklichkeit vollkommen entbehren könne, dahingegen das Denken etwas Mangelhaftes sey, das sich erst an einem Stoffe zu vervollständigen, und zwar als eine weiche unbestimmte Form sich seiner Materie angemessen zu machen habe. Wahrheit ist die Uebereinstimmung des Denkens mit dem Gegenstande, und es soll, um diese Uebereinstimmung hervorzubringen—denn sie ist nicht an und für sich vorhanden—das Denken nach dem Gegenstande sich fügen und bequemen" (Einleitung, p. 28).

his inner judgment, he affirms what is true, not only thinking the object, but recognizing what he naturally thinks. Hence there is a true affirmation and a true negation, and these relate to the form as much as to the matter of thought, so that the question regarding the form and matter of thought and their relation to each other has nothing to do with the question whether man does or does not possess the truth. It was modern philosophers, and especially Germans, that confounded these two utterly distinct questions.

"(4) It is, therefore, false to say that we must unite the matter to the form of thought, in order to possess the truth, or, as Hegel puts it, in order that thought may become a real cognition. By the addition of matter to form, the *quantity* of human knowledge is certainly increased, but its *quality* is not thereby changed so that, from being false, it becomes true. Knowledge may be more or less great, more or less materiated; but this has nothing whatever to do with its truth. The question, therefore, regarding the truth of knowledge does not depend upon the matter of knowledge, but upon pronouncing true judgment with respect both to the form and the matter of knowledge.

"(5) To call the form united to the matter real cognition is an abuse of terms. Every human cognition is real, even that which is merely formal; for, although the object of cognition may be a pure idea, still the act of thought which terminates in it is real, as much as the intelligent subject that performs it.

"In all the passage quoted from Hegel, therefore, there is only this much of truth, that the absolute anoetics are wrong in considering the matter of thought, the reality, as a world that stands by itself, utterly apart from, and independent of, thought. . . . But this error was not well observed by Hegel, who, in observing it, fell into the opposite one. In fact, although we may prove that the real world cannot exist without a mind, the consequence drawn from this fact by Hegel does not follow, viz., that there is an absolute interdependence between external reality and the human mind. This interdependence cer-

tainly exists, if we speak of the world in so far as it is actually known by man; but man, when he thinks the world, thinks it as existing absolutely, and therefore as independent of the thought of him who thinks it. At the same time, through a higher reflection, he sees that this world cannot exist really without being thought by some mind, for the reason that the act of being upon which it depends is eternal, essentially intelligible, and therefore from all eternity the object of an intelligence.*

"Let us now give a sample of the other way in which Hegel tries to inculcate his system.

"He sets out with a sensistic prejudice. Indeed, at the bottom of all those philosophics, which seem so speculative, there always lurks sensism, or even materialism, as we shall see. 'We have,' he says, '. . . already alluded to the ancient belief, according to which the real in objects . . . does not present itself immediately in consciousness, . . . but must be reflected upon, in order to give the real nature of the object.' † 'By reflection something is changed in the way in which the content originally is in feeling, intuition, and perception. It is, therefore, only by means of a change that the true nature of the object comes into consciousness.' ‡ 'Inasmuch as the real nature of things becomes apparent only in reflection, and this reflection is *my* activity, it follows that this nature is the *product of my* spirit as a thinking subject, of me according to my simple universality, as the absolutely self-present Ego—or of my freedom.' §

* See an excellent article, entitled *Mr. Spencer on the Independence of Matter*, by Prof. T. H. Green, in the *Contemporary Review* for March, 1878.

† "Es ist . . . der alte Glaube angeführt werden, dass was das Wahrhafte an Gegenständen . . . sich nicht *unmittelbar* im Bewusstsein einfinde . . . sondern dass man erst darüber nachdenken müsse, um zur wahrhaften Beschaffenheit des Gegenstandes zu gelangen" (*Encyclopædie*, § 21).

‡ "Durch das Nachdenken wird an der Art wie der Inhalt zunächst in der Empfindung, Anschauung, Vorstellung ist, etwas verändert; es ist somit nur vermittelst einer Veränderung, dass die wahre Natur des Gegenstandes zum Bewusstsein kommt" (*Ibid.*, § 22).

§ "Indem im Nachdenken ebensosehr die wahrhafte Natur zum Vorschein kommt als diess Denken *meine* Thatigkeit ist, so ist jene ebensosehr das *Erzeugniss meines* Geistes und zwar als denkenden Subjekts, Meiner nach meiner einfachen Allgemeinheit, als des schlechthin bei sich seyenden Ichs oder meiner Freiheit" (*Ibid.*, § 23).

"This is the way in which Hegel pretends to demonstrate that the matter and reality of things issue from the forms of things or from ideas. We believe every man who understands what an important matter and what a paradox are involved in this thesis, will demand, before accepting it, a demonstration a little less flimsy, and, I would almost say, a little less slippery than this. If we analyze it, we shall see that it is vitiated in a hundred places.

"(1) It has for its foundation sensism, a sensism received as a prejudice, accepted as true without even the semblance of proof. Indeed, Hegel lays it down as something beyond question, that the object is given in sensation and in perception; that is, in sense-perception, as is shown by the context. Such, indeed, is the prejudice of sensism. . . . If it be admitted that sense gives us the object, then feeling is transformed into thinking; for this is the essential difference between feeling and thinking, that the former has not an object, but only a term, whereas the latter has an object: sensation is a modification, a mode of being of the sentient subject; the idea is an object entirely different from the thinking subject, never a modification, never a mode of its being.

"(2) Hence Hegel wrongly gives the name of *reflection* to what is only *intellective perception*, whereby real being is apprehended as the term of initial or ideal being. This perception, which presents real things to thought, is an *immediate* operation, for the simple reason that sense has no prior object, and merely adds an element to the object of perception. Reflection, on the contrary, is *mediate*, because it supposes the object as already given, and does not itself construct that object. From this error Hegel falls into another, which is even an absurdity. It is this: Nothing *immediate* can be true, and all truth is *mediated*.

"(3) Hence, in the same way, it is altogether false, with a vulgar and sensistic falseness, to say that reflection produces a modification in the object previously given in sensation. It is doubly false: *First*, because, since, as we said above, the object is not given in sensation (the

object is merely ideal, being intuited by the mind, and therefore does not enter into sensation), reflection cannot modify it. The truth, on the contrary, is that there is intellective perception, which does not indeed modify it, but constitutes it for man, perception being that act of the intelligence whereby real things are immediately known, as we have already seen. *Second,* because neither perception nor reflection modifies or changes objects in any way. . . .

"(4) Even supposing that Hegelian reflection did modify objects, it is a purely gratuitous inference that he draws therefrom, when he says, 'By reflection something is changed in the way in which the content originally is in feeling. . . . It is, therefore, only by means of a change that the true nature of the object comes into consciousness.' If the object is already in sensation, and is afterwards modified in reflection, how does our philosopher know that the true nature of the object results from this modification and is not already given in sensation? What proof does he adduce? How does he justify this predilection for reflection? He offers us *no* intrinsic reason. But this man, who in everything else sets such small store by common sense and the ancient philosophers, and who boasts himself content with few judges, is, nevertheless, here content to have recourse to the authority of common sense and of the ancient logicians—interpreted, to be sure, in his own fashion. He assures us that it is admitted by common sense that, in order to know the true nature of things, we must elaborate the data and transform them by thought; that ancient philosophy recognized the agreement between ideas and things, and concluded that things are in themselves as they are conceived in thought. Hence, concludes our philosopher, thought is the truth of things, objective truth. That common sense, together with ancient philosophy, admits the agreement between ideas and things, is most true; but it does not, in the smallest degree, follow that thought produces things. If, instead of the equivocal, or, more correctly, subjective word *thought*, we put *idea* (and Hegel himself uses the two promiscuously, thereby rendering his whole reasoning confused), we too

shall be willing to admit that the idea is the *objective* truth of things. But this does not mean that the subjective thought of man produces objective truth, that is, the idea. On the contrary, the idea is itself given to the human subject to contemplate as an object, and hence it cannot be a production of thought, which does not exist without it or before it, that is, does not exist without its natural object. Hence the object, which is ideal being, is united to real things as a principle to its terms, and these are not without that principle; but *terminated being*, that is, being with its terms, is before human thought and independent of it, and is not by any means, as Hegel holds, a production of it. It is thus that we must interpret common sense and ancient philosophy, and not make them talk vagaries, as Hegel always does. As to pretending that common sense admits that, 'in order to know the true nature of things, thought must elaborate and transform their data,' this is equivocal talk, which may be true, but not in the sense in which Hegel means it. The phrase 'to know the true nature of things' either means the same thing as 'to know the nature of things,' and then the word *true* is superfluous, or else it means 'to know the inner nature of things more profoundly,' and then the word *true* is, to say the least, equivocal, because we may know little or much of a thing, and, in either case, the knowledge may be true; for surely the nature of a thing may be known in different degrees, more or less implicitly, and yet the knowledge may be always true. If, however, in order to know the nature of a thing more profoundly, we must more thoroughly elaborate that thing and transform the data of thought, as Hegel says, this does not mean that we must necessarily recognize as false the knowledge which we had before, but merely that, if into the knowledge which we had before there has entered any error through our wills, that error is dropped and then other explicit determinations are added to the thing. But the whole of this operation is always performed by means of the idea of being, from the womb of which is drawn all that before was virtual, and of new sensible experiences, which show

new real forces and phenomena. In this way knowledge increases, but does not change. It always increases through the two elements, the ideal and the real, given to thought and not produced by it, although thought may seek them with its own activity, in the same way as the eye may seek for the various tints in a picture, without thereby creating them" (*Theosophy*, vol. ii. §§ 820–826).

This passage clearly shows the position of Rosmini's philosophy, and how it steers clear of both sensism and idealism, by according to both what properly belongs to them, without allowing the one to trench upon the domain of the other. Our knowledge is not entirely made up of sensation, as the materialists hold, nor is it entirely made up of ideas, as the idealists assert; but it contains two distinct elements, both of which are absolutely and equally necessary to it. On the insufficiency of sensation to account for the facts of knowledge, see an excellent essay by Professor Luigi Ferri, *Sulla Dottrina Psicologica dell' Associazione*, Rome, 1878 (Reale Accademia dei Lincei).

We have seen above, under § 15, Rosmini's definition of *essence*. He elsewhere says, "Essence is that which is thought in the idea of the thing. We therefore know as many essences as there are things of which we have any idea. To say that we know essences, in this sense, is a mode of speech, which will be easily understood if we make the following observation. When we say 'the essence of a thing'—for example, of tree, of man, of colour, of size, or the like,—we use, in order to indicate the thing whose essence we are looking for, certain words—tree, man, colour, size, etc. Now, what are the words thus applied meant to signify? We have seen that 'words are applied to things in so far as we know these,' and if we add to them a wider signification, we abuse them, pass into darkness, among creations of fancy. When, therefore, I say tree, man, colour, size, etc., I mean things in so far as they are known to me; otherwise I could not name them. What, then, is the meaning of looking for the essence of tree, man, colour, size, etc.? Simply examining what these words mean, what idea men have attached to

them respectively. Shall I look for what they have not attached to these words? In that case I shall be looking no longer for the essence of tree, man, etc., but for the essence of something unnamed and unknown, for which I could not even make the search.

"But if this is the meaning of essence, some one will say, it is that which is included in the definition of things, neither more nor less. Precisely, and in this and in no other sense the ancients understood the term essence. '*Essentia*,' says St. Thomas, '*comprehendit in se illa tantum quæ cadunt in definitione speciei*' (*Sum. Th.*, i. 3, 3)" (*New Essay*, vol. iii. §§ 1213, 1214).

Considerable exception might be taken to this identification of *knowing what a thing is* with *knowing the essence of a thing*. The former phrase merely implies power to distinguish by means of the senses, while the latter indicates intellectual comprehension. Many people know what a circle is who do not know its essence. Aristotle very carefully distinguished between τὸ τί ἐστι and τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, and identified the latter alone with essence (οὐσία).* In the case of being, however, which is purely intellectual, the distinction does not hold, so that, in regard to it, Rosmini's language is strictly correct, although hardly felicitous.

19.

When I affirm a particular real being, what do I know more than before?

But if, after knowing the essence of being, I affirm to myself, that is, know, that a particular real being exists, what do I know more than before? Before answering this question, I must meditate on the affirmative act whereby I arrive at this new cognition: I must scrutinize the nature and grounds of it. Why then do I affirm

* See Trendelenburg, *Aristotelis De Animâ, Lib. III.* pp. 192 sqq.; Bonitz, *Aristotelis Metaphys.*, pp. 311 sqq., and the authorities and passages there cited.

The cause of affirmation a feeling.

that a being exists? What causes me to do so? What is this existence? It is clear that, in many cases, if not in all, what induces me to make the affirmation is a *feeling*. For example, that which causes me to affirm the existence of external bodies is the sensations which they produce in me. I am induced to affirm the existence of my own body by the peculiar feelings which I have of it. Lastly, I am led by an inner sense or feeling to affirm that I myself exist. In all these cases, what makes me affirm that a particular real being exists, is feeling. Hence, in the given cases, every affirmation, every judgment whereby I affirm that a particular real being exists, may be reduced to this form: there is a feeling; therefore there exists a being.

The formula for affirmative cognitions.

In this section the author passes to real being, which, according to him, is presented to us only through the senses, and known to us only through a perception, involving a judgment. "Being has two modes, the ideal and the real. Ideal being is the form of cognition, real being its material" (*New Essay*, vol. iii. § 1166). "In the state in which nature places us here below at our birth, we have no intellectual perception of anything but of ourselves and bodies. In truth, we cannot perceive the subsistence of a being unless it operate upon us, unless we feel its action. *Feeling*, therefore, is necessary to the intellective perception of a subsistent entity" (*Ibid.*, § 528). "In order that our minds may perceive a thing, they must have that thing present to their perceptive powers" (*Ibid.*, § 515). "*Intellective perception* is a judgment, whereby the mind affirms the subsistence of something perceived by the senses. Analyzing this act of the mind, we find that it requires three conditions: *first*, that the body which we are to perceive should act on our senses and hence produce

sensations in us, since this sensible body is what is to be judged to exist; *second*, that we should have the idea of *existence*, that universal which we apply to said body when we say 'exist'—a universal which does not come from the senses; *third* and last, that we should perform an act in which we consider the action of the body upon us from the side of the operating principle, and that we should regard this principle as existing in itself, and different from ourselves. By so doing we place it in the class of existing things and close the judgment: That which strikes my senses exists. Now, from this analysis of perception it is plain that three distinct faculties concur and co-operate in it: *first*, the faculty of feeling the sensible; *second*, the faculty which possesses the idea of existence, or which intuites being, which again supplies the predicate of the judgment; and, *lastly*, the faculty which unites the predicate to the subject and thus puts into the judgment the copula, or the form of the judgment itself. By whatever terms we choose to designate these faculties, they must always be kept distinct and never confounded" (*Ibid.*, vol. i. § 338; cf. *Psychology*, vol. ii. §§ 1306 sqq.).

20.

What this formula presupposes.

This formula must be well studied and analyzed. It presupposes that between feeling and real existence there is a necessary bond, such that there cannot be any feeling without a real being; in other words, that in some way or other the essence of being, which we previously knew only universally, is found realized in feeling. When, therefore, a mind at first cognizant only of the essence of being, without knowing that a being exists, receives, experiences, observes a feeling, it immediately affirms that the being of which it previously knew only the essence, also exists. Feeling, therefore, is that which constitutes the

It is feel-

ing that constitutes the reality of beings.

reality of beings. But here springs up a crowd of objections.

This section brings out, in a most distinct manner, the point in which Rosmini's system differs from all other systems, viz., in making the matter of thought (the real) subjective, and its form (the ideal) objective. In this it exactly reverses the common view of the position of subject and object. By so doing, it avoids Kant's difficulty, and cuts off the possibility of scepticism. If the matter of thought is purely subjective, and its form absolutely intelligible, not in spite of, but by reason of, its objectivity, then, of course, all question as to the reality of an external world, and how the gulf between the mind and it is to be bridged over, ceases. Externality itself becomes a mere mode of presentation—the mode wherein the subject, by means of its ideal object, re-presents its extra-subjective sensations to itself, or, in other words, objectifies them.

In regard to the ancient, as compared with the modern, use of the terms *subject* and *object*, the following note is of some importance :—"*Subject* and *object*, two terms so frequently employed by philosophers, may both be traced back to Aristotle. According to him, ὑποκείμενον has two principal meanings : *first*, that of which something is predicated in a proposition (grammatical subject) ; *second*, the substance which in nature lies, so to speak, at the bottom of actions. In both senses ὑποκείμενον was translated *subjectum* by the Latins (cf. Boethius in *Categor.* cap. 5). *Object* is almost the Greek ἀντικείμενον, although the latter, as being more general, is usually rendered into Latin—for instance, by Boethius—by *oppositum* (cf. *Categor.* 10 ; 11 b, 16 : *De Animâ*, i. 1, 7 ; 402 b, 15 : ii. 4, 1 ; 415 a, 20 : ii. 11, 12 ; 424 a, 11). Thus, throughout the Middle Age, as well as in the works of Descartes and Spinoza, *subject* has the meaning of substrate substance. Spinoza, in his *Principia Philosophiæ Cartesianæ*, p. 11, edit. Paul [vol. i. p. 29, edit. Bruder], says, '*Omnis res cui inest immediate, ut in* subjecto . . . *aliqua proprietas . . . cujus realis idea in nobis est, vocatur*

substantia.' Hence *subjective being* (*esse subjectivorum*) is now used in Germany with a sense exactly contrary to that in which it was used by William of Occam in the fourteenth century. In the works of that philosopher it means something in nature lying outside of the mind and not formed merely by thought, whereas *objective being* (*esse objectivorum*) is explained as '*ipsum cognosci adeoque esse quoddam fictum*' (*Sententiæ*, Bk. i. dist. 2, quæst. 8). From this will further be clear what is meant by *realitas objectiva* in Descartes, *e.g. Meditations*, iii. In Germany, owing chiefly to the influence of Kant and Fichte, the use of these words has been exactly inverted. *Subject* means that which knows; *object*, on the contrary, is a thing, in so far as it subjected to thought, but as preserving its own nature free from the opinions of the knower. Hence *subjective* is what depends upon the different states of the knower; *objective*, what is based upon the constant nature of the thing itself" (Trendelenburg, *Elementa Logices Aristoteleæ*, p. 54, n.). It will be seen from this that Rosmini uses the two terms partly in the ancient, partly in the modern sense, but rather in the former than in the latter. *Subject*, according to him, is "a sentient individual, in so far as it contains within itself a supreme active principle." "*Intellective subject* is a subject that intuites ideal being." "*Human subject* is a subject, the principle at once of animality and intelligence" (*Anthropology*, § 767). *Object* of thought, on the contrary, is defined as "a thing present to us in itself. A thing in itself [*Ding an sich*] means a thing in its existence; and, since to exist and to be present are different from to act, the *object* of thought is essentially a thing different from us as thinking beings. The truth of this is shown when I think myself. In that act, I, the subject, become the object of my own thought. At the same time, in thinking of myself, I consider myself in so far as I exist and no farther. The essential character, therefore, of thought is, that it terminates in an *object*, that is, in a thing different from the *thinking subject*, as such" (*New Essay*, vol. iii. § 1093). According to Rosmini, nothing can be an object of the mind but pure being and its modifications,

that is, ideas (see note under § 18), which the mind is enabled to form by using its feelings to determine pure being. These ideas every mind forms relatively to itself, but does not form absolutely (see under § 42). Ideas, as logical possibilities, are eternal, necessary, and independent of any finite subject (cf. § 35).

21.

In what sense the essence of being is universal.

The first objection that presents itself is, that the intuitive knowledge of being, which precedes every affirmation of real being, relates to a universal being, while all affirmed being is particular. The answer to this is, that the essence of the being which is known intuitively, is not universal, but that the word *universal*, which is joined to it as an attribute, expresses the mode in which it is cognized: hence, when we affirm that that essence is realized, we do not affirm this realization of the mode in which the essence is known, but of the essence itself.

As to the nature of universality, see citations under §§ 17, 24. The phrase, "the essence of being is realized," presents some difficulties, and has even caused differences of opinion among Rosmini's disciples. In order to understand its meaning fully, we must bear in mind that, in Rosmini's view, all being involves a principle and a term. *Term*, in his language, bears the same relation to end that principle does to beginning (see under §§ 15, 18, 22). When, therefore, he says that the essence of being is realized, he merely means that the principle of being must necessarily have a term. This principle is given to us by intuition; when we find the terms in feeling, we recognize them as such, and call them realizations of the essence of being. "It is easy," he says, "to see that what is wanting to

the perfection of the being naturally intuited by us is its terms. We conceive this activity which is called being; but we do not see where it issues, in what it terminates; just as if we knew that a certain man was working, without knowing the term of his action—whether, for example, he was making a statue, a picture, or something else. Not knowing, therefore, by nature, wherein that activity which we conceive and call *being* terminates, we come to find:

"*First*, that the intuition of this activity cannot by itself impart to us the knowledge of any real thing, because real things are so many terms of that activity which is called being.

"*Second*, that the being naturally intuited by us is *indeterminate*, which means devoid of terms; *universal*, inasmuch as it is capable of receiving all those terms which it has not; *possible* or in potentiality, inasmuch as it has not a terminated or absolute act, but only a principle of act. In a word, . . . that which we see by nature is the *first activity of being*, without its terms, by means of which alone it natures itself and forms a real subsistence.

"*Third*, that if this being, evolving itself more manifestly before our minds, should put forth its own activity and so terminate and complete itself, we should see God. . . .

"*Fourth*, and finally, that the other activity presented to us by feeling, inasmuch as it does not issue from being itself, the form of our intelligence, but comes from elsewhere, is seen as essentially separate and distinct from it; but that, nevertheless, this activity is judged by means of it, and known to be dependent on it, known as a term of it, partial, contingent, and inconfusible with it" (*New Essay*, vol. iii. §§ 1177, 1178; cf. Buroni, *Dell' Essere e del Conoscere*, §§ 175, 176, where the author, with some reason, objects to the phrase, "ideal being realizes itself").

22.

Examination of the objections to the identification of reality with feeling.

Other difficulties arise in regard to our statement that the real existence of being lies in feeling: *first*, because we see that many feelings change, while the subject of them remains identical; *second*, because external bodies have no feeling, and yet they are affirmed and believed to exist. In regard to the former of these difficulties, we must observe that the subject of the feelings which change is itself a feeling, otherwise it would not be known; or, to avoid all discussion on this point, let us say, at least, that it is a sentient principle, having an essential relation to feeling, and that, therefore, it cannot be entirely sundered from feeling. In regard to external bodies, they are perceived only in so far as they act in the feeling we have of ourselves; hence they are known only through their relation to feeling, as active principles modifying feeling. They, therefore, fall under feeling as agents in it. Every real being, therefore, known to us by experience, reduces itself in the last analysis to feeling, to the principle of feeling, or to certain virtues that act in feeling. To include the whole in one phrase and avoid discussion, let us say that what is affirmed, in the perception of a real being, to be a being, is always a *felt activity*. Let us now continue our analysis of the affirmation of real beings.

Rosmini defines *reality of being* as "being in so far as it is feeling, or in so far as it has the power to produce or

modify feeling," and concludes that "perception is a communication between two realities, the one of which is sentient, the other sensiferous (*sensifera*)" (*Psychology*, vol. i. § 54).

Rosmini is well aware that this doctrine is both novel and startling, and he is, therefore, at considerable pains to justify it. In answer to the question whether real being is always reducible to a feeling, he says, "In the first place, if we pay attention to experience, we see that it gives us no real beings except those that are of the nature either of a term or a principle. Now, principles are subjects, all endowed with feeling, and terms are what is felt; but this again has reference to the sentient subject, and is therefore in feeling. But, if we apply to these data of experience analytic reasoning, we find:

"*First*, that the word *feeling* signifies properly the completed act of the sentient subject.

"*Second*, that the felt term is either proper or foreign. . . . If it is proper, it is the sentient principle itself as felt, because a proper term is one whose being is identical with that of its principle. Thus, in the feeling expressed by the word *I*, the sentient and the felt are identified. In such cases, therefore, the feeling belongs to the term as much as to the principle.

"*Third*, that if, on the contrary, the term is foreign, it has indeed an 'essential relation' to the foreign principle with which it is united, but the proper act of the foreign principle does not belong to it, and, therefore, neither does its feeling. Hence it presents itself to our view simply as matter of feeling, matter which, though felt, might equally well not be felt. This is the reason why we are wont to think that entities, themselves devoid of feeling, but capable of being felt or not felt, have matter. Thus, the common mode of thinking is justified, and this fact does not, in the smallest degree, interfere with the philosophical truths which we have set forth, since the ordinary thought does not reach them, having no reason to occupy itself with them. Among these truths there is this, that every foreign term must necessarily have a principle of its own,

which is beyond our experience. Now, the feeling of this principle belongs to that entity which to us is a foreign term, and, therefore, that too comes within the domain of feeling. But that entity which to us is a foreign term is not felt by its own principle as it is felt by us,* because by us it is felt as foreign and devoid of all principle of its own, is felt solely in so far as it acts by exciting a feeling in the principle foreign to it, which feeling is entirely different from the feeling felt by its own principle. Indeed, the two sentient principles in question are altogether different. Hence, in the term of our feeling three things must be distinguished: *first*, the term actually felt, and this is what receives a name and is talked about—for example, the name *body*; *second*, the supposed *matter*, which is not felt—an abstract entity formed by the removal from the felt of the quality of being felt, after which there remains an unknown something, which is known only as capable of being felt; *third*, the matter felt, not by us, but by its own principle, with a feeling totally different from ours. This matter, accordingly, which lies between the two feelings, is considered as matter identical in the two. But, properly speaking, it has no existence apart from the two sentients. It is merely a sort of figment of our limited mode of conceiving, and, therefore, is not even identical in the two feelings. On the contrary, the feeling felt by its own principle has no matter, since the felt is the feeling itself. Nevertheless, the concept of this matter formed by our limited minds, or constituting, at least, the negation of them, is not entirely useless, inasmuch as, in connection with our own feeling, it points to a truth, namely, that our feeling presupposes and demands an entity beyond what it feels, an entity which remains entirely unknown to experience, and which is called the *matter of feeling*, because its relation to feeling is the only thing we know about it. However, we should fall into error, were we to suppose that this something lying beyond what we feel bore any

* This completely disposes of Mamiani's objection to the sensivity of matter. Rosmini, of course, does not mean that a fruit feels its own sweetness, or a stone its own weight. See *Confessioni di un Metafisico*, vol. i. pp. 44 sq.

resemblance to that feeling. Hence, the concept of this matter does not help us to know what that matter is in itself, but merely to know that there is a real entity (of unknown nature) standing in sensible contact with our sentient principle, which contact is the origin of what we feel. Now, this negative concept is the concept of a *pure, abstract reality*, which is something anterior to feeling, and for that reason denominated pure, as being that whereby we begin to know *reality*. Such knowledge is, of course, relative and imperfect.

"*Fourth*, that in every feeling, as well as in every felt, there is an activity. Now, abstraction is wont to separate even the activity of feeling from feeling itself, and to give to this activity the name of *pure reality*, that is, reality separated from the feeling which completes it. But here, too, we must beware of taking the products of abstraction for self-existent entities, for real beings. The truth in regard to feeling is, that, when we set aside the foreign terms, its activity itself is feeling" (*Theosophy*, vol. v. p. 145. sq., cap. xxxviii.). On the meaning of *principle* and *term*, see under §§ 15, 18.

23.

Identity between the essence of being and the activity manifested in feeling.

When we affirm that the essence of being is realized in a felt activity, we affirm that a real being exists. Hence to know the existence of a real being is to affirm a kind of identity between the essence of being and the activity manifested in feeling.

This is one of the cardinal points of the system. All that we mean when we assert a thing to be real, is that what we feel on any particular occasion *is*. By thus placing a feeling in being, we separate it from our subjective self, and regard it as having an existence of its own (see under § 32). In this way it becomes to us a

reality, whereof the being which we impart is the substance (see §§ 88, sq.), and the feeling the attribute or determination. The phrase "manifested in feeling" is not, strictly speaking, correct. Feeling, as such, has no power of manifestation.

"Although *ideal being* can never be confounded with *real being*, yet the connection between the two is wonderful. It is such that, if the two are taken together, they form but one and the same identical being, having two modes, or, as we might say, two original and primitive forms. Hence it is more correct to say the *ideal mode* or the *real mode of being*, than to say *ideal being* and *real being*, as if they were two. And even common sense shows that it knows perfectly this conjunction, this basis of identity, between the ideal and the real, by the way in which it imposes and uses terms; for it does not impose on each thing two names, but one, and with this one it is wont to express both the ideal being of a thing and its real being. For example, the word *house* was invented to signify both the house which the architect imagines and builds in his mind and the house which adorns the public square of a city" (*La Sapienza*, ii. 7, p. 401, sqq.).

24.

This identity is imperfect.

This identity, indeed, is not complete, inasmuch as no activity, whether felt or feeling (sentient), ever exhausts the essence of being; hence the innumerable feelings which make us affirm the existence of so many real beings different from each other. In regard to each we affirm that it exists. Of each we affirm the same thing: in each we recognize the essence of being. This recognizing of the essence of being in each is the same thing as saying that the essence of each of these beings which we affirm is identical with the essence of

being which we knew before by intuition, and that, too, in spite of the fact that they are all different beings. We must, therefore, admit that, however different they may be in other respects, inasmuch as they are all beings, they have one common element, the essence of being. Let it be noted that in all this we only observe and analyze the fact of the *cognition of real beings*, without drawing any conclusions from it. Still, now that we know that the essence of being is realized in all the reality of the real beings which we affirm, we can better understand the meaning of the phrase *universal being* employed by us. Being is universal in this sense, that it may be realized in many particular beings, and that we know all real beings by it alone. This universality, therefore, is not in it, but is a relation in which it stands to real beings.

Fuller explanation of meaning of "universal being."

That the universality of ideas lies in their application, and not in their nature, is a doctrine often insisted on by Rosmini. "Any one who has clearly understood the nature of the idea of being must have observed that mental being is at once *particular* and *universal;* indeed, that it is particular, that is, singular, long before it is universal. And surely we have shown that a universal means nothing else but a relation of similitude between one thing and many. Now, before a thing can be considered in a relation of similitude with many, it must first have been considered or perceived in itself, and hence in its singularity. The unity of a thing, therefore, which, as we have elsewhere said, is identical with its existence, precedes the consideration of its universality. Hence, we may say with truth, that, when we begin with being, we begin with a singular, inasmuch as it is singular in itself, while at the same time it is a light

diffusing itself universally on all cognizable things. This reflection has special force as applied to the idea of being. In fact, ideal being is in the highest degree simple, essentially one, the principle of unity in all things, and, hence, not only singular in itself, but also the source of all true unity and singularity" (*New Essay*, vol. iii. § 1474; compare citation under § 17). Rosmini defines universality thus: "By *universality* we mean that quality which the mind discovers in an entity conceived by it, by which quality that entity can exist in an infinite number of individuals, always remaining identical." Setting out from this definition, he concludes:

"*First*, that *precategorical absolute being* cannot, properly speaking, be said to be universal, because it does not exist in an infinite number of modes, but only in the three categoric modes (cf. below, under § 166).

"*Second*, that *universality* is something different from *identity*, since the former can exist without the latter. Thus, absolute being, in so far as it is ideal, is single, and therefore not universal, and its realization is not merely possible, but actual.

"*Third*, that being, intuited without the terms that complete it, is that which has the greatest universality, that in which, as in its native seat, universality resides, in which exists *first* universality, that from which all universality flows to every other entity.

"*Fourth*, that, nevertheless, the *universality* which flows from initial being, or being separated by the act of the mind from its terms, to other conceivable entities, appears in two shapes" (*Theosophy*, vol. v. p. 95, n.). The two kinds of universality here referred to are the generic and the relational. The former belongs to all forms or ideas, the latter to matter considered in itself.

Elsewhere Rosmini says, "This word *universal* expresses a relation of manifesting being to the things manifested, and this relation is discovered only by the reflection of the philosopher, who has advanced far enough to confront manifesting being with the things manifested, and to bring out the fact that the former is the means whereby

the latter are known" (*Theosophy*, vol. iv. p. 459; cf. Buroni, *Dell' Essere e del Conoscere*, pp. 65 sqq.). Buroni is entirely wrong when he writes a chapter to prove *that Being is in itself universal, and does not become such by virtue of the mind* (*Ibid.*, pp. 46, 47). Indeed, he is not able to bring forward a single passage from Rosmini in support of this view.

25.

The essence of being is realized in the difference as well as in the identity of real being.

But if the beings which we affirm agree only in being beings, and differ in other respects, are not these respects in which they differ themselves so many entities or forms of being? Assuredly: if they were not entities, they would not be at all. Hence the essence of beings is realized in that wherein they differ as well as that wherein they agree. Even in these differences, in those modes in which they are, is found the identical essence of being.

26.

Corollaries derived from the identity of the essence of being and the multiplicity of its realizations.

But how can this identical essence of being be realized in so many different beings, and not merely in that which they have in common, but also in that which is peculiar to each? For an answer to this question we must appeal to observation, and, instead of concluding *à priori* how the thing might be or ought to be, satisfy ourselves of how it is. Now, this philosophical observation plainly tells us that every real being, as well as every *difference* between real beings, is always a *realization* of the essence of being

previously known to us. The essence of being is identical; its realizations are many and various. Hence—

I. The essence of being has various grades and modes of realization.

II. None of these finite grades or modes of realization exhausts the essence of being, which may, therefore, always be realized in other grades and modes—whether *ad infinitum*, we will not now inquire.

III. The different grades and modes in which the essence of being is realized are all limited; for it is with these alone that we are dealing, and these limitations constitute their difference. Now, these limitations which occur in real beings are so far from belonging to the essence of being that they are non-beings. Hence the essence of being is realized in the various beings, in so far as they are beings, not in so far as they are non-beings. This realization is limited, and, in so far as it is limited, its identity with the known essence of being ceases.

IV. The essence of being, therefore, is capable of a higher or lower realization; but, in so far as it is realized, it is entirely (not totally) realized, for the reason that it is one and indivisible; just as the entire essence of wine is as truly in a single drop as in a whole butt. This implies that we require the whole of the essence of being in order to know even a small part of real being, just as we require the whole of the essence of wine in order to know even a drop of wine.

27.

These observations enable us to conclude that quantity is something belonging to the realization, and not to the essence, of being. We must further observe that it is to quantity we must have recourse in order to explain the limitations, the different modes, grades, differences of being, number, etc., all of which belong, not to the essence of being, but to the laws of its realization.

Quantity belongs to the realization, not to the essence, of being.

In these three sections the author takes up the question how pure simple being, the constitutive object of intelligence (see below, under §§ 35, 36), comes to be determined into real things. This, as we see at a glance, is the old and much-vexed problem of the One and the Many, which caused so much trouble to early Greek thinkers. The career of this problem is one of the most curious in the whole history of philosophy. As very often happens in such cases, it presented itself most clearly to the first person to whom it occurred, viz., Parmenides. The thinkers previous to him had found no difficulty in assuming a simple substance and making it determine itself. Even Herakleitos made his One, fire, enter into the process of its own determination, and thus arrived at his famous dictum: "All things pass and nothing remains (*πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει*)." He identified being with nothing, and made War the father of all things (*πόλεμος πάντων πατήρ*) (vid. Bywater, *Heracliti Ephesii Fragmenta*, p. 18, no. xliv.); but how this identity in diversity came about, or where the War came from, he did not stop to inquire. Parmenides, severely criticizing the followers of Herakleitos,* whom he calls—

* See Schuster, *Heraklit von Ephesus* (*Acta Soc. Philolog. Lipsiensis*, vol. iii. pp. 1–398), pp. 36 sq., and compare my translation of the Fragments of Parmenides, *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, vol. iv. no. 1 (1870).

"Deaf and dumb and blind and stupid unreasoning cattle,"
(Κωφοὶ ὁμῶς τυφλοί τε, τεθηπότες, ἄκριτα φῦλα),

lays it down that being, pure and simple, alone is true, eternal, necessary, and unchangeable, whereas all its determinations are merely phenomenal (πρὸς δόξαν); in other words, that being is independent of any subject, whereas all determination is purely subjective. He, moreover, identifies thought with being (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι). According to this theory the universe is self-thinking being, and all phenomena are subjective delusions. To get rid of this latter consequence, Plato, drawing partly upon Anaxagoras' doctrine of a world-ordering intelligence or νοῦς, and partly upon Pythagoras' theory of numbers having a similar function, split up Parmenides' one being into a large number of parts, which he called ideas, and connected these with the phenomenal world by making the Divinity create or order the latter in accordance with them. Previous to the time of Sokrates and Plato, philosophical inquiry had been directed solely to the question how things are, not to the question how they are known. The literal acceptance by the sophists of Parmenides' doctrine, that all phenomenal knowledge is purely subjective, now, however, made the latter the burning question. Plato made an heroic effort to redeem human knowledge from mere subjectivity, by claiming for the soul a prenatal existence, in which it had had immediate knowledge of eternal ideas, whereof the things of the material world, into which by birth it had fallen, were only faint copies, hardly more than sufficient to recall the originals. By so doing he assumed two distinct phenomenal worlds (independent ideas, in order to be known, must become phenomenal even to disembodied spirits), connected by a *deus ex machina*, and rescued the objectivity of knowledge only at the expense of making man a fallen creature. Moreover, he did not succeed in accounting for either the unity of consciousness or the unity of the world. Aristotle got rid of a few of the more glaring of Plato's difficulties and paradoxes, by uniting the ideal with the real world as form with matter, and making the former

synonymous with intelligence. According to this doctrine, ideas or forms (λόγοι, εἴδη) think themselves in two ways: *first*, with matter, in feeling and its correlated objects; *second*, without matter, in intelligence, which is one with its objects. Aristotle, indeed, plainly tells us that feelings are ideas in matter,* that the intelligent soul is the place and form of forms,† and identical with its own objects.‡ How ideas or forms come to connect themselves with matter, or to assemble in one place, or to range themselves under one supreme form, he does not tell us, so that his doctrine is rather a clear statement of a difficulty than the solution of it. Indeed, that doctrine, if accepted as a solution, would do away with both subject and object, and leave "nothing but a bundle of ideas dancing through space to the tune of associations." The truth is that the ancient world furnished no solution of the problem of cognition. Indeed, it never even succeeded in stating it. Nor was the mediæval world a whit more fortunate. The best of the Scholastics did nothing more than try to reconcile the theories of Plato and Aristotle and dispute over the locality of universals, as they termed ideas. Even St. Thomas, as we have already said, had no consistent theory of cognition. What with nominalism, realism, conceptualism, intelligible species, and the rest, the original form of the problem, as it presented itself to Parmenides, was utterly forgotten; so that, even when modern philosophy arose, that problem not only remained unsolved, but did not even seem to call for solution. Philosophy, from Descartes to Hume, remained essentially in the position in which Aristotle left it, failing utterly to account either for the unity of consciousness or the unity of the world. Indeed, Hume's result was precisely the same as Aristotle's, though reached by a different process, and much more clearly and consciously stated. Both abolished not

* "Τὰ πάθη λόγοι ἔνυλοί εἰσιν" (*De Animâ*, i. 1, 10; 403 a, 25).

† "Καὶ εὖ δὴ οἱ λέγοντες τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τόπον εἰδῶν, πλὴν ὅτι οὐτε ὅλη ἀλλ' ἡ νοητική, οὔτε ἐντελεχείᾳ ἀλλὰ δυνάμει τὰ εἴδη" (*De Animâ*, iii. 4, 4; 429 a, 27 sq.). "Καὶ γὰρ ἡ χεὶρ ὄργανόν ἐστιν ὀργάνων, καὶ ὁ νοῦς εἶδος εἰδῶν" (*Ibid.*, iii. 8, 2; 432 a, 1 sq.).

‡ "Ταὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ νοητόν" (*Metaph.*, xi. 7; 1072 b, 20).

only the objects, but even the subjects, of thought, and left nothing in the universe but associated ideas, each thinking itself. The bold statement of this doctrine brought Kant into the field, and with him a new epoch in philosophy. Kant's great merit lay in drawing a clear distinction between the matter and the form of thought. His error lay in substituting forms for *the* form, and making these attributes of the subject. His twelve categories have no essential connection with each other, and are not derived from an analysis of the primary act of cognition, but from that of the various forms of secondary judgments. Moreover, by making these categories or forms subjective, while sensation, the matter of cognition, is manifestly so, he rendered thought and cognition entirely subjective, and, as his successors abundantly showed, all objectivity purely problematical. Hegel carried the doctrines of Kant to their ultimate conclusions. Dropping the problematical objective, and stringing together Kant's categories by a coil of negations, he resuscitated, in a complicated form, the old doctrine of Herakleitos, against which Parmenides had, ages before, so vigorously protested. By making being identify itself with nothing, in order to impel it to start on a career of self-determination, he annihilates not only it, but likewise the possibility of anything, and arrives at pure nihilism. To be sure, by conjuring with the word *identity*, so as to make it mean negative correlation (full : not full), or more frequently contrary correlation (full : empty), and by abusively calling what all other men have hitherto understood by the term, viz. absolute sameness, "naughty identity" (*schlechte Identität*), he succeeds in creating a word-world, which he tries to pass off for real. But Hegel's wonderful structure has, in truth, no reality other than vocal, and no unity other than grammatical. Thus, when Rosmini appeared, philosophy had forgotten, amid a multitude of secondary questions, the original problem of Parmenides, and had wandered back to the doctrine of Herakleitos and nihilism. Rosmini resuscitated the Eleatic problem, brought it into connection with the Kantian distinction between the form

and matter of thought, and so, by a careful analysis of the primary act of cognition, arrived at the conclusion that the One (being) is the form of cognition; the Many, its matter. He moreover showed, by a careful examination of Kant's categories, that while they were all subjective but one, that one, viz. being, was necessarily objective, and the very essence of objectivity. In this way he introduced a necessary, objective element into cognition, and so made true cognition possible. Rosmini's solution of the problem, how being comes to be determined, lies in showing that being exists essentially in two forms—one ideal and undetermined, the other real and determined (see §§ 18, 21). As to determinations being, as such, non-beings, see Buroni, *Dell' Essere e del Conoscere*, pp. 95, sqq.

28.

Ideas which make known the negation of being.

It may be said, If all things are known through the essence of being, how do we come to know those negative properties of being which we spoke of above, and which are not in the essence of being? Are there not ideas of particular beings, of their differences, etc.? I reply that it is by means of the essence of being that we know all negations, since all that we know about them is that they are the contrary, the negation of being, and the negation of a thing is known as soon as we know the thing negated. Nevertheless, it is to be observed that language imposes a positive mark, a word, not only on being, but also on the negation of being, and we say *nothing*, *limit*, *mode*, as well as *being*. Hence it is that all these negations figure in our imaginations as if they were so many entities, although they are not.

All ideas of particular beings consist of positive and negative.

I reply, therefore, that the ideas which have as their object the negation of being are only the idea of being itself, *plus* the act whereby we negate it. As to ideas of particular beings, which are all made up of positive and negative—in other words, of realization and limitation—they are only so many relations between real being (or the memory of real being) and the essence of being, so that the idea of a horse or a man, for example, is simply the essence of being in so far as it may be realized in a horse or a man, etc., etc. Thus the basis of our knowledge of all these beings is, in every case, the essence of being. The ideas, therefore, of particular beings are always the idea of being considered in relation to a certain given grade and mode of realization; whence, properly speaking, there exists but one idea which makes known to our minds numerous particular beings, and thus transforms itself into so many *concepts*, becoming, in this way, the special concepts of all these beings.

There is but one idea, the essence of being, and all the rest are relations of it.

In regard to the nature of negative ideas Rosmini is very explicit: "Nothing as nothing, neither is, nor can be, thought. When, therefore, we think nothing, we really think a relation of contingent being, a relation which being has with thought and with itself; and by which we think that being either is, in which case it is thinkable, or is not, in which case it is not thinkable. Now, this *is not* means nothing more than two combined acts of the thought itself, by one of which being is thought, while by the other it is removed and the object of thought thereby abolished. Indeed, that nothing, as thought, is not really nothing, but a relation of being, may be readily seen from the numerous reasonings of mathematicians in regard to nothing, and the

various kinds of nothing which they distinguish" (*Psychology*, § 1300). On negative cognition see under § 182.

In regard to "ideas of particular beings" or particular ideas, the author says, "An idea is particular only in so far as, in my mind, it is attached to a real individual. As soon as it is separated therefrom, it acquires, or rather manifests, universality, since, when set free, it may be applied at pleasure to an infinite number of similar individuals. That which is absolutely peculiar or particular in an idea is simply the real individual to which it adheres, and which does not form part of the idea itself, but is something heterogeneous to the idea, joined to it, not by nature, but by the action of the intelligent mind" (*New Essay*, vol. i. § 43, n.). "Every idea is universal and necessary. And, indeed, it is always the idea of being that, clothed with determinate qualities derived from experience, furnishes me with a quantity of ideas or concepts more or less determinate, but representing merely possible entities and not subsisting entities" (*Ibid.*, vol. ii. § 431).

29.

In respect to quantity, the essence of being and beings perceived by us are different, not identical.

Besides this, we must consider further, in order clearly to see wherein consists the imperfect identity, which, as we have said, we observe between the entities felt by us and the essence of being which we intuite. We said that limitations do not enter into this identity. Now, one of these limitations is the contingency of finite things. Hence, contingency is not to be found in the essence of being, so that even in this respect there is opposition between contingent being and the essence of being, which is intuited by us as immutable and necessary.

"Every being," says Rosmini, "when considered in its

logical possibility, is universal and necessary. And, indeed, there is no logical reason why there should not subsist any number of real beings corresponding to my one idea. Hence, every idea is a light, whereby I am able to know all the beings corresponding to it that subsist now or yet may subsist. It is, therefore, universal, infinite. Every single sensation, on the other hand, is particular. All that I feel in it is limited to it. . . . The same may be said of the attribute of necessity. What I contemplate as possible, I know very well to be necessary ; for there is no way or mode of thinking that the possible ever was impossible [cf. under § 35]. Real sensation, on the contrary, may or may not be. It is accidental, contingent. There is, therefore, nothing in it that could awake in my mind the sense of an absolute necessity" (*New Essay*, vol. ii. § 428). Contingent things are the *improper terms* of ideal being. Its *proper*, that is, its necessary term is God (see under § 21). How ideal being comes to have improper terms is a question of Theosophy, or even of Theology.

30.

The identity between the essence of being and real beings exists between them only in so far as they are known.

Furthermore, when we observe the identity between real, contingent being and the essence of being, we observe this identity in our *perception* and cognition, not in being as independent of such perception or cognition (§ 24).

31.

It is only as known that real being is identical with ideal being.

In fact, it is only in *real* being as *known* that this identity is found or formed, and it is in the finding of it that the *felt activity* is perceived and cognized. It is not until the felt activity is identified with the essence of being that it is known

or perceived, that it becomes a perceptible entity, an object. In the act of perception, therefore, there is added to the felt activity something which renders it a perceptible entity, and this addition is being itself, the feeling or contingent felt activity of which is but an imperfect mode, not perceptible apart from being, but only in objective being, as we shall show more clearly further on, when we come to speak of perception (§§ 92–94). Moreover, although the mind thus supplies an element of its object, of *perceived being*, this does not render its perceptions less true, since the mind clearly knows what it adds and what is given to it. Hence it knows things as they are.

Perception not less true on that account.

In answer to the grave question, "How can the matter of cognition identify itself with the form; and if the matter does not so identify itself, how can it be said to be contained in the form, and to form a perfect equation with it?" Rosmini replies, "The *matter*, considered in itself, never does identify itself with the form of cognition. On the contrary, . . . the matter in itself . . . is an activity different from knowing, and, therefore, still more different from the form of knowing. . . . The matter of cognition, so long as separated from cognition itself, remains unknown, and there can be no question of certainty with regard to it, because certainty is an attribute solely of knowledge. That, therefore, which identifies itself with the form of cognition is the matter of cognition, *so far as known.* The mind, under these circumstances, merely considers this matter in relation to being, and sees it contained in being as an actuation and term of it. Hence, before it is united to being, there is no identification: before the matter is known, there is nothing to be said about it; but when it is united to being and thus objectified, when it is known to us, it has already received,

in the act of our cognition, a relation, a form, a predicate, which it had not before, and in this predicate consists its identification with being. Being is predicated of it, and in that predication consists the act whereby we know it. In this way it seems to us, when we consider the *matter already known*, that it has in itself something common with all things, whereas this quality, in so far as it is common, is acquired by it and received from the mind—is a relation which it has to the act of the mind, a relation not real in it, but only in the act of the mind. Aristotle and others, not having sufficiently considered this, fell into the error of supposing that the mind could derive the idea of being by abstraction from what was most common in things, whereas it was the mind itself that put this most common quality into the things ; and when it took it from them, it only reclaimed its own. Hence . . . what is common in things is only a result of the relation in which they stand to the intelligent mind" (*New Essay*, vol. iii. § 1174). St. Thomas and most modern Thomists make the same blunder as Aristotle.

32.

Why we think that we do not know the ground of things.

This analysis of the nature of our knowledge of real beings shows us why men generally have a conviction that they do not know the ground of things—that which causes them to be. The reason of this ignorance is the fact that in all felt activities this ground is wanting, and has to be given or lent to them, so to speak, by the perceiving mind itself. In other words, the mind attributes to contingent things a basis, because otherwise it would be incapable of perceiving them ; but, inasmuch as it does not perceive this basis, it is unable to determine its nature.

"When our minds have received through the senses the corporeal elements above described, the understanding cŏmpletes the perception of them in the following manner:—The passion [*passio, πάθος*] which we undergo in sensation has two aspects—the one turned toward its term, that is, us; the other turned toward its principle. The former is passion, the latter, action. Action and passion are two words which signify the same thing under two diverse and contrary aspects. Now, the sense does not perceive the thing of which we speak except as passion or expectation of new passions. It is the understanding alone that is able to perceive it as action. In so doing, the understanding adds nothing to the thing, but merely considers it in an *absolute* mode, whereas the sense perceives it only in a particular *respect*, in a *relative* mode. The understanding sunders itself from us as particular beings, and, with its vision, regards the things in themselves, whereas the sense never sunders itself from the particular subjects to which it belongs, that is, from us. The conceiving of an action, therefore, belongs exclusively to the understanding. But conceiving an action involves conceiving a *principle in act;* hence the intellect, in perceiving an action, always perceives an *agent* as existing in itself, that is, a *being in act.* The understanding does this by means of the idea of being, which it has in itself. When, therefore, the understanding perceives the agent in question, as a being different from us and *furnished with extension*, it has *the perception of body.* From all of which it is clear that the understanding, in order to perceive a body, does no more than consider what the senses supply to it. It does so, however, not in a mode relative to us, as is the case with the sense, but by prescinding and abstracting from us, that is, by adding the universal concept of being. The *intellective perception of body*, therefore, is the union of the intuition of a being (agent) with sense-perception (passion), or, in other words, a judgment, a primitive synthesis" (*New Essay*, vol. ii. § 964). "It is true that the sense perceives the passion and not the action, since the former has an existence different from that of the latter; but the

understanding perceives the passion with the *concept* of passion, and the concept of passion cannot exist without including the *concept* of action, since these concepts are relative, and reciprocally include each other. But what is this *concept?* How does the understanding form to itself the concept of passion? . . . The principle of cognition is this: The object of the intellect is being, or, in other words, the intellect, if it understands, must understand something. Now, when we, endowed with intellect, are conscious of a modification, we say naturally (*i.e.* instinctively), 'There is something which is not ourselves.' And to say this is reasonable and necessary, since, whatever it is, it must always be something that modifies us. We feel that, sometimes with our consent, sometimes without, in every case force is applied to us, and that what actually produces passion is not a zero; therefore, there is something, an entity, which is perceived. We say, at the same time, 'If there is something here, there must be a substance or a first act which is the basis of that being;' since all that is given is either substance, in this sense, or appurtenance of substance, there being no third alternative. We see, therefore, what it is that is perceived in the passion of the sense. It is an action in us, an agent, therefore an agent-being, since an agent cannot be conceived except as being. Thus the proposed difficulty vanishes. The sense could not perceive the event that occurred in it, except in its own form, that is, as passion, since it was not an objective faculty; it could not perceive an agent, save in its own passivity, and hence could not perceive it in the relation of action. But the understanding, the faculty which sees things in themselves, necessarily sees the being that acts, because it is exactly in so far as a thing is in itself that it performs its operations, operation being a consequence of being. Being is an essential activity; it is the first act, on which all the others depend. Hence it is the special faculty of the intellect always to see action in passion, the agent in action, and being-in-itself or substance in the agent. One thing is implied in the other, and all are seen with a single act, which is called the act of perception"

(*New Essay*, vol. iii. §§ 1206, 1207; cf. *Theosophy*, vol. ii. § 868). The perception of passion by the sense is *sense-perception;* the perception of action, which is a function of the intellect, is *intellective perception.*

33.

Why being, as a means of cognition, is called *ideal.*

The means, therefore, whereby we cognize real beings is the essence of being, which, for this reason, we have called *ideal being*. Be it observed, however, that the word *ideal* does not apply to the essence of being, but to the property which it has of making known real beings to us. When, therefore, we affirm that a real being exists, we do not affirm ideality of it, we do not affirm that it is ideal, but only that it has the essence of being.

It has been a common objection to Rosmini's philosophy that, since all things are known by means of ideal being, and this being constitutes their cognizability, the things known must themselves be ideal.* Such objection shows a profound misunderstanding of the system. In the phrase *ideal being*, the word *ideal* does not express an intrinsic attribute of being, but, like *universal*, a relation of possibility in which it stands to its real terms. The phrase *formal being* would express the meaning, perhaps, better. It is plain enough that the terms *ideal* and *possible*, which Rosmini employs as synonymous, cannot apply to being itself. It is not being that is possible or ideal; it is merely the ideality or possibility of other things. What is ideal in knowledge is not the things known, but the knowledge itself (cf. under § 35). Ideal being is what the

* See Galluppi, *Lettere Filosofiche sulle Vicende della Filosofia intorno ai Principii della Conoscenza umana da Cartesio fino a Kant*, xiv.; Mamiani, *Compendio e Sintesi della propria Filosofia*, pp. 208, sqq.; *Confessioni di un Metafisico*, vol. i. pp. 239, sqq.

Schoolmen called the means of vision *sub quo*, of which Cardinal Zigliara says, "The means *sub quo* lies between the true and the intellect, as the principle and form disposing the intellect to see the intelligible, in the same way as material light disposes the bodily eye to see the sensible, and passes between the two. This means . . . is the light of the active intellect, which stands in the same relation to the so-called *possible* intellect as corporeal light does to the external sense of sight" (*Della Luce Intellettuale e dell' Ontologismo*, vol. i. p. 11 ; cf. p. 6, note 1).

34.

The essence of being is self-intelligible, and forms the intelligibility of all other things.

But if we know real things by means of the essence of being, how do we know the essence of being itself? Observation attests that our notion of the essence of being is given to our minds prior to all other cognition ; and if we study the nature of it, we shall see that it must be so—that this knowledge does not depend upon any other previous knowledge—in other words, that it is cognizable in and through itself. And, indeed, facts show us that we do not begin to use the faculties of our minds until moved by external sensations, and that we begin to think by observing that bodies exist, that we ourselves exist, that something real exists. Now, this first thought is, as we have said, simply an affirmation, an affirmation of a being, which supposes that we know beforehand the essence of being (§ 14). The essence of being, therefore, is known to us before any act of our thought. It is not, therefore, acquired by any act of thought, but is implanted before all thought by the Author of Nature.

If this be not true, let us suppose that we did not know what being was. We should in this case never be able, whatever pains or pleasures we might experience, to say that there was a being. We should never be able to know that sensation presupposed a being, for the simple reason that we should never know what being was. The result would be that we should not know anything, and, not knowing anything, we should not have any element of knowledge whereby we could know the essence of being. It is thus clear that the essence of being cannot be known through any other knowledge but through itself. *The essence of being*, therefore, *is knowable in and through itself, and is the means whereby we know all other things.* It is, therefore, the *Light of Reason.* From this point of view we say that the idea of being is innate, and that it is the form of intelligence.

The idea of being is the Light of Reason, is innate, and is the form of intelligence.

Rosmini devotes a very large number of pages in his *New Essay* to showing that, since the idea of being cannot come to us either from bodily sensations, from the feeling of our own existence, from reflection (in Locke's sense), or through the act of perception, it must be innate. That it does not come from our bodily sensations is clear from its characteristics, all of which are utterly opposed to those of sensation. These characteristics are objectivity, possibility or ideality, simplicity, unity or identity, universality and necessity, immutability and eternity, and indeterminateness. That it cannot come from the feeling of our own existence is likewise manifest, partly on account of the same characteristics, and partly because, without first having the idea of being, we should never be able to distinguish the feeling of ourselves. That it cannot come

from reflection is plain, inasmuch as reflection adds nothing to sensation, and sensation does not contain the notion of being. Finally, that it does not spring into existence in the act of perception and as a result of that act, is obvious, for the simple reason that that act could never be begun without it (*New Essay*, vol. ii. §§ 413–466). Hence the author concludes that the idea of being is innate. "This proposition," he says, "follows from the preceding ; for

(1) If the idea of being is so necessary that it enters essentially into the formation of all our other ideas, so that, without the use of it, we have not the faculty of thinking ;

(2) If this idea is not to be found in sensations ;

(3) If it cannot be derived from external or internal sensations through reflection ;

(4) If it is not created in us by God in the act of perception ;

(5) Finally, if it is absurd to say that the idea of being emanates from ourselves ;

it follows that the idea of being is innate in our souls, so that we are born with the presence and vision of possible being, albeit we do not pay attention to it until much later. This demonstration by exclusion is irrefutable, provided it be demonstrated that the enumeration of possible cases is complete. Now, that it is complete is seen in this way. The idea of being in general exists : this is the fact to be explained. Since it exists, it was either given to us with our nature or produced in us afterwards ; there is no third alternative. If it was produced afterwards, it must have been either by ourselves or by something different from us ; here, also, there is no third alternative. The first alternative being excluded, if it was produced by some cause different from us, this cause must either be something sensible (the action of bodies) or something not sensible (an intelligent being different from us, God, etc.) ; here, again, there is no third alternative. Now, these two cases were likewise excluded. Hence the enumeration was complete, because reduced to two alternatives, which always rejected as absurd a middle term. If, therefore, all the cases

in which the idea of being could be supposed to be given to us after our coming into existence are impossible, it follows that the idea of being is innate or unproduced. Q. E. D." (*New Essay*, vol. ii. §§ 467, 468).

Rosmini's assertion that the idea of being is innate has caused much misunderstanding and opposition in various quarters; but both proceed from want of attention to his explanations. By "innate," Rosmini does not mean innate in the subject and forming a part, or modification, or attribute of it, but innate as form, object, presence. "We must carefully attend," he says, "so as not to confound two things that are altogether distinct. It is one thing when we say, 'a being present to the mind,' another, when we say, 'a modification of the mind.' Were it otherwise, this being which we see would be nothing else than ourselves modified, a mere subjective entity. . . . The intuition of being gives us these two truths respecting it: *first*, that it is a being present to the mind—objective, and not a being having an independent subsistence of its own; *second*, that it is not a mere modification of the mind. . . . What do we mean when we say, 'a being present to the mind'? We mean a being which has its existence in the mind, in such a way that, if we should suppose that there was not *some mind* to which it was present, it would not be at all, for the reason that its mode of being is intelligibility itself, outside the mind, not in the mind. By means of it we know, not the act of existence in itself, but the act of existence in the mind. . . . In the second place, . . . (being) is not a mere modification of the mind or of the subject which has the intuition of it. This truth manifests itself, as soon as we attentively consider universal being itself. In the thought of being, we see that the being thought by us is the *object* of the mind, and, what is more, likewise the objectivity of all the terms of the mind. . . . It is, therefore, in its essence, distinct from the subject, and from all that can belong to the subject. It is the light of the subject, and superior to it. The subject is receptive with respect to it, while it is essentially received in a mode peculiar to itself. The subject is compelled to see it more

than the open eye is compelled to see the rays of the sun which it has before it and which strike its retina. Being is immutable; it is what is: the subject is mutable. Being imposes laws and actualizes the subject by rendering it intelligent; and since it cannot be said, in any proper sense, that the subject suffers from the object (because the presence of the latter merely gives it its mode and compels it to rouse a new activity in itself), what takes place in the subject must not be called *passion* (πάθος) but *increase of act.** . . . Attentive observation, therefore, directed to this being, which naturally shines before our minds, leads us to conclude that it is an object essentially different from the subject which intuites it; that, at the same time, it is not thought by us as furnished with any other existence save that alone whereby it shines before our minds; and hence that, if *all mind* were removed, this being would no longer be conceivable, which is the reason why it is called an ideal being (*ente*)" (*New Essay*, vol. iii. §§ 1440–1442). This last observation respecting the removal of *all mind* furnishes Rosmini, as we shall see, with his strongest proof for the necessary existence of God (§ 179).

35.

Meaning of the word *form*.

But the word *form*, having different significations, requires explanation. It is used, generally speaking, to mean that which imparts to a being an original constitutive act, which makes it to be what it is. Thus the essence of being, knowable in and through itself, is said to be the form of the intelligent soul, because it is that which imparts to the soul the act whereby it is intelligent. But here we must distinguish two

Two

* Cf. the remarkable passage in Aristotle: "Οὐκ ἔστι δ' ἁπλοῦν οὐδὲ τὸ πάσχειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν φθορά τις ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου, τὸ δὲ σωτηρία μᾶλλον τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος καὶ ὁμοίου οὕτως ὡς δύναμις ἔχει πρὸς ἐντελέχειαν" (*De An.*, ii. 5, 5; 417 b, 2, sqq.; also *Ibid.*, iii. 4, 2, 3; 429 a, 13, sqq.).

kinds of form. Notionally considered, that which imparts to a being its original, essential act is different from that act itself; but sometimes it is part of the being itself and confounds itself with the act, being separable from it only mentally and through abstraction; at other times, it is something really different from the act and from the being which it informs. Thus the form of a knife is the edge of the knife, belonging to, and forming part of, the knife. On the contrary, the form of incandescent iron is fire, something altogether different from the iron, but such that, when the two are brought into contact, the one becomes the form of the other, penetrating and acting in the other's sphere of being. Now, in which of these two senses is ideal being the form of intelligence? Here, again, we must appeal to observation and fact, and these show us that ideal being is the form of the intelligent mind in the latter sense only, and not in the former. And, indeed, although we clearly see that we are intelligent beings only in virtue of the essence of being which stands before our minds, still, we find it impossible to believe that the essence of being is ourselves or forms part of ourselves. It is, therefore, a form different from us. That which imparts to our spirits the act of intelligence is something very different from us, notwithstanding that it is in us or present to us. But this is not enough. Even if we accept this signification of the word, it can be applied to ideal being only in a sense altogether peculiar and different from that

senses of the word *form*.

In which of the two is the *idea of being* used?

which we adopt when we say of two real beings, which act reciprocally on each other, that the one is the form of the other. We must, therefore, carefully observe that the mode in which the essence of being becomes the form of our spirits has no resemblance whatever to the mode in which one real being, through action and reaction, becomes the form of another. The essence of being becomes the form of our spirits simply and solely by making us know, by revealing to us its own natural cognizability. Hence there is no reaction on the part of our spirits. These are simply receptive, and the light, the knowledge, which they receive is what renders them intelligent. The essence of being is simple, unalterable, incapable of being modified or confounded or mixed with anything else. In this way it reveals itself, and it can reveal itself in no other. The spirit which intuites it, no less than the act of intuition, stands outside of it. When the mind intuites *it*, it does not intuite itself. For this reason the essence of being receives the name of *object*, meaning that which is placed before the intuiting mind, or *subject*. It will thus be seen that, when we say that ideal being is the form of the mind, we use the word *form* in a sense altogether different from, and opposed to, that in which Kant uses it, all Kant's forms being subjective, whereas our one form is objective, and objective in its very essence.

Object and *subject*, and their relation.

Kant's forms not objective, but subjective.

In regard to the meaning of the word *form*, Rosmini says elsewhere, "It seems that Kant took the word *form*

in a material sense, drawing his concept from the form of bodies. By *form* we mean a perfecting principle, as the ancient philosophers did. Moreover, in our case, it is the ideal object which informs the mind.* Those, therefore, who have charged us with taking one of Kant's forms as the basis of our system, have not understood that the *form* of which we speak differs essentially from all Kant's forms, as *object* differs from *subject* and *extra-subject*" (*Theodicy*, vol. i. § 151, n.).† "It is being which, as object, draws our spirits to that essential act which is called *intellect*, and which renders them capable of seeing this being afterwards, in relation with the particular modes of sensation supplied to it—a capability which is called *reason*. In a word, the idea of being, united to our spirits, is that which forms our intellect and our reason. It is this that renders us intelligent beings, rational animals" (*New Essay*, vol. ii. § 482). It follows from this that the peculiarity of mind lies in having its form as object. Being is, of course, the first and essential *form* of everything; but it is the *object* of mind alone. In other words, consciousness is the power which certain beings have of separating the universal form from their matter, and holding it up, so to speak, as an object. The being of a table is not its object.

"By the *form of cognition*," says Rosmini, "we mean that element whereby cognition is cognition, whereby everything cognized is cognized. . . . Moreover, this element must be known through itself, and not through some other means rendering it known. . . . Therefore, it must be known immediately, *per se*. Now, in every one of our cognitions, nothing is known, unless existence be known, because any known thing is simply a thing whose (possible) being and whose determinations are known. But not one of these determinations is known, unless its possible existence is known. To know these determinations is to know

* Cf. St. Thomas: "Id quo aliquid operatur, oportet esse formam ejus. Nihil enim agit nisi secundum quod est actu. Actu autem non est aliquid, nisi per id quod est forma ejus" (*Summa contra Gentes*, ii. 59).

† In spite of this, Mamiani still insists that Rosmini's *being* is subjective, one of Kant's forms (*Prolegomeni*, p. 114, etc.).

them as existing in their possibility. Therefore, every knowing is a knowing of, at least, possible existence, and every known is known because its possible existence is known. Therefore, ideal or possible existence, or the idea of existence, which is the same thing, is the form of all cognitions. . . . The *matter of cognition* is the determinations of existence, ideal, real, or moral. Matter here means what is known and does not make known, that which requires something else in order to be known, that in which cognition ends as its term. Hence, although everything, even a determination of existence, is known because its possible existence is known, yet pure existence is not the thing known, but only the form of cognition. Thus the mind finds this distinction, which separates in cognition the pure form of knowing from the matter" (*Theosophy*, vol. iv. § 123). In answer to the question, How can the same thing, that is, ideal being, be at once the form of cognition and of the power of cognition, that is, of the intellect? Rosmini says, "Ideal being has two relations. . . . that is, it is at once manifesting and manifested. As *manifesting*, it is called the form of the mind, because without it the mind would not be mind. . . . As *manifested*, it is called the form of cognition, because it constitutes the cognized object, what there is of objective and, therefore, of formal in every cognition. Hence . . . ideal being may be called the *immediate cause of the form of intellect*, as well as that *form* itself" (*Ibid.*, § 124).

Rosmini's system was so much a reaction against Kantianism, and its objective fundamental principle so much the result of a refutation of Kant's twelve subjective categories, that it will be worth while to quote that refutation. Kant's categories are presented in the following table :—

"TRANSCENDENTAL TABLE OF THE CONCEPTS OF THE UNDERSTANDING.

"1. According to *Quantity*.
Unity (Measure),
Multiplicity (Magnitude),
Totality (Wholeness).

"2. According to *Quality*.
Reality,
Negation,
Limitation.
"3. According to *Relation*.
Substance and accident,
Cause and effect,
Community of passion and action.
"4. According to *Modality*.
Possibility—Impossibility,
Existence—Non-existence,
Necessity—Chance." *

"I do not purpose," says Rosmini, "to enter here into a minute examination of the Kantian forms. Although Kant has promised rigorously to deduce the categories from the various forms of judgment (which is certainly a very happy thought), he has not kept his word; for, as far as I can remember, he nowhere undertakes to demonstrate that from the forms of the judgment there result categories amounting to the exact number of twelve, and assignable in triads, with perfect distributive regularity, to each of the four fundamental forms. Having thus failed to justify the symmetrical deduction of the categories, he left it a matter of doubt, no less than did Aristotle, whom he justly censures, whether or not these are perfectly deduced and enumerated, that is, whether they are the only twelve categories of human knowledge, so that there remains nothing that could not be classed under one or other of them. For this reason it would be tedious and out of place here to enter into a minute criticism of this division of the most universal ideas of the human understanding—a division which is certainly no less arbitrary than those made in ancient times. So much is visible at a first glance, that he sometimes confounds the dress which our ideas receive from the different views taken by the mind and from speech with the ideas themselves, and then he picks up and classifies one idea as several, when he finds it in a variety of garbs. This, to be

* See *Kritik der rein. Vern.* and *Prolegomena*, pt. ii. § 21.

sure, helps to perfect the symmetrical regularity of his division, as when he finds under the form of quality the subdivision *infinite judgments*, which are not in any way different from *affirmative* or *negative* judgments, except in their garb of expression. In the same way, he seems to omit certain ideas which determine the classes of human knowledge, and which might have been placed among the categories, merely for fear that these might increase beyond the appointed number, and destroy his favourite regularity. Thus, *continuous* and *extensive quantity* might have been ranged under the category of quantity, whereas he places under it only discrete quantity, as being the one which supplies him with exactly the three desired classes—*unity*, *multiplicity*, and *totality*. . . .

"Let us now examine the twelve categories which Kant calls the forms of our understanding, and the two forms of the inner and outer sense, and let us see whether all these are really primitive and original forms of our intelligence, as the critical philosopher pretends. I observe, in the first place, that Kant's twelve categories cannot all aspire to the same dignity. They are not independent of each other, or confined to distinct genera, in such a way that they cannot be reduced or ranged under each other as smaller classes under greater. Let us take the form of *modality*. It has the three subordinate categories, *possibility*, *existence*, and *necessity*. Now, let us compare with this form the other three, viz., *quantity*, *quality*, and *relation*. I can conceive, with the utmost ease, a *possible* or *existent* being, without being obliged to know what *quantity*, *quality*, or *relation* it has. My understanding, in this case, is conditioned by the law that it is obliged to think such a being either as *possible*, or as *existent*, or as *necessary*; but it is not obliged, after that, to clothe this being with the forms of *quantity*, *quality*, and *relation*. If, therefore, there can be an act of the intelligence which does not require the three forms, *quantity*, *quality*, and *relation*, this means that these are not *essential* or *necessary* forms; they are not those forms which inform and constitute the peculiar nature of the intellectual operation, and hence they are not the forms we are looking

for, inasmuch as we are looking for those through which the understanding is understanding, and by which the intellectual operation exists—in a word, the forms that constitute the immediate, essential, and necessary term of the intellectual act. For this reason, the form of modality is independent of *quantity*, *quality*, and *relation*, so that the understanding, with merely the form of modality, can, without these others, perform certain of its acts. On the contrary, we cannot think the *quantity*, the *quality*, or the *relations* of a being, without first having thought it either as *possible* or as *existent*. Hence the three forms, *quantity*, *quality*, and *relation*, depend upon the form of modality, which is superior to these, and is the necessary prior condition of their having a place in thought. We may, therefore, without hesitation, conclude that Kant's three primitive forms, *quantity*, *quality*, and *relation*, cannot be considered as original and essential forms of the understanding, inasmuch as its existence and operation can be conceived without them. The same may be seen from another point of view. Is it necessary that every being should have a determinate *quantity* and *quality?* To affirm this absolutely, as Kant does, is at least to commit an act of audacity and temerity, more than dogmatic, on the critical reason, and to attribute to it a power of deciding in this way a question which it is impossible to settle *à priori*. If Kant had said to us, 'To say that every possible being must be furnished with a determinate quantity and quality, is to go beyond the powers of reason, because, in order to say this, we should have to examine all possible beings, and even enter into investigations concerning the Infinite Being, whereof we have no positive or adequate idea,' he would, at least, have shown a little philosophic modesty, real, or, at all events, apparent; he would have shown some consistency, since there is nothing that gives him greater satisfaction or pleasure than to be able to criticize reason, and to inveigh against those philosophers whom he contemptuously calls dogmatists, that is, against all those who, in their simplicity, admit something as certain. By pronouncing a decided judgment in the matter in question, by placing *quantity*

and *quality* among the primitive forms of the human understanding, just as if it could not think anything without these, he has plainly laid himself open to the charge of rashness. . . . We may conclude, therefore, that, if among the forms of Kant there is to be found any one that deserves the title of an *original form* of the human understanding, as informing it and informing the cognition that proceeds from the intellect, it must be looked for under *modality*. Let us see, therefore, whether there is under it anything like what we are looking for.

"In the first place, I observe that, when I think and judge that something exists, I do not necessarily, in that act, complete my idea of the existing thing. And, indeed, I may have an idea, as perfect and determinate as can be desired, although the being which corresponds to it do not really *exist*. Hence, to judge that the thing of which I have the idea exists, is an act essentially different from that whereby my intellect has and contemplates the *idea*. This judgment adds nothing new to my *idea*, no new notion informs my mind through that idea. Hence *real* or external existence, the term of my judgment, cannot be any original form of my understanding, since in my understanding there is nothing but the idea of the thing, and this neither increases, diminishes, nor undergoes any alteration on account of the subsistence or non-subsistence of the thing in question. The form of the intellect must, therefore, be an idea, and not the subsistence of the thing; hence, of the three categories of *possibility*, *existence*, and *necessity*, that of existence, considered as a thing apart from the other two, cannot in any way be an original and essential form of our understanding. Let us see, then, whether the other two forms, possibility and necessity, have the character of original and essential forms.

"The idea of anything (in so far as it is not self-contradictory) is what is called the logical possibility of it. Now, it is clearly impossible to perform any act of the understanding without the form of *possibility*. But when I think the possibility of a thing, am I also obliged to think explicitly the absolute *necessity* of the same? No,

not if we mean to refer this necessity to the thing thought, and not to the possibility itself, in which latter case it is not distinguishable from the possibility itself, being a mere abstract quality of it. *Necessity*, therefore, cannot be an original and primitive form of my understanding, inasmuch as it is not its universal and immutable object and term. We are obliged, therefore, to conclude that, of all the twelve forms of Kant, only one, viz., *possibility*, has the characteristics of a form of the human intellect. Let us, therefore, examine this possibility a little.

"We have said that the *possibility* of which we speak is the idea of anything. Indeed, possibility must always be thought as possibility of something, since we cannot think the possibility of nothing. Possibility, therefore, is inseparable from something, while, at the same time, it may be found united to *any* something. In order, therefore, that we may think possibility, it is not necessary that this something should be determined as to genus, species, or individual. It is sufficient that it be something, a being perfectly indeterminate. The idea (the possibility), therefore, of *indeterminate being* is the only original and essential form of the human intellect.

"Now, let us see how all the nine prime forms of Kant reduce themselves to this one as their formal principle, and how the other two categories of modality, *existence* and *necessity*, have nothing formal about them, and are elements already contained in possibility. Let us begin with these latter.

"If by existence is meant the idea of the existence of things *in general*, it is already included in the idea of *indeterminate being*. If by existence is meant the actual subsistence of being, this is not the term of the faculty of judgment, and does not add any form to the *intellect*. *Necessity* is found by analyzing *possibility*, inasmuch as that which is possible is necessarily so. In this sense, necessity also is included in the *idea of being in general*. On the other hand, if by *necessity* is meant a *necessary real being*, we must repeat concerning this what was said universally concerning the *actual subsistence* of beings.

"Having thus reduced the three categories of *modality* to the single form of *idea of being in general*, let us next see how the three forms comprised under the head of *relation*, that is, *substance*, *cause*, and *action*, may be reduced to this same form. I have already shown that the only intellectual element in the ideas of *substance* and *cause* is the idea of existence and of being in general [see under §§ 93–101]. If, therefore, Kant placed *substance* and *cause* among the essential categories or forms of the human intellect, he did so only because he did not carry out the analysis of these far enough to discover what in them was pure form. With regard to *action*, we must observe that not only the understanding perceives action, but that *sense* also perceives it in its own way, by feeling it. Now, we cannot put among the categories *particular action*, in so far as it is perceived by sense, but only *action* as conceived by the intellect, or, which is the same thing, the concept of action. But how does it happen that the *particular action* perceived by sense becomes universal, when it is made the object of the intellect? It happens through the faculty which the intellect has of considering the particular action experienced by the sense as *possible* to be repeated an indefinite number of times. It is, therefore, the addition of *possibility* that renders the action a *universal concept*. The same is true when I consider what constitutes the nature of action in general, and leave out of view the particulars of the different species of action. The concept, therefore, of action, when subjected to analysis, turns out not to be entirely a pure form of the intellect, but to be composed, (1) of a material element, in so far as it relates to the actions experienced by our sense; and (2) of a formal element, in so far as our intellect adds the form of possibility, and thus abstracts and universalizes the particular actions. Hence all that is formal in the idea of *action* is *possibility*, or the idea of universal being.

"By a similar analysis we might reduce Kant's *quantity* and *quality* to the form of being in general, that is, by separating from them their material elements and retaining only that which is formal. But this analysis brings us to

the final result, that these concepts have nothing formal about them but the idea of possibility, or, which is the same thing, of universal being. And, indeed, even the term of my sense has a certain *quantity* and a certain *quality*. Now, the *quantity* or the *quality* perceived by my sense is not, in the smallest degree, the form of my intellect. The *quantity*, therefore, and the *quality*, which are concepts, and, according to Kant, also forms of my intellect, are not particular quantity and quality, but quantity and quality universally considered. Now, to repeat what was said above with regard to action, how do we arrive at *quantity* and *quality* in general? When I perceive a particular quantity, and then think it as purely possible, with this and nothing more I think it as *universal*. But if from the possible idea or quantity I abstract the specifying characteristics, and thereby generalize it, I have in it quantity in general. Neither *quantity*, therefore, nor *quality* is the object of my intellect in the sense of being its form; but in order to become such, each requires to be informed by another form, and the form which my intellect unites to it for this purpose is none other than possibility. *Quantity* and *quality* are, therefore, in themselves, *matter*, and it is my intellect that, by informing them, renders them its concepts. These concepts, therefore, of quantity and quality, when analyzed, have nothing formal about them except the *idea of possibility* or *of being in general*. Thus Kant's twelve forms reduce themselves to one pure and true form.

"And here it is not necessary to speak of what Kant calls the forms of the outer and inner sense, that is, *space* and *time*, because these do not belong to the order of intellectual things. The only question would be with reference to their concepts. All that is formal in such concepts limits itself, for the reasons given above, to *possibility*, or the idea of *indeterminate being*.

"But there is another difference to be marked between the nature of Kant's manifold forms and the nature of that one which has remained in our hands after we have scattered all the rest. And this difference is, that the whole of

Kant's forms proceed from the basis of the subject, and are therefore subjective, whereas the true form is, in its essence, *object*. This diversity of nature is of infinite importance, as we shall see. . . . Let us conclude. The human mind has innate no *determinate* form; and Kant's seventeen forms have no real foundation, and are entirely superfluous for the explanation of the origin of ideas. On the other hand, the human mind has one single *indeterminate* form, and this is the *idea of universal being*. The idea of being in general is pure form, and has no material element combined with it. It is not subjective, but, on the contrary, object. It is so simple and so little that it cannot be further simplified, and nothing less can be imagined that would be capable of informing our cognitions. At the same time, it is of infinite fecundity. And, indeed, it is impossible to imagine any act of the mind that does not require this form, or is not natured and informed by it. Hence if we take away the *idea of being*, human knowledge and the mind itself are rendered impossible" (*New Essay*, vol. i. §§ 368–371, 374–384).

By Kant's *seventeen* forms, Rosmini means the two forms of sensibility, the twelve categories of the understanding, and the three postulates of the pure reason. Rosmini has certainly found the primal categories of being in its three necessary modes—*ideality*, *reality*, and *morality*; but he has nowhere, so far as I know, shown the relation of these to the categories of Aristotle and Kant. He has, indeed, told us that *quantity* and *quality* come under reality (§ 27); but where he would place relation, etc., it would be as interesting to know as it is disappointing that he has not informed us. His work on the History of the Categories is unpublished.

The author of an excellent essay upon Kant's theory of cognition says, "The modal definitions are the summary canon of every theory of cognition. They exhibit the result which the investigation has brought to our scientific consciousness. They describe the whole field of experience. When we know what possible, actual, and necessary mean, we know also what knowledge we may possess and what

we are to look for. They are also the sole basis from which practical philosophy may make legitimate demands. Every attack on critical idealism will have to be judged by the success with which it overthrows the modal definitions of that system and replaces them by others." The definitions in question, according to this author, are as follows:—"In nature, that is *necessary* whose existence is demanded by the principles of the theory of cognition." "*Actual* is that which is felt or must necessarily be supposed capable of being felt." "*Possible* is that which corresponds to the conditions of conception (*Vorstellung*)." Of necessity he says, "Necessity is not an accident which we recognize in the substance, but the quality of the function of unity in the subject in regard to a given object." * It is easy to see that, according to these definitions, the ground of necessity and possibility, as well of actuality, lies in the subject, whence it follows directly that all our knowledge is subjective. Rosmini has not only attacked, but overthrown, the first and last of the definitions, by showing that the ground of necessity and possibility lies, not in the subject at all, but in the object, which is being. Possibility and necessity, in so far as possibility is not an expression of subjective ignorance due to want of objective data, mean exactly the same thing, and are both based upon the principle of contradiction, which again is grounded in the nature of being. *Possible* is that which ideally is, or, stated in the form of a reflection, that which logically does not contradict itself. But what does not logically contradict itself is ideally necessary. If A may be B, A must be B. If three straight lines placed in a certain position, *may* form a triangle, it follows that, when so placed, they *must* form a triangle. In other words, so long as we deal only with the ideal or objective world, possible and necessary are exactly the same thing, and both identical with actuality. When we pass into the real or subjective world, on the contrary, the words are used with this difference of meaning, that the former expresses partial ignorance, the latter complete

* August Stadler, *Die Grundsätze der reinen Erkenntnisstheorie in der Kantischen Philosophie* (Leipzig, 1876), pp. 130–132.

knowledge. When I say, "A may be B," all I mean is that my partial notion of A contains nothing incompatible with the idea B; but that, if my knowledge of A were complete, I should be able to say with certainty, "A must be B" or "A cannot" (we do not say "*must* not") "be B." Aristotle, with his doctrine of potentiality and actuality, placed possibility and necessity in things, that is, in real subjects, thereby introducing much confusion into one part of logic. Kant increased this confusion when he placed them in the thinking subject, as subjective conditions of thinking. The truth is, both lie in the nature of being, which, as such, is always object and never subject. What is meant by real possibility occurs when one condition of a total actuality is conceived as subsistent, and the rest as merely ideal. A proposition is then formed in which the condition conceived as subsistent is made the subject, the total actuality the predicate, and the remaining ideal conditions are vaguely expressed in the copula, *e.g.* "An acorn may be" (*i.e.* with certain ideal conditions made actual, is) "an oak." When we say, "An acorn is potentially an oak," we are saying what is not true. When we say, "An acorn is a possible oak," we are talking nonsense. A possible oak never grew from an acorn—indeed, never grew at all. (Cf. Lange, *Logische Studien*, pp. 30, sqq.)

36.

All intelligence is reducible to thinking being as realized in a certain manner, with certain limits.

The essence of being, therefore, simply by making itself cognizable to the mind, informs it and renders it intelligent. In other words, inasmuch as every act of intelligence has entity for its object, this produces the faculty of intelligence. All intelligence is reducible to the intuition of the essences of beings, and to the thought of being (whose essence is known) realized in certain modes, with certain limits (§ 14).

The relation of the essence of being to the subject cannot be easily conceived, and Rosmini cannot characterize it otherwise than by saying that it is a relation of objectivity or cognizability. And this is not to be wondered at, for it is most evident that the relation of subject and object involved in cognition is one altogether peculiar and not to be expressed in terms of any other. The most that can be done is to bring it out into clearness and to define the elements that enter into it. It is manifest enough that, if one thing can make itself an object to another, it thereby of necessity makes that other intelligent. It is not so clear how an essence in its very nature infinite can be the form of a finite thing, such as every intelligent being recognizes himself to be. To this Rosmini replies as follows :—"Every one of us knows that he is finite, and when he says *I*, he is well aware that he is affirming a reality which excludes numerous other realities of the same or of a different order, and, therefore, that he is affirming a finite thing. At the same time, the human soul, in so far as it is intellective, is united to infinite being, namely, the idea, and, under this aspect, it partakes of a certain infinitude. Indeed, ideal being, in its relation to the mind, is like an infinite space, all equally illuminated, in relation to the eye. Hence, although the real things cognized by man are always finite, because the real thing which perceives them, viz., the soul, is finite ; yet the *means of cognizing* the real things perceived by the sense, that is, the idea of being, is never exhausted or rendered inefficacious. . . . Now, here a difficulty presents itself. Ideal being is the form of the intellective soul ; but form and matter are two elements constitutive of one nature: hence ideal being is a true constitutive element of the soul. But ideal being, as ideal, is infinite : therefore the human soul is composed of finite and infinite. I reply as follows, by distinguishing the minor premise of this syllogism :— *Forms* are of two kinds, subjective and objective. Subjective forms belong to the subject and constitute it ; objective forms neither belong to the subject nor constitute it,* but bring the subject into act, and, therefore, may be called

* Being, of course, constitutes the subject an ego. Cf. under § 124.

the immediate causes of the form of the subject. At the same time, they may with equal propriety be called forms, when they are considered as the term of the act of intuition, since universal being, in so far as it is merely the term of this act, is, as it were, appropriated to the soul, without thereby ceasing to be universal in itself. And, indeed, although it is true that being in general is intuited as identical by all intellects, yet in so far as it is merely the term of one intellect, it is not the term of another, and it is in this sense that the truth possessed by man may be said to be created. Indeed, the proposition, 'The truth of the human intellect is created,' is equivalent to this other, 'The truth, which is eternal, has been made to become the term of a created intellect'" (*Psychology*, vol. i. §§ 236–238).

37.

In what sense ideal being is said to be *possible*.

The essence of being we have called *ideal being;* its realizations, *real beings*. If ideal being be considered with reference to its realizations, it may be called *possible being*. The word *possible* does not designate a quality of being, but merely expresses the fact that it may be realized. This must be carefully borne in mind, in order to preclude the notion which might arise, that the essence of being is itself a mere possibility, and nothing more. It is a true essence, not a possibility of essence. But this essence may be realized; if it is not realized, its realization is possible. This is what we mean by possible being.

As we have seen, Rosmini identifies the two terms *ideal* and *possible*, and in this he is right, from his point of view. *Ideal being* means *being as form;* but form, with reference

to realities, is a mere possibility. Hence *ideal* and *possible* both express the same relation of being to its terms or realizations. "Being," he says, "is in itself, and possibility is only a relation to reality, that is, to terms, whose nature is not known until they are perceived" (*Theosophy*, vol. i. § 86). As to the fact that ideal being is not nothing, see citation under § 18. It seems a flat contradiction when Rosmini says, on the one hand, that being 'is in itself,' and, on the other, that apart from a subject it would not be (see under § 34): but this is only apparent; for it must be remembered that, in Rosmini's language, *to be in itself* means *to be as object*, and certainly nothing can be as object when there is no subject.

"*Possible*, in the logical sense, means free from contradiction. Now, being admits no contradiction" (*Psychology*, vol. ii. § 1340).

38.

How possible and ideal beings are said to be many.

Since real beings are many, and each of them has a relation to possible being, possible being, considered merely in relation to the various real or realizable beings, becomes their idea, or, more correctly, their concept. For this reason we say that concepts, ideas, ideal beings, and possible beings are many, because they are as numerous as the modes in which the essence of being can be realized.

Speaking of concrete relations, Rosmini says, "Each of these is in one place, separated from every other, incommunicable to every other; for example, the pain which I feel in a finger has nothing to do with the pain which another man feels, say, in the same finger, and this on account of the limitations of place and of real subsistence which separate these two sensations. On the contrary, being (*essere*) or a being (*ente*), which reveals itself to the

mind as a mere possibility, is not more in one place than in another.* It may be realized in many places, if it is of a nature to occupy space, and even if it is otherwise, it may be indefinitely multiplied. Suppose the mind contemplate the human body in its possibility: this possible body is always the same, in whatever place it may happen to subsist through realization, or to whatever extent it may multiply itself. *Real bodies* become many; the *concept* or idea of the body always remains one. The mind, or, as the case may be, several minds, see it as identical in all the infinite number of human bodies, which they think as subsistent. Hence the nature of real things, to which belong *sensations*, is opposed to the nature of the simple idea" (*New Essay*, vol. ii. § 427).

39.

Ideality a mode of being incapable of being confounded with reality.

Let us now inquire into the relation between *ideal beings* and *real beings*. Suppose I am in possession of ideal being; I know the essence of being, nothing more. I do not know whether the being whose essence I know be realized. This is equivalent to saying that I have not yet any feeling, or, at least, that I do not reflect upon my feeling; for if I made the reflection that I had a feeling, I should at once know a reality. But remove from my mind all knowledge of real being, and suppose that I know merely what being is, without knowing that it is realized, is the object of my mind nothing? Certainly not. In that case my mind would know nothing, whereas, as a matter of fact, it knows the essence of being. If then the object of my mind is not

* Porphyry says, "Τὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἀσώματα, αὐτὸ ὃ κρεῖττον παντός ἐστι σώματος καὶ τόπου, πανταχῆ ἐστιν· οὐ διαστατῶς ἀλλ' ἀμερῶς" (*Sentent.*, ii.).

nothing, may it not be that I myself am the object of it? This also is impossible, for I am a real being, and my mind, in the case supposed, has for its object only ideal being, without any realization. Besides this, I am perfectly aware that I am not the essence of being in general, that the essence of being is the object which I intuite, whereas I am the intuiting subject, and between these two there is opposition: the one is not the other. Since then the ideal being intuited by the mind is neither nothing nor real being, we must admit that there is another mode of being besides the real, and hence that there are necessarily two modes of being, the ideal and the real. Moreover, since both, being true modes of being, may be designated by the term *existence*, to avoid confusion we will agree to call the real mode of being *subsistence*.

40.

Differences between ideas and the things known by means of them.

It is plain that ideal being stands related to real being, as *design*, *model*, *example*, *type*, terms which, in the last analysis, imply simply means of knowing, cognizability of ideal being. Now, if real beings are limited and contingent, it is plain that their reality is distinct from the idea; for the idea is immutable and unalterable, whereas real beings may either be or not be.

41.

Essence known through idea; subsistence through affirmation on occasion of feeling.

Hence the knowledge of the essence of things differs from the knowledge of their subsistence. The former comes through the *idea;* the latter through *affirmation* on occasion of a feeling (or of some sign that takes the place of a feeling). But the knowledge of the subsistence of any particular being presupposes a knowledge of the essence of being, at least in general (§ 14). If a feeling should occur in a being who did not know what being was, this feeling would remain blind and unintelligible, because devoid of the essence which could render it intelligible. The being having it would not affirm a real being, because he would not be able to refer the feeling to the essence, or to say to himself what the feeling was. This is the condition of the lower animals, which, though they have feelings, are without the intuition of being. For this reason they are utterly incapable of interpreting to themselves their own feelings, or of completing them by saying to themselves that there are real beings. We, on the contrary, having a knowledge of being, as soon as we have a feeling, declare that there is a real being.

The relation of the ideal to the real may be considered either from an ontological or from a psychological point of view. The former is treated farther on (see §§ 166, sqq.). The latter is the one under consideration in the above three sections, from which it appears that ideal being is different from real being, and serves to make it known.

Analysis of human cognition, according to Rosmini, shows us, "*first*, that every contingent thing has two modes of being—one in the mind and one outside of it; *second*, that the mode of being which is in the mind is *potential* (δυνάμει), that the mode which is outside the mind is the *act* (ἐνέργεια) of the same identical essence that is seen by the mind; *third*, that, hence, there is in the mind a perfect *similitude* of the thing which is outside of the mind —a similitude such that, though it is not identical with the thing in respect to its act of reality, it does not numerically differ from the thing to which that act belongs, but is its beginning, and constitutes its *species* and intelligibility; *fourth*, that if we consider things (limited and contingent) as separate from mind, they are not only unknown, but even *per se* unknowable, and their relation to the mind is not in them, but in the mind, as a similitude, which is nothing more or less than their ideal being, a determination of universal being, the fountain of all ideas and of all cognizability, as being that which alone is cognizable in itself; *fifth*, that limited and contingent things, being only so many acts and terms of the common being intuited by the mind, may be considered separately from that being, in which case they are said to subsist outside of the mind, and are called *real things; sixth*, and finally, that even if the *reality* and *ideality* of things were identical, which is not the case (the thing alone being identical, not the mode of being), still the thing would never confound itself with the act of the mind nor with the subject that possesses it, because the idea itself is essentially object, distinct from the thinking subject, and opposed to it. *Real* things, therefore, cannot in any way, without violence done to language, be confounded with ideas; still less can they be confounded with the mind that perceives them, because the separation and real distinction of these three entities is contained in their definition" (*New Essay*, vol. iii. §§ 1192, 1193). "In the idea is seen the essence, not of the ideal, but of being, and being is identical under the ideal and under the real form. Now, the idea is nothing else than *being intuited by the mind*, in its own proper

essence, which is eternal. But this essence at one time contains the realization of being, and then it is infinite being—God, who is not seen [cf. under § 21]; at another, it does not contain this realization, and then it is ideal being, to which is referred the realization which we learn in feeling. For this reason, the known real thing is merely *ideal being realized*, so that the object of knowledge results from two elements . . . *first*, the ideal; *second*, the real;—the latter being, as it were, the complement of the former. The ideal, therefore, is representative, not, indeed, as one real thing is representative of another; for example, a statue, of a man; but as the essence of a thing represents the thing realized, which thing is not disjoined from its essence. If it were so disjoined, it would no longer be a complete being. Therefore the essence is the act by which the being is in the ideal world, the realization another act of the same being, whereby it is in the feeling (that is, either feels or is felt) which unites with it in the perceiving mind (*spirito*) as its complement. And here it must be borne in mind that existence in the mind does not cancel existence in itself, but, on the contrary, constitutes it" (*Psychology*, vol. ii. § 1339).

42.

How in perception we unite ideal being with feeling.

But since feeling is a reality distinct from the essence which renders it cognizable, we must now inquire how we are able to put together these two elements of the being perceived. In order to understand this, we must have recourse to the *unity of man*, or the *simplicity of the human spirit*. The *ego*, that principle which knows what being is, is the same as that which feels in itself the action of it (feeling is only an action of being). So long as this action or feeling is kept apart from the knowledge of being, so long it remains

unknown. But this principle, being entirely simple, though at once intelligent and sentient, is obliged, by reason of this very simplicity, to bring together its feelings and the knowledge of being, and in this way it sees being operating, that is, producing feeling, in itself. It is the same being that, on the one hand, manifests itself to us as *knowable*, and on the other, as *active*, producing feeling. And here let it be observed that all the activity of being is reducible to its entity. It exists in this entity as in its spring. It is active being itself, and, as all being is cognizable, so all its activity is cognizable in it. Therefore, feeling, which is this activity, is cognizable in being. Before being acts, this activity is only potentially cognizable because it exists only potentially. Before being acts in a determinate mode (producing feeling), this mode is potential and not determined as one mode rather than another; hence its activity, when known only potentially, is indeterminate. For this reason, ideal being is called *indeterminate being*.

This section contains the gist of Rosmini's theory of cognition (*Erkenntnisstheorie*), or, as he calls it, intellective perception. The passages which might be cited in explanation of it from his various works, *New Essay*, *Psychology*, *Logic*, *Theosophy*, etc., are almost innumerable. The following must here suffice. In regard to the unity of the intelligent and sentient subject, he says, "There remains the last difficulty. . . . How can the sentient principle and the intelligent principle be a single principle in man? In order to answer this question, let us revert to our doctrine of *substance* [see §§ 93–97]. We said that substance is

that *first operative principle* of a being, the principle whence flow its actions and passions [πάθη], and hence its diverse states; that these actions, passions, and diverse states are virtually contained in that principle, that is to say, in that virtue, activity, or potency of it which is the efficient cause of the being. We said, moreover, that these actions, passions, and states may be conceived as forming different groups, although it may not be demonstrable *à priori* that every such group is possible, that is, reducible to a first act, a first virtue, a first substantial principle. In order to determine *à priori* which of these groups could be virtually comprised in a first substantial principle, would require nothing short of a complete knowledge of the intrinsic order of being. The intrinsic order of being, however, is not known immediately by man, but has to be gleaned from observation and experience. Hence, when observation and experience reveal to man the existence of a group of activities united in a single substantial principle, he is justified in concluding that such substantial principle *may* exist, because *ab esse ad posse datur consecutio.*

"Now, internal observation is what attests to man that he is a single principle, sentient and intelligent at the same time; for every man can say to himself, 'This I, who feel, am the same I who understand, and if I were not the same, I should not know that I felt, or be able to reason concerning my sensations.' On the other hand, it involves no contradiction to suppose that the sensitive activity should have the same principle as the intellective activity, when we consider that many actions may start from one principle, . . . just as many lines may start from one point.

"But it must be admitted, nevertheless, that, after all these concessions, there remains a very serious objection to be overcome. We have said that, in order to constitute a sentient principle, we must conceive a primitive term of sense [αἰσθητόν] virtually comprehending all the special actions of feeling that such principle can ever perform; and in man this primitive and fundamental *sensum* is his own body, sensible in space. We have said, moreover, that,

in order to constitute an intelligent principle, there is necessary a first object of intelligence [*νοητόν*], virtually comprehending all that is ever to be understood, and in man this object of intelligence is universal being. Now, if the sentient principle is constituted by the corporeal felt term, and the intelligent principle by intelligible being, we shall be obliged to say that the corporeal extended and intelligible being are identical, or else that they constitute two different principles and not one.

"In order to reply to this most grave objection, we must observe that in every felt (term of feeling) there is an entity, because every act, of whatever nature, is an entity. But in felt entity there is altogether wanting the intelligible light, in other words, cognizability, as is seen from the fact that the expression *felt entity* is not *understood entity*. To say *felt* instead of *understood*, in this case, is to exclude cognizability from feeling. On the other hand, intelligence has for its object *understood entity*, since the intelligent principle does nothing but understand, and everything that it understands is, of necessity, entity. Hence the term of the sentient principle and that of the intelligent principle are both *entity*. There is, therefore, identity in their terms.

"But in what, then, are they distinguished? They are distinguished by the difference of the manner in which the same entity adheres to the same principle. The truth is, this entity communicates itself to the sentient principle in its felt mode, which I call also reality and activity, whereas it communicates itself to the intelligent principle in its understood mode, which I call also ideality, intelligibility, cognizability, light, etc.

"With these explanations, we see clearly how the sentient principle and the intelligent principle may compenetrate each other so as to form one and the same principle of operation, inasmuch as both the principles have the same term, although to one of these it adheres in one mode and communicates itself in one form, while to the other it adheres in another mode and communicates itself in another form. There are two principles, therefore, if we consider the *form* in which the entity communicates itself;

there is only one, if we consider the *entity itself* which is communicated, apart from its forms. We may say that the principles are two, provided we recognize that in man they are not first principles; but there is above them a first single principle to which they are subordinated and united, which first principle has reference to entity itself, and not to the forms of entity; and this is the principle which synthesizes, both in the theoretic order, where it manifests itself as *reason*, and in the practical order, where it appears as *will*. Hence this intellective principle, in so far as it is superior, is the point from which the two activities, that is, the sensitive and the intellective, start, and is called the *rational principle*. From what has been said, it appears that the human soul is a *single substantial subject*. It is a *subject*, because it is a first principle of action, endowed with feeling, and it is a *substance*, because this principle is conceived by the mind as existing in itself, and not in another anterior to it in the order of feeling and understanding" (*Psychology*, vol. i. §§ 174–181).

From what was said above, under §§ 30, 31, it might be inferred that there was no other link between ideal and real being than that formed by the unity of the sentient and intelligent subject that cognizes the one by means of the other. This, however, is very far from being Rosmini's doctrine.

"We find," he says, "that although the ideal and real are so very different, nevertheless they have an identical element, viz. *being*. The same, identical being occurs in both, only under different conditions and different forms. One form under which being presents itself is ideality, or cognizability, or objectivity—terms which mean substantially the same thing; another form in which it appears is reality, sensibility, activity—which are likewise terms substantially meaning the same thing. Thus, while there is a very great difference in the form, there is perfect identity in the content, which is being itself. This, in so far as it is purely cognizable, is ideal; in so far as it is sensible, it is real. The sensible rendered cognizable, that is, the union of the two, is what produces intellective perception and

the cognition of the real" (*On the Purposes of the Author*, § 60, *sub fin.*).

It must be admitted that it is extremely difficult to seize exactly Rosmini's theory of cognition, and of the relation of the individual human subject to the universe of things. From one point of view, it seems as if each man gave being to things, that is, created them; from another, it seems as if the universe existed independently of all human thought. How these two doctrines can be simultaneously true, seems a puzzle. In order to solve it, we must distinguish absolute from relative existence, τὸ ἁπλῶς εἶναι from τὸ πρός τι εἶναι. The world exists absolutely as subject and object, that is, as real and ideal, independently of any finite intelligence; but it does not exist for any man until he makes it exist for himself by his own act. Human intelligence is a rendering relative of what was before absolute, and, in this sense, all human knowledge may be said to be relative. It is relative only to the subject. It does not in the least follow from this that it thereby ceases to be absolute. A man does not cease to be a man because he enters into the relation of husband or father. Indeed, knowledge could not be relative unless it were likewise absolute. The important point is that man, in knowing, does not in any way alter the objects of knowledge. Hence his knowledge, though relative with respect to the subject, is absolute with respect to the object (cf. under § 43).

43.

Objection to calling intellective perception a judgment.

The following objection might here be advanced:—"When we affirm a being, we make a judgment. Now, in order to make a judgment, we must know the two terms of the judgment—the subject and the predicate. But in the case we are supposing, one of the terms, feeling or reality, is not known. Therefore the supposed judgment is impossible." The only effect of this

Answer: The objection does not touch the fact, but only the propriety of the term.

objection, when well considered, would be to make us deny the name of judgment to that act whereby we affirm, and, by affirming, know real beings. Now, even if we were to refuse the name of judgment to this affirmation, this would not in any way interfere with the correctness of our theory, which rests on observation. Even if we admit that the objection is well taken, it remains always a fact that to know that a being subsists is to make an internal affirmation that that being subsists, and, therefore, in either case our analysis of this affirmation and the consequences derived from it remain unimpeached. Still, in order entirely to satisfy our objectors, let us consider the new question. May the internal affirmation whereby we know that a being subsists be called a judgment?

It is here that Rosmini most clearly parts company with Kant. This philosopher, as every one knows, derives his categories from the various forms of judgment as recognized in the formal logic of the Aristotelians. In every one of these, the terms of the judgment, viz., subject and predicate, are recognized as already formed, and the only question is in regard to their relations. As these relations are numerous, Kant drew from them a long list of categories, which he set down as primitive forms of the understanding. Rosmini, setting aside all Kant's judgments, as secondary and dependent upon a primitive one, went behind them to that one, and, analyzing it, found that the understanding had but one primitive form, which was objective, whereas all the others were secondary and subjective (cf. under § 35). Accordingly, he does not ask, "How is the judgment, $7 + 5 = 12$, possible?" but "How do we ever manage to think 7 or 5?" (see above, under § 14).

He shows that all Kant's synthetical judgments *à priori* are really analytic, and that the only truly synthetic judgment *à priori* is that wherein we predicate being of sensation, or, in other words, form to ourselves the concept of a reality. In order to form this judgment, the only *à priori* element requisite is the simple notion of being or existence, the essence of objectivity. Rosmini, accordingly, concludes that, since no reality can be known until being is predicated of it, being must be manifested to the mind without the necessity of a judgment, and prior to all reality; in other words, prior to all sense-experience.

The usually recognized order of cognition, as we find it in all the old logics, as well as most of the more recent ones, is this (cf. *New Essay*, vol. i. § 227, n.):—

(1) Simplex Apprehensio,	(2) Judicium,	(3) Discursus;
(1) Concept (*Begriff*),	(2) Judgment (*Urtheil*),	(3) Inference (*Schluss*);
(1) Term,	(2) Proposition,	(3) Syllogism.

These three classifications, of which the first is that of Aldrich, the second that of Kant, and the third that of Jevons, are virtually the same. Rosmini, holding that all *concepts* are results of primitive judgments in which *terms* of being are *simply apprehended*, would substitute for this classification the following:—(1) Intuition of being; (2) Judgment, involving perception of the real and conception; (3) Inference.* According to this theory, judgment, perception, and conception are only three aspects of the same act. In his very friendly criticism of Reid, speaking of the view which holds that "simple apprehension, or the pure idea of the thing, precedes the judgment respecting its real existence," he says, "On the one hand, it seems as if this proposition must be true; for how can I judge that a being, of which I have not the idea, exists? The idea of being, or simple apprehension, would seem, therefore, when we look at the matter from this side, necessarily to precede the operation of the judgment which

* Cf. under § 14.

we make regarding its real existence. But, on the other hand, experience is entirely at variance with such a view, and assures us that we first form the concrete idea of the being really existing, and afterwards draw from it the abstract idea, which is separate from the persuasion of its real existence, and is what is called simple apprehension of the being. And, in fact, do we think a possible horse, without having first perceived some horse with our senses?

"This knot of the question was not clearly seen either by Reid or by his adversaries, and for this reason each party was able to confute the other, without being able to maintain its own position. Reid confounded two questions in one; for it is one thing to ask, Can the mind form a judgment of the existence of external things without possessing beforehand some universal idea? another to inquire, Does the judgment, affirming the existence of external things, require to be preceded by simple apprehension, or by the ideas of the things themselves? The adversaries of Reid answered this second question in the affirmative, and, in doing so, they were wrong. Now Reid, in opposing them, was not content with showing that the judgment affirming the existence of external things does not require to be preceded by the simple apprehension of the things themselves, which would have been sufficient to overthrow their system; . . . but he undertook to prove that, prior to all ideas, we form a primitive judgment, which is inexplicable and mysterious. This reply . . . led from the second of the questions above proposed to the first, and decided that the judgment affirming the existence of external things can be made, not only without the ideas of the things themselves, but also without the pre-existence of any universal idea in our minds. Now, it was this gratuitous extension of the original question that hurt Reid. . . . In fact, it is sufficiently evident that no judgment can be formed by one who possesses no universal idea, and therefore the proposition which Reid undertook to defend . . . was exaggerated and untenable. . . . It was not easy to find a satisfactory reply to the terrible objection, How can I judge that that of

which I have no idea really exists? In order to answer this objection, there was no other way but this: to excogitate a system in which the object judged possible should be the effect of the judgment itself, that is, in which the object should exist only in virtue of the judgment made with reference to it. All the difficulty, therefore, consisted in finding a judgment which should give existence to its own object, or to the idea of the thing concerning which the judgment was made, or, which is the same thing, should produce in us the specific ideas of things. . . .

"Now, passing in review all the kinds of judgment which we make with reference to things, we see clearly that, so long as the judgment relates to some quality of the thing, the thing must necessarily exist in our mind previous to the judgment and to the quality which, in that judgment, we attribute to it. When, on the contrary, the judgment relates to the existence of the thing itself, then the thing judged of does not exist in our thought previous to the act of judgment, but in virtue of it, since so long as we do not think the thing as existing—that is, as having an existence either possible or real—it is nothing; it is not an object of our thought or an idea. The judgment, therefore, regarding the existence of things differs from all other judgments in this, that it produces its own objects, and thereby shows that it possesses an energy of its own—a creative energy, so to speak, which deserves the most profound meditation on the part of the philosopher.* This object, which did not exist before the judgment made regarding it, comes into existence in virtue of it, and therefore, at most, contemporaneously with it. Such judgment, therefore, is a peculiar faculty of our understanding, which thinks a thing as actually existing. . . .

"Three questions might be asked with regard to this faculty: (1) How does it begin to think a thing as actually existing? (2) Where does it obtain the universal idea of

* Rosmini quotes the following passage to show that St. Thomas held a view similar to this:—"Prima ejus [intellectûs] actio per speciem est formatio sui objecti, quo formato, intelligit: simul tamen tempore ipse format et formatum est, et simul intelligit" (*De Natura Verbi Intellectus*).

existence necessary for such thinking? and (3) How does it restrict the idea of existence, which is universal, to a determinate thing, and so think this determinate object, rather than that, as existing? To the first and third of these questions it is easy to reply with the help of experience. We are excited to think an existing object by sensations, and it is likewise these sensations that determine this object existing in our thought. . . . The difficulty, therefore, all consists in knowing whence we derive the idea of existence, which is necessary to the first of all our judgments, to that judgment whereby we know that something external exists. This is the great problem of Ideology" (*New Essay*, vol. i. §§ 121–126).

It is plain from this passage wherein the great difference between Kantianism and Rosminianism lies. Both Kant and Rosmini proposed to themselves the same question, How are synthetic judgments *à priori* possible? And both answered virtually in the same way: Through the existence in the mind of a form or forms prior to all judgments. Here the parallelism ceases. Kant mistook for synthetic judgments *à priori*, judgments which are at once analytic and, as far as their terms are concerned, *à posteriori*. He thus arrived at a series of categories, which had three cardinal defects: (1) it had no unity or necessary completeness; (2) it was entirely subjective, and hence could not account for objectivity or for the existence of concepts; and (3) it gave merely the terms of the judgment, but could not account for the copula. Rosmini, on the contrary, having discovered the only judgment which is really synthetic *à priori*, arrived, by analyzing it, at a single form, which is at once one and primitive, objective, and, with the aid of sensation, capable of accounting for all parts of the judgment (cf. under § 35).

44.

Is this affirmation a judgment?

It is plain that, so long as the two elements of the affirmation in question—that is, the *essence of*

being and the *felt activity*—are considered separately, they do not present the elements necessary for the formation of a judgment: hence the objection. But if the objection were valid in this instance, would it not be valid against every judgment equally? In fact, there is not and cannot be any judgment whatsoever so long as the terms of the judgment remain separate. The judgment is formed only when they are put together. It is sufficient, therefore, that the two terms be such as will form a judgment when they are united; and it is of no consequence what they are before union. We must, therefore, examine whether, in the present instance, the terms which before union were incapable of forming a judgment become by union thus capable. This is not inconceivable. And it is precisely what happens. But before proving this, let us attend to some other considerations.

No judgment whatever is possible without the union of its terms.

An attentive consideration of the sources of knowledge shows us that not only are its elements given to us, but that they are also combined by nature and independently of our wills or action. Indeed, it is nature that forms all those combinations whose analyses by reflection we call judgments. I cannot say, "This horse is black," until after I have seen, perceived, the horse as black. In the perception the combination of *black* with *horse* was already made, and the judgment merely analyzes it. In this sense, all judgments, without exception, are analytic.

45.

In intellective perception, it is not intelligence, but nature, that unites the terms of the judgment.

Why do we say that subject and predicate cannot be united in a judgment unless both are previously known? Because it is supposed that the principle which brings them into union is the intelligence or the intelligent will, as in the majority of judgments; and it is obvious that the intelligence does not unite two terms without previously knowing them. But might it not be that what unites the terms is not the intelligence at all, but nature itself? This is precisely what happens in the case in question; for the *essence of being* and the felt activity are brought into union, not by our intelligence, but by our nature, as we have said. This union has its origin in the unity of the subject, and in the identity which exists between being as *known* and being as *felt* (active). Now, inasmuch as nature unites these two elements, it remains to be seen whether, by uniting them, it has not rendered them capable of becoming the terms of a judgment. In order to make this clear to ourselves, let us take the formula of such a judgment, and, analyzing it into its terms, consider whether these possess the requisite conditions. The formula we may express thus: *Being* (whereof I have knowledge) *is realized in this feeling* (felt activity). When I make this affirmation within myself, I know real being; I know what feeling, the felt activity, is; I know what a being is. The element, therefore, which was unknown to me

This judgment produces its

before I made the affirmation, is known to me as soon as the affirmation is made. Therefore, although *feeling*, before being united with ideal being, was unknown to me, and, therefore, not yet capable of becoming one of the terms of a judgment; yet as soon as nature joined it to ideal being by a spontaneous act of affirmation, it is already known, and therefore capable of being one of the terms of a judgment. If we agree to give the name of *subject* to feeling or reality, it will be easy at once to comprehend the meaning of the statement which we have several times made, to the effect that this primitive affirmation, this primitive judgment, produces its own subject. own subject.

Kant and his followers committed two great and fundamental errors: *first*, in supposing that, before a judgment could be formed, both its terms had to be known; and, *second*, in not seeing that the primitive and constitutive form of the understanding must be that which is common to all judgments. The first led them to overlook the spontaneous judgment of simple apprehension; the second, to destroy the unity of consciousness and abolish true objectivity. Both these errors are corrected in the system of Rosmini, who does full justice to the primitive judgment. "The judgment," he says, "respecting the existence of this or that sensibly determined thing, of this body which now falls under my senses, may easily be explained and analyzed in the following manner:—We have a mind (*spirito*) at once sensitive and intellective [cf. under §§ 42, 122]. . . . Sense is the power of perceiving sensibles; the understanding is the faculty of perceiving things as existing in themselves. Now, that which falls under our sense becomes the object of our understanding, because WE who feel are the same who possess understanding. When, therefore, we have perceived sensible qualities, what operation

will our minds perform upon them? The understanding consists, as we have said, in the power to see things as existing in themselves [see under § 32]. Therefore, our understanding will perceive the sensibles as existing in themselves, and not in the intimate relation which, as sensations, they have with us. Now, to perceive sensibles as existing in themselves, independently of us, is the same thing as to judge them existing in themselves. This, again, is the same thing as judging that there exists outside of us a being in which the sensible qualities are. . . . Let us, then, fix the difference between the two kinds of judgment which we form. Sometimes in our judgments we do nothing more than think a quality as existing in a being already conceived by us, as when I say, 'This man is blind,' in which case I think blindness as existing in the man of whom I have an idea, and who is the subject of my judgment. At other times, on the contrary, with our judgment, we think a being as adhering to certain sensibles, as when we say, 'There exists a being determined by those sensible qualities which I now perceive with my senses.' In the first kind, the object of the judgment exists before the judgment itself; in the second, the object does not exist before the judgment, but only the elements of it; that is, (1) sensations not yet become cognitions; (2) the idea of existence which lights up these sensations by adding being to them, and makes them known in and through being. To conclude: Judgment is not always an operation performed on an object already thought, but sometimes an operation performed on sensibles which, in the judgment itself, become objects of our thought" (*New Essay*, vol. i. § 128).

46.

The term *judgment* does not express the nature of affirmation, but a subsequent

Plainly, then, the affirmation of a real being is entitled to the name of judgment only after it is formed, not before. Now, reflection distinguishes in every judgment a subject and a predicate; but, in so doing, it analyzes a judg-

ment already formed. That which is not yet formed cannot be analyzed. It is this analysis that supplies the definition of judgment, which runs: *A judgment is the logical union of a predicate with a subject.* This definition is analytical and the product of reflection. The term *judgment*, therefore, as applied to an affirmation, does not designate the affirmation itself, as it is in its origin, but a subsequent reflection, which, by dealing with affirmations according to its own laws of action, changes or analyzes them into judgments.

reflective analysis of it.

This is an extremely important point, and one that is often lost sight of in philosophical and logical discussions. Many people talk as if a judgment were the putting together of two concepts, and then declaring whether they were identical or different. For example, the logic from which I have already quoted lays down that "*Judicium* est quo mens non solum PERCIPIT DUO OBJECTA, sed, quasi pro tribunali sedens, expresse apud se pronuntiat, illa inter se convenire aut dissedere." The truth is that the judgment is neither the one nor the other of these processes. Perception of two objects is not necessary to a judgment, nor is the affirmation of agreement or disagreement any part of one. When I say, "A is B," this means, not that I have perceived A and B as two objects, but that I have perceived them as one. If I had not, I should never think of making the judgment. When I say "Fire is not water," this means that I have tried to think them as one, and failed.

47.

This statement may be rendered clearer if we consider that, when reflection analyzes an affirma-

Reflection in analyzing a judg-

ment, distinguishes, but does not separate, its elements.

tion into subject and predicate, it does not in reality separate or disunite the two terms. Indeed, if it could do so, both would at once be destroyed. They would at once cease to be subject and predicate, and hence would cease to be elements of a judgment. The judgment would therefore be destroyed. Reflection, indeed, merely *distinguishes* the two terms notionally, and does not really break up the judgment of which they are the interdependent elements, and through which alone they are subject and predicate. Let us illustrate this by an example. Let us take the judgment: *This being which I see is a man.* Of what does this judgment inform me? That this being which I see is a man. Before I pronounced this judgment, I did not know that this being which I see was a man; for knowing this and saying it to myself are precisely one and the same thing. Now, let us by reflection analyze this judgment. *This being* is the subject, and *a man* is the predicate. It is clear that if I should regard these two terms separately, without paying attention to their relation, I should not know the one as subject and the other as predicate. They would not be terms of a judgment at all. How, then, do they become subject and predicate? By means of the judgment itself. Subject and predicate, therefore, do not exist prior to the judgment of which they are elements. They are formed in the judgment, and, after they are formed, reflection finds them there. Let us now apply this reasoning to our affirmation: *Being is*

Subject and predicate do not exist prior to the judgment, but are formed in the act of judgment.

realized in this feeling, or, *The activity of this feeling is a being*. Analyzing it, I say that the feeling is the subject and being the predicate, and, in so doing, I simply express what I find in the judgment itself. But, of course, if I take the feeling out of the judgment, and thus destroy the judgment, the feeling ceases to be subject, being altogether unknown to me. The objection advanced, therefore, though plausible, is without foundation, being based upon a false premise, viz., that the subject must exist as subject before the formation of the judgment, whereas the truth is, that it is in all cases the judgment itself that produces it.

It follows from this that judgment, in its proper and ordinary sense, belongs to Logic, which Rosmini calls "the art of reflection" (*Logic*, § 69), and not to Ideology. That which enables us to make judgments, namely, the primitive, spontaneous synthesis of being and sensation —in other words, *direct cognition*—belongs to Ideology, whereas the analysis of that synthesis by reflection—in other words, *reflexive cognition*—belongs to Logic. "The understanding," says Rosmini, "forms perceptions and such ideas as are consequent on these, in an instinctive and natural manner, and, for that reason, is not liable to error; for nature does not err.* But we must now distinguish these involuntary *first cognitions* from those which come afterwards and are voluntary. The first form *direct*, the second *reflexive*, cognition. . . . Direct cognition is purely *synthetic*, whereas reflexive cognition is also *analytic*. In reflection we turn back upon what we before perceived directly, analyzing it, decomposing it, considering it in parts, and, after having decomposed it, again recomposing it according

* Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.*, viii. 1; 252 a, 12 sq.: "Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδέν γε ἄτακτον τῶν φύσει καὶ κατὰ φύσιν· ἡ γὰρ φύσις αἰτία πᾶσι τάξεως."

as we will; whereas in perception we embrace the whole thing in its entirety, with a simple act and as if it were a simple object. Through this first intellective apprehension we distinguish no particular element of the thing perceived, because the nature of our intelligence is limited by this law, that it requires a plurality of acts to distinguish a plurality of things, and cannot distinguish one thing from another without a negation, which must always be preceded by an affirmation. At first, therefore, we perceive the thing as a whole; afterwards, by means of reflection, we pass on to analyze it. Considering things in parts brings us new clearness, whereas the first complex perception appears to us confused and imperfect.* This is the reason why the latter altogether escapes the notice of those who do not carefully observe how the act of thinking takes place in their own consciousness. . . . Hence reflexive cognition may be called *recognition* rather than *cognition*" (*New Essay*, vol. iii. §§ 1258, 1259, 1261).

48.

Difference between primitive affirmations and other judgments.

The sole difference between the affirmation whereby we arrive at a knowledge of real beings and other judgments consists in this, that in all other judgments the subject and predicate, though not known as subject and predicate before the formation of the judgment, are known in other ways, whereas the subject *feeling* is not known in any way previous to the affirmation of real being. But this difference does not render the

* Aristotle expresses this thought very happily in the beginning of his *Physics*: "Διόπερ ἀνάγκη τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον προάγειν ἐκ τῶν ἀσαφεστέρων μὲν τῇ φύσει ἡμῖν δὲ σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα, ἔστι δὲ ἡμῖν πρῶτον δῆλα καὶ σαφῆ τὰ συγκεχυμένα μᾶλλον· ὕστερον δ' ἐκ τούτων γίνεται γνώριμα τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ διαιροῦσι ταῦτα" (*Phys.*, i. 1; 184 a, 18 sq.). He also says that "Ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων νόησις ἐν τούτοις περὶ ἃ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ψεῦδος" (*De An.*, iii. 6, 1; 430 a, 26 sq.); but συγκεχυμένα and ἀδιαίρετα are not synonymous.

primitive judgment different in nature from other judgments, since in other judgments the knowledge which we have of what afterwards becomes the subject is not what produces the knowledge which we obtain through the judgment. The two, indeed, are utterly independent. Let us show this by an example. When I judge that the being which I see is a man, what knowledge does this judgment bring me? That the being which I see is a man. Before I make the judgment, therefore, I am entirely unaware that the being which I see is a man. The being which I see I do not recognize as a man: I know it only as a being seen. Now, the mere knowledge of it as something seen has nothing to do with my knowledge of it as a man. I might, indeed, know it for thousands of years as something seen, without knowing that it was a man, and this would actually happen if I had no knowledge of man. The being, therefore, which I see, although known under one aspect, is, before the judgment, altogether unknown to me in its relation to the predicate *man*. Hence, in all judgments without distinction, the subject as such—that is, in its relation to the predicate—is unknown before the formation of the judgment. The effect of every judgment is to make known what was previously unknown, and, therefore, the subject of every judgment is, as subject, an unknown which has to make itself known.

The nature of the primitive

But, in the affirmation of real beings, the knowledge to be acquired is first knowledge,

judgment further illustrated.

before which there can be no other. In this case, therefore, before the formation of the judgment, the subject is unknown, not only in its relation to the predicate, but in every respect. Indeed, if it were known in any way, it would no longer be true that the knowledge of real beings which we acquire through affirmation was the first real knowledge, since we should previously have some knowledge of what afterwards becomes the subject. If, then, every judgment produces in us knowledge which we did not previously possess, and if one piece of knowledge is based upon another, in such a way that, if we descend the scale, we must come to a first knowledge, which can be no other than the affirmation of existence, it follows of necessity—

(1) That the subject of every judgment is unknown as subject, that is, in its relation to the predicate, previous to the formation of the judgment.

(2) That, although, before the formation of the judgment, the subject may be unknown as such, yet something else may be known about it.

(3) That this something which is known about it must have been known through a previous judgment.

(4) That, going back in this way to the first judgment of all, we shall have to admit a subject which, previous to that judgment, was not known at all, for the simple reason that there was no previous judgment through which a knowledge of it could have been obtained.

(5) That the first of all judgments is that by which we know that something real exists, since whatever we know of any real being presupposes that we know it to exist.

(6) That, therefore, the first affirmation must form a subject, which, by a law common to all judgments, was previously unknown.

"The act of understanding or conceiving intellectually a corporeal being consists in seeing the relation between the particular agent perceived by the senses and the universal idea of existence. It does not consist in our placing in, or uniting to, the being in question our own idea (in this case, existence), but in simply conceiving, through the unity of our inmost sense, the relation which it has with our idea of existence. Perceiving a relation is not confounding or mixing the two terms of the relation together into one thing. This kind of union would be material. . . . In this sense I call the primitive judgment of our spirits, that which gives birth to intellective perception, *synthetic* and *à priori*, because in it there is formed a spiritual union between a thing given by the senses, which becomes subject, and one which does not enter into the subject and is not given by the senses, but is formed only in the intellect and is the predicate. Be it observed, I say that this predicate does not exist in the subject supplied by the senses [*τὸ αἰσθητόν*], and I do not say, as Kant does, that it does not exist in the *concept* of the subject. Indeed, the predicate certainly exists in the *concept* of the subject; for what is the concept of the subject, when it is formed, but the sensible subject with the intelligible predicate already applied to it? To say, therefore, that the predicate does not exist in the concept of the subject, is something entirely different from saying that the predicate does not exist in the subject. The former is Kant's expression, and is erroneous and equivocal: it is the latter alone that I admit and recognize as accurate. In one word, the subjects of our judgments are either supplied solely by the

senses, or are already conceived by the intellect. In the latter case we have already the *concept* of the *subject* of our judgment. In the former case we have, in a certain mode, the subject itself of the judgment, that is, we have potentially that which will become the subject when the judgment is formed; but we have not the *concept* of it. Only when we unite the predicate to the subject, and so form the judgment, do we obtain, by means of the judgment itself, the *concept* of this subject. And these are the *primitive judgments*, which constitute our perceptions of real beings, from which again we derive concepts, or *determinate ideas*. . . . The judgments, therefore, whereby we form the *concepts* or ideas of things are primitive, that is, they are the first that we form respecting these things; they are *synthetic*, because we add to the subject something which is not in it, or, more correctly, we consider the subject in relation to something outside of it, that is, to an idea of our intellect; and they may also fairly be called *à priori*, inasmuch as, though the matter of them has to be supplied by the senses, we find the form of them only in our intellect; and in these synthetic judgments *à priori* consists the problem of Ideology, the first in philosophy" (*New Essay*, vol. i. §§ 359, 360).

49.

The primitive judgment may also be called the primitive synthesis.

In view of this peculiarity of the affirmation of real beings, we have given to this judgment the name of *primitive synthesis*, and to that faculty of the human spirit which forms it, the name of *reason*, which is that one power of the mind which brings into union being and feeling, and afterwards exercises reflection upon the result.

"The *primitive synthesis*, which already contains *universalization*, although still bound up with a foreign element, is not deliberate; it is performed, or at least

aided, by nature, which has put together in man a vigilant understanding, an open eye, as it were, to see all that takes place before it, an eye which sees being essentially. Hence it is not very difficult to understand that, given sensations, the process of primitive synthesis is performed by the mind spontaneously. . . . On the contrary, since abstraction belongs to reflection, which is a *voluntary* faculty, and one not self-moved, it is always man himself who, by his will, causes this movement" (*New Essay*, vol. ii. § 513). "The intellective faculties are reducible to two principal ones, the *intellect* and the *reason*. The acts of the intellect belong purely to nature. Those presided over by art must be counted among the acts of the reason. . . . The general faculty of applying being is called *reason*. . . . We must distinguish two principal functions of reason. Reason, in so far as it applies to feeling the idea of being, exercises the function which is called *perception*. Reason, in so far as it applies the idea of being to objects already thought, exercises the function called *reflection*" (*Logic*, §§ 64, 67, 69).

50.

Convertibility of the terms of the primitive judgment.

We have said that, in the primitive synthesis, the feeling may be considered as the subject, and being as the predicate. Nevertheless, we might, with equal propriety, call the essence of being the subject, and its realization the predicate. The reason of this convertibility of subject and predicate in the primitive synthesis is, that it is an identical judgment (§§ 23–28), expressing an equation between feeling and the essence of being through the idea (the cognizability of the latter).

This statement must be accepted with considerable caution. It is by no means indifferent whether I say, *Freezing is* or *Being freezes*. The former expression, if un-

usual, is, at least, sense, while the latter is nonsense, as well as at variance with Rosmini's central doctrine. What he means is, that, in perception, being adheres or is present to sensation, as much as sensation to being. This shows how much superior the ancient mode of expressing judgments was to the modern ; for I can say with equal propriety and truth, "Τῷ πήγνυσθαι ὑπάρχει τὸ εἶναι" or "Τῷ εἶναι ὑπάρχει τὸ πήγνυσθαι." With our modern way of expressing judgments, we are continually exposed to the risk of being led to imagine that one reality can be predicated of another, as has been the case with all thinkers who have quantified the predicate. Although the predicate of every logical proposition is an idea, while the subject may or may not be so, still, subject and predicate may exchange places, so long as we express their relation by a word expressive of relation (ὑπάρχει), and not by a word expressive of independent existence, *is* (ἐστί).

51.

Solution of the problem of the origin of ideas.

We have thus, then, explained the meaning of *reason, light of reason, form which renders the mind intelligent, faculty of knowing.* We have also solved the question concerning the origin of ideas. There is one primitive idea, that of being. By means of it the primitive judgments are formed, and real beings, as felt, are affirmed and thus known. The relations between the idea of being and real beings are the concepts or specific ideas of particular beings. These ideas form the matter of analysis, reflection, abstraction, etc.—processes which produce the various abstract entities of reason.

The phrases, *light of reason, light of the intellect, intellectual light*, which play so important a part in the language

of the Schoolmen and others, may all be traced back to a metaphorical expression used by Aristotle in the fifth chapter of the third book of his *De Animâ*. It is used to give a notion of the nature of the formative or creative moment in the separate or self-subsistent intelligence. This history of this metaphor, which gave occasion to the formative intellect (νοῦς ποιητικός) of the later Aristotelians, and the active intellect (*intellectus agens*) of the Arabs and Schoolmen, is one of the most interesting and curious in the whole development of philosophic terminology. As to the meaning of *active intellect* in the language of St. Bonaventura and St. Thomas, see Cardinal Zigliara's large work, *Della Luce Intellettuale e dell' Ontologismo* (Rome, 1874); the excellent little treatise of Sebastian Casara, *La Luce dell' Occhio Corporeo e quella dell' Intelletto* (Parabiago, 1879); and the recent work, *Il Lume dell' Intelletto* (Loescher, Turin, Rome, Florence, 1881).

52.

Those who wish to pursue further the question concerning the deduction of special and general ideas or concepts, and of all human knowledge, may consult the author's *New Essay on the Origin of Ideas* and *Restoration of Philosophy in Italy*. In these works will be found the development and application of the ideological theory here set forth.

Cf. *New Essay* and *Restoration of Philosophy*.

See especially *New Essay*, vol. ii. §§ 474–557, and *Restoration*, pp. 593–636. Having thus shown that cognition presupposes three elements: (1) the universal idea of being, present to the intellect; (2) sensation, and, (3) the synthesis of the one with the other by reason; he now proceeds to consider the subsequent analysis, whereby we become conscious of the elements of this synthesis through a further act of the reason, which we call judgment. The primitive synthesis, being made by nature, which does not err, is

always correct; the subsequent analysis, on the contrary, being made by the thinking subject itself, is liable to be false as well as true. In order that it may always be true, certain rules and principles, forming together what may be called the art of reasoning, are necessary. The science of this art is Logic, which, therefore, forms the link between Ideology and Metaphysics, drawing its principle and criterion of truth from the former, and laying down the rules whereby truth may be reached in the latter. As Rosmini says, "Logic is the doctrine of the intellectual light considered as the principle and guide of reason" (*Logic*, § 8; cf. below, under § 70).

2. *Logic.*

53.

Logic. Logic is the science of the art of reasoning.*

Rosmini elsewhere defines Logic as "the science of the art of reflecting," or "the science of the art of directing the reflection." "From this definition," he says, "we see why other sciences akin to logic have frequently been confounded with it. Some persons, deceived by the etymology of the word, have believed that logic ought to treat of reason [λόγος] under all its aspects. But the doctrine concerning the nature of reason, in the subjective sense—that is, as principle and power of reasoning—belongs to *Psychology*, which is the first part of *Metaphysics*. On the other hand, the doctrine concerning the nature of reason, in the objective sense—that is, as the objects in which the acts of the faculty terminate—belongs to *Ideology* and to *Theosophy*, which is the second part of *Metaphysics*. Logic, therefore, must be limited to the consideration of the exercise of reason, and especially to the art of that exercise, whereby reasonings are conducted in the best manner and to the best

* Rosmini has left an admirable treatise on Logic, perhaps the very best that exists, in spite of certain conclusions which do not belong to the sphere of pure philosophy (see *Bibliography*).

rational end" (*Logic*, §§ 71, 72). Reflection, as distinguished from perception, which is limited to the *object perceived*, is defined by Rosmini as a "turning back of the attention upon the things perceived." "Hence," he says, "it is not limited to the object of a single perception, but may diffuse itself over several perceptions at once, and form to itself an object out of several objects and their relations. . . . Reflection, therefore, may be called a *general perception*, that is, a perception of several perceptions" (*New Essay*, vol. ii. § 487).

Rosmini defends the old Aristotelian logic against the attack made upon it by Hegel, and utterly rejects what the latter chooses to call logic. "Of the rejection of the syllogism," he says, "and the contempt poured upon the rigorous language of Aristotle, what was the necessary result? The abolition of human reason, . . . and this was really accomplished in the philosophy of Germany from Kant to Hegel" (*Logic*, § 25). "Kant sets to work and commands the human spirit to produce the logical forms, but stops short before the material reality. Fichte shouts 'Forward!' and commands it to produce matter likewise. Schelling next arrives, and, observing that the producer still remains distinct from the product, and therefore unproduced, seeks to push on the philosophical revolution still farther, by issuing a decree that the human spirit, by an intuition, shall identify its own productions with itself, and calling the result the *System of Absolute Identity*. In this way, the spirit, which, after having produced all things from itself, sees their identity with itself, has identified the subject with the object, and thus, according to Schelling, has found the Absolute.

"But Hegel next ascends the throne, and finds this philosophy still too slow and old fashioned. According to him, the fecundity of the human spirit is not yet exhausted or carried to the last conceivable point. Schelling's intuition leaves subsisting a distinction between the subject and object of intuition, and therefore the subject is not yet completely identified with the object. Hegel, therefore, in his lofty fancy, imagines that the human spirit, the producer

of all things, by dint of putting forth, puts forth itself, finally exhausting and annulling itself in its own product, like a sack, which, by being gradually folded down, finally becomes the sack turned inside out. And lo! 'the absolute idea' is found. These philosophers, especially the last, did not fail to acquire a great deal of celebrity as great dialecticians. We question the permanency of this celebrity. . . .

"These remarks suffice to show that the period of dialectic thought unfolds itself into three kinds of philosophy: *first*, the philosophies which openly profess scepticism; *second*, the philosophies which, like that of Kant, declare that they profess neither dogmatism nor scepticism, pretending that there is a middle system; and, *third*, the philosophies which return to dogmatism, believing erroneously that they have found absolute thought. Such are the philosophies of Kant's three successors, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.

"These are their pretensions and magnificent promises. Nevertheless, the sceptic alone expresses himself with sincerity. In fact, all these three kinds of philosophy belong to dialectic thought and never get outside of it. They are three phases, three results, of critical philosophy. The first is characterized by despair of finding the truth. The second tries to remedy this unfortunate state of things through faith in practical reason floating in mid air, without any theoretic foundation. The third is distinguished by philosophic pride, which, feeling everything vanish from its grasp, invites humanity to a show, in which it promises to take *all* out of *nothing*, before the eyes of its public, which it warns to be very attentive, just like those prestidigitators who, from under an empty dice-box, bring a large, various-coloured ball, four times as big as the box itself" (*Logic* §§ 40-43).

"But let us examine this transformation of logic. . . . The transformation in question involves, in the first place, the entire overthrow of ancient logic. Logic, according to Hegel, is the science of the idea in itself, of the pure idea.* Its object is 'the absolute form of truth, and the pure truth

* "Die Logik ist die Wissenschaft *der reinen Idee*" (*Encyclop.*, pt. i. § 19).

itself.' * To understand this new definition, we must bear in mind that Hegel's point of departure is 'thought as the object of thought.' † This object, which is thought itself, as object, moves, and, moving, performs three acts. With the first it produces the *absolute idea* as such, rising from the last abstraction to the concrete idea, as he calls it, which virtually contains all existences. Its second act is a continuation of the first. It is the *concrete idea* developing itself, going out of itself, positing itself as another, and becoming nature. When this idea has become nature, the third act begins. The idea returns to itself, as a perfect consciousness of that which is in itself, and then it recognizes itself as *spirit*. To these three developments the whole of Hegel's philosophy reduces itself. The first is the subject of Logic; the second, of the Science of Nature; and the third, of the Science of Spirit—precisely the three parts of philosophy. And here we see the position that Logic holds in the philosophical Encyclopædia of Hegel. It is the movement which thought, as the object of thought, goes through, and by which it succeeds in constituting itself as concept or absolute idea.

"But even this first movement has three parts. There is a movement or process in the sphere of *being*, a movement or process in the sphere of *essence*, and a movement or process in the sphere of the *concept*. The movement in the sphere of being is a *passing over into another;* the movement in the sphere of essence is a *reflection or manifestation* in another; the movement in the sphere of the concept is a *development*, by which alone is posited that which already is in itself or in potentiality, as a plant that unfolds from the germ in which it was contained.‡ This triple movement or process returns eternally into itself, begins every instant, and every instant completes itself. The description of this eternal movement is the logic which Hegel tries to substi-

* *Ibid.*, Zusatz i.; cf. § 24, Zusätze ii., iii.

† "Für den Anfang den die Philosophie zu machen hat scheint sie . . . hier das *Denken* zum Gegenstand des Denkens machen zu müssen" (*Ibid.*, § 17).

‡ "In der Natur ist es das organische Leben, welches der Stufe des Begriffs entspricht. So entwickelt sich, z. B., die Pflanze aus ihrem Keim" (*Encyclop.*, pt. i. § 161, Zusatz).

tute for the vulgar one [*gemeine*], as he calls it, and of which he speaks contemptuously.*

"Now, in this new logic, what is truth? 'The agreement of the *object* with the *concept*,'† says Hegel. This agreement is found in the *absolute idea*, which is the last term reached by the concept itself in its development. Hence proceeds this singular consequence that error eternally coexists with truth;‡ for, since our philosopher admits that this triple progress moves in a continuous and eternal circle, and that truth lies only in the last point, in which the circle completes itself, and which is where the *concept* has become *absolute idea*, it follows that all the other points of the circle remain in the deficiency which belongs to error—that only a single moment of the circle belongs to truth, whereas all the rest belong to error. Thus, error has a much larger and richer share than truth. Since, moreover, this triple circular and eternal process is necessary, it follows that the perpetual alternation between the dominion of truth, which consists in a point, and that of error, which extends to the whole round of the circle, is also necessary. Hence this philosopher, who desires to be in the highest degree Unitarian, tumbles unawares into the Manichæan system of two principles—

> Insincera acies duo per divortia semper
> Spargitur, in geminis visum frustrata figuris.

"To tell the truth, the purpose of this new logic is far more sublime than that of the old one. The old one taught men to make sure of the truth. The new one laughs at such simplicity, and advises man to resign himself to the acceptance of truth and error as *necessary* moments of the understanding, which alternate in perpetual motion, without affording any possibility that the truth shall in the end prevail over its contrary. . . .

* See *Encyclop.*, pt. i. § 19, Zusatz ii.; § 20, Zusatz.

† "Dahingegen besteht die Wahrheit im tieferen Sinu darin, dass die Objektivität mit dem Begriff identisch ist" (*Encyclop.*, pt. i. § 213, Zusatz).

‡ "Eben so falsch ist die Vorstellung, als ob die Idee nur das Abstrakte sey. Sie ist es allerdings in sofern alles Unwahre sich in ihr aufzehrt" (*Encyclop.*, pt. i. § 213).

"Hegel elsewhere congratulates himself on having thus discovered how to effect the conciliation of truth with error, and how to make them live at peace with one another. The same may be said with respect to good and evil. . . . The new philosophy assures us that it has the marvellous power to bind together good and evil, as well as truth and falsehood, and from these two contraries to draw forth a third entity—and what entity would one suppose? The Absolute Good! 'The good, the absolute good,' says Hegel, 'eternally accomplishes itself in the world, with the result that it is already accomplished in and for itself, and does not require to wait for us. That it does so wait, is the illusion in which we live, and which is the sole active principle upon which interest in the world rests. The idea, in its process, causes this illusion to itself, sets another over against itself, and its whole action consists in cancelling this illusion. Only from this error does truth spring, and herein alone lies the reconciliation with error and finitude. Otherness or error, as cancelled, is itself a necessary moment of truth, which is only in so far as it makes itself its own result.' *

"Such is the singular fruit of the new logic! Such are the promises it holds out! It teaches man to put away from himself the illusion of doing good, or of expecting it in another life, as if the good were still to be accomplished, and were not continually being accomplished in our world, without our concurrence! It likewise teaches us that it is in vain to seek for truth free from error, because error is the product of truth transforming itself into another, and truth is the product of error transforming itself into truth. If such were the nature of things, we ought to close the eyes of the mind to avoid the error of seeing it. If absolute science were at once the contemplation and production of this sad spectacle, of this continual, fatal revolution of thought, we ought to congratulate him who does not possess it, and he who does ought to do his best to unlearn it.

* *Encyclopædie*, pt. i. § 212, Zusatz.

"'The idea is the Absolute, the highest definition of God,'* says Hegel. But this god of Hegel's is a god who continually deludes himself, and whose whole activity consists in constantly dissolving the delusion which he practises upon himself. It is from this delusion, from this error of Hegel's god, that truth proceeds! A logic which ingenuously confesses to such results would not seem to require any further examination, because, even if it were true, it could be neither good nor desirable; and, since it cannot be good, it cannot be true. Nevertheless, we will not omit to mark some of the principal errors by which Hegelian reasoning is corrupted to its very roots.†

"(1) Hegel sets out with a supposition altogether gratuitous and at the same time evidently false, viz., that ideas move themselves, that they change and develop themselves, as the germ of a flower, which develops into the plant. He assures his disciples, who, for the most part, listen in rapture, that all his assertions (and his system is only a series of assertions) are necessarily connected, that which follows with that which precedes; but no philosopher ever made a falser boast. And, in fact, the assertion that ideas move is neither deduced from any principle nor supported by even the smallest proof; and internal observation, to which alone our philosopher could appeal, testifies to the contrary. It testifies that ideas are plainly immutable, that man intuites them or does not intuite them, reflects on them or does not reflect on them, thinks them in one mode or another, passes from the consideration of one to the consideration of another, and all this without the idea's suffering the least change. Hence, the new logic begins by giving proof of entire ignorance respecting the nature of ideas—starts with a proposition not only arbitrary, but manifestly erroneous.

"(2) Hegel, in his Logic, undertakes to trace the whole of this dialectic movement. But his philosophical imagi-

* "Die Definition des Absoluten, dass es die Idee ist, ist nun selbst absolut" (*Encyclop.*, pt. i. § 213; cf. § 85).

† Cf. Trendelenburg, *Logische Untersuchungen*, vol. i. p. 38 (3rd edit.), and *Die logische Frage in Hegel's System*, pp. 12 sqq., and my translation of the same in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, vols. v., vi.

nation is so strong that the steps which he makes thought take, far from appearing necessary, are arbitrary and capricious. Let us open the *Science of Logic*. Its point of departure, as we have already said, is 'thought as the object of thought.' This must develop itself, and it is Logic that describes and performs this development. And lo! the Logic of Hegel, all of a sudden, and without even the smallest hint of a reason, divides itself into three parts —the Theory of Being, the Theory of Essence, and the Theory of Concept and Idea.* It, therefore, begins at once by describing the movement of being. But was not the original undertaking to describe the development of thought as the object of thought? How, then, has being, so suddenly and without any warning to the reader, been substituted for thought as the object of thought? Is it not plain that the philosopher is here entertaining his disciples with nimble sleights of hand? By this trick he makes them swallow the implicit proposition that thought as the object of thought is identical with being. It follows, of course, that, since they are identical, they may be interchanged at pleasure, without its being necessary to prove this supposed identity. Thus, the famous *Science of Logic* begins by suddenly putting *being* in the place of *thinking*. The philosopher starts with a *petitio principii*, and violently introduces into the very first lines the whole system which he ought to demonstrate. Assuming, therefore, from the beginning the truth of the whole system, and taking its germ and principle for granted, he affords a first and solemn example of the new art of reasoning, which certainly stands entirely opposed to the old.

"(3) But, at least, the inferences which follow will be furnished with that dialectic necessity which makes so much display, and to which appeal is made as to the sole and only proof of the system. 'Think!' After having in the very beginning exchanged thought for being in our

* Hegel excuses himself for this, on the ground that, preliminarily, no deduction of these can be given (see *Encyclop.*, pt. i. § 20); but, as he has not shown why this deduction is impossible, and, if it is impossible, his propositions are pure assumptions, his excuse goes for nothing, and, indeed, is a mere apology for simple incapacity.

hands, Hegel begins to tell us that 'being is the concept,' * the indeterminate. Here, again, without favouring us with any proof, he demands, or rather commands, that we shall thus blindly believe that being is the concept; and so the rigorous dialectic process, which he had promised us, is reduced to a substitution of one word for another, to an arbitrary and absurd metamorphosis. Who, that has not lost his head, will ever grant to him that being, thus generally, is the concept? On the contrary, everybody will tell him it is by the concept that being is known, and for that very reason the one is not the other. If he meant to speak of *ideal being*, he ought to have said so, since certainly ideal being, as intuited by the mind, though not properly a concept, is, nevertheless, the idea; but being, without distinction of form, is neither an idea nor a concept. He adds 'the indeterminate.' But is the indeterminate the same thing as being? Certainly not; and as little is the indeterminate the same as the concept. And if you assert that it is, you assert something that nobody will grant. On the contrary, being is essentially determined, and when it is undetermined, it is so much the less being. In a word, the indeterminate signifies only a privation, which is characteristic of ideal being.

"(4) But, if you mean to speak not of being simply, but of indeterminate being, again, why not say so? Why dissemble after the manner of sophists who deal in equivocations? If this is what you mean, then you ought to account for the idea of indeterminate being, and show us its origin. If you had done so, you would not have begun your logic thus with a leap into indeterminate being, but with something else, which might have led you to an explanation of the idea of indeterminate being. According to us, not the indeterminate simply, but indeterminate *being* is the light of reason, the form of the intelligence, and it is only after having rigorously demonstrated it that

* "Das Seyn is der Begriff nur an *sich*, die Bestimmungen desselben sind *seyende*, in ihrem Unterschiede *Andre* gegeneinander, und ihre weitere Bestimmung (die Form des Dialektischen) ist ein *Uebergehen in Anderes*" (*Encyclop.*, vol. i. § 84).

we assumed the right of asserting that here is the point of departure of the human spirit, distinguishing this from the point of departure of man in his first development, as well as from that of the man who begins to philosophize, and that of philosophy as science.*

"(5) 'Being,' says Hegel, 'has three forms—quality, quantity, and measure, or qualitative quantity.' Of this, again, there is no proof, and, indeed, there could be no proof of an error so patent. He has been speaking of indeterminate being, and now he tells us that it has quality, quantity, and measure.† What a leap! Indeterminate being has certainly not one of these, for these are determinations, and when being has them, it is no longer indeterminate. Here again, in the usual fashion, the subject of the discourse is surreptitiously changed.

"(6) But let us see what he says of quality. 'Pure being,' he says, 'forms the beginning, because it is at once pure thought, and the indeterminate, simple immediate.'‡ What a number of things at once! How many assertions in a few words! He has been speaking of being, and now he enters the field with a slight change, *pure being*. Once more *pure being* and *thought* are identified, without one word to tell us why. And yet all men distinguish, and always will distinguish, thought, which is the act of the intelligent subject, from being, which is its object, and in no manner will they confound two things so different and so much opposed to each other. He says, again, that this pure being is the immediate; but immediate is an adjective, and requires a substantive, and he who can may guess what that substantive is. But without stopping to consider this, let us ask on what grounds he affirms that pure being is the immediate. We must believe it blindly, because he says so: this is the usual intimation that our philosopher

* See under § 9.

† "Eine jede Sphäre der logischen Idee erweist sich als eine Totalität von Bestimmungen und als eine Darstellung des Absoluten. So auch das Seyn, welches die drei Stufen der Qualität, der Quantität und es Maasses in sich enthält" (*Encyclop.*, pt. i. § 85, Zusatz).

‡ "Das reine Seyn macht den Anfang, weil es sowohl reiner Gedanke als das unbestimmte, einfache Unmittelbare ist" (*Ibid.*, § 86).

gives us. He immediately subjoins that 'pure being is pure abstraction, and therefore the absolute negative, which, when similarly taken in its immediacy, is Nothing.' * But if pure being is an abstraction, how is it immediate? Rather the abstraction is immediate, and pure being, obtained through the medium of it, is mediate. And from what is this abstraction made? That from which the abstraction is made must be anterior to the abstraction, and therefore more immediate than it, as well as than the abstract which it produces.

"(7) But attention here to another poetic metamorphosis! Pure being, which is said to be an abstraction, is directly afterwards a *pure abstraction*, which becomes synonymous with the absolute negative. And when this substitution of words is accomplished, without further ceremony the assertion is made that the absolute negative, taken in its immediacy, is nothing, which is defined as abstraction and absolute negation. These sudden transitions pretend to be, in the highest degree, dialectical by rigorous necessity! But to speak more seriously; men will not be so easily persuaded that indeterminate being is nothing, inasmuch as indeterminate being is, after all, an object of thought; nor will they admit that calling nothing abstraction and absolute negation is a proper way to speak, since abstraction and negation are *operations* of thought, whereas nothing, though indeed the result of total negation, which removes all object from thought, is not the negation itself. But why should indeterminate being be nothing? Our philosopher never feels himself bound to give us any reasons; but a reason may be gathered from what he tells us, viz., that it has in it no reality. Men of good sense, however, will find an induction of this sort illogical and antidialectical, inasmuch as indeterminate being is still something, although it is devoid of real form and determination, for the simple reason that it is being. It is ideal and formal being; it is being that virtually has within it

* "Dieses reine Seyn ist nun die reine Abstraction, damit das *absolut negative*, welches, gleichfalls unmittelbar genommen, das Nichts ist" (*Ibid.*, § 87)

all determinations. It is the intelligibility of all determinate beings, and therefore can never identify itself with nothing. This, again, instead of being a dialectically necessary step, is a desperado's leap in the dark, since being is always that which directly contradicts nothing.

"(8) Hegel, having thus, by his usual method of substituting one word for another, defined being in this way—that is, by calling it nothing—takes other steps, not a whit more dialectical than the preceding, but merely verbal; for example: 'Nothing, as this immediate, self-equal, is, in its turn, the same that being is. The truth of being, as well as of nothing, is the unity of the two: this unity is BECOMING.'* And this is the principle and characteristic of the whole Hegelian philosophy. In it, everything is always becoming, the idea being, according to Hegel, essentially movement. Nevertheless, it is impossible to conceive any movement in the idea, movement and change being contradictory of the eternal and immutable nature of the idea. And this observation alone is sufficient to overthrow the whole imaginary edifice. But let us examine the last words. After having told us that indeterminate being is nothing, Hegel pretends that this consequence follows: 'The truth of being, as well as that of nothing, is the unity of the two.' But let him tell us clearly, and without equivocation, whether being and nothing be one or two; because if they are two, there is no longer a perfect identity between them, and if they are one, there is no need for uniting them. The truth is that they are neither one, since it is impossible that being should ever become nothing, nor, on the other hand, are they two, except with respect to our minds, which, with two different operations, posit and remove being; and these two operations can never be united into one, inasmuch as our minds can never, at the same time and in the same respect, affirm and

* "Das Nichts ist als dieses unmittelbare, sich selbstgleiche, ebenso umgekehrt *dasselbe* was das *Seyn* ist. Die Wahrheit des Seyns, sowie des Nichts, ist daher die Einheit beider: diese Einheit ist das Werden" (*Ibid.*, § 88). Here and elsewhere I translate directly from the third edition of the *Encyclopædie*, which differs somewhat from the first, from which Rosmini translated.

negate being. For this reason, the logic which Hegel calls vulgar is perfectly right in admitting the principle of contradiction, and the new dialectician is wrong when he impugns it, in order to enjoy the singular privilege of contradicting himself. It follows that the union or identification of being with nothing is only an absurdity, which cannot be conceived by any intelligence; and an absurdity is not anything, not even *becoming*.

"(9) On the other hand, neither being nor nothing *becomes*, because being is, and that which is does not become; and nothing does not *become*, because it is nothing; for nothing neither does nor suffers anything. For these reasons the concept of becoming is not, and cannot be, either in being, or in nothing, or in their union or identification. We must, therefore, analyze this concept, and not bring it into the field ready made, without any explanation, and without saying what it is. Without such explanation, *becoming* remains a mere word, which, not being defined and therefore not clear, is not fit to be used by the dialectician, but only by the sophist. And, indeed, first of all, the word *becoming* may mark either a *simple concept*, or it may mark a *reality*. What then, in Hegel's view, is real becoming, and what is the concept of becoming? He takes excellent care not to let this be known, because he is under the absolute necessity of using the word sometimes in the one sense, sometimes in the other—sometimes for the real act [of being], and sometimes for the concept of this act; and it is only by these ambiguities that he hopes to make us swallow his paradox, that the concept and the reality are all the same thing, and that the real is comprehended in the ideal. Such a marvellous result he could not reach otherwise than by introducing a word capable of signifying either the one or the other, so as to make us pass from the identity of the word to the identity of the thing.

"(10) Again, the pretended dialectical transition from indeterminate being to becoming does not exist. In indeterminate being there is to be found nothing that can become or cause to become, no *activity* of any kind, but

only pure *intelligibility*. Hence even the possibility of the transition is wanting. Instead, therefore, of a transition, through deduction of one thing from another, the whole process is reduced to an arbitrary adding of one thing to another. Now, as you, at your good will and pleasure, join becoming to indeterminate being, so I may join to it any other determination that pleases me, without discovering that I have thereby, with so little trouble, constructed a philosophical system or performed anything beyond a simple and very ordinary exercise of thought. I say, therefore, that you introduce *becoming* abruptly, not by a necessary transition from one concept to another, but as one word follows another without nexus. Indeed, *becoming* presupposes the being which becomes, and therefore being precedes becoming. If so, becoming itself cannot be being, but something that is subsequent to being. Add what we have said above, that ideal being never becomes, and that indeterminate being is merely ideal, since all real beings are determinate. Further, becoming presupposes a force, a force determining a subject to change and to change in a given manner, whence the virtue of becoming, whether active, passive, or intransitive—take it as you choose—must always be a determinate. And even if, in thought, you should form an abstract concept of becoming, and thus should wish not to determine the mode of becoming, this concept, although abstract, would begin to render being less indeterminate, so that, by adding becoming to being, you do not thereby make indeterminate being move. This being necessarily remains before the mind, the same as before, while, from the concept of completely indeterminate being, your mind passes to consider another less indeterminate concept: that is all.

"(11) And, after all, you cannot obtain this determination, *becoming*, except from the real world, as we have said, because it is nowhere else. How have you then jumped out of the ideal world, where you were, into the real one? How do you account for such a leap? Whilst you were discussing indeterminate being, which can only be the object of the mind, how have you managed to drag into

the discussion becoming, which is found only among realities, and not even among all these, but only among such as are finite? Here is another most mortal leap, antilogical and antidialectical, from indeterminate being to finite being. The purely indeterminate concept of being is unlimited, infinite. For the very reason that it is indeterminate, it has no limit of any sort. Becoming, on the contrary (whatever this becoming may be, and we shall see farther on what it is), is a passion [πάθος, affection] of purely finite being, of which you have not yet spoken, but which you, nevertheless, take the liberty of smuggling in as a presupposition of your philosophy, while all the time you are proclaiming that no new personage can enter without the passport of necessary dialectic. Your words, therefore, are mere words, and are contradicted by facts. To sum up: you see here three headlong leaps—*first*, from being to an affection of being, such as becoming is; *second*, from ideal being, which is the same as indeterminate being, to real being, in which alone is found the affection of becoming; *third*, from infinite being, the indeterminate, to finite being, which alone can be said in a certain way to become, if indeed that word has any meaning. . . .

"(12) But Hegel further tells us that becoming is properly the identification of being and nothing, because it expresses that point in which one being ceases and the other is not yet begun. If it were true that it expressed this point, it would not therefore be true either that indeterminate being was the identification of being with nothing, or that this identification was becoming. That indeterminate being has no reality is true; but it has identity, and identity is not nothing. And nothing cannot, properly speaking, be united with being, because they are not two things. The being of the world has, indeed, limits; but the word *nothing* does not indicate these limits. Nothing is a simple concept indicating total removal or absence of being, whereas the limits are different and have different concepts, being relations of beings differently limited. Let us, however, admit that, by a figure of speech (all such ought, however, to be excluded from rigorously scientific

deductions), we may say that indeterminate being is the union of being and nothing, because it contains at once ideal being and the zero of reality. Let it further be admitted, by another figure of speech, that becoming is the union of being and nothing, because, in the act of becoming, we conceive the cessation of one being and the beginning of another. After all this is admitted, it will not follow, in the least, that indeterminate being is becoming, although both may be defined as the union of being and nothing. This definition would not signify the same thing in the two cases. What it would signify when applied to *indeterminate being* would be something different from its signification as applied to *becoming*. The union of being and nothing, in the case of *indeterminate being*, would be a mode of union different from the union of being and nothing in the case of *becoming*. In indeterminate being there are entirely wanting the concepts of annulment and production: there is nothing but (ideal) being and (real) non-being. In becoming, on the contrary, there are not simply being and non-being, but annulment and production. Nothing and annulment are two different things. Nothing presupposes nothing, whereas annulment presupposes an agent that annuls and an entity that is annulled. So likewise, being and the production of being are two different things. Being expresses a completed, quiet act; production expresses an uncompleted, unquiet act. We must, therefore, at all events, reform these definitions, figurative though they be, and say that indeterminate being is the union of (ideal) being and (real) nothing, whereas becoming is the union, not the identification, of annulment and production. When the definitions are thus reduced, they have lost their identity. The Hegelian sophism, therefore, comes from having abandoned the ancient logic, which, if our philosopher had studied it, would have taught him to begin his discussions with rigorous definitions and with acute analyses. If he had made such definitions and analyses, the whole enchantment, under which the mind of the Berlin professor lies, would have vanished as if at the sign of the cross.

"(13) And, in fact, all this large number of errors in this

small number of words arises not only from the omission of definitions, but, above all, from the omission of analysis. Hegel, who is so contemptuous of the learning of the ages, which fine spirits have now declared too vulgar, has introduced into philosophy his concept of becoming, borrowing it bodily from the vulgar. He has not taken the least trouble to rectify or purify it, but has placed it, in all its roughness, bulk, and confusion, as the corner-stone of his edifice. Had he applied a little philosophical analysis to it, he would have seen that becoming, as the vulgar conceive it, does not exist in nature save phenomenally. But our philosopher, while he imagines that he is soaring aloft as an eagle, is deceived by the most ordinary prejudices, and contents himself with wrapping them up in obscure verbiage. Becoming, therefore, as we have said, does not exist in the sense of being a point in which one being annuls itself and another begins ; but whatever instant we choose to assign, in that instant being either is or is not, and of that which is, we cannot say that it is not yet. Thus, in creation, which Hegel professes to admit,* between the existence and non-existence of the world there was no middle step. Nor is creation a beginning : it is a positing of being in all its completeness. In creation, therefore, there is not a something which becomes, and, even in the created world, becoming belongs to the changing modes of real being, not to being itself ; and even of these modes, every one at every instant either is or is not. At all events, it is another mistake thus to apply to substantial being that which may only, in a certain sense, be predicated of its modes and determinations ; and Hegel applies becoming to being, in such a way that, not content with making being itself become [*i.e.* enter into the process of its own determination], and become whatever he chooses, he tries to make it becoming itself. But even with respect to the modes and determinations of being, it cannot . . . be asserted that

* "Die tiefere Anschauung ist dagegen diese, dass Gott die Welt aus Nichts erschaffen habe" (*Enclyclop.*, pt. i. § 128. Cf. Siebeck, *Die Lehre des Aristoteles von der Ewigkeit der Welt*, in Untersuchungen zur Philosophie der Griechen, pp. 137–189; Bernays, *Die unter Philon's Werken stehende Schrift über die Unzerstörbarkeit des Weltalls*).

there is any true continuity of transition other than phenomenal, or that one state succeeds another immediately... To be sure, there is continuity; but this means no more than that the successive states of a being which develops itself —for example, a plant—are so little different from each other that our powers of observation are not equal to distinguishing them, and that, therefore, we imagine there is continuity. As we have elsewhere demonstrated, the concept of continuity in motion is a confused concept, concealing an absurdity.* Hegel, therefore, adopts, as the basis of his system and of his new logic, a most vulgar concept, phenomenal in its origin, confused and carrying within it an absurdity. One can easily conceive that a philosopher, who sets out with propositions so equivocal, arbitrary, confused, erroneous, and absurd, may very easily, especially if he is gifted with great power of abstraction, such as we find generally in Germans, draw from them the strangest consequences and create a species of fantastic universe, calculated to surprise untrained and confident young minds, and thus to form a kind of school, as we find the philosopher of Stuttgard has done; but any man, whose sense has been educated in a manly way, and who does not allow himself to be hoodwinked by a blind (though, it may be, sometimes generous) enthusiasm, weighs the grounds, and penetrates to the bottom, of every new doctrine, and thus does not fall into such nets. The celebrity of this man is explicable. It is one of those numerous celebrities which blossom in university halls, one of those crowns woven by the hands of unsophisticated youth" (*Logic*, §§ 40–52).

We have quoted this long passage for three reasons: *first*, because it shows the wide gulf which separates the philosophy of Rosmini from the romantic idealism of Germany; *second*, because it affords an excellent example of his method of dealing with subtle questions; and, *third*,

* See *New Essay*, vol. ii. §§ 814, 815; *Psychology*, vol. ii. §§ 1210–1223. Rosmini denies all continuity in any transient act, that is, any act involving movement. His arguments, some of which are identical with those of Zeno, if not altogether convincing, are, at least, very acute and deserving of careful consideration.

because it shows how serviceable his first principle is in clearing up the entanglements of subjectivism. A very instructive parallel might be drawn between the above criticism of Hegel's system and that pronounced by Trendelenburg, which is also very able.

54.

Aim of reasoning and nature of conviction.

The aim of reasoning is certainty, and certainty is a firm persuasion in accordance with known truth.

Elsewhere Rosmini defines certainty as "a firm and reasonable persuasion conformable to truth," and then proceeds: "I may have present to my spirit a true opinion, and yet doubt of its truth: in that case, I have no certainty. It is not, therefore, enough that a thing should be true, in order that it should be true for me. In order that it may be true for me, I must have a motive which produces in me a *firm persuasion*, and produces it *reasonably*; that is, by means of a *reason* which convinces me that my opinion and belief are true and indubitable. Although it is a fact that logical truth has no existence in itself, outside of all subsistence, nevertheless, it exists in itself outside of the human intellect, and this justifies the distinction between true in itself and true for man. A thing becomes true for man by means of the *certainty* which he has of its *truth*. . . . Certainty, therefore, results from three elements: *first*, truth in the object; *second*, firm persuasion in the subject; and, *third*, a motive or ground producing such persuasion" (*New Essay*, vol. iii. § 1044, 1045). St. Thomas distinguishes two kinds of certainty. "Certitudo," he says, "potest considerari dupliciter, uno modo ex causa certitudinis, et sic dicitur esse certius id quod habet certiorem causam. . . . Alio modo potest considerari certitudo ex parte subjecti; et sic dicitur esse certius quod plenius consequitur intellectus hominis" (*Sum. Th.*, ii.² q. 4, art. 8, cor.; cf. q. 1, art. 1, m.). "Certainty," says Sir W. Hamilton, "expresses

either the firm conviction which we have of the truth of a thing, or the character of the proof on which it rests" (*Lect. on Metaph.*, vol. i. p. 161). It will be seen that Rosmini's definition of certainty includes both objective and subjective certainty.

55.

Twofold office of Logic.

Logic, therefore, has two offices: (1) to defend the existence of truth in general and the validity of reason in particular; (2) to teach men to use their power of reasoning so as to arrive at complete possession and conviction of truth—to attain certainty. Logic, therefore, may be divided into two parts: (1) defence of truth, and (2) means of arriving at truth and certitude.

56.

What is truth?

Truth is a quality of knowledge. Knowledge is true when that which is known *is*. Let us reflect closely upon this definition of truth. If the thing which is known is, it is true; therefore the truth of a thing is, in the last analysis, its being. Known being, therefore, is the truth of knowledge. But the form of intelligence is *being*, as ideology shows us. Hence the form of intelligence is truth. The first truth, therefore, is possessed by the human spirit through its very nature. This very simple deduction disposes of those sceptics who deny all truth, as well as of those who, without expressly denying the existence of certain truths, nevertheless declare that all truth is unattainable by man.

Truth is the form of our intelligence.

The above definition of truth differs slightly from that adopted by Aristotle, according to whom truth, and, of course, also falsehood, are qualities of judgments. The difference, however, is really not essential, inasmuch as all knowledge, properly so called, is the result of judgments. Aristotle, moreover, admits that the knowledge of indivisibles—a knowledge which would correspond to Rosmini's intuition—cannot possibly be false (see under § 47 ; and cf. Aristotle, *De Animâ*, iii. 6, 1 ; 430 a, 27 sq. : *De Interp.*, 1. ; 16 a, 12 sqq. : *Metaph.*, ix. 10 ; 1051 b, 3 sq.).

That being and truth are equivalent terms is a favourite doctrine with Rosmini, and would seem to follow from the theory that being is at once the form of mind and of cognition. "It is essential to cognition," he says, "that it should be the truth or true. . . . Whence it follows that the formal cause of cognition, that which imparts to it the essence of cognition, must be the truth itself, since to be true means simply to have the truth in it. If, therefore, ideal being is the formal cause of cognition, and this being is the truth, it follows that it is also the *supreme criterion*, since that which essentially is has no need to recur to anything else in order to be so, and there is nothing anterior to essence. The criterion of truth, therefore, reduced to a proposition will be this : That which the human spirit apprehends is true if it is conformable to being, and false if it is not so.

"But even independently of this demonstration, we may show in another way that being is the truth. For what is truth ? This question contains its own answer. By asking what IS, we imply that when we say what it *is*, we shall have answered the question. But being is precisely that which *is*, and which essentially is, because it is being. If that which IS IS that which IS, then that which is is the truth ; therefore, being is the truth. In fact, being cannot not-be ; if it could, it would not be being : hence being necessarily is. But being is in all the things that are, and in all that is affirmed of them ; hence being is the truth essential, necessary and universal. Hence, again, being is the criterion of the truth and the supreme criterion,

because it is immediate. Being itself the truth, and at the same time the formal cause of all cognition, it introduces necessity, simply because that which is cannot not-be" (*New Essay*, vol. iii. §§ 1047, 1048).

It will be seen that in the above quotation Rosmini confounds the *is* of the copula with the entirely different *is* of existence, the ὂν ὡς ἀληθές, as Aristotle would say, with the ὂν δυνάμει (see Brentano, *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles*, pp. 6 sqq.). Indeed, it cannot be said that Rosmini's identification of truth with being is either logical or felicitous. Truth is not being, but an attribute or quality of the manner in which being is applied. It is true that when that which is known, or, in other words, that which is judged to be, is, the knowledge and the judgment expressing it are both true; but the same is the case when that which is judged not to be is not. If, therefore, in the first case I am justified in making an abstract noun of my predicate and calling it truth, so am I likewise in the second; whence it would follow that not-being, as well as being, was truth. Unless being is a mere relation, it cannot be truth; but surely being is not a relation. If it were, then the object of human intelligence being a relation, all knowledge would be relative, which Rosmini would be the first to deny. The tendency to elevate truth, which is a mere relation, into a subject, has caused much ambiguity and mischief in philosophical discussion. When Jesus, speaking to Orientals, says, "I am the way and *the truth* and the life," such figurative expressions are easily understood, and need mislead no one; but when St. Thomas undertakes to prove that God is truth (*Summa contra Gent.*, lib. I., c. lx.), or when Hegel tells us that the truth is concrete (*Encyclopædie*, Einleitung, § 14), that it is the self-mediated, the unconditioned, etc., they are simply putting words in the place of thoughts, and helping to confound thinking. It is fortunate for Rosmini's system that this identification of truth with being is not in any way essential to it. Rosmini was probably led to make this identification through the

ambiguity of the Italian word *vero*, which, like the German *wahr*, means actual as well as true.

57.

Confirmation of the same doctrine.

This argument may be stated in another way. If what I know is, I know the truth. But, by nature, I intuite the essence of being. Now, the essence of being is simply being itself, inasmuch as, when I say being, I exclude non-being. The being, therefore, which I know by nature, is; hence my first cognition is true: I possess a first truth, since what I know is.

"Every time," says Rosmini, "that we attribute to a thing that part of being which it has in it, neither more nor less, the proposition we utter is true. The character, therefore, of true propositions is, that in them is recognized, in that which forms the object in question, that amount of being which is in it, neither more nor less, and that this is expressed in the predicate. In fact, errors take place only in the following cases:—(1) When being is said or uttered of a thing which has it not; (2) When being is denied of a thing which has it; (3) When it is affirmed that a thing has a mode or grade of being which it has not; (4) When it is denied that a thing has a mode or grade of being which it has" (*New Essay*, vol. iii. § 1062). This is true, and yet the demonstration attempted in the above section is a very unfortunate one. The intuition of indeterminate being, given, as it is, by nature, is not liable to error; but this proves nothing with regard to determinate being, since indeterminate being furnishes us with no criterion whereby to distinguish one mode or grade of it from another. Merely to know that x is, and y is, does not enable us to determine the mode of either. The modes of being are given in sensation (see § 65), and the great desideratum is to find a standard of sense. If mere being could enable

us to settle degrees of heat, what would be the use of the thermometer? (cf. § 69).

58.

Here the transcendental idealist comes forward and says, "Your truth is an illusion. You merely *think* you know what being is; but it may, after all, be only an appearance." I reply: Your objection merely shows that you have not understood the manner in which I have just shown that man possesses the first truth; that you have not understood the first truth of which I am speaking, since your possibility of illusion does not touch the first truth at all. In fact, what do we mean by illusion? We mean that something appears which is not, or in a mode in which it is not. Now, neither of these forms of illusion can touch the first truth of which we have been speaking. Such illusions can at best touch only those secondary cognitions which we form when we affirm, for example, real beings. With these we shall deal at the proper time. At present, however, it may be admitted that when I affirm a particular real being, I am liable to illusion in both the forms mentioned. In other words, I may affirm a certain real being, and this being may not be, may not subsist. Or I may affirm that a particular real being is in one mode, when, in fact, it is in another. But neither of these forms of illusion is possible with reference to my knowledge of the essence of being, pure and simple. Let us

Transcendental scepticism objects to the doctrine that the mind by its nature possesses the first truth.

Reply. In the case of universal being, illusion is impossible. Two kinds of illusion.

prove this with regard to the first form of illusion.

Proof of the impossibility of the first illusion.

In regard to being, apart from all determinations, to know what it is, and to think I know what it is, are one and the same thing. When I think I know what being is, I do know what it is, and when I know what it is, I know the truth, since the essence of being is to be. In fact, we hold that to know what being is, is to know the truth. But our objector says, "You only think you know what being is; but this may be an illusion." In answer to this, let us observe that the knowledge of what being is, is the simple conception of being, and not an affirmation of any subsistent being. When this is considered, is it possible to doubt whether we have the conception of being or not, without having that conception? Before we can doubt whether we have the conception of being, we must have the very conception about which we are doubting. In the same way, before we can believe that we have the conception of being, we must have the conception to which that belief refers. The illusion in question is, therefore, not possible, since we cannot assert that the conception of being is illusory, without having the conception in question. The nature of simple conceptions is such that we either have them or have them not. If we have them not, we cannot believe that we have them, since believing we have them and actually having them are one and the same thing.

We cannot say that *any* concept, as such, is illusory. Before we can say so, we must have the concept, and to have a concept is all that is necessary to make it a true concept. It is an entirely different question whether there be anything real, that is, anything not posited by us, corresponding to such concept. Our belief that there is may be illusory; but this belief is not the concept itself, but a judgment respecting a relation of the concept, its relation to reality. Our concept of a unicorn, or a τραγέλαφος, as Aristotle's example is (*De Interp.*, i.; 16 a, 16), is a true concept, although there s nothing real corresponding to it.

59.

The impossibility of the second illusion proved.

Let us now take up the second illusion and show that it likewise cannot possibly touch our first knowledge of being. We are told, "You intuite being, but are you sure that you intuite it as it is? Might it not be in a *mode* different from that in which it appears?" This objection supposes that being has different *modes*. But for this very reason it cannot apply to the first intuition, since in it being is without modes. We repeat, therefore, that the objection lodged has no validity save in relation to our knowledge of being as invested with some particular mode. Then, indeed, we may be illuded, and being may appear to us in one mode when in truth it exists in another. How far this is possible, we shall consider when we come to speak of special cognitions having for their object determinate beings. But at present we are dealing with being as destitute of modes, of the pure, simple essence of being; illusions, therefore, which might be possible with regard to

its modes, are impossible with regard to itself. Hence I have said somewhere that the manifest and essential truth of being shines forth in its *universality*. This universality entirely destroys transcendental scepticism, which gratuitously assumes that the human mind is endowed only with restrictive and modal forms, whereas, in fact, it has but one universal form without any modes at all. Modes, indeed, have no existence save in the world of reality. It follows directly from this that those who hold being in its universality and simplicity to be a subjective product, that is, a product of the subject man (§ 36), make an assumption not only gratuitous, but plainly false and contradictory, inasmuch as man himself is only a limited, modal, and contingent realization of the essence of being.

60.

Transition from observation to the proof that observation is a valid source of knowledge.

Let us now look back and consider what we have proved. In the first place, by means of simple observation, we established the fact that the human mind knows what being is, leaving undecided the question whether observation was a reliable source of truth. This question we have now decided, and shown that observation is valid. Having found that the result of observation is the intuition of being, we were able to convince ourselves of the truth of observation itself, inasmuch as we found in intuited being that clear light of truth which excludes from our observation all possibility of deceit, error, or illusion (§ 11).

This is a strong point in Rosmini's system, the point at which he emerges from the vicious circle described under § 10, and passes from mere tentative thinking to philosophical, constructive thinking. We must be very careful to remember that being, though reached by a process of abstraction, and in reality abstract, is, nevertheless, not a mere mode or attribute of the abstracting subject, but an objective entity and the very essence of objectivity. In modern times we are wont to confound abstract with subjective, and therefore to imagine that the nature of every abstraction depends upon the nature of the subject. This is utterly false. Our sensations, indeed, are purely subjective, but our concepts of them are purely objective, and could not be thought correctly, even by God, otherwise than they are thought by us.

61.

Error impossible in ideas generic and specific.

The same arguments by which we have answered the sceptical objections of the transcendental idealist and shown that the simple conception of being cannot, in any degree, be illusory, are equally valid for special concepts or ideas. If, indeed, there be error in these, it must lie either in the undetermined being which forms their common basis, or else in the particular modes under which they present limited being to us. But we have already seen that in undetermined being there is no possibility of error. It now remains to be seen whether error can occur in the modes of these same concepts. Now, what do we mean when we say that there is error in the modes of being? We mean that a being appears to us in one mode, when, in truth, it exists in another. The possibility of error, therefore, arises from the

fact that the same being cannot exist in more than one mode at the same time, and that if we attribute to it another mode than that in which it is, this other mode is not, and therefore we have made a false judgment, an error. Such false judgments we make frequently in reference to real beings, which are limited to a single mode. For example, I may make the false judgment that a given being is a man, when it is an animal or a bush; I am in error because I attribute to it a mode which does not belong to it. But, if I am dealing not with real beings, but with purely ideal being, the conditions of error are altogether wanting. Inasmuch as ideal being is not limited to a single mode, but has potentially all modes, it may be realized in all modes. Therefore, whatever mode of ideal being I may conceive, it is free from error, since it must always be one of its modes. These modes of ideal being are concepts, specific or generic ideas; hence all specific and generic ideas are absolutely free from error. The ancients, therefore, were right when they taught that error can never occur in ideas, but only in judgments, and that the knowledge, so called, that comes from simple intuition, is entirely free from error. For this reason, moreover, we say that ideas are exemplary truths, and that things (real beings) receive their truth from their conformity to ideas. If, for example, I judge that a certain being is a horse, and it is a horse, we say that it is a real horse, meaning thereby that it corresponds to the idea of horse, to that mode which I attribute to it and whereby I judge it.

Ideas are the exemplary truths of things.

62.

But when we say that no error can occur in simple ideas, we do not mean to extend this assertion to the *relation of ideas.* In these, indeed, there may be error, inasmuch as they are affirmed by means of a judgment, which has the possibility of being false as well as true. Thus, for example, I am in error if I judge that one idea is contained in another when it is not—that two, let us say, goes into five twice without a remainder. In a word, there can be no error where there is no judgment. Simple intuition does not admit error.

There can be no error without a judgment.

Aristotle very correctly says, "Ἐν οἷς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθές, σύνθεσίς τις ἤδη νοημάτων ὥσπερ ἓν ὄντων" (*De Animâ*, iii. 6, 1 ; 430 a, 27 sq). He affirms, on the contrary, that "Ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων νόησις ἐν τούτοις περὶ ἃ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ψεῦδος" (*Ibid.*, 26 sq.)

63.

It does not follow from this that error is possible in every judgment. On the contrary, there are judgments in which error is absolutely impossible. For example, after I have discovered that in the intuition of being, whether universal or special, no error is possible, I may express this in the form of a judgment, and say, In ideas there is no error. In so doing, I form a judgment absolutely free from error, for the simple reason that what I express in it is free from error. In

There are judgments absolutely free from error.

the same way, all judgments which express only what the mind intuites are free from error; for example, these two: The object of knowledge is being; Being and not-being, as predicated of the same thing, at the same time, is not an object of cognition. These propositions, these judgments, express only what the intuition of being shows us. The first expresses the fact that being is the essential object, the form, of the intelligence; the second, that if being, the object of the intelligence, be removed, it cannot still be present. Here also the simple intuition of being shows itself to be the necessary condition of knowing.

"Although the idea of being is possessed in the way of simple intuition without *subjective affirmation*, yet there is in it implicitly an *objective judgment*. This being the origin of all judgments, we must turn back upon it, in order to see how this *implicit* judgment is developed by man, and how it renders itself explicit.

"The word *being* expresses an act,* the absolutely first act. An act may be conceived and expressed in two ways: (1) as an act which is seen taking place; (2) as an act which takes place. In the former way, that is, as *seen* by the mind, it is expressed by nouns or the infinitives of verbs, which are also nouns; such is the infinitive mode, TO BE.† In the second way, that is, as an act taking place, without the relation of seen, it is expressed by that inflexion which the grammarians call the third person singular, present tense of the verb, as, for example, when

* Act, *actus*, ἐνέργεια, entirely different from action, *actio*, πρᾶξις. The distinction belongs to Aristotle.

† This is the literal translation. In English, instead of the infinitive, used in Greek, Latin, German, and the Romance languages, we employ more frequently the verbal noun ending in *ing* (A.S. *ing*, entirely different from the participle, which ended in *and*).

we say IS. The two modes of conceiving, expressed by the two forms TO BE [English, *being*] and IS, are different concepts of the same act, and are distinguished because they express the same act in two relations: *first*, to the person who is able to see it—relation of cognizability; *second*, to the person who performs it, or to itself as performing. This is the essential and radical difference that holds between *nouns* and *verbs*. The former express acts in so far as they are, *per se*, visible; the latter, acts in so far as they are performed. Now, in the concept of an act which is seen, there is implicitly included the concept of an act which takes place, because the act which is seen is an act which is seen to be performed and posited. . . . But the act which is seen or conceived as taking place, and so expressed, is a possible judgment, as, in the case under consideration, this form IS expresses a judgment, although an incomplete one. Hence we must admit that in intuited being there is contained implicitly an objective judgment. . . . It must be observed that the judgment expressed by the word IS, when merely applied to being itself, has so much evidence and necessity, that he who sees it cannot refuse it his assent. . . . Being, therefore, contains an objective judgment, which is present to the mind as soon as we formulate it, not as seen, but as being (act). Then, in the very act of pronouncing it, we give it our assent, and this, in the logical order, is the first of assents and the origin of all others" (*Logic*, §§ 320–322, 324). "The word *being*, therefore, expresses that first act of all acts in a necessary relation to some subject which sees it; the word *is* expresses the same act purely and simply in itself. The word *being*, therefore, expresses an *object*, the word *is*, a subject, which object and subject are identical being in the two modes in which the mind apprehends and expresses it. The formula, *Being is*,* therefore, manifests a relation between subjective cognition (although the cognition is not totally subjective) and objective cognition, and this double relation permits the redoubling of being.

* Cf. Taglioretti, *Il Verbo Essere* (The Verb to Be). This pamphlet has considerable philosophic value and well deserves the attention of philologists.

Hence we derive the two primitive judgments, which implicitly contain all other self-evident judgments—

(1) Being is the object of intelligence;

(2) That which is, is.

These two self-evident judgments are called, respectively, the *principle of cognition* and the *principle of identity*. They are called principles, because all other judgments are derived from them, and receive from them the ground of their truth" (*Logic*, §§ 337, 338). "The principle of cognition may be called the *principle of being;* the principle of identity, the *principle of the order of being*" (*Ibid.*, § 343). "The *principle of identity* is the universal and supreme rule, which enables us to know what judgments are true, and what otherwise. In its application it may be expressed thus: Those judgments are true in which there exists between the subject and the predicate that mode of identity which is affirmed" (*Ibid.*, § 352).

64.

Such are the judgments expressing what is contained in an idea. These are called *principles*.

When the content of an idea is pronounced in the form of a judgment and expressed in a proposition, the idea thus expressed assumes the name of *principle*. The idea is always universal in this sense that it may be realized an indefinite number of times. (To this general rule there are exceptions, which we omit for the present.) The idea of being may be realized in all modes; generic ideas and also abstract specific ideas, in many modes. If the specific idea is not abstract but full, so as to include all the accidents of the particular being, it can be realized only in one mode, but in an indefinite number of individuals (bating said exceptions). For this reason ideas are said to be *universal*, and hence

What are principles?

also *principles are universal judgments applicable to many cases.* For example, the principle which tells us, *Being is the object of knowledge*, is true, not merely in a single act of knowledge, but in all cognitive acts without distinction. The principle of contradiction, *Being and not-being at the same time, cannot be an object of knowledge*, expresses the absurdity of all contradictory propositions. Absurdity is the unfitness of a proposition to be an object of knowledge.

Meaning of *absurd.*

"Principles," says Rosmini, "are self-evident, most universal judgments, which impart the light of truth, and hence certainty, to all those other judgments which are drawn from them, . . . and which in regard to them are called consequences" (*Logic*, § 359).

"*Absurd* is that which involves contradiction" (*New Essay*, vol. ii. § 793). "Before the *idea* of *being* can take the form of the principle of contradiction, I must have used it; I must have begun to judge and reason. I must have formed for myself a mental being, *nothing:* I must have acquired an idea of *affirmation* and *negation*, which are acts of thinking. I must have observed that negation united with affirmation forms a perfect equation with nothing. Now, however rapidly we perform these operations, judgments and ratiocinations, however naturally and immediately they may arise from the idea of being, however true it be that they are all merely the *idea of being* itself *applied*, disguised, accompanied by relations, it is always necessary that our reason move from that first state of perfect quiet, in which, like a spring, it rests in tension. But all that in us is the consequence of any non-essential, non-innate movement of the reason, is acquisition, and such, in its explicit form of judgment, is the principle of contradiction" (*Ibid.*, § 566). "The principle of contradiction simplified is as follows:—That which is (being) cannot not-be. *That which is* is the subject, *not-be* the predicate; *cannot* is the

copula which expresses the relation between the two terms. What then, in this judgment, is the relation between *being* and *not-being? Impossibility.* And we have seen what logical *impossibility* is. It is simple unthinkability, in a word, nothing. . . . Hence the principle of contradiction is merely impossibility of thinking" (*Ibid.*, § 561). This accords completely with Aristotle's famous dictum," Τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό" (*Metaphys.*, iii. 3 ; 1005 b, 19 sq.), which he holds to be the most certain of all principles ("βεβαιοτάτη τῶν ἀρχῶν") (cf. under § 15).

65.

Primitive judgments affirming that what is felt exists are free from error.

Principles, therefore, being only intuited ideas, whose objects are expressed in the form of judgments, it follows that they are as free from error as the ideas themselves. But if the ideas and principles of human knowledge are beyond the reach of error, what shall we say of the primitive synthesis, whereby we affirm the real things communicated to us in feeling? May we claim immunity from error for the perception of real things, that is, of the activity felt by us and affirmed as a being? In the perception of a real being we must distinguish two things—the affirmation of being, and the affirmation of the mode of being determined by the feeling. In the affirmation of being, considered apart from its modes, there can be no error, since there can be no error in the essence of being intuited by us. To affirm a being is to affirm the essence of being intuited, in its realization. This essence we know with an evidence which is beyond the possibility of

error, and therefore we cannot fail to recognize it when it presents itself to us as realized. We must observe, moreover, that the modes of being are determined by feeling, and not by intelligence. Now, we must carefully note that the child, in its first perceptions, does not affirm the modes of being, but simply being itself.* Being is indeed determined for it by its feelings, but it does not stop to gauge these feelings intellectively, or to determine their limits, forms, or differences. So long, therefore, as we pronounce no judgment upon the feelings which constitute the reality of beings, but accept them simply and solely as modal realizations of being, so long we do not expose ourselves to any risk of error. Those perceptions, therefore, whether made by a child or any one else, in which feeling is taken merely as the realization of being, no attention being directed to its mode or limits, are such that error is excluded from them. The judgment, therefore, which affirms the existence of real beings in general, or the realization of being as such, without adding anything with respect to modes or limitations, is absolutely free from error. It remains to be seen whether the same is true of the judgment which affirms the *determinate* mode of real beings, that is, which, on occasion of a particular feeling, affirms that one being, rather than another, subsists.

The child affirms being only, not its modes.

* "Schon dem *Kinde* wird das Nachdenken geboten. . . . Die Regel ist nichts Anderes als ein Allgemeines und diesem Allgemeinen soll das Kind das Besondere gemäss machen" (Hegel, *Encyclop.*, pt. i. § 21, Zusatz). It is needless to say that the first universal is being.

To affirm the existence of reality in general is merely to affirm that I have a feeling. Now, while I may make an incorrect identification of one present feeling with another merely remembered, I can never be in any doubt that I feel, and this fact is altogether independent of whether there be any external cause producing my feeling. I may think I am loaded down when I am merely fatigued, thus mistaking the feeling of weakness for that of weight; but this does not interfere with the fact that I have a feeling. Unless I had a feeling I could not even misinterpret it. My feeling is always equally a reality, whatever be its origin. It follows from this that the essence of reality is beyond all mistaking. One must be careful not to confound with ideal being, which is essentially indeterminate, the indeterminate concept of real being. The former is the simplest of all ideas; the latter, the vaguest of all concepts, the *individuum vagum* of the Schoolman. The *individuum vagissimum* is pure reality, completely undetermined.

66.

In perception we add the essence of being to the felt activity, but we never confound the two.

It may be said that, since we must add the essence of being to feeling, before we can affirm or know it as a being, therefore we know in feeling what is not in it. Let us observe, however, that this objection would be valid only if we affirmed that the feeling itself was the essence of being. But this we do not do. We do, indeed, add the essence of being to the felt activity in order to render it a perceptible and knowable being; but we are perfectly aware, at the same time, that the felt activity is not by itself the essence of being, but only a contingent realization or mode of it, the term of its action. The essence of being, which we add to it, is only the means

whereby we know it, the felt activity not being knowable except when seen in being (§ 31). We may cite a parallel case. We cannot perceive *accident* without perceiving it in *substance*, and yet we never mistake the one for the other: we always know perfectly that the accident is something different from the substance which we add to it in the act of perceiving it.

It would seem plain enough that the sensation of pain and the thought or concept of the same pain are two different things; in other words, that sensation is not perception. This distinction was made as early as Plotinus, who says that *αἰσθήσεις* are not *πάθη*, but are energies in relation to corporeal things and judgments in regard to spiritual ones.* It has been frequently restated, more or less perfectly, by many philosophers since his time; but no one before Rosmini clearly marked the distinguishing element. In modern times the distinction was made current mainly by Reid, who expresses it as follows:—"If . . . we attend to the act of the mind which we call perception of an external object of sense, we shall find in it these three things: *first*, some conception or notion of the object perceived; *secondly*, a strong and irresistible conviction and belief of its present existence; and, *thirdly*, that this conviction and belief are immediate, and not the effect of reasoning." "Almost all perceptions have corresponding sensations, which constantly accompany them, and, on that account, are very apt to be confounded with them. . . . When I smell a rose, there is in this operation both sensation and perception. The agreeable odour I feel, considered by itself, without relation to any external object, is merely a sensation. It affects the mind in a certain way; and this affection of the mind may be conceived, without a thought of the rose or any other object. This sensation can be nothing else than it is

* *Enneads*, iii. 6, 2; in Kirchhoff's edition, xxv. 1, vol. i. p. 206.

felt to be. Its very essence consists in being felt; and when it is not felt, it is not. There is no difference between the sensation and the feeling of it; they are one and the same thing. . . . Let us next attend to the perception which we have in smelling a rose. Perception has always an external object; and the object of my perception, in this case, is that quality in the rose which I discern by the sense of smell. Observing that the agreeable sensation is raised when the rose is near, and ceases when it is removed, I am led, by my nature, to conclude some quality to be in the rose which is the cause of this sensation. This quality in the rose is the object perceived; and that act of the mind, by which I have the conviction and belief of this quality, is what in this case I call perception."* The distinction is excellently drawn, but the ground of it is not given. We are merely told that perception has always an external object, though what this means is not explained, and that we are compelled by our nature to place our sensations in some such object. This is stating, rather than explaining, a fact. Sir William Hamilton, who, though contemporary with Rosmini, was earlier in the history of philosophy, says of Reid's distinction, "The opposition of perception and sensation is true, but it is not a statement adequate to the generality of the contrast. Perception is only a special kind of knowledge, and sensation only a special kind of feeling. . . . Now, as perception is only a special mode of knowledge, and sensation only a special mode of feeling, so the contrast of perception and sensation is only the special manifestation of a contrast, which universally divides the generic phænomena themselves. It ought, therefore, in the first place, to have been noticed that the generic phænomena of knowledge and feeling are always found coexistent and yet always distinct; and the opposition of perception and sensation should have been stated as an obtrusive, but still only a particular, example of the general law. But not only is the distinction of perception and sensation not generalized—not referred to its category by our psychologists; it is not concisely and precisely

* *Intellectual Powers*, Essay ii. ch. xvi., Collected Works, p. 310.

stated. A cognition is objective, that is, our consciousness is then relative to something different from the present state of the mind itself; a feeling, on the contrary, is subjective, that is, our consciousness is exclusively limited to the pleasure or pain experienced by the thinking subject. Cognition and feeling are always coexistent. . . . Perception proper is the consciousness, through the senses, of the qualities of an object known as different from self; sensation proper is the consciousness of the subjective affection of pleasure or pain, which accompanies that act of knowledge. Perception is thus the objective element in the complex state—the element of cognition; sensation is the subjective element—the element of feeling" (*Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. ii. pp. 98 sq.).

It will be seen from this that Sir William Hamilton had no clear notion of the distinction between perception and sensation. According to him, we should have no perception of self or its qualities, and no sensation of anything but pleasure and pain. This is plainly false, and Sir William would not have assumed such grounds of distinction, had he been able to state the true ones. This he was unable to do, because he had only a very vague and negative notion of what constitutes objectivity. Indeed, in this respect, as in many others, he is inferior to Reid. Rosmini (who had great respect for Reid, and indeed owed him much) adopted his distinction between sensation and perception, gave these terms the generality claimed by Hamilton for cognition and feeling, and showed what was the real distinction between them; viz., that, while sensation is merely a modification of the subject involving no act on its part, perception is the result of a synthetic judgment, wherein the subject, by the addition of being to sensation, objectifies the latter and so cognizes it. Thus sensation and perception are, or, at least, may be, co-extensive. It is curious that though Hamilton (1788–1856) and Rosmini (1797–1855) were contemporaries, and though the former was acquainted with Italian philosophers, and the latter with nearly all the thinkers of the Scotch school, the one seems never to have heard of the other. For Rosmini's distinction between

sensation, *sensitive perception*, and *intellective perception*, see under § 74.

67.

Judgments respecting the mode of perceived beings.

When we say that felt activity is realized being, it is plain that being must be realized in that mode which constitutes the felt activity. Therefore, if it is true that, when I pronounce a judgment on a mode of being, I merely pronounce and affirm that activity which I feel, nothing more and nothing less, it is evident that my judgment must be true. Here then I have found the condition whose fulfilment will enable me to escape error even in my judgments respecting the mode of perceived being. It is this, that I affirm simply what I feel, nothing more and nothing less. It remains to be seen whether this condition is necessarily present in all such judgments, or whether it is necessarily not present, or finally whether, though it *may* always be present, it is not necessarily so. In the first case, my judgment would be necessarily true; in the second, necessarily false; in the third, it might always be true, if I chose to proceed with fairness and caution, but might be false, if I chose to proceed otherwise. Now, it is quite obvious that I am not obliged always to say to myself exactly what I feel. I may lie to myself; I may say I feel more, or less, or otherwise than I really do. I may take one feeling for another—an internal image, for example, for an external perception. I may, in a word, deceive myself. But it is also plain that I

Condition of their validity.

Three possibilities with regard to this condition.

We may be deceived in determining the modes of perceived being, but we are not necessarily so.

am not obliged to deceive myself. Who obliges me to say I feel what I do not feel, or to say I feel more, or less, or otherwise than I feel?

"The universal principle of all application of human reason to the facts furnished by feeling is this: The known fact must form an equation with the form of the reason. Now, it is plain that, if the knowledge of the fact is equal to the form of the reason, the former being justified, the latter is so likewise and therefore certain" (*New Essay*, vol. iii. § 1169; cf. above, §§ 23, 24).

According to Rosmini, all error is voluntary. "Error," he says, "occurs only in *reflection*, and only after the point at which reflection begins to be voluntary" (*New Essay*, vol. iii. § 1279). "There is error every time that, with our assent, we attribute to a subject a predicate which does not belong to it. Therefore, the point at which error occurs is the *nexus* between the predicate and the subject. We may fall into error without being able to formulate the judgment to which we give assent, and without being able to say where our error lies, because the power to do either of these things demands a reflection superior to that of the particular error into which we fall. Erroneous assents are usually due to some *imperfect reflection*. But reflection is moved by the will, either habitually and virtually,* or else actually; it is also influenced, excited, and moved by external agents. Hence the causes of error are of three kinds: *first*, those which are due to the understanding, and arise from the imperfect manner in which *reflection* operates—*disposing causes; second*, those which are due to the will, principally in its habitual state—*efficient causes; third*, those which are due to external events and circumstances which influence the will—*exciting causes*" (*Logic*, §§ 244–246). "The judgment . . . may be irresistibly seduced. This does not mean that, when the truth stands before our minds, we may be obliged to mistake it, but

* Perhaps better, from a habit or virtue. In Aristotle's language, "διὰ συνήθειαν ἀπὸ ἕξεώς" (*Rhet.*, i. 1; 1354 a, 7).

that we may fall into error from the destruction or confusion of our vision. . . . Error is, in the last analysis, always ignorance: he who errs must always first have been subject to some confusion of ideas and mental operations; finally, he who errs does not properly judge, but prejudges —concludes before he has confronted the two terms of the judgment and perceived their relation" (*Anthropology*, § 738).

68.

We have a faculty for affirming exactly what we feel, and this faculty is only another function of the faculty whereby we affirm being apart from its modes.

If I had never experienced but one feeling, it would be impossible for me to imagine another, or in any way to alter the one I had. Hence I have in me the faculty of affirming feeling as I feel it: this is the faculty with which nature endows me. If I deceive myself, it is because I do not make proper use of this natural faculty, but call in another to disturb and confuse it. I need be in no doubt that I possess this faculty of attesting to myself exactly what I feel, if I reflect that this faculty is but a new use, a new function, of a faculty which I previously recognized as infallible—the faculty whereby I affirm being apart from its modes. To affirm being is to recognize the identity between feeling and the essence of being (§§ 23, 24); therefore, inasmuch as being is realized in every, even the smallest, activity of feeling, I may in every one affirm it with infallible certitude. But when I affirm being in *all* the activities of a feeling, I affirm the entire mode of the feeling, neither more nor less. If this be true, I possess a faculty which enables me to affirm with certainty even the modes of being.

This faculty is infallible, and, if I deceive myself, my error must arise not from this faculty, but from another which I substitute for it, and which for the present I shall call simply Faculty of Error. Inasmuch, then, as the judgments which I make with regard to the modes of being which I perceive are neither necessarily true nor necessarily false, it follows that the error in question is one that may be avoided, but also one that may be incurred.

Deception arises not from this faculty, but from the faculty of error, which I allow to disturb it.

"When we give our assent, moved by a false ground, then we give it by an act of will, since we act in virtue of a supposed ground (*regione opinata*). But the false ground must have been accepted as true, either by means of a blind, instinctive assent, or through an act of free will, which declared the true false and the false true. In this latter case, in which free will declares a false ground true, that is, gives a false assent, this false assent is given from a motive of interest, which does not prove the truth of that ground. . . . This free will, which, instead of following the ground presented by the intelligence, creates one (a false one) of its own, by putting itself in the place of intelligence, is the *faculty of error*. The force of this faculty of error is such that no limits can be assigned to it; and the history of humanity shows that, under certain conditions, it goes so far as to give assent to the most strange and incredible things, and to deny it to the most credible and certain" (*Logic*, §§ 139, 140; cf. § 288).

St. Thomas, speaking of faith or belief, as distinguished from the other acts of intelligence, says, "Sed actus qui est credere, habet firmam adhæsionem ad unam partem, in quo convenit credens cum sciente et intelligente; et tamen ejus cognitio non est perfecta per manifestam visionem, in quo convenit cum dubitante suspicante et opinante: et sic proprium est credentis, ut cum assensu cogitet. Propter hoc distinguitur iste actus qui est credere ab omnibus ac-

tibus intellectus, qui sunt circum verum et falsum. . . . Intellectus credentis determinatur ad unum, non per rationem, sed per voluntatem" (*Sum. Theol.*, ii.[2], q. 2, art. 1). "Voluntas movet intellectum et alias vires animæ in finem; et secundum hoc ponitur actus fidei *credere in Deum*" (*Ibid.*, art. 2).

69.

The error possible in the perception of real being.

May such error, then, always be avoided? Yes, provided we are willing to use the necessary precautions; but, before speaking of these, let us make one observation. The error in question does not occur properly in the perception of real being. The perception of real being takes place as soon as, on occasion of a feeling, we have affirmed it. Then comes *reflection*, and undertakes to determine and pronounce the exact mode and extent of the perceived being. But, in order to do this, it is obliged not only to fix its attention upon the feeling in all its parts, but also to compare it with other feelings and other beings. Thus, the *perception* of real beings is infallible; and error enters only where *reflection upon perception* begins. The broader, higher, and more complicated the reflection, the greater, of course, are the chances of error. I have said that, in order to determine the mode and degree of a feeling, we are obliged not only to consider carefully the feeling itself, but also to compare it with other feelings and other beings previously perceived. The reason of this is, that the *measure* with which such judgments deal is never absolute,

Perception is followed by reflection, which tries to determine the exact mode of the perceived being.

Error begins with reflection and keeps pace with the complication and extent of it.

but always relative. If we perceived but one quantity, and had no other to compare it with, we should never be able to pronounce any judgment regarding it, or even to invent a name for it. If, therefore, we entirely exclude reflection, which always tends to measure feeling by comparison, we may readily conceive a kind of observation or intellectual attention which should lay hold of a feeling without pronouncing anything in regard to it beyond the simple act of perception. The judgment in this case would be as infallible as the perception itself, of which, indeed, it is but a part. The perception, then, has two forms, which, if we choose, we may designate thus: (1) perception which pronounces the existence of a real being determined by feeling, and nothing more; (2) perception which pronounces the presence of a real being and of the feeling which determines it, without referring it to any other feeling.

Since all error lies in reflection, that is, in the analysis of what unerring nature presents to the mind, it is important to know exactly what reflection is. "Reflection," says Rosmini, "is a *voluntary attention* directed to our conceptions, an attention governed by an aim, which aim presupposes an intellectual being, capable of knowing such aim, and so of proposing it to himself. By reflection, therefore, ideas of relation are formed, and ideas grouped (synthesis) or segregated (analysis). And when we use reflection to analyze an idea and to separate what is common in it from what is proper, then we perform that operation which is called *abstraction.* All these are functions of reflection" (*New Essay*, vol. ii. §§ 488, 489; cf.

§ 511, n.). "Reflection adds *light* and perception to human knowledge. Hence, while philosophic science has, on the one hand, the disadvantage of being very liable to error, it has, on the other, the advantage of being furnished with a light and a perception immensely superior to those of popular knowing, if it arrives at truth. Reflection . . . is moved by instinct and by will, but we may say simply by will, because this always co-operates, at least, in the way of habits or negatively. Hence the will, right or wrong, guides reflection to error or to truth" (*Ibid.*, vol. iii. § 1373; cf. *Logic*, §§ 998, 999).

70.

Perception infallible. Reflection may be rendered so by Logic.

In demonstrating that we have an infallible faculty of perception, we have disposed of the sceptics. In reflection, indeed, there is the possibility of error, inasmuch as it is veracious or mendacious according to the use we make of it; but Logic was invented for the very purpose of showing us how to use it, so that it might lead us to truth, and show us how to recognize and avoid error.

The place of Logic in a system of science is shown in the following passage:—"As being, which is the term of intelligences, has three modes—*reality*, *intelligibility*, and *morality* [see § 166], so also the intelligent subject has three modes of uniting itself to being. It may unite itself as a real with a real, as an intelligent with an intelligible, or as a being endowed with will with an object willed. . . . The real union forms the subject of a *Physiology* of the soul, which is a part of *Anthropology*. The spiritual union forms the subject of the *Moral and Eudæmonistic Sciences*. The union of the intelligent with the intelligible is the subject of *Ideology* and *Logic*. Ideology treats of the

union of the human spirit with intelligible being under the forms of idea and concept, and hence deals with the nature of idea and concept. And since there is a first idea, which is being itself in its *ideal form*, Ideology shows where evidence, and hence, where the supreme criterion, lies. Hence in Ideology is contained the germ of Logic, which teaches in what way the human spirit, in possession of the idea, may still more closely unite itself with intelligible being, that is, with truth, by means of the development of that being, and how it may avoid errors on the way" (*Logic*, § 1099). "The mediator, so to speak, between pure and applied science is Logic" (*New Essay*, vol. iii. § 1464; cf. above, under § 52).

71.

Error is always involuntary. Reflection does not, save accidentally, produce error.

Let us observe here that error always depends upon the will, and is, for that reason, never the product of the mere faculties of cognition. Reflection never gives birth to error of itself, but always because we make it say what it does not say. Indeed, the original objects of reflection are perceptions, which, as we saw, cannot contain error. This first reflection merely tells us what is contained in one or more perceptions; it merely analyzes and recomposes. But if the reflection said that the perceptions contained what they did not contain, it would not then, properly speaking, be reflection, since it would not reflect upon perceptions; it would be another power simulating reflection—it would be a liar saying that reflection asserted what it did not assert. This liar is, of course, ourselves. We have the faculty of affirming what reason does not tell us. This is the

The faculty of conviction does not always depend, as it should, on that of reasoning. Hence error.

Various causes which produce conviction in spite of reasoning.

faculty of *persuasion*, which must be clearly distinguished from the faculty of *reasoning*. Reasoning is and ought to be a means of persuasion. But persuasion is likewise formed independently of it. We often have an inner persuasion that there is reasoning when there is not—that reasoning says something which it does not say. Our persuasion, assent and judgment are not always due to reason, but sometimes to instinct, habit, prejudice, affection, passion. Thus error insinuates itself into rational beings, not because they are rational (if they were purely rational, they would be incapable of error), but because, besides the faculty of reason, they have the faculty of judging arbitrarily. For this reason, we say that it is the nature of error to be voluntary. It does not follow from this that error is always sinful or culpable ; it does, however, always partake of the moral characteristics of the causes which produced it.

Error, though always voluntary, is not always culpable.

On the nature of persuasion, see under § 5. Error Rosmini defines as "a reflection in which the understanding, turning back upon what it has cognized, voluntarily denies its assent to the same, and inwardly affirms that it has learnt something else than what it actually has learnt" (*New Essay*, vol. iii. § 1285). He elsewhere calls it "a consequence which does not result from the premises" (*Ibid.*, § 1293). "The occasional causes of error," he says, "are two : *first*, the *similarity* which the false has to the true ; and, *second*, the inclination of the will to give assent to that which resembles the truth, because it suits the inclination itself" (*Ibid.*, § 1290).

72.

Three kinds of remedies against error, corresponding to its three sources.

It is the province of Logic to enumerate the occasions and causes of error, and to show how they may be avoided. It is clear that, in order to avoid culpable errors, we must have recourse to moral preventives; we must heal the disordered will, when it leads the faculty of conviction astray to its own culpable ends. The physical causes of error, morbid instincts, disorder of imagination, etc., must be removed by physical remedies. Lastly, if error proceeds from precipitancy or imprudence, we must meet it by prudential measures, by logical rules precisely expressed.

73.

Sophistic.

Logic does not content itself with merely indicating the various ways in which the causes of error may be removed, but likewise shows how errors may be detected and corrected after they are committed. The characteristics of error are very numerous. One class of these is to be found in the verbal expression of reasoning, and the branch of Logic which points out such symptoms of error is called *Sophistic* [σοφιστική].

"Sophisms," says Rosmini, "are apparent arguments. They imitate the form of argumentation; but, by erring in some essential part of it, they fail to draw any cogent or true conclusion. . . . Sophisms are divisible into three classes: *first*, those which have their foundation in the

falsity of the matter, that is, of the propositions which form the premises of the syllogism; *second*, those which sin against the form of the syllogism; and, *third*, those whose falsity results not so much from the particular argumentation as from the intent of the dispute" (*Logic*, § 710). Rosmini devotes a section of his Logic to a consideration of the various forms of sophism, Book ii. sect. iii. pp. 281–304 His definition of Sophistic corresponds closely with that given by Aristotle: "Εστι γὰρ ἡ σοφιστικὴ φαινομένη σοφία οὖσα δ' οὔ, καὶ ὁ σοφιστὴς χρηματιστὴς ἀπὸ φαινομένης σοφίας ἀλλ' οὐκ οὔσης" (*Top.*, ix. 1; 165a, 21 sqq.).

74.

More on perception.

But let us return to perception, the solid basis of all knowledge in so far as it has real beings for its object.

Any felt activity is sufficient to make the intelligent mind affirm that a real being subsists. Activity (felt) and reality are the same thing. Reality is a form of being, not being itself. The latter is added in the act of perception. The first felt activities which rouse our faculty of judgment and make us affirm the subsistence of certain beings are corporeal feelings (*sensioni*). If we analyze these feelings, we find in each of them three activities: *first*, the activity which modifies us without our wills, and toward which we are passive; *second*, the sensation which is the effect of that activity; and, *third*, ourselves who are modified. At first, indeed, the attention of our intelligence, instead of dividing itself equally between these three, concentrates itself upon the first, so that our first affirmation is that there are external bodies.

Analysis of corporeal sensations.

When we affirm the existence of external bodies, there is in our sensation something more than the external bodies, that is, than the agent which modifies us; nevertheless we do not advert to it or become aware of it. And here we must observe the law of mental attention. *Intellectual attention* is the force which directs our understanding. This force is characterized by having the power of applying the understanding to any object it chooses, of restricting it to a single object or to one part of a feeling, and of affirming one object at a time, to the exclusion of all the rest. We must not, however, suppose that, when attention directs and applies the understanding to a sphere more or less restricted, it proceeds by mere chance. On the contrary, it follows certain fixed laws, imposed upon it, for the most part, by the nature of being. This, however, is not the place to speak of these laws. It is enough to give prominence to the fact that, in virtue of this faculty, perception limits itself to a single object, however many there may be even necessarily connected with it. The necessary *nexus* of two objects does not enter into the perception, or even into that concept of the being which is immediately derived from perception. Thus, when I affirm the existence of an external body and thereby perceive it, I do not necessarily, with the same perception, affirm either myself or the act of perception. Fichte is therefore in error when he says that we perceive the *Ego* and the *non-Ego* contemporaneously and in the same act.

Law of intellectual attention.

The necessary *nexus* of objects does not enter into perception.

Of the three activities intellectually distinguishable in feeling (*sensione*) Rosmini would confine the term sensation to the third. "We have reserved the word *sensation*," he says, "to mark simply the sentient subject in so far as it feels, using the phrase *sensitive perception of bodies* to designate the same sensation, in so far as it is a passion [πάθος], which, as such, has necessarily a relation to something external and different from the sentient subject. Hence, *first*, *sensitive perception of bodies*, and, *second*, *intellective perception*. Now, in the case of *sensitive perception* . . . our spirits seize and envelop the bodies themselves, which is not true of *intellective perception*, except in so far as it presupposes the other as matter. . . . *Sensitive perception* is an element (the *matter*) which enters into intellective perception. *Intellective perception*, therefore, composed of matter and form, cannot be said to resemble *sensitive perception*, because the latter is not co-ordinate with the former—but subordinate to it—an element, not a copy, of it" (*New Essay*, vol. ii. § 453, nn.).

In regard to the order of perception and the fact that, in external perception, we are not obliged to perceive ourselves, Rosmini lays down three propositions, viz., "*first*, experience demonstrates that every action of a limited being has a term, either external to such being, or, at least, distinct from the beginning of the action; . . . *second*, if every fresh action of beings proceeds from within and is directed outwards, this must be true also of the action which the human intellect performs in perceiving; *third*, the term of perception is its object, and the object of perception means that which we perceive and cognize in perception." He then adds: "Hence follows the corollary that what is perceived in the act of perception is the object of the same, neither more nor less. If, indeed, we should perceive anything else besides the object of perception, this thing would at once be object by the very definition. Hence, man, the intellective being, does not, with his first perception, perceive himself, but only something else that is presented to him as object. This is confirmed by experience. Man perceives himself only by a *reflected* movement, in

which he turns back upon himself; the external world, on the contrary, he perceives with a direct perception, in which, so to speak, he leaves and forgets himself, to go out and cognize the world in which his perception terminates, and in which he becomes limited by the limitation of his object. As, therefore, the external world is not the percipient *Ego*, so the perception of the external world and that of the *Ego* are two perceptions essentially distinct; and it is impossible for a man to perceive these two objects for the first time with one and the same perception, not only because they are essentially distinct, but also because they are presented to him by two essentially different feelings—the one by an internal feeling, the other by external sensations. Whence it is that the act of perceiving in these two perceptions has a contrary direction. The act of perceiving the world goes from within outward; that of perceiving the *Ego* has a direction, so to speak, from within to within. Now, since one and the same act cannot have two contrary directions, it is absurd to say that a single first perception perceives the *Ego* and the world in one. What may have given occasion to this false belief is the confusion between *feeling* and *intellective perception*" (*New Essay*, vol. iii. §§ 1433–1436).

We have already alluded to the distinction which Rosmini draws between *term* and *object* (under §§ 15, 18). It will be well here to make it more clear by giving his own account of it. "No other faculty," he says, "except the understanding, has for its term an *object*. By *object* we understand a term seen in such a way that the seer sees neither himself nor any relation to himself (that is, as intuiting subject), and that himself . . . remains excluded and forgotten, while the term stands by itself and appears as existing in an absolute mode. It appears simply as being (*essente*), and, although it is an intuited being, nevertheless, by merely looking at it, we cannot know or say that it is intuited: in order to know this, we must perform an act of reflection upon the intuition. This is the marvellous property of the understanding, that which distinguishes it from every other faculty, and especially from that of feeling.

The faculty of feeling has for its term the felt. But the felt involves an essential relation to the sentient, so that it is impossible to conceive that the felt exists without implicitly conceiving the sentient and its act. Hence the felt is not object, but simple *term*, and the faculty of feeling has not the *essential property* of the faculty of understanding" (*Logic*, §§ 303–305). This is one of the most original, characteristic, and important distinctions in the whole of Rosmini's philosophy, and one that saves him from many ambiguities into which other philosophers have fallen. Without it, it is impossible to state the essential quality of intelligence as distinct from sensation. To hear most philosophers talk, one would suppose that sensation was capable of distinguishing between subject and object, which, if it were true, would render intelligence a superfluity. Aristotle is guilty of this confusion. He speaks of the *objects* of sense as well as of the objects of intelligence (*πάλιν ἄν τις ἀπορήσειεν εἰ τὰ ἀντικείμενα πρότερα τούτων ζητητέον, οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ καὶ τὸ νοητὸν τοῦ νοητικοῦ.*" *De An.* i. 1, 7 ; 402 b, 14 sqq.). The same confusion is the source of all the errors of Kant. This philosopher says, "The faculty (receptivity) of receiving representations in the way in which we are affected by objects is called sense (*Sinnlichkeit*). By means of the senses, therefore, objects are given to us, and it alone furnishes us with intuitions ; by the understanding they are thought, and from it spring *concepts*" (*Kritik der reinen Vern.*, pt. i. § 1). Just as if things were objects before they were thought or conceived! It is needless to say that the same confusion runs through nearly all modern philosophy.

75.

Source of Fichte's error, confusion between feeling and perception.

Whence arises Fichte's error? From not having carefully distinguished what takes place in *feeling* from what takes place in *intellective perception*. It is most true that in our sensation

there is not only the external agent (the outer world), but also the limitation and modification of ourselves. This is the nature of corporeal feeling, always double, made up of that which feels and that which is felt. But feeling and intellective perception are different in nature. Notwithstanding that two beings concur in feeling, perception limits itself to one of them at a time. It is by this means that it distinguishes the one from the other. Perception terminates in what it affirms; when it affirms the external world it terminates in that. If the case were otherwise, it would confound the external world with itself, instead of separating the two, as it does. I say *separate*, and not *distinguish*. In order to separate the external world, it is enough to have perceived it and nothing else, whereas in order to distinguish it we must negate ourselves, which implies that we must have perceived ourselves, since we cannot negate what we do not know. And it was nothing else but the misuse of the word *distinguish* that rendered Fichte's sophism plausible. The truth is that, when we perceive one thing, entirely ignoring all the rest, it is already thereby separated from all the others, without our being obliged positively to negate them or distinguish them from it. Fichte's error, therefore, arose from a confusion between feeling and sense-perception—another error to be laid at the door of sensism.

Perception separates, reflection distinguishes, its object from others.

"Fichte, a disciple of Kant's," says Rosmini, "undertook to evolve everything from the subject. . . . Kant had divided the activity of the spirit into so many forms or

partial activities. He had even admitted passivity in thought (perhaps without observing that he did so), and had excluded from it *noïmena*, things as they are in themselves. Fichte concentrated anew the action of thought, considered it in its unity, and propounded the doctrine that everything was pure activity. In this system the activity of the *Ego* was the beginning, the middle, and the end of the philosophy which was called *Transcendental Idealism*. The *Ego*, according to Fichte, posits itself, which is equivalent to, creates itself. But this first act, which the *Ego* performs in positing itself, though simple, is, nevertheless, complex. The *Ego* does not posit itself without positing, in opposition to itself, the *non-Ego*. This identical act, which renders it conscious of itself, is that which renders it conscious of the external world and the things outside of itself, collected under the designation of *non-Ego*, or, to speak more correctly, the act which renders it conscious of something different from itself renders it also conscious of itself. Now, to be self-conscious, in this system, is the same thing as to be. Before being conscious, therefore, the *Ego* is not, since the essence of the *Ego* is to be conscious. The *Ego*, therefore, by the act of its own consciousness, posits, creates itself.* But the act of its own consciousness, which constitutes the *Ego*, cannot, according, to Fichte, take place without the act whereby the external world, or the *other* of the subject *Ego*, that is, the *non-Ego*, is known. Hence in the first act of the *Ego*, in that first act in which the *Ego* feels itself, it also feels, or, to use Fichte's expression, thinks, the eternal world. All that man knows is the *Ego* and the *non-Ego*. Now, the *non-Ego* does not exist before the *Ego*, but at the same time with it. . . . 'The act of my spirit,' said Fichte, justly, 'is anterior to the fact of consciousness. We must not, therefore, set out with the fact of conscious-

* In a note to this, Rosmini says, "Fichte's error here consists in not having observed that the first act whereby the *Ego* exists, and, in general, the first act whereby anything exists, though an act of the thing itself, is nevertheless an act created by a cause antecedent to the thing." It is almost incredible nowadays, but Fichte actually says, "The *Ego* originally absolutely posits its own being" (*Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre*, Leipzig, 1794, p. 13. On page 11 may be found some of the most puerile logical fallacies on record).

ness, but with the activity of the thought, which returns upon itself, that is, upon its own consciousness.' . . . But here there is a manifest ambiguity. The point of departure of the reasoning and the point of departure of the human spirit are two different things.* Reasoning cannot set out from anything but the fact of consciousness, because reasoning, especially philosophic reasoning, sets out, not from what a man knows, but from what he observes or knows that he knows. Now, the chronological order of *observations* or reflections . . . is the inverse of that of *direct consciousness*.† Man, therefore, reflects first on the fact of his own consciousness, and then on the act by which he reflects: hence this reflexive act of the spirit is observed after, although it exists before, the observance of the act of consciousness. The first thing, therefore, observed by the philosopher who meditates on himself is the fact of consciousness; this, therefore, is the point of departure in reasoning. But afterwards the philosopher asks himself, 'How did I observe the fact of my own consciousness?' Then he replies to himself, 'By an act of reflection on it.' This act of reflection, therefore, is a point of departure in thought higher than the fact of consciousness known by reflection.

"Be it observed, I have said, 'a point of departure in *thought*,' not 'a point of departure in the *spirit*.' This distinction escaped Fichte's notice. He set out from the reflection of the thought upon itself, as the first radical act whereby all the acts of the human spirit may be explained. Hence he reduced everything to thought and even confounded thought and feeling, . . . which shows that even in the bowels of Transcendental Idealism sensism has laid its egg. If Fichte had not made this confusion, he would not have used this formula to indicate the point of departure of the human spirit, 'the activity of thought which reflects upon itself,' but would have used this other, 'the activity of thought which falls upon

* See under § 9, where four points of departure are distinguished.

† Cf. Aristotle, "οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν πρότερον τῇ φύσει καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς πρότερον, οὐδὲ γνωριμώτερον καὶ ἡμῖν γνωριμώτερον." (*Anal. Post.*, i. 1; 71 b, 34 sq.).

feeling,' and in this latter it would have been impossible for him to place the point of departure of the spirit, because he would at once have observed that feeling must precede *the act of thought* which observes it. On the other hand, 'the thought which reflects upon itself,' as the point of departure of the human spirit, involves a contradiction in terms, inasmuch as it makes the thought which reflects identical with the thought upon which the reflection is made. It, therefore, concentrates and confounds the active and the passive in a single essence, even making the passive active and the active passive, which is a clear contradiction. . . .

"If Fichte had been properly acquainted with the act of reflection, he would have seen that no act really returns upon itself, but always upon a previous act, which becomes its object. Let us consider an act of reflection. This returns upon another act, which may likewise be an act of reflection, in which case this latter is likewise reflected upon another act, and so on. Finally, however, we must come to an act of first reflection, and this must reflect itself upon a *direct* act of thought, otherwise we should go on *ad infinitum*, which is absurd. Now, the direct act of thought is *intuition* and *perception*. Perception is an act of thought in which are united two affections: *first*, corporeal sensation; *second*, the intuition of universal being. Previously, therefore, to any reflection, there exist *feeling* and *intuition*, which are the foundation of everything; in other words, *first*, an intellective intuition; *second*, a corporeal sensation. And these two affections, united by the single activity of the spirit, form the most simple perception, and upon this the *reflection* of thought begins to act. But this analysis was omitted by Fichte, and herein, in my opinion, lies the source of his errors.

"When I perform an act with my thought, with this act I know the object in which my act terminates; but the act itself remains unknown to me. In order that I may know it, I must perform a second reflex act on the first act, so that the latter may become an object; but then, in the same way, the second reflex act remains unknown to me.

If I reflect on the second act, I perform a third act, enabling me to know the second, which makes itself the object of the third, but not to know itself; and in this way we may go on as long as we choose, so that we may lay down, as the law of our manner of knowing, this great canon: Every act of our understanding makes us know the object in which it terminates, but no act makes us know itself.* Seeing that this is the case, we are met with the question: Are we not, then, *conscious* in the act by which we know an object? We must observe that this question differs from this other: In the act in which we know an object have we a feeling? To have *consciousness* is to have knowledge of an act as ours, that is, of our act, and, at the same time, of ourselves as performing it. And this knowledge we cannot have save through another act of reflection. Feeling, on the contrary, does not require any operation on our part; but feeling is blind. Most men, however, find it impossible to persuade themselves that we may perform an act without even having a consciousness of it.† The reason why most men think in this way is, that

* It follows from this that the first act of knowledge, viz., intuition, is not knowledge, that is, does not know itself.

† Sir W. Hamilton says, "An act of knowledge may be expressed by the formula *I know*, an act of consciousness by the formula *I know that I know;* but as it is impossible for us to know without at the same time knowing that we know; so it is impossible to know that we know without our actually knowing." That the former of these acts is impossible is clearly not true. Sir William overlooked the fact that to know, and to know that we know, are two distinct and separate acts. Children know very many things; but so long as they do not clearly know what knowing is, they cannot know that they know. Much confusion has arisen from confounding consciousness of knowledge with knowledge itself. Herbert Spencer, who is fond of confounding the different acts of the mind, says, in so many words, "To be conscious is to think; to think is to put together impressions and ideas" (*Principles of Psychology*, vol. ii. ch. xxvi. § 377). Now, if to think be merely to put together impressions and ideas, it is plain that the impressions and ideas themselves are not thought, and that we are not conscious of them. Thinking consciousness, therefore, is the putting together of things that are unknown. In this view, consciousness would be a mere mechanical force acting blindly, and ideas having an existence outside of it and independent of it, would become real entities—in a word, Platonic ideas. But any one who has ever seriously reflected upon mental processes knows that all consciousness takes the form of judgment, and that judgment is the analysis of a synthesis formed previously in thought but outside of consciousness. Consciousness, therefore, is only one

when we perform an act with our minds (spirit), we can at once reflect on it and observe it, or, at least, we think we can, and this act which we perform in reflecting and observing we are not aware of. Hence we have a tendency to believe that this act of our minds is observed and known by itself, and not by an act superadded by us ; whereas the truth is that, in itself, it is unknown and unobserved, although at the moment we can, or think we can, at our pleasure, render it known to us by reflecting on it, and so observe it. Now, Fichte knew most clearly this error into which most men fall ; but, to avoid it, he ran into the opposite extreme. He was not satisfied with saying that this act of our minds was not observed and reflected on through itself, but affirmed that it did not exist at all. He, therefore, gave to the *reflection* of the mind an activity to produce it, and even tried to identify it . . . with reflection itself. We, on the other hand, affirm that every act of the mind exists even before being reflected upon and known, but only as a feeling. Hence in any act of the intelligent spirit there is an idea and there is a feeling. The object intuited is that which is illustrated and is termed *idea;* the act whereby we perceive an object in our consciousness is a blind feeling, and nothing more. Now, nothing is known without an idea. Man, therefore, so long as he has only feelings, really knows nothing, and, in particular, the condition of man prior to reflection on himself is a condition . . . which it is impossible to observe. For this reason, it seems a state of pure non-existence, whereas it is merely a state unknown to us. Hence Fichte, confounding the not-known with the non-existent, said that the *Ego,* by a reflection of its own, posited itself with the same act with which it posited the *non-Ego.* It is of no avail to say that

element in thought, one part of the process involved in it. When I think or cognize a white horse, I do not first think the white, and then the horse, and then put the two together in order to be conscious of them. I think the white horse as a whole, and, in order to be conscious of what I think, I analyze that whole into *white* and *horse,* and express the fact that I have *found them already united,* by saying, *The horse is white.* If I had to put together the two elements, it would never occur to me to express that fact by, *The horse is white.* I should say, " I have made a horse white."

the essence of the *Ego* consists in cognition or thinking, for the *Ego* is originally not a thought of itself, but a *feeling;* and by making feeling absorb thought, without noting the broad distinction between them, Fichte fell into all his strange and profound mistakes. If, indeed, the intelligent *Ego* has also an intellective feeling, it does not therewith terminate in itself, but in universal being. And this elementary thought cannot be taken for Fichte's reflection, since it has nothing reflex about it, and is the immovable and perpetual part of man. Here, however, it seems that Fichte made an approach to the truth, and caught a distant glimpse of it, when he uttered the excellent words: 'While thoughts pass, there is in man an immutable part which contemplates'" (*New Essay*, vol. iii. §§ 1388-1395).

"We must not confound the consciousness of the soul with the soul itself. Still less ought we to confound with the soul that act with which it says *I;* or, again, we must not confound the *reflection* of the soul with the soul itself. Consciousness, *Ego* pronounced, reflection, are accidents, not the substance of the soul, which, as a reality, is prior to all these its accidental modifications. The confusion of these with the soul itself is the source of all the aberrations and extravagances in which the German school lost, and still goes on losing, itself. Reinhold having proposed the principle of consciousness, Fichte reduced the soul itself to consciousness, and thus converted it into a reflection; but since reflection is only an accident, all substance disappeared from his philosophy, and left in his hand mere accidents. Hence he himself, at the end of all his reasonings, came to the conclusion that 'No being exists, but merely images; every reality is a dream, and thought is the dream of that dream.' From this labyrinth, German philosophy has never been able to extricate itself.

"Fichte began with this proposition, which contains the error indicated, 'The *Ego* posits itself.'* The proposition

* "*Das* Ich *setzt sich selbst*, und es *ist*, vermöge dieses blossen Setzens durch sich selbst; und umgekehrt: Das Ich *ist*, und es *setzt* sein Seyn, vermöge seines blossen Seyns.—Es ist zugleich das Handelnde, und das Produkt der Handlung; das Thätige, und das was durch die Thätigkeit hervorgebracht wird" (*Grundlage der gesammten Wissenchaftslehre*, p. 10). One can hardly blame Rosmini for calling such talk "delirium."

is manifestly absurd, because it supposes that the *Ego* operates before it exists. Now, certainly no being can posit, that is, create itself. He ought to have said, 'The soul posits the *Ego*,' because this proposition would signify, The soul affirms itself, and in so doing changes itself into an *Ego*, because the *Ego* is the soul affirmed by itself. Thus the *Ego* is distinguished from the soul, the *Ego* being the soul invested with that reflection whereby it affirms itself. Now, there is nothing strange in the soul's producing this reflection ; but it is passing strange that the soul should be the *Ego*, that is, the reflected soul, even before it has made the reflection in question. At the same time, since the man who philosophizes is already a fully constituted *Ego*, it is, of course, by no means easy for him to dissolve himself, so to speak, and to persuade himself that his *Ego* is compound, that it is an accidental, and not an essential, state of the soul, or, to speak more correctly, that it is the soul constituted in accidental conditions" (*Psychology*, vol. i. §§ 72–74). The definition of *Soul* is given further on (§§ 121–124). The definition of *Ego* runs thus: "The *Ego* is an active principle in a given nature, in so far as it has consciousness of itself, and pronounces the act of consciousness" (*Psychology*, vol. i. § 55 ; cf. *Anthropology*, §§ 768–805, sqq.). In order to be self-conscious, that is, to be an *Ego*, the subject must have combined the feeling of *meity* (*meità*, what the Germans call *Ichheit*) with ideal being as intuited, and then, by reflection, have analyzed the object thus formed into the judgment, "Meity is." But existent Meity is precisely what we mean by *Ego*. Of course, the act whereby the subject constitutes the *Ego*, by subsuming itself under being, is in its beginning unconscious. Its term is self-consciousness.

76.

Schelling's error in asserting that the finite

A proper understanding of the nature of perception shows also the erroneousness of the doctrine of Schelling, which has recently been

revamped and reproduced. Schelling accepted Fichte's two objects of perception, and added a third. Fichte's object of perception, though two-fold, was finite. Schelling affirmed that the finite could not be perceived without the infinite with which it was correlated. Now, Fichte attributed to *intellective perception* what, in reality, belongs to *feeling*. In like manner, Schelling attributed to *intellective perception* what belongs to *reasoning*. Neither the one nor the other understood the nature of perception, which limits itself to a simple object, without being obliged to extend itself to the other objects connected with it. Perception terminates in a finite object, without ever considering that it is finite, or that, in order to exist, it requires an infinite. It terminates in its immediate finite object, without considering that this is an effect and, therefore, could not exist without a cause. It considers it as a being, adding to it the essence of being, without ever considering that, but for this essence, it would not be. All these are subsequent reflections, reasonings, which have perception for their object indeed, but are not themselves perception.

cannot be perceived without the infinite.

Origin of this error, confusion between intellectual perception and reasoning.

Rosmini devotes a good many pages of his *New Essay* to a discussion of Schelling's system (vol. iii. §§ 1396–1407); but as it has vanished into thin air, along with many other creations of the German philosophic brain, the criticism need only be referred to.

77.

How reasoning finds the limits, contingency, etc., of perceived beings.

We have now shown that in perception we perceive one object apart from all the rest. It remains to be seen why, in spite of this, we subsequently discover from reasoning that this particular object, this reality, cannot subsist by itself, and that, if it is finite, it is necessarily conditioned by an infinite; if it is contingent, by a necessary, which is its cause, etc., etc. This happens because reflection, turning back upon the *object perceived*, compares it with the essence of being, which is the light of the mind, and, in so doing, recognizes that in that object the essence of being is not fully realized. It thereby recognizes that the subsistence of this object is conditioned by another greater being. It is clear from this that the last-mentioned German philosopher had a glimpse of a truth, without being able to state it with precision. He saw that the human mind must, from the very beginning of its reasonings, have present to it something full, complete, universal, to which, as to a type, it could refer that which is modal, incomplete, relative; otherwise it would be impossible to explain how we ever came to be aware that the world, for example, is contingent and requires a cause, that it is finite, in other words, immeasurably removed from the infinite, etc., etc. Of course, in order to know this, the mind must possess the perfect type of being to base these judgments upon. But the German philosopher was not able to distinguish

Schelling saw dimly but could not express the fact that the mind, prior to all reasonings, must have something complete and universal.

intuition from *perception*, the *ideal mode of being* from the *real mode*, the *essence of being* from its *realization*, the *ground of subsistence* from *subsistence itself*, that *which has being*, because it receives it from perception, from that *which is being*. He, accordingly, attributed to *perception* what belongs to *intuition* or else to the comparison of the *perceived* with the *intuited*, which is the work of reasoning. He concluded that the human mind naturally perceives the *absolute*, whereas it only perceives the *absolute ground*, ideal being. And inasmuch as in perception we hold beings apart, and limiting distinctions belong to the order of reality, he held that, in what he supposed to be primitive and natural perception, *Ego*, *non-Ego*, and *absolute being* were already distinguished, whereas the truth is that in ideal being there is no distinction, no limitation, no mode. It is being, in one unlimited form. In spite of this, ideal being is sufficient for the mind, not only because it renders possible the perception of particular things, but also because it enables it by reasoning to know the limits of the objects of perception and the necessity of the infinite and the absolute.

The error which Rosmini here criticizes is the one with which his own system has most frequently been charged, viz., that it makes the absolute the form of human reason, and thereby results in pure pantheism. There is certainly no error against which Rosmini has more carefully and completely guarded himself. Not only has he repeatedly declared that pantheism is an erroneous and absurd system (*Theos.*, vol. i. § 457 ; *New Essay*, vol. iii. § 1178, n. 3) ; but

he has taken the utmost care that his own system shall not lead to it. He admits, indeed, that his *ideal being* is an appurtenance (*appartenenza*) of the Absolute Being (*Theos.*, vol. i. § 455, etc., etc.), and that if this being "were to put forth its own activity and so complete and terminate itself, we should see God;" but he adds, "until this happen, and so long as we see as imperfectly as we naturally do this being, this first activity which hides from us its first term, we can only say, in the admirable words of St. Augustine, that in this life, 'certa, quamvis adhuc tenuissima forma cognitionis attingimus Deum'"* (*New Essay*, vol. iii. § 1178). Rosmini writes a whole article to show that "The self-manifest being, communicated to man, is not God." † In another place he says, "Object being, thinkable being, self-intelligible being, are expressions almost synonymous. Hence the SELF-INTELLIGIBLE is merely ideal being; real being is INTELLIGIBLE BY PARTICIPATION [μεθέξει]. To this principle there is a single exception, and even it is not properly an exception: God, even in his reality, is self-intelligible. Now, this happens because in his ideal essence subsistence is included; whence it cannot happen that subsistence or reality is ever in God disunited from ideality. It is, therefore, a most grave and pernicious error to say that God is an idea or even THE IDEA, a word which, in the language of men, does not mean reality, whereas God is MOST REAL. And why do men use this word *idea?* Why did they invent this word *ideal* in opposition to *real?* Because, not having, by nature, the vision of the most real being, they have no experience of the necessary *nexus* between ideal being and complete real being, and, therefore,

* *De libero Arbitrio*, ii. 15.

† *Theosophy*, vol. iv. ch. vi. art. 1, §§ 26–30. In a note to this article, Rosmini replies, in a very subtle way, to the objections urged against his system, as pantheistic, by Vincenzo Gioberti, and completely disposes of them. In spite of this, a Jesuit has recently repeated, almost in the very same words, the same objections, and drawn from them the desired conclusion, namely, that Rosmini is a pantheist (*La Reforma della Filosofia promossa dall' Enciclica Aeterni Patris di SS. Leone Papa XIII.*, Commentario per Giovanni Maria Cornoldi. Bologna, 1880). If the philosophy of Rosmini must be condemned, would it not be respectable to find at least some charge against it which he has not answered? He cannot now answer any before any earthly tribunal.

can only infer the existence of such a *nexus* by means of reasoning. Hence the invention of the word idea and its constant use suffice to overthrow the error of those who attribute to man the vision of God himself in this present life" (*Psychology*, vol. ii. § 1343).

When Rosmini calls ideal being an "appurtenance of God," or, as he elsewhere does, "something of the Absolute Being," * he does not go so far as Albertus Magnus, who says, "The *active intellect*, which is light, is a certain image and similitude of the first cause, that is, of God, by virtue of which the soul brings intelligibles (*intellecta*) to the intellectual light, abstracting the intelligible forms from all the obscurity caused by material appendages, and placing them in its own simple being." † The same philosopher says, "So far as the soul stands under the light of the intelligence of the first cause, so far the active intellect flows therefrom." ‡ (Cf. under § 182.)

78.

Defence of the laws of perception and reasoning against the objections of sceptics.

But now we must clear up better the laws of perception and reasoning, and arm them effectually against the objections of sceptics. Let us begin with the perception of external bodies. At the moment when we become aware of a sensation which we had not before, our intellectual attention turns to the agent, to the force which modifies us,

* *Theosophy*, vol. i. § 454; cf. §§ 292 sq., 294 sq.

† "Intellectus agens, qui est lux, est imago et similitudo quædam primæ causæ, sive Dei, cujus virtute anima intellecta agit ad lumen intellectuale, abstrahens formas intellectas ab omni obumbratione ab appenditiis materialibus causata, et ponens eas in simplici esse suo" (*De Natura et Origine Animæ*, ii. tr. 15, q. 93, m. 2). The last word here is ambiguous.

‡ "Secundum quod anima stat sub luce intelligentiæ causæ primæ, sic fluit ab ea intellectus agens" (*Ibid.*, tr. 13, q. 77, m. 3). In the language of the Arabs there is nothing equivalent to the distinction between *intellectus* and *intelligentia*; but in the Latin translations of their works *intellectus* is used to mean *νοῦ δύναμις* or *possible intellect*, *intelligentia*, to mean *νοῦς ποιητικός* or *active intellect*. See Brentano, *Die Psychologie des Aristoteles*, p. 8, n. 20.

In external sensation we feel within us a force which is not ourselves. This enables us to affirm that a being exists without confounding it with ourselves.

It is very certain that we feel within us a force which is not ourselves, but is, on the contrary, opposed to us. We are passive; it is active. Here be it observed that this force enables us to affirm that there exists a being, without affirming that this being is ourselves. We are still unknown to ourselves. And if we are not prepared to admit this, let us accept it merely as a supposition. I say that, even if our intellectual attention does not fix itself at all upon ourselves, but concentrates itself upon the agent which operates in our feeling, we shall affirm that this agent is a real being, and shall not confound it with ourselves, since, even admitting that we have a feeling of ourselves, we do not, according to the supposition, fix our attention upon it. Hence it is not necessary to suppose the contrary.

Rosmini divides the objects of knowledge as follows:—(1) those which we perceive; (2) those which we represent to ourselves by *intellective imagination*. "The beings different from ourselves which we perceive are—(1) our subjective body; (2) extra-subjective body; (3) an entity made up of corporeality and spirituality." This is not the place to speak of Rosmini's theory respecting the manner in which we cognize the third class of objects, which, if not altogether bodies, are, at all events, extra-subjective; but it will be well here to make clear what he means by this last term. We have seen that the only object of intelligence is *ideal being*—that this is the very essence of objectivity, and the means by which all other things are objectified. All other beings are, therefore, subjects. They are not, however, all *one* subject. On the contrary, they are numerous, and each is external, that is, extra-subjective, to the other. All contingent reality is, therefore, either sub-

jective or extra-subjective. One subject can never directly become the object of another. In order to do so, it must be combined with ideal being and appear in the form of a concept. Nevertheless, one subject may communicate with another through feeling, that is, make itself felt within the sphere of the other's activity. "We, as subsistent, sensitive beings, are subjects united with, and in communication with, other beings, so that the other real beings exercise their action upon us, modifying our feeling, and hence the agents in us are those which we know as beings foreign to us" (*New Essay*, vol. iii. § 1188). It is thus clear that Rosmini means by extra-subjective what is usually termed objective, viz., the external world. *Extra-subjective* is, of course, a negative term, and this for the reason that, until the extra-subjective is rendered objective by union with being, it is a mere negation, a non-being.* The advantage to philosophic thought from the clear distinction between the extra-subjective and the objective is very great.

79.

Perception is the bridge between us and the external world, and the difficulties of idealism arise from considering the world apart from perception.

Now, this peculiarity of perception, that it is always limited to a single being, which therefore can never be confounded with others, enables us to explain how we know the corporeal world. The difficulties advanced by the idealists all arose from considering bodies apart from perception, from not knowing the nature of perception, and from neglecting to analyze it. Of course, if the world be looked at apart from all relation to perception, we shall never know that it exists, because (to use a famous phrase) the bridge between it and us is broken down. This bridge is perception.

* Non-being is not nothing, but the simple reality regarded as separate from being, which is its cognizability. Nothing is neither capable of being united with being, nor, as a consequence, of being cognized. Nothing is the unthinkable.

The bridge between subject and object Rosmini accounts for in this way. "The idea of universal being is the one whereby we think the thing in itself. To think a thing in itself is to think it independently of the subject, of ourselves. To think a thing as independent of ourselves is to think it as having a mode of existence different from ours (which is subjective). The idea of being, therefore, is the one which constitutes the possibility which we have of going out of ourselves, so to speak; that is, of thinking of things different from ourselves. It is, therefore, absurd to inquire, How can we go out of ourselves? or, What is the bridge which forms the connection between me and things different from me? Of course, with these metaphorical expressions, *going out* and *bridge of communication*, the question presents no clear meaning and cannot be answered, because it asks for a material or mechanical explanation of a purely spiritual fact. No one can go out of himself; between us and that which is not in us, no *bridge* will ever be found. We must, therefore, reduce the question to proper terms. If we do so, it will assume the following shape:—Man thinks of things as they are in themselves: this is a fact. Whether he deceive himself in so thinking or not, he does think that he has present the objects in themselves, that is, as objects, and not as subjects. Now, how can this be explained? We reply, By means of the idea of universal being, which is what forms man's intelligence. To have this idea means to have the power of seeing things in themselves. Man has, therefore, in a certain way, innate in himself this *bridge* of communication, if such metaphors be desired, because he perceives being in itself, and being is the common and most essential quality of all things, the quality which causes them to be what they are, independent of us and divided from us, who are subjects.* The intelligent spirit, therefore,

* In a note the author says, "*Outside of us* . . . expresses a relation of exterior things to our bodies, and means the same thing as *different from our bodies*. The question, How can we be sure of what is *outside* of us? was propounded by the philosophy of the senses. It was soon transferred to spiritual things, and, through a habit, introduced by the sensists, of applying to spiritual things metaphorical expressions derived from material things, such statements were made as, All our thoughts go out from us, etc."

from the first moment of its existence, has the capacity for thinking things as they are in themselves, and not as they are in us. It has the concept of this difference, of exteriority, or, more correctly, of the objectivity of things. It remains to be seen how it can pass from the conception of a thing in itself merely *possible* to a thing really existing in itself and not in the spirit" (*New Essay*, vol. iii. §§ 1081, 1082; cf. vol. ii. §§ 842–884).

80.

Perception yields the important ontological truth that beings, in so far as agents, may exist in each other without intermingling.

Perception, when properly studied and analyzed, yields an ontological truth of the greatest value, and one altogether unknown to the sensists, viz., that one being can enter with its action into another; that beings, in so far as they are agents, may exist in each other without mingling or confounding themselves with each other, remaining altogether distinct, by reason of the opposite relations of activity and passivity. In the perception of bodies we feel an agent which is not ourselves and toward which we are passive. This is the basis of the proof that there exists an extended being different from us, that is, body.

Rosmini's definition of body is: "Body is a force diffused in extension or space;" and of force: "Force is what produces a passion in feeling or in its extended term" (*Psychology*, vol. i. § 51). Elsewhere he says, "I designate . . . by the term *body* the subject of sensible qualities, that is, of those virtues which produce in us sensations. Hence body is the subject of extension, figure, solidity, colour, taste, etc., in so far as these qualities are found in bodies, that is, as virtues capable of producing in us the corresponding sensations. Now, these virtues or sensible qualities are the proximate causes of our sensations. We may, therefore,

define body as the proximate cause of sensations and the subject of sensible qualities. Even if it were true that bodies did not exist, still this definition expresses the idea which men have of body" (*New Essay*, vol. ii. § 667).

"Our bodies, . . . considered as associated with sentient *subjects*, have extension in common with the external bodies which are purely felt agents. The community which these two classes of bodies have in extension forms the passage from the idea of the one to the idea of the other—the bridge of communication between them. With the same act whereby we perceive the mode of existence of our own bodies, we likewise perceive the mode of existence of external bodies. This consequence is of great importance. Indeed, we have shown bodies to be made up of two elements: *first*, an action performed on us; *second*, an extension in which that action diffuses itself and terminates. Now, our bodies exert a continuous internal action upon us, that is, occasion the *fundamental feeling*,* and this effect of the agent is expanded in extension. Here, therefore, we have both the essential elements of the essence of body, so that the perception of our own bodies is not liable to doubt, and the existence of these is as certain as the fact of consciousness.

"We now come to the perception of external body. In the first place, we feel an action performed in us; but the first effect of this action is merely a modification of the fundamental feeling. By this effect alone we do not go out of ourselves; we feel only our own bodies as before, although in a new way (with an accidental sensation). We may, indeed, from this infer a cause; but this is still unknown, because thus far we have only an indeterminate action. This alone would not suffice to make us perceive a body outside of us. What more, then, is requisite? The *action* in question must be likewise *extended*. Then we shall have perceived an agent in extension, which is the notion of body. Now, how have we been able to perceive the extension of said agent? . . . We habitually feel extension, that is, the expansion of the fundamental feeling.

* See below, under § 132.

We were able, therefore, also to feel the extension of the external agent, when this agent diffuses its action in the same extension as the fundamental feeling. For this purpose it was arranged that the surface of the extension of the fundamental feeling and the surface of the extension of the external body should coincide, that is, should unite so as to form the same surface, and that in one surface we should, in a wonderful way, experience two feelings. Hence, in that surface in which the fundamental feeling diffuses itself and terminates, the action of the external body comes to exert and extend its action, so that the same consciousness testifies to us that that action comes from without, and that it is also performed in an extension which was already naturally felt by us. Thus we perceive, *first*, an external action ; *second*, the surface in which this external action operates or terminates ; and in this way we perceive the two essential properties of body, common to our own and to the external body. Hence we ascertain that there are two bodies, and that both have the same corporeal nature, although they exert upon us such different effects. In this way we see that the extra-subjective perception of bodies is based upon subjective perception. The first element of extra-subjective perception is a force which modifies us. This force we perceive in its act, along with the subjective modification of the fundamental feeling, in that species of violence which is exerted upon us. The second element is extension, an extension which we feel naturally—that, namely, of the fundamental feeling. But since this is changed into extension, through an external force applied to some point in it, we perceive this force as extended in its term. Hence . . . the criterion of the perception of external body is, in the last analysis, the perception of our own bodies" (*New Essay*, vol. ii. §§ 842–845).

81.

Our perception of ourselves is posterior to our perception of the external world.

There comes a time in which we perceive ourselves also. I am convinced that, although we are always accompanied by feeling, our intellective perception of ourselves is subsequent to our intellective perception of bodies. Be this as it may, the important thing for the philosopher to understand clearly is, that our perception of ourselves is different from our perception of bodies, and for the simple reason that we are different from bodies. One perception is not another, as truly as one being is not another, nor does the perception of a being require to establish its own identity by positively *negating* other beings. All it has to do is to affirm the being which constitutes its object, and this object excludes all others by its very nature, that is, because it is not the others. The human mind has no need to take the trouble to exclude them by a negation.

"The human subject feels materially, feels the extended, and feels, as identified with the felt extended, its own activity, which is made up of passivity and activity. The same human subject intuites being, and, in intuited being, feels indivisibly its own cognitive activity. Furthermore, the human subject, single and simple as it is, unites the felt with the understood. Through this union it sees that the *felt* exists in the *understood* as being. It sees that feeling forms an equation with the idea, that it is a realization of the intuited being of the idea, and, hence, that there is in it a sentient being or principle. The union, therefore, which man forms between feeling and being, produces for him the perception of the *sentient principle*,

without which feeling itself would remain inexplicable to him. In a similar way he discovers an intelligent principle, when, instead of applying being to his own *material feeling*, he applies it to his own *cognition*, to the intellective perception of the feeling, and to intuited being itself. Then he sees the cognition and the perception in being, equates these two terms, recognizes this cognition or perception as simply being itself realized, and hence concludes, There is a cognizant, a percipient, there is an intelligent principle; simply because there is cognition, perception, intellection. Moreover, the human subject, in uniting and equating feeling with the idea (or cognition with the idea), in recognizing that they are the same being [*ente*] under two forms, that is, the ideal form and the real form, puts forth a new activity. The activity which unites feeling and idea is neither the activity which feels the extended, nor the activity that intuites ideal being. It is a third activity, uniting and reconciling the two former. This third activity takes the felt extended, which is the product of the sentient activity, and the intuited being furnished by the intelligent activity, and puts together these two terms of the sentient and intelligent activities, making one of them, and so forming a single ideal-real being. This is what is called *intellective perception*. Now, the human subject feels also this third activity, and, in doing so, cannot help feeling that it dominates the other two. In this way it feels that these two depend upon it—that they, therefore, have a common principle. He concludes that the sentient principle and the intelligent principle are, in one and the same activity, at once sentient and intelligent. But this superior activity, in which both the sentient and the intelligent principles are grounded, is not merely *felt* by the human subject. In its turn it is also intellectively *perceived*. The human subject may likewise confront this activity with the ideal being which it possesses; may recognize that it, too, like every other entity, is already contained in ideal being, as drops of water are contained in the ocean. As soon as a man has seen this superior activity in ideal being, he has already thereby changed it into a *being*, that is, has recog-

nized it as a being. Now, it cannot be a being, except on condition of having an active subsistent principle [by the principle of substance: see below, §§ 93-97]. Man, therefore, discovers, in this activity, being, or substance, the active principle, *sentient*, *intelligent*, and *unifying*—a principle perfectly one and simple, but furnished with a triple act. On reaching this stage of the process, man has found himself; so far, however, without being aware of it. In fact, he does not yet know that that being, that substance, which he has discovered, is himself. He has not yet formed the consciousness of himself; he is not yet able to pronounce the monosyllable *I*. How is he to take this further step? we ask again. In what way shall he give himself this new mode of existence and life? How shall it happen that he will not only live, but will begin to know that he lives, to live for himself? A single step more, and he will arrive at that too. Having found that single principle which feels, understands, and reasons, he will only have to re-think the manner in which he found this single principle. When he contemplated the unifying or reasoning activity in being, and saw it therein, he performed a new act, in which he perceived the reasoning activity. Now, in that first moment in which a man observes that the act which perceives the reasoning activity is not something different from the reasoning activity itself, but an activity identical with it, in the same moment he has perceived himself, and can pronounce *I*. In truth, *I* expresses identity between the reasoning principle and the principle which pronounces it by saying *I*; that is, he who pronounces *I*, in articulating this monosyllable, testifies that he is conscious that there is an activity, and that this activity is the same that speaks, that announces itself, that is conscious of itself. He who pronounces *I*, therefore, must have reflected upon his own activity, and have found that what reflected on its own activity was not a different principle from that on which it reflected. All that now remains to be explained is the manner in which a man is able to recognize that the reflecting and speaking activity is the same as the perceiving and reasoning. This identity of principles in the

different reflections arises from the inner feeling, that is, from the feeling which man has of his own universal activity, wherein are virtually contained and identified all partial activities, and wherein it is felt that that act which gives rise to perception and reasoning is nothing other than an act, a partial application, of that first fundamental activity, from which likewise proceeds reflection upon that which is perceived and reasoned about, upon perceptions, upon reasonings, upon the reflections themselves, and that this activity is the very one which speaks and posits itself by saying *I*. Thus is generated the *Ego*. Hence we see clearly that there are—(1) a subject merely sensitive, which neither sees nor understands itself; (2) an intellective subject, even before this subject understands itself; (3) a human, that is, a sensitive-intellective subject, anterior to its consciousness of itself; and (4) we see that, when the human subject, through diverse internal operations, succeeds in gaining a consciousness of itself, it then becomes an *Ego*" (*Anthropology*, §§ 805–810).

82.

Reflection would be unable to compare perceived beings together, if it had not universal being, by means of which it knows the mode and quantity of its realization in those beings, and, hence, if they belong or not to the same species.

It is true that, after we have perceived both the corporeal world and ourselves, we may reflect upon these two perceptions, compare the object of the one with that of the other, and mark their relations. This comparison we could not make unless we had in our minds universal being, the measure of all beings. When we refer real, particular, limited being to the essence of being, its ground and principle, we understand that the former is not a complete realization of the latter; and when we refer other real, particular, limited beings to the same essence, we are able to see whether they are, or are not, realizations having the same mode and quantity as the preceding.

If, when we refer a second being to the essence of being, we see that it is a realization having the same mode and quantity as the first, we call it a being of the same species. Although it may be in all respects like the preceding, we may yet be able to see that it is a different individual, from the fact that it is the object of a second perception contemporaneous with the first. And this is the *principle of the discernibility of individuals.* If the second being were the object of the same identical perception as the first, they would not be two individuals, but one.

Principle of the discernibility of individuals.

Rosmini carefully distinguishes between the *individual* and the *idea of the individual;* but he seems to find no principle that satisfactorily explains individuation. He says, "The true individual occurs only in the order of real being, and the principle of individuation is simply the *reality* of being" (*Anthropology*, § 785. Cf. under § 84).

83.

We know, then, the *number* of contemporaneous perceptions, when the individual beings are exactly the same in all other respects—a supposition logically possible. The reason of which is that, in this case, we are able to refer two or more individuals at once to universal being, by the light of which we are able to see that the realization of two is more than the realization of one. Thus arise the ideas of numbers. Afterwards, of course, comes abstraction (reflected attention limited to certain observable elements of being), and gives us pure numbers.

Origin of the ideas of numbers.

84.

If, however, two perceived beings are recognized as different, not only because they are perceived by different contemporaneous perceptions, but also because they differ in the mode or quantity of their realization, then they are recognized as different in species, or, if their species is the same, as different in some accidental attribute. *The difference in mode of realization* constitutes the difference of species; the *difference in the quantity*, or even of the *actuality*, is the cause of accidental differences.

Difference of mode of realization constitutes difference of species; difference in quantity or actuality constitutes accidental differences.

This doctrine will hardly be accepted by those who believe that species are due to quantitative differences of constituent parts, and that accidental differences may, by being perpetuated till they become sufficiently great, constitute qualitative or specific differences. Sulphuric anhydride has qualities very different from those of sulphide dioxide, and yet the ground of the difference between the two is purely a matter of quantity (SO_3; SO_2). Here is involved the whole question of the *Origin of Species*.

In regard to specification, Rosmini lays down the following principles:—

"(1) Pure *reality*, without determination, is an abstract concept, which marks neither being, nor substance, nor accident, nor principle, nor term, nor quality, nor quantity, but merely a mode of being. If we descend from this most abstract concept to one less abstract, but still abstract, and consider that reality which is the extended term of feeling, it will take the name of *matter*. Matter, considered thus, without any further determinations, is unlimited, or, more correctly, indefinite, and, therefore, still devoid of quantity.

"(2) Nothing real can exist indeterminate. . . .

"(3) Reality is of two kinds, *principle* and *term*. To the *term* reality belongs matter; . . . to the *principle* reality, the spirit, that is, the sensitive principle, the intellective principle, and the rational.

"(4) Hence four kinds of forms:

"A. The form which determines and individuates matter (first kind of form). This form produces *dimensive quantity*, *figure* and *number* of material individuals—parts.

"B. The materiated form which determines and individuates the sensitive principle (second kind of form). Formed matter . . . may exist in three states—continuity pure and simple, continuity with internal movements, and continuity with internal harmonic movements. These three states of formed matter give occasion to three varieties of the same species, that is, the species of sensitive individuals.

"C. The form which determines and individuates the intellective principle—object being (third kind of form, pure objective).

"D. The form which determines the rational principle—object-subject being (fourth kind of form, objective, with determinations coming from the subject).

"(5) Finally, we may gather from what has been said—

"A. That the multitude of real, corporeal, animal and human *individuals* is due to the division of matter, which division is a consequence of its peculiar form.

"B. That the multiplication of species is due to the various nature of the terms. In other words, as soon as a term, ontologically considered, is so limited that it excludes another and another excludes it, so that between the two there is no gradation, but entire separation, so entire as to make necessary the use of a different idea in order to be thought, then this term excites in the principle a *feeling likewise exclusive*, which is not a matter of degree, but altogether a different feeling, in which difference consists, as we have seen, ontological limitation. Why a term renders itself thus exclusive; how being is susceptible of such determination; how many such ontological limitations there may be;—all these are questions. . . . whose

answers lie hid in the abyss of being. These specific feelings have their root in as many exclusive acts of being.

"C. Finally, the multiplication of *genera* is due to abstract thought, which, nevertheless, is based on the intrinsic order of being, when it distinguishes different things in it, but, in so far as it separates them and considers them apart, operates according to its own subjective laws.

"Genera which are formed according to some purely *mental* principle ought to be called, not *genera*, but *classes*" (*Theosophy*, vol. v. pp. 384–386).

It is needless to add that it is one of St. Thomas' favourite doctrines, derived from Aristotle, that matter is the principle of individuation. See *Sum. Theol.*, i. q. 3, art. 3, c.; q. 54, art. 3, 2 m.; q. 56, art. 1, 2 m.; q. 75, arts. 4 and 5, c.; q. 85, art. 1, c.; q. 86, arts. 1 and 3, c., etc., etc.

85.

When may we say that *Ego* and *non-Ego* mutually limit each other?

When we refer the perception of bodies and of ourselves to universal being, and then compare the objects of the two perceptions, we find that the two limit each other and our mind adds the negations and distinctions. Then the corporeal world may be called *non-Ego* (the concept of the *Ego* is, indeed, much more complicated; but we will not stop here to explain minutely its formation); then we may say that the *Ego* and *non-Ego* mutually limit each other; then, when we perceive the *Ego*, we shall negate body, and *vice versa*.

Probably no one, except Hegel, ever denied that all negation presupposes a previous affirmation; but it was a great merit on Rosmini's part to have shown that an affirmation does not, as such, include a negation. The

affirmations of intuition and perception are made without any implied negations, and it is only when we have had several perceptions, and begin to reflect upon and compare them, that their difference induces us to introduce negation. Hence, the perception of the external world by no means includes a negation of the *Ego;* nor does the perception of the *Ego* include a negation of the external world. Only when the two are thought together, reflected upon, and compared, does the one become the negation of the other. It was the failure to see this that enabled Hegel to find a starting-point for his Logic. Had he seen that the thought of being does not imply or involve the thought of nothing, he would never have been able to lay the first stone of that huge constructive abuse of negation.

86.

The mind rises to the infinite neither in the primal perception, nor in the reflection which compares the *Ego* and *non-Ego*, but in that which considers the the limitation, contingency, and relativity of either.

A further reflection is necessary, if we wish to reason from the finite to the infinite. In this case, the attention of the mind must not fix itself upon what distinguishes the *Ego* from the *non-Ego*, but must consider what they have in common, *i.e.* their limitation, and so from the thought of the finite, contingent, etc., ascend to the infinite, necessary, etc. Hence, to ascend to the thought of the infinite, necessary, and absolute, I do not require the two perceptions, but I may reach it equally well by setting out from either of them, since each is limited, contingent, and relative. Therefore, that act of the mind by which I ascend to the infinite is not primitive perception. It is not even that reflection whereby I compare the perception of the *Ego* with the perception of the *non-Ego;* but it is a reflection in which, from the

limits of either the *Ego* or the *non-Ego* indifferently, I leap into the infinite.

One learns how valuable such a result as this is, by seeing what strange conclusions persons come to, who have not reflected on the source and nature of our concept of the infinite. Max Müller, for example, holds that we perceive the infinite with our senses. In answer to the question, how a being with only five senses, which supply him with knowledge of only finite things, comes to think or speak of anything not finite or infinite, he says, "I answer without fear of contradiction (!) that it is his senses which give him the first impression (!) of infinite things, and supply him in the end with an intimation of the infinite. Everything of which his senses cannot perceive a limit is to a primitive savage, or to any man in an early stage of intellectual activity, unlimited or infinite. Man sees; he sees to a certain point, and there his eyesight breaks down. But exactly where his sight breaks down, there presses upon him, whether he likes it or not, the perception of the unlimited or the infinite. It may be said that this is not perception, in the ordinary sense of the word. No more it is, but still less is it mere reasoning. In perceiving the infinite, we neither count, nor measure, nor compare, nor name. We know not what it is, but we know that it is, and we know it, because we actually feel it and are brought in contact with it. If it seems too bold to say that man actually sees the infinite, let us say that he suffers from the invisible, and this invisible is only a special name for the infinite" (*Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion*, p. 27). In other words, where the finite ceases to make an impression on man, there he is brought into contact with the infinite, a perception of it presses on him, and he suffers from it. Now, what sort of contact is possible with the infinite as infinite? How can a perception press? And if it could, what kind of pressure would it have to exert in order to give a sense of the infinite? What would have to be the nature of suffering in order that it should seem the infinite? It is true that, where sight breaks down, one

suffers from a sense of incapacity; but the question is, why does one posit, on that account, anything beyond what he sees. Sense feels what it feels and no more. It is intelligence with its infinite ideal object that comes in and declares that there is no end to being. It need hardly be said that Max Müller has no notion of what constitutes perception, or of what is meant by the infinite. The invisible a special name for the infinite! It follows that total darkness is the infinite! How blessed are the blind!

87.

The supreme principle of all our reasoning.

We know the relations of perceived beings, therefore, through reflection, in that we refer them to universal being, and observe how nearly they approach its fulness or how much they fall short of it. Thus is discovered the fountain of all reasonings and the supreme principle on which they all rest. If we try to formulate this principle, it will take this form: The human mind, knowing the essence of being, affirms being in feeling; then, drawing a comparison and referring the affirmed being to the essence of being, it knows its conditions, limits, and relations. Afterwards, by means of new reflections, it refers, in the same way, the cognitions arrived at to the essence of being, and thus draws from it ever new cognitions.

88.

The principle of substance one of the conditions of real being fall-

Let us stop and consider the conditions of perceived beings. The conditions under which real beings subsist are of two kinds: those which fall under *perception*, and those which fall

under *reasoning*. By the former, I mean those which render real being capable of being perceived. Among these is the *principle of substance*, which we must now explain.

ing under perception.

Substance Rosmini defines as "that energy whereby a being and all that it includes actually exist," or "that energy in which is based the actual existence of a being" (*New Essay*, vol. ii. § 587). As his doctrine in regard to it involves one of the cardinal points of his system, it will be necessary to devote some space to it.

"Let us see, then," he says, "in how many ways the mind conceives this energy; and, to see this, let us analyze its concept. In this we may note two elements: *first*, the act of existence, or that energy whereby a being exists; *second*, the being itself which exists (essence). This distinction is made only through abstraction; but abstraction is precisely what we require in this case, because we are dealing with what takes place in the mind, and not with what takes place outside of it. . . .

"What, then, are the modes which our idea of substance may assume?

"(1) We may think the *energy* whereby beings exist universally, that is, by thinking not any particular being, but merely any possible being; not fixing any determination, but supposing it determined in that mode which is necessary in order that it may exist. This is the idea of *substance in general*.

"(2) We may think the *energy* of a being furnished with some generic determination. This is the idea of *generic substance*.

"(3) We may think the aforesaid *energy* of a determinate being *specifically;* that is, we may think the actual existence which the individual of a determinate species may have, thinking in that idea the complete individual, furnished with all that it requires in order to exist, that is, with all its common, as well as with all its proper, marks. When the mind has succeeded in thinking the possibility

that such an individual should actually exist, without yet knowing that it does really exist, it has the idea of *specific substance*, an exemplary idea, or one reducible to an exemplary idea. . . .

"Hence, in the three ideas of substance, there is always thought a thing entirely determined as being, and lacking nothing but subsistence, which thing I call *individual*. . . . If I think the energy by which an individual may subsist, I think substance in general; if I think the energy whereby an individual of a given genus may subsist, I think generic substance; if I think the energy whereby an individual of a given species may exist, I think specific substance. Idea of substance in general, idea of generic substance, idea of specific substance, are always ideas of the energy which constitutes actual existence, which can be only *individual*.

"I cannot think the actual existence of a being without at the same time thinking that this being may receive all the determinations which it requires in order to exist. The idea of an individual, therefore, is intimately connected with, and comprised in, the idea of substance, so that an explanation of the origin of the one explains the origin of the other. Now, there cannot exist in our minds any other ideas of substance or individual besides these three, that is, the universal, the generic, and the specific. We must, therefore, describe the origin of each of these.

"Supposing such description given, we should not even then have offered an explanation of all the thoughts which we think regarding substances. Besides ideas, we form judgments respecting the real subsistence of substances. . . . The act whereby we pronounce 'a thing subsists' is an operation of the mind (*spirito*), essentially different from simple intuition; it is an operation which unites to the idea of the thing the persuasion of, or belief in, the subsistence of what was previously thought as possible. Hence, as we have three ideas of substance, so also we may form three judgments regarding their subsistence: (1) That there subsists a substance simply; (2) that there subsists a substance of a given genus; (3) that there subsists a substance of a given species. . . .

"Of all these ideas and of all these judgments we must describe the origin, or show their mode of possibility in the human mind. In order to facilitate this undertaking, let us see if we can in some measure contract the limits of our investigations. . . . In the first place, our path is shortened by the connection in which the three ideas stand to each other. They are, indeed, united in such a way that the one is engendered from the other. Hence, if we explain the origin of one, we explain that of all.

"In order to see this, let us begin with the idea of specific substance. Now, in order to obtain the ideas of generic and universal substance, we have only to abstract them from this. . . . Hence, if we explain the idea of specific substance, we explain also the other two. . . . Whence, then, comes the idea of specific substance? In searching for the origin of this idea, we find that it is connected with judgments which we form regarding the subsistence of beings—a connection which still further limits the field of our investigations; since, when we have understood this connection, we shall see that with one explanation we have answered not only the question, What is the origin of the idea of specific subsistence? but also the question, What is the origin of the judgments which we make respecting the subsistence of substances?

"The judgments which we form respecting the subsistence of substances are, as we have said, three. Let us show the *nexus* between them, and how the difficulties in all three may be reduced to one. In judging that there subsists (1) any individual being, (2) an individual of a certain genus, or (3) an individual of a certain species, we must be moved by some ground.

"This ground, which determines us to affirm the subsistence of individuals, is the ground of our perception of the same. When this is found, those judgments are explained, that is, we see how they may be formed by our minds. This shows that in all these three kinds of judgment, the difficulty to be overcome is one and the same, and consists in showing plainly what is our ground for saying to ourselves, This individual subsists. We must

therefore, *first*, indicate the mode in which we form the idea of specific substance; *second*, show what is the ground that leads us to judge respecting the subsistence of substances. To this simplicity we have reduced our inquiry. But it may be simplified still further, if we consider the *nexus* between the two questions. Let us suppose we know the ground that moves us to posit the subsistence of an individual. On this ground, we say to ourselves, This individual subsists. Now, in our perception of this individual there is already included the idea of substance, since, inasmuch as substance is merely the energy by which a being exists, we cannot conceive a subsistent being without conceiving along with it the energy whereby it exists, and this is its substance. The two questions, therefore, reduce themselves to one: How can I pronounce a judgment on the subsistence of a being? When, indeed, I make this judgment and thus perceive this being, I at the same time perceive its substance, and hence easily form, or rather, have already formed, the idea of it" (*New Essay*, vol. ii. §§ 589–596).

It follows, of course, from this, that substance is merely the ideal being which we unite to sensations in the act of intellective perception, thereby giving them objectivity. Substance, therefore, is merely objective being, the form of the mind. It may be supposed from this that substance, being synonymous with ideal being, is a mere abstraction, a mere mental figment. Rosmini, however, is very far from considering either the one or the other in this light. According to him, an abstraction is not necessarily a mental product. He says, "When I call the idea of universal being *most abstract*, I do not mean that it is produced by the operation of abstraction, but only that it is, in its nature, abstract and separate from all subsistent beings" (*New Essay*, vol. iii. § 1455). This is a point of extreme importance.

It is curious to observe to what strange consequences Herbert Spencer has been led by a failure to reach the truth respecting the nature of the idea of substance. "Existence," says this distinguished biologist, "means

nothing more than persistence; and hence in mind that which persists in spite of all changes, and maintains the unity of the aggregate in defiance of all attempts to divide it, is that of which existence in the full sense of the word must be predicated—that which we must postulate as the substance of mind in contradistinction to the varying forms it assumes. But, if so, the impossibility of knowing the substance of mind is manifest. By the definition, it is that which undergoes the modification producing a state of mind. Consequently, if every state of mind is some modification of this substance of mind, there can be no state of mind in which the unmodified substance of mind is present" (*Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. pt. ii. ch. i. § 59).

This would seem very cogent reasoning. Let us consider it. The substance of mind is its persistent element. Admitted. But how do we ever come to know that there is in the mind a persistent element? It must be, of course, by some modification, producing a state of mind. But what modification of mind could produce a state corresponding to permanency? By the very definition, no modification is permanent, and since modifications alone produce states of mind, there can be no state permanent. Hence it would be utterly impossible for the mind ever to discover that it had a permanent element, that is, to recognize its own persistent identity. Again, since in no modification of mind its unmodified substance can appear, *à fortiori*, in no modification of mind can any other modification of the substance of mind appear. It will follow directly that the mind can never know any past modification, and hence that it can have no continuity of consciousness and no memory. The source of the error which leads Spencer to these manifestly false results is very evident. Is knowledge a mere state of mind, a modification of its substance? If it were so, there would be absolutely no difference between sensation and knowledge, for no one will question that sensation is a modification of the substance of mind. It would follow from this that pain and the knowledge of pain were the same thing, and that the only way to know or think of a toothache would be to have one. But this is

obviously untrue. Hence, knowledge is not mere sensation, and, therefore, not merely a modification of the substance of mind. If we ask wherein knowledge differs from sensation, the most simple reply is, that knowledge always has an object, whereas sensation, in so far, at least, as it is a modification of the substance of mind or a mental state, never has an object. To speak of the object of a modification or of a state would be a patent absurdity. Nothing is known until it is made an object, that is, until it ceases to be a modification and state of the subject, and becomes a permanent something altogether independent of subjective states. If this be the case, there is no reason why the mind should not make itself, with or without its modifications, an object to itself, and, abstracting from these modifications, if need be, think its substance unmodified. But, after this operation was performed, how would the substance of mind, being without modifications and therefore without distinguishing marks, differ from any other substance? What would it be more than simple being, the element which every object of thought must have in order to be thought? But surely we know what being is. If we did not, we should not know anything, for nothing is known except as being. We could not even put the question, What *is* being? without already knowing what it was. The question implies that we desire an answer in terms of being. It thus appears that we know what substance unmodified is, and since we know the modifications that distinguish the substance of mind, we know even its specific substance. What we do not know is, how these modifications are connected, how substance comes to be modified in this particular way. But there is no apparent reason why we should not discover this, and therefore no ground for dogmatic agnosticism with reference to spiritual entities.

89.

We cannot perceive sen-

We saw (§ 74) that in all our sensations of body there are three activities: *first*, the activity

which modifies us; *second*, our modification; and, *third*, ourselves who are modified. The first of these activities is the object of our perception of body; the third, the object of our perception of ourselves: it remains for us to consider the second, our own modification, or sensation itself. The sensation or modification of ourselves is certainly what stimulates our intellectual attention to perceive bodies and ourselves. But our sensation is not the body which produces it, neither is it we ourselves. What is it, then? Do we perceive it? If we consider its nature, we see clearly that it is a passive act of our feeling, and that we ourselves are a feeling susceptible of various modifications. We see, moreover, that this modification of the we-feeling is produced by the action of an external agent. But all this knowledge concerning sensation we now have through *reflection*. Does it, therefore, fall within perception? Here again we must appeal to fact, so that we may not be misled by capricious theories, and put a false construction on the nature of things. Now, the fact tells that that reflection does not and cannot fall under perception *alone*. And, indeed, what is perception but the affirmation of a real being? Now, is sensation by itself a real being? Of course not. It is only a certain passive actuality or quality of a being. Hence, on the occasion of sensations, we never perceive the sensation alone. We always perceive ourselves who are beings, and it is only as united to us that sensation is perceived as a modification of ourselves.

sations pure, but only as modifications of ourselves.

90.

Does perception take place directly or through reasoning?

This enables us to solve the somewhat difficult question so often put by philosophers: *Does the perception of beings take place directly or through the medium of reasoning?* Our reply is that it takes place directly, by means of a simple *judgment*, and without any reasoning. We add, however, that this judgment is followed by reflection, which breaks it up into a process of reasoning. This reasoning, although the product of the reflection itself, and entirely distinct from perception, leaves upon us the impression that a secret process of reasoning has taken place in the act of perception itself, although it really has not.

This is easily explained. Perception is a synthetic judgment of objectivity, made by nature, and does not therefore, *as such*, enter into consciousness. The becoming conscious (*das Bewusstwerden*), the cognition, is the analysis of the judgment made by reflection. Things are really presented to the intelligence as objects, that is, as feelings already combined with being, or, which is the same thing, inhering in substance. What the intelligence does is to analyze these compounds, separating substance, which is the same for all things, from the sensible modifications which alone constitute real differences. Every act of cognition, therefore, is a separation of substance and accident. Judgment gives us cognition; reflection, recognition, in both senses of that term. When I reflect upon a cognitive judgment pronounced spontaneously, I cognize, in a new and indirect way, what I had previously cognized directly, and I also acknowledge my previous cognition as mine.

91.

The process by which reflection translates our perception of ourselves is the following :— When the human spirit receives a sensation, it immediately perceives that there is a reality. But reality is always an entity which must belong to a being. Now, the mere reality of sensation is not itself a being. Therefore, if this reality, which must pertain to a being, is not itself a being, there must exist a being to which it belongs and whose actuality it is. Therefore a being subsists. Such is the reasoning that seems to take place in every perception. Properly speaking, however, this reasoning is the work of reflection, which insinuates itself unawares into perception. In fact, perception is the affirmation of a being. Therefore, there is no perception until the spirit has said to itself that there is a being—has pronounced the last proposition in the above process of reasoning : A being subsists. The other propositions, therefore, are prior to perception. But before perception there is no process of reasoning, since human thought regarding reality begins with perception. Hence the process in question does not properly belong to perception, but is the work of reflection. How, then, does perception take place ? Blindly ?

Process by which reflection translates the perception of ourselves.

How much of this reflection belongs to perception ?

"I am a being that thinks itself, therefore I am a *substance*. The substance of the *Ego* is a feeling, because the *Ego* feels. I always feel myself the same in all the various operations which I perform ; and when I am per-

forming no operation, I feel myself still, because I live, and feel that I live, essentially. This *Ego* is, therefore, a fundamental feeling. because all other sensations are based on it. It requires no other sensations ; it is *per se ; we* never can be without ourselves ; all sensations require an essential feeling, because all possible sensations are but modifications of us. With the feeling *Ego*, therefore, we feel a being, a substance, a subject (that is, a living sentient principle). In this way, if we think this feeling, we perceive a substance. It is, therefore, a substance that we perceive immediately, and this substance is ourselves" (*New Essay*, vol. iii. §§ 1195, 1196).

92.

Perception does not take place blindly.

Of course not. On the contrary, it takes place in full light. As soon as we feel ourselves modified, we pronounce the existence of ourselves, because we pronounce nothing else than the existence of a being. When we have a sensation, the first thing we see is the being in which the sensation inheres, the being modified. Before we perceive being, sensation is but a feeling. Given this feeling, we directly affirm the principle of it. This principle is inseparable from it, so inseparable, indeed, that the feeling cannot be known, just as it cannot exist, without it, that is, without the being in which it is. Feeling, therefore, incites us to affirm not only the feeling itself, but also the being in which it inheres, and, hence, to perceive the being and the feeling in the being simultaneously.

Rosmini holds that the sensations do not excite the intelligence directly ; but that, when a need is created in

the sensitive nature, the *Ego* puts forth, in order to satisfy it, all its forces, and among them its intellectual ones. "In this way, the sense, without acting directly on the intelligence, occasions intellectual movement. The sense excites the *Ego*, which possesses the intelligence, to put in activity this intelligence itself. The unity of the *Ego*, therefore, in which sense and intelligence come together, is the mediator and path of communication between these two entirely different powers" (*New Essay*, vol. iii. § 1258, n.).

93.

It is governed by the principle of substance.

This necessity which constrains us intellectively to perceive sensation as in the sentient being, and not as standing by itself, is, when formulated into a general principle, called the principle of substance, and may be thus expressed: *Whenever the feeling is a reality which does not by itself constitute a being capable of forming an object of perception, intellective perception does not stop short at this reality, but affirms the being to which that reality belongs.*

"When we, intelligent beings, supply being to *sensitive perception*, we thereby form the idea of substance, that is, of a being conceived by us as existing in itself and not in another. When we supply being to the *intellective perception* of an *action*, then we form the idea of cause, that is, of a substance performing an action.* The act of our understanding is the same in the formation of the idea of cause and in the formation of the idea of substance. Both operations consist in supplying being to that which feeling or perception furnishes to us. This is possible

* In a note the author says, "By this supplying of being, we do not create it or make it emanate from ourselves. On the contrary, it is given to us to intuite from the first moment of our existence."

through the identity of the subject (WE) which feels, perceives intellectively, and reflects. . . . Cause is a being performing an action outside of itself (effect). . . . *Sensible quality* cannot stand alone without a substance. *Action* cannot stand alone without a cause. . . . Thus the intellect completes sensation and arrives at substance; completes perception and arrives at cause" (*New Essay*, vol. ii. §§ 622–625).

94.

Substance and accident.

The reality which does not by itself constitute a perceivable being is called *accident*, and the being to which this reality belongs is called its *substance*, as being the *immediate substratum* of the accident; in other words, that wherein the accident is known and affirmed as subsisting.

95.

Why the child, which has not perceived itself, is compelled by the principle of substance to attribute its own sensations to bodies.

Before proceeding further, let us reply to an accessory difficulty which may very naturally arise in the mind of the reader. It may be said, You have supposed that, given sensations, we perceive ourselves and our sensations as modifications of ourselves. But this is not the fact. The child, when it receives its first sensations, perceives external bodies rather than itself, and even its own sensations it attributes to bodies, believing these to have colour, taste, sound, etc. This, I reply, is certainly true of the child, and is a fresh proof that, in the child, the perception of bodies, as I have already stated, precedes the perception of itself. But this does not affect the principle of

substance. The child, for the very reason that it has not yet arrived at the perception of itself, is compelled by the law of its understanding, which obeys the principle of substance, to attribute to bodies its own sensations, for the plain reason that, in virtue of this principle, it cannot perceive sensations without attributing them to a being. Being unable, therefore, to attribute them to itself, since it has not yet perceived itself, it attributes them to bodies—to the foreign agent which operates in it and whose force and activity it perceives bound up with every one of its own sensations. So closely, indeed, is the agent bound up with the sensation produced by it, that the closest attention and reflection are required in order to separate the two.

96.

It may now be replied, Then the principle of substance is fallacious, causing us to attribute our own sensations to bodies and look upon them as accidents of these. But this is not really the case. It is not the principle of substance that causes us to attribute our sensations to external bodies rather than to ourselves. This principle obliges us only to affirm a substance when we have a feeling of accidents, not to specify what substance it is. We have, therefore, to be on our guard and see that the substance which we affirm is the substance to which the accidents properly belong. If in this respect we commit errors, we have a faculty

It does not follow that the principle of substance is fallacious.

The errros we commit in re-

ferring accidents to the wrong substance may be corrected.

whereby we can correct them. Thus, through careful reflection, we come afterwards to recognize that sensations are accidents of ourselves, and not of bodies, although they are felt by us at the same time and place as the bodies which act upon our feeling. Indeed, in the last analysis, a force acting in us is our only concept of these. Now, if we have a faculty whereby we may correct our errors, nothing more is required in order to confute scepticism and secure to us the possession of the truth.

"The principle which ought to enable us accurately to distinguish, within sensation, the subjective element from the extra-subjective is the following :—Whatever enters into sensation considered in itself (and not in the mode in which it is produced) is subjective; and all that enters into the concept of our passivity, as attested to us by consciousness, is extra-subjective" (*New Essay*, vol. ii. § 881). In other words, *sensation*, as such, is subjective; whereas *sensitive perception*, that is, the feeling of passivity, involving as it does, when reflected on, the notion of activity, is extra-subjective (cf. under § 78).

97.

The principle of substance is the intuition of the essence of being, the first and universal truth.

What, then, is the principle of substance? It is simply the application of the idea of being to those felt realities which are not sufficient of themselves to form a perceivable being; it is the law of perception. But perception is infallible (§§ 64–70); hence also the principle of substance is infallible. We say that a given felt reality sometimes does not by itself constitute a perceivable being. Be-

fore we can say this, we must know what constitutes a perceivable being, and this is the same thing as knowing what the essence of being, which we affirm in feeling, is. This we know by nature. Hence the principle of substance is nothing else but the intuition of the essence of being applied to reality. We are able to affirm it of certain realities (substances); of certain others (accidents) we cannot affirm it, unless they are united with the first. In making this distinction we are guided by the essence of being itself, which cannot be realized in the second without the first—a circumstance which shows that in being there is an intrinsic order. But the intuition of the essence of being does not admit error; it is the intuition of truth itself. Hence the principle of substance does not admit error, but is essentially true.

It must not be supposed from this that Rosmini holds to the doctrine of a single substance in the Spinozistic sense. Substance is not mere being, but being applied to feeling. If being be separated from the terms of sense, it is no longer substance. Substance is being, employed to render cognition of realities possible, and, when not so employed, becomes a mere abstraction. (See *New Essay*, vol. ii. § 659, n.)

98.

The condition of perception, therefore, is that in every feeling it must affirm a being. Reflection has many other conditions which it tends to

One of the conditions of reflection is the principle of cause.

establish. One of these is the *principle of cause*, whose nature and veracity we must now show.

In regard to the principle of cause, see under § 93. Cause may be defined as the substance of action. Of course, such cause does not include what, since Aristotle's time, has been called final cause (*τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα*), which can exist only for, and act only through, intelligence, and which is known prior to the action whose substance it becomes. "The principle of cause," says Rosmini, "descends from the *principle of contradiction*, and hence from the *principle of cognition*. The principle of cause may be expressed thus: Every event (everything that begins) has a cause which produces it. . . . This proposition is entirely equivalent to this other: It is impossible for intelligence to think an event without thinking a cause that has produced it. In order to show that an event without a cause cannot be thought, we must show that the concept of such an event would involve a contradiction. . . . To say that what does not exist acts, is a contradiction. But to say, An event is without a cause, is equivalent to saying, What does not exist acts. Therefore an event without a cause is a contradiction. . . . To conceive an operation (a change) without a being is to conceive without conceiving, which is a contradiction. Indeed, the principle of cognition says, The object of cognition is being; hence, without a being, there can be no conceiving. . . . An event is an operation (a change). If, therefore, this operation has no cause, it is conceived as isolated, without any being to which it belongs. It is therefore an operation without being, or, which is the same thing, that operates which does not exist" (*New Essay*, vol. ii. § 569).

99.

Various orders of reflection.

We have already stated wherein reflection consists. It is an act wherein the mind considers the objects of perception, or of previous reflections, in relation to the essence of being. Let

us at present deal with reflection of the former order, that which touches objects of perception, and not the objects of previous reflections.

Reflection of the first order discovers the different limitations and mutual dependence of real beings.

When reflection refers perceived beings to the essence of being, it sees how limited they are, how little of the essence of being they include, how far they come short of exhausting it. It sees that they have the essence of being, but are not that essence. In this way it discovers their interdependence, inasmuch as the dependence of one being upon another is only a kind of limitation. That, therefore, which renders contingent limited beings *separate*, distinct *beings* is not the same as that which renders them *independent*. Things may be separate and distinct beings although they be dependent. Hence each of them, as a separate being, may be the object of a special perception. Its dependence is not the object of perception, but of reflection.

As far as mere perception goes, a table, for example, is a perfectly distinct thing. It is only when reflection comes to consider the act of its coming into existence that its dependence becomes conspicuous. When we think a time before the table was, and then a time after the table was, we find we cannot pass from the latter to the former with the idea of table in our minds, without throwing the existence of the table, in the form of cause, into the earlier time. This means that we cannot think absolute beginning, or passage from nothing to being. As Sir W. Hamilton puts it: "We are utterly unable to realize in thought the possibility of the complement of existence being either increased or diminished. . . . There is conceived an absolute tautology between an effect and its causes" (*Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. ii. p. 377).

100.

Notions of cause and effect.

When we see a being, a reality, a mode, a new accident begin, reflection immediately says that there must be a cause for such being, reality, mode, or accident, and calls the new product an effect. When we consider this operation of the mind, we see that the concept and name of effect are posterior to the name of cause. It is only after we know that a given being could not exist without a cause that it receives the name of effect. What is the meaning of recognizing that a being had a cause? It simply means recognizing that that being (its essence) has not within itself its own subsistence, which, therefore, must come to it from elsewhere. But when we say that a being has not its subsistence in itself, but derives it from without, this is the same thing as saying that it has a cause. When, therefore, we judge that a being must have a cause, we merely recognize that it has not subsistence through its essence. To recognize that a being (or a reality belonging to a being) has not subsistence through its own essence, is only to compare the real perceived being with the essence of being, which, as we said, is the work of reflection. One of the conditions, therefore, under which reflection works, one of its essential rules, is the principle of causation.

Rosmini frequently adverts to the scepticism of those who deny the absolute universality and necessity of the principle of causation, and undertakes to show that such scepticism is groundless. "The fact," he says "which these

philosophers admit is this: 'All men *assume* the proposition that there is no effect without a cause, recognizing and using it as necessary and universal.' What they deny is, that this proposition *is* necessary and universal. They say it is so only in appearance. Now, setting out from the fact which they concede, we might reason as follows:—You admit that the proposition, 'Every effect must have a cause,' is necessary and universal in appearance, but you add, *only* in appearance. Now, I will show you that it could not even appear so to men, if they had not a cognition which was *à priori* and not due to the senses, that is, a cognition truly necessary and universal. Let us suppose, then, that the proposition, 'Every effect must have its cause,' is only a limited result of experience, which, expressed in rigorously accurate terms, would take this form: 'Certain events repeatedly precede certain others.' Now I ask, In order that men should have been able, by means of their imaginations, to transform this empirical proposition into this other rational one, 'Every effect must have a cause,' what ideas must they have possessed? It is plain that they could not have made the change without having, first, the idea of possibility; second, the idea of cause; third, the idea of necessity; fourth, the idea of universality. Now, all these are ideas that we cannot possibly have from the senses, as our adversaries themselves admit; that is, it is impossible to have (1) the idea of possibility, because the possible being of a thing does not fall under the senses; (2) the idea of cause, because only effects fall under the senses; (3) the idea of necessity, because the senses show only what is, not what must be; (4) the idea of universality, because sense experience is limited to a given number of things, and is repeated only a given number of times. The same difficulty, therefore, which occurs in admitting the principle of cause to be true, recurs in admitting it to be apparent" (*New Essay*, vol. i. § 321).

101.

The principle of cause is merely an application of the idea of being to a perceived being, so as to see whether the latter has or has not in itself subsistence.

It follows from this that the principle of cause is only an application, made by reflection, of the idea of being to a perceived being, by which application it is seen that the essence of perceived being has not in itself subsistence, which therefore must come to it from without. Hence the principle of cause is in itself infallible, inasmuch as the object of perception is free from error, and the essence of being with which it is compared is truth itself. All that remains to be done is to recognize whether reality is or not included in the essence of the being perceived.

"Hypotheses," says Rosmini, "have relation to causes; but true causes are always metaphysical. Physical causes . . . are only certain circumstances given by external experience, which, when they occur, are always accompanied by certain facts. Hence, there are two absolutely distinct kinds of hypotheses: *first*, hypotheses of true causes; *second*, hypotheses of physical causes" (*Logic*, § 962).

What are usually called physical causes are certain phenomena that, invariably preceding other phenomena, are supposed to have an active connection with them. Some recent thinkers would even deny the active connection, and define a physical cause as a phenomenon that invariably precedes another. But, in either case, a physical cause is only the place of true cause, not such cause itself. When I say that heat causes expansion, I have merely located the cause of the second phenomenon. To know this cause itself, I should have so to enter into the being of heat as to see that its union with a material body was tantamount to, or identical with, the expansion of that body. But identity is purely a metaphysical conception; hence all true cause is metaphysical.

102.

What is contingent being?

To say that the essence of a being does not include subsistence is equivalent to saying that the perceived being has not in itself the ground of its own subsistence, and that it is *contingent.*

"In the concept of being it is necessary that they [all limited modes] exist, otherwise it would no longer be the concept of being, which has unlimited extension. There are, therefore, two necessities, both arising from the nature of being—

"(1) The necessity that being should exist in itself, and, therefore, that it should have its proper terms, without which its existence in itself would be wanting, and therefore would annul itself in itself. This is the necessity of absolute being.

"(2) The necessity that being should exist as intelligible, because, if it were not intelligible, it would lack the concept of being in itself, and therefore, *à fortiori*, would lack existence in itself. The necessity of the concept of being implies that in this concept are contained also all the limited modes of being, without which that concept would be another, and no longer that of being. This is the *necessity of the possible* (*possibilium*), or of the essences of limited things (cf. *New Essay*, §§ 307 n., 375 n., 1106, 1158, 1460). Hence comes the concept of *contingency*. Every necessity springs out of the nature of being, and reduces itself to this formula: 'Necessity is the property which being has of existing in itself.' The conditions of the existence of being are two: (1) that it exist with its proper terms; (2) that the concept of it, embracing all improper terms, exist. But it is not a condition of the existence of being in itself that it exist in itself with its finite terms. The real existence of these is not, therefore, necessary. The absence of this necessity is called *contingency*. Contingency, therefore, is that negative property of finite

beings, whereby they do not necessarily exist in themselves, or in their real or moral form" (*Theosophy*, vol. i. § 427).

103.

The *principle of integration* is a development of the principle of cause, and contains the reason why all peoples believe that God exists.

With the principle of cause, we run through the whole series of second causes; but finding them all contingent, we are not able to stop with them. Reflection does not rest until it has arrived at a first cause, in whose essence subsistence is included, and this cause is God. The principle of cause, which thus unfolds until it reaches its last operation, was called by us the *principle of integration*. All men, from a necessity which belongs to intelligent reflection, use the principle of integration with great rapidity, run through the second causes in a body, and, by an irresistible rational instinct, arrive at the knowledge of God. For this reason the existence of God has been admitted in all times and by all the peoples of the world (cf. *Logic*, §§ 680–684).

This is true, and yet the proof of the existence of God derived from the supposed necessity of positing a first cause is an extremely fallacious one. The argument takes this form. If there be no first cause, there must be an infinite succession of caused causes; in other words, an infinite number of successive causes. But infinite number is a contradiction in terms, that is, an absurdity. Therefore there must be a first cause. The whole force of the argument lies in the unthinkability of an infinite number actually realized. It is quite true that an infinite number is unthinkable, because all number, from its very nature, is finite. But number altogether is but an intellective mode of grouping, and does not lie in things themselves. It

may, therefore, be admitted that in finite time it is impossible to group an infinite multitude of things; but it by no means follows that an infinite multitude, beyond any, and therefore beyond all, number, does not exist. An innumerable multitude of successive causes is therefore entirely possible, and there is no necessity in thought for positing a first cause. This fact does not interfere with the validity of other proofs for the existence of God.

104.

All other principles of reflection are reducible in the same way to the first and universal truth, the essence of being naturally intuited by us.

Reflection is guided by other principles besides these; but, in the last analysis, all its operations reduce themselves to comparing a known object with ideal being, in order to see how far, and in what mode, it partakes of the essence of being, and how far it falls short of that essence. Hence all reflection is by itself an instrument of truth, having truth as its type and as the measure of all things.

105.

Purposes of the art of reasoning.

The validity of human reasoning being thus demonstrated, Logic undertakes to teach the art of it. The first purpose of the art of reasoning is the avoidance of error, and the second, the attainment, by means of reasoning, of the end proposed.

106.

How errors in reasoning are avoided.

We avoid errors when we proceed so that the mind affirms nothing gratuitously, and that the *faculty of conviction* is always guided by *reason*, Des-

cartes' four rules of method.

in such a way that what we say to ourselves is reached by way of pure reasoning, without the interference of the will. And here Descartes' four rules of method find their application.

These four rules, expressed in succinct and comprehensive language, are: "(1) To accept nothing as true which is not clearly known to be such, from its presenting itself to the mind so clearly and distinctly as to give no occasion for doubt; (2) to divide, as far as possible, every problem into its natural parts; (3) to arrange one's thoughts in due order, advancing gradually from the more simple and easy to the more complex and difficult, and to suppose a definite order, for the sake of orderly progress in research, even when none such is furnished naturally by the subject under consideration; (4) by exhaustive enumerations and complete revisions, to take care that nothing be overlooked" (*Discours de la Méthode*, Part II.).

Rosmini lays down six rules or *norms*, which he reduces to these two precepts—

"(1) Never affirm anything you do not know, or in a mode different from that in which you know it. The same applies to denying.

"(2) Affirm with your inner thought all that you know, but affirm it in the mode in which you know it, without addition or subtraction. The same applies to denying" (*Logic*, § 168).

107.

Three aims of reasoning. Hence three methods—*apodeictic*, *heuristic*, and *didactic*.

The aims proposed by reasoning are three: *first*, to demonstrate and defend truth: *second*, to discover new truth, and, *third*, to teach the truth to others. Hence the three methods, the *apodeictic*, the *heuristic* or inventive, and the *didactic*, each of which has its special rules.

Rosmini devotes a considerable portion of his *Logic* to an examination and classification of these rules (Book ii. § iv. pp. 305–473, §§ 749–1038). He has also left a very valuable work, treating of the didactic method as applied to education. The title of it is, *On the Supreme Principle of Method, and on Some of its Applications, for the Benefit of Human Education.* This work, which is almost unknown outside of Italy, contains many excellent thoughts on education.

108.

Artifice of the syllogism, to which the various forms of argument are reducible.

The apodeictic method uses various forms of argumentation, but they may all be reduced to that of the syllogism. The artifice of the syllogism consists in showing that the proposition to be demonstrated is already contained in another proposition, either evident or, at least, certain. The syllogism is composed of three propositions, the last of which is called the conclusion or thesis, and the other two the premises. The one of the two premises implicitly contains the conclusion, and the other proves that it really contains it. The proposition which we wish to show to be contained in the first premise must have either the same subject or the same predicate as that premise. If the subject is the same in both propositions, it is sufficient to show that the predicate of the conclusion is contained in the predicate of the proposition assumed. If the predicate is identical, it is sufficient to show that the subject of the conclusion is contained in the subject of the proposition assumed. In order to show that the predicate or the subject of the conclusion

is contained in the predicate or subject of the proposition assumed, we take a concept which we call the middle term, and show that this is identical either with both predicates or both subjects, whence it follows directly that the two subjects or the two predicates are themselves identical, on the ground that "things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another."

Rosmini, like all truly great thinkers, sees the value of the syllogism and defends it against Hegel and other detractors. His reply to Hegel is one of the most acute and masterly pieces of philosophical criticism in existence. See *Logic*, §§ 1092–1098.

109.

Universal rule of the syllogism.

In order to see whether a syllogism is valid or otherwise, we may apply this universal rule: The middle term must have a comprehension at least equal to that of the predicate, and an extension at least equal to that of the subject, of the conclusion.

110.

From the necessity of more than one middle term arises the *sorites*.

When no one middle term can be found which may be identified with both subjects or both predicates, we may take two or more which are identical with each other, and the first of which is identical with one of the two subjects or two predicates, and the last identical with the other. Then, instead of the second premise, we have two

or more propositions. This form is called a *sorites.*

III.

The premises must be certain in order that the conclusion may be necessary and apodeictic. If they are only probable, the conclusion will also be probable; if they are hypothetical, the conclusion will be the same. The doctrine of probability is manifold and most important.

The conclusion has the same logical value as the premises.

"All probability," says Rosmini, "is, in the last analysis, based upon this reasoning: I apprehend a certain thing. I have observed that several times when such a thing was, there was also this other, that is, the being (thing) affirmed in the possible judgment. Hence, when this being is affirmed, although I do not apprehend it, still there is probability that it is. Such is the universal foundation of probability. The index or sign of the *being affirmed,* that is, of the truth of the proposition, is of many sorts, as many as there are possible connections and relations between one being and another. It would be too long a matter for our present purpose, though an important one, to stop in order to classify them. We will merely observe that, since probability has for its basis the connection (not known as necessary) between two entities, one of which is apprehended and the other conjectured from it as its mark, it rests no less on those connections which exist between the nature and the accidents of two entities, than on those which are given in experience, although the connection arising from the nature or the accidents is not seen. Hence there are *rational probabilities* and *experimental probabilities,* according as the connection in question is rational or purely experimental. . . .

"The rational probability which is derived from know-

ing the nature and accidents of two connected entities may be called *philosophical;* the probability which is inferred from similar cases may be called *mathematical.* These two kinds of probability are frequently found intermingled. . . . Philosophical probability, arising from the consideration of two entities connected together, does not lend itself to mathematical calculation, but is discovered through meditation, and this is one of the chief reasons why the calculation of probabilities has a limited sphere, beyond which when mathematicians try to go, they fall into error. And these errors may be attributed to three special causes. Either, *first*, the calculation does not seize the rational probability; or, *second*, the calculation tries also to seize the rational part and errs through the difficulty of reducing it to figures; or, *third*, it frequently happens that the similar cases which form the basis of experimental probability are the effect of the nature of the two connected entities and represent it; hence every time there is added to the calculation any figure to express the rational probability, the same thing is made to enter twice into the calculation. Sometimes, again, the number of similar cases results from diverse causes, that is, from the connection based upon the nature of the two entities and from other causes foreign to these; and it is most difficult to determine how much of the frequency of similar cases is due to the one source and how much to the other. Every time, therefore, that mathematicians, not content with basing their calculations on the number of similar cases, presume to base it also on the causes that may have produced them, they almost inevitably fall into error. And they do the same, if, omitting to include in the calculation the probability which arises from causes, they deal merely with the number of similar cases, because most frequently this number cannot be derived from experience save in a very imperfect and often irregular manner" (*Logic*, §§ 1073–1076). The logical relation of the calculation of probabilities to the distributive judgment has been treated with great clearness by F. A. Lange in his *Logische Studien*, pp. 99 sqq.

112.

Three sources from which a knowledge of truth is derived.

The heuristic or inventive method teaches how truth may be obtained from the sources within the reach of man. These sources are, generally speaking, three: *first*, authority and tradition; *second*, observation and experience; and, *third*, reasoning—each of which may, again, be subdivided into many. The question of how the various human faculties must be applied to these sources in order to draw from them pure and abundant knowledge, and the question of how certain external means, which direct and aid these faculties, are to be applied, afford abundant material for this part of logic.

113.

The didactic method is either general or particular.

The didactic method is general or particular, according as it contains the general principles for the communication of truth, or particular rules for the teaching of special sciences.

114.

Supreme principles of the three methods.

Each of these three methods has a supreme principle which directs it. That of the apodeictic method is: Given a proposition which is certain, all that is implicitly contained in it is also certain. That of the heuristic method is: The idea of being, which is the light of reason, when applied in the proper way to new feelings or to cognitions

already possessed, produces new cognitions. That of the didactic method is: Let the truths which it is desired to teach be arranged in such an order that those which precede do not require those which follow in order to be understood.

Sciences of Perception.

Psychology and Cosmology.

115.

Why Ideology and Logic were called Sciences of Intuition.

Ideology and Logic were called Sciences of Intuition, because they treat of the means of knowing, and this is ideal being, which is intuited. After we have come into possession of the means of knowing, we have still to apply it to the various beings that present themselves to us, and to try to discover their ultimate grounds. But the first application which we can make of the means of knowing to beings, we make by means of perception. Since the only function of the *intellect* is that of *intuition*, there remain for the *reason* the two functions of *perception* and *reflection*. Now, we cannot *reflect* upon anything relating to real beings unless perception supplies the material. The abstract sciences, therefore, cannot be legitimately built up, except through reasoning based upon material supplied by perception.

In answer to the question, "What means has the human reason for knowing *essences*, or for forming the ideas of things?" Rosmini says, "These are four: (1) *perception;* (2) *analysis* and *synthesis;* (3) the perception of natural

or conventional signs, and chief among these latter *words;* (4) *integration*" (*New Essay*, vol. iii. § 1220; cf. under § 103). Rosmini entirely agrees with Kant, that nothing respecting the nature of reality can be known except through feeling; but he differs from Kant in holding that we can infer by reason the real, and not alone the ideal existence of certain beings—for example, of a First Cause or God.

116.

What we can perceive is ourselves and the external world. Hence the two sciences Pyschology and Cosmology.

Now, what are the beings which we can perceive? All those, and only those, which fall under our feeling, wherein alone we find reality—ourselves and the external world. Hence the philosophical sciences of perception are *Psychology* and *Cosmology*.

"The science of the world, or Cosmology, is unquestionably a science of perception and observation, and if by world is meant all that is created, Psychology itself becomes a material part of Cosmology, since, after all, man is a member of the world. But it is one thing to consider sciences from the point of view of their subject matter, another, to regard the fountain from which they spring. If Cosmology be considered in relation to the source from which man draws it, it is readily seen to rise out of Psychology, inasmuch as it is a science of perception and observation. . . . In the feeling of the soul there is a duality, there is a subjective element, and there is an extra-subjective element, which through reflection respectively change into *Ego* and *non-Ego*. . . . Hence it is the feeling of the soul that enables us to know the material universe . . . Thus Psychology furnishes the first rudiments to Cosmology. Cosmology is, in truth, conceived in the womb of Psychology, as the known world exists in the bosom of the soul" (*Psychology*, §§ 24–26).

117.

Super-natural Anthropo-logy goes beyond the limits of mere phi-losophy.

The Christian doctrine teaches us that, by a gracious communication, we receive also the feeling of God, whereby we are lifted to the supernatural order of things. The science which treats of this deiform perception we have called *Supernatural Anthropology*.* It goes beyond the limits of mere philosophy.

1. *Psychology.*

118.

What is Psycho-logy?

Psychology is the doctrine of the human soul.

Rosmini has left two great works on Psychology, the one called after the science, the other entitled *Anthropology in the Service of Moral Science.* Of all Rosmini's works, these best deserve to be widely known.

119.

Parts of Psycho-logy.

Psychology does three things: *first*, it shows what is the essence of the soul; *second*, it describes its development; and, *third*, it discusses its destinies [cf. *Psychology*, vol. i. §§ 45–49].

120.

All reason-ing on the essence of

The essence of the soul is known through perception. If the soul did not *feel* itself, it would

* See Bibliography of Rosmini's works, Class VI.

be unable to *perceive* itself. It is a primitive fact, and the starting-point of all reasoning regarding the soul, that each individual feels and perceives his own soul. Experience and reason show us that this fact may be generalized, and that in every case there is no perception without feeling. In truth, bodies themselves would not be perceived by the understanding, if they were not first felt.

the soul sets out from our feeling of the soul.

" *Being* and *feeling* cannot be defined. The notion of being is supposed in every affirmation. Remove this notion and all speech and all thought are rendered impossible. If we try to explain what we mean by being, we shall find that we use being to explain being. Feeling likewise is indefinable. It is a most simple thing to him who has experience of it; but no one could communicate a knowledge of it to one who had not. At best, he could say that feeling is a certain mode of being " (Angeleri, *Trattato di Filosofia Elementare*, p. 9).

121.

But between the feeling which we all have of bodies and the feeling which each of us has of his own soul, there is this great difference: that bodies are felt as something foreign to us; our souls, as something of our own, as ourselves even. Bodies are felt by the soul; the soul is felt by itself and through itself. From this we derive at once a preliminary definition of the soul. If the soul feels itself, it is in its essence feeling, since it is only feeling that is felt by itself (*per se*); and if bodies are felt by the soul, and the soul is felt by itself, the soul is the principle of feeling. The

Difference between our feeling of bodies and our feeling of our own souls.

soul, therefore, is a principle of feeling implanted in feeling.

"Feeling is given originally. The question, therefore, is not, how feeling arises, but how it is modified and how it gives birth to sensation" (*New Essay*, § 717). "The *Ego*, which reflects upon itself, finds that, at bottom, it is a feeling that constitutes the sentient and intelligent subject" (*Ibid.* § 719). "When I undertake to analyze the energy whereby sensations exist, I find that the concept of it includes not merely the act whereby the sensations exist, but something more. . . . The sensations exist; therefore, there is an energy which makes them exist. Now, what are sensations . . . and how do they occur? If I observe the facts, I find, in the first place, that sensations occur in me (this is attested by my consciousness), that is, that colours, sounds, etc., are all *my* sensations, in such a way that, if I did not exist, or if I had not the faculty of feeling, I should not only be without them, but they would not exist at all. . . . Observing this to be the nature of sensation, I say that there must be a sentient subject besides the sensations and the act whereby they exist, something else in which this act of this existence is rooted, and that this fact is so manifest as to require no proof. Indeed, when I say, 'I feel this odour, I see this colour,' besides the sensations, I posit the *I* which perceives them and which is their subject. The *Ego*, therefore, is not simply the act whereby the sensations exist, since in the pure idea of existing sensations I do not yet find the *Ego*. On the contrary, but for the *Ego*, I should be obliged to think in sensations an equal number of self-existents, whereas, when I think the number of sensations as I experience them, I convince myself that many of them are referable equally to a single *Ego*. The *Ego*, therefore, which experiences many sensations, is one, and the sensations experienced by the *Ego* are many. The *Ego*, therefore, is different from the sensations, as the subject is different from the modifications to which it is subject. Again, the *Ego* undergoes many actual sensations, and many sensations cease for the *Ego*, while others supervene.

The *Ego*, meanwhile, does not cease to be what it was, although it is furnished with diverse sensations. It has, therefore, the power of being modified, and the power of feeling many sensations is something altogether different from any one actual sensation. Finally, the sensation is felt by the *Ego*, whereas the *Ego* is that which feels. These characteristics, not only different but contrary, clearly show that sensations and the act which makes them exist cannot be conceived without a middle subject, that is, without something in which that act of the existence of sensations terminates, before it terminates in them, and in which sensations receive and have existence.

"In all this, the important point to observe is that the sentient subject in question is not deduced from a long train of reasoning, but from a simple analysis of this idea, *existent sensation*. In the same way, therefore, as we showed above, . . . that even to conceive an *existent sensation* (this is granted by Hume) is to conceive a substance, and this from the analysis of *existing sensation*, so here we show that the mere conceiving of a substance is conceiving something different from the sensations (their subject), and this by means of the analysis of the idea of substance. The subject of sensations, therefore, is not merely an act extending to them, but is a principle existing in itself, which has the power to feel, and abides even when deprived of all special and accidental feelings" (*New Essay*, vol. ii. §§ 640–643).

There is no greater difficulty in conceiving an *existing sensation* than in conceiving any other unit of force, such, for example, as an atom. Indeed, the difficulty is even less in the former case, since sensation is in its nature a principle of unity. The difficulty with regard to the conception of the human soul resolves itself into the difficulty of conceiving how these units of sensation are united in a higher sentient unity. But this is no more difficult than to conceive how a number of atomic forces unite to form a single molecular force, different from its components, yet capable of being resolved into them, and how this molecular force is capable, under different circumstances, of

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displaying actions totally or widely different from each other. The soul might be defined as the substance of the unity of sensation, or the substantial unity of sensation. It is thus that the soul is the substantial form of the body, as the Schoolmen said (see St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.*, Pt. i. q. 76).

122.

The human soul a principle at once sensitive and intellective.

But the human soul not only feels, but also intellectively perceives—perceives felt bodies and itself. The human soul, therefore, is a principle at once sensitive and intellective.

The difference between sense and intelligence, now so frequently overlooked, was seen as early as Herakleitos, who says that "Those who hear without intelligence are like deaf persons (Ἀξύνετοι ἀκούσαντες κωφοῖσι ἐοίκασι)," and "Eyes and ears are evil witnesses to men with barbarous souls (κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρώποισι ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὦτα, βαρβάρους ψυχὰς ἐχόντων [ἔχουσι?]" Bywater, *Heracliti Ephesii Reliquiæ*, pp. 2, 3). The distinction was more clearly brought out by Plato and Aristotle; but both made it far too wide, the former, by utterly separating the intelligible from the sensible world, the latter, by separating the intellective from the sensitive in man, and giving him, so to speak, two souls, one intellective and one sensitive. St. Thomas and the Schoolmen did not go much beyond Aristotle. They still continued to speak of the *object* of sense, as well as the object of intelligence, and of a common sense, as different from intelligence. Indeed, the true nature of the distinction was never cleared up until Rosmini showed that sense has only a *term*, while intelligence has an *object*, and that in cognition this term and this object are correlated as matter and form, as subject and object. This clearing up would not have been possible without the previous distinction between the matter and form of cognition. That this distinction found currency in philosophy, is mainly

due to Kant, although, as Rosmini shows, it was previously made by Genovesi (1712–1769). That it was "*ancient* and, in Italy, well known," does not seem correct. (See *New Essay*, vol. i. § 328 n.).

123.

In what sense the *Ego* expresses the soul, and in what sense it is called the principle and subject of Psychology.

When this sensitive principle pronounces itself, it uses the word *I* or *Ego*. *I*, therefore, is a word which expresses the soul, but expresses it in so far as it utters itself. It does not therefore express the soul purely, but the soul invested with certain relations to itself—the soul in a state of development. If we desire, therefore, to form a clear conception of the soul, pure and simple, we must carefully consider what the *Ego* contains, and then remove from it all that part which is known to have been added and acquired by the operations of the soul itself. It is the *Ego* as thus despoiled that is the principle and subject of Psychology.

See above, under § 75. This is a most important distinction, and one which is, even to the present day, systematically and almost universally overlooked. The *Ego* is a self-affirmed subject. Now, all affirmation belongs to the science of Logic. Hence the *Ego*, as such, is not the subject of Psychology, nor does any act of the *Ego* involving an affirmation form part of that subject. Aristotle saw this very plainly, and from his treatise *On the Soul* excluded everything involving the recognition of true objectivity. On the contrary, Herbert Spencer, who, as we have seen, does not understand the nature of the distinction between sensation and intelligence, introduces into his *Psychology* all the processes of reasoning. This is exactly the same

thing as making Biology a branch of Inorganic Chemistry; for there is certainly as much difference between objectified and unobjectified sensation, as there is between animate and inanimate matter. It is not necessary to say that the soul's relation (objectively considered) to objectivity in general falls within the domain proper of *Psychology*.

124.

Complete definition of the human soul.

Proceeding in this way, we find, with the aid of Ideology, a more complete definition of the human soul, which may be thus expressed:—The human soul is an intellective and sensitive subject or principle, having by nature the intuition of being and a feeling whose term is extended, besides certain activities consequent upon intelligence and sensitivity.

It is instructive to compare this definition with that of Aristotle, which for so many hundred years held possession of the philosophical world. According to that philosopher, "The soul is the first active form* of a physical body having life in potentiality, and a body is such when it is organized" ("Ψυχὴ ἐστιν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ δύναμις ζωὴν ἔχοντος. Τοιοῦτο δὲ ὃ ἂν ᾖ ὀργανικόν." *De Animâ*, ii. 1, 5; 411 b, 26 sq.) It will be seen at a glance that, while this is the definition of the soul as the principle of life, Rosmini's definition refers to the soul as the principle of cognition. But the two are by no means so distinct as at first sight might seem. This will appear if we note how the former was understood by the Schoolmen, and what by them seen to involve. St. Thomas

* On the meaning of ἐντελέχεια, see Trendelenburg, *Aristot. De An., Lib. III.*, p. 295, sqq.; Biese, *Die Philosophie des Aristoteles*, vol. i. pp. 355, 452, 479 sqq.; ii. 129, 207 sq., 214 sq.; Bonitz, *Aristot. Metaphys.*, pp. 387 sq. (1047 a, 30); Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, vol. ii. pt. ii. p. 480; Teichmüller, *Aristotelische Forschungen*, iii. pp. 55 sqq., 119 sqq., etc., etc.

translates it thus: "Anima est *actus* corporis physici potentia vitam habentis," and adds: "Comparatur igitur anima ad corpus, sicut forma ad materiem." Hence it is a standing principle with all orthodox Thomists that the soul is the substantial form of the body.* And when they say "the soul," they mean the intellective part of it, the *νοῦς* or *ψυχὴ νοητική*, that which Aristotle calls the place of forms (*τόπος εἰδῶν*) and the form of forms (*εἶδος εἰδῶν*). St. Thomas, in the *conclusio* of the article above cited, says, "Since the intellective principle is that whereby man is originally intelligent, whether it be called intellect or intellective soul, it must be united to the human body as form." † And this is correct, for the first active form of the human body, *as such*, must be intelligence. This is easily shown. The human body, as such, is the correlate term of the unity of human sensation, and must, therefore, be determined by the same form as that unity. But the unity of human sensation is intelligence. Since the unity of sensation must be something that is aware of all sensations, and since one sensation cannot be aware of another, the unity of sensation cannot be itself sensation. But that which is aware of all sensations without being itself a sensation, is intelligence. Hence, intelligence is the unity of human sensation, and consequently the unity or substantial form of the body, which is the correlate term of such sensation. Hence Aristotle's definition, as correctly interpreted by the Schoolmen, involves Rosmini's. The above reasoning may seem somewhat scholastic and wire-drawn; but it is the sober truth.

It is worth while here to call attention to a definition of the soul which was given in ancient times, and agrees in several essential points with Rosmini's. It is that of Porphyry, who in the eighteenth of his *Sentences* (*Ἀφορμαὶ πρὸς τὰ νοητά*) says, "The soul is an essence, unextended,

* Zigliara, *Summa Philosophica*, vol. ii. p. 138, says, "Anima humana unitur corpori nostro ut vera ejus forma substantialis."

† "Cum principium intellectivum sit quo primo intelligit homo, sive vocetur intellectus, sive anima intellectiva, necesse est ipsum uniri corpori humano ut formam" (*Sum. Theol.* i., q. 76, art. 4).

immaterial, imperishable, endowed with essential, self-derived life, possessing being." * This, of course, is a definition of the soul as separated from its sensible term, the body, and, as such, is very remarkable: *first*, because it identifies the soul with life, as Rosmini does (see § 125, 2); and *second*, because it attributes to it the possession of being, which, according to Rosmini, is the essential form of intelligence. Whether Porphyry saw all that this attribution involves, may be regarded as doubtful; but when one remembers that the whole of mediæval philosophy had its origin in a single sentence of the *Eisagôge* of this philosopher,† one will not pronounce very dogmatically upon the limits of his insight. Certain it is that very many of his utterances coincide, in a most remarkable way, with those of Rosimini, and seem to be based upon the same principles.

125.

Hence are deduced the other properties of the human soul.

From this definition, which expresses the essence of the soul, may be deduced its properties, the most important of which are these two—*simplicity* and *immortality*.

Simplicity.

The *simplicity* of the soul is shown by the facts that it is a single principle, and that it is unconditioned by space. That it is a single principle, is evident; for it is the same principle which feels and understands. That it is unconditioned by space, is shown from this, that the act of feeling excludes extension through the opposition by

* "Ἡ ψυχὴ οὐσία ἀμεγέθης, ἄϋλος, ἄφθαρτος, ἐν ζωῇ παρ' ἑαυτῆς ἐχούσῃ τὸ ζῆν, κεκτημένη τὸ εἶναι." Cf. my translation of these *Sentences* in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, vol. iii. Another rendering is possible.

† See Hauréau, *De la Philosophie Scolastique*, vol. i. cp. iv.; cf. Ueberweg's *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie* (American translation), vol. i. p. 365 sq. The sentence allu 'ed to refers to the nature of genera and species. See Berlin edition of Aristotle, vol. iv. p. 1 a. 8–13.

which it distinguishes itself from the felt extended, as well as by the fact that it receives its form from the idea, which is altogether free from space and time.

Immortality.

The *immortality* of the soul is proved from these considerations: *First*, the soul is the principle which gives life to the body. Now, the soul, being that which gives life, is itself life. For this reason it cannot cease to be life, unless it be annihilated. Hence, of itself it cannot die; it is through itself immortal. *Second*, the form of the intelligent soul is the eternal and immutable idea. It is true that the soul, being in its nature contingent, might be annihilated; but this could be done only by God, who alone has the power to create, and hence, also, to annihilate. Now, God annihilates nothing that he has created, annihilation being contrary to his attributes, as is shown by *Natural Theology*.

"Since the body is the proximate cause of our sensations, and these are facts which happen in us without our agency, while we are merely passive subjects, it follows of necessity that *we* are not body. And since that which the word WE expresses is the feeling and thinking subject, therefore this subject is a substance entirely different from corporeal substance" (*New Essay*, vol. ii. § 668). It follows directly that, if the soul is incorporeal, it is simple. By *simple* is not meant that which is without distinction or determination, but that which is entitatively and *per se* one. The following table of the various significations of *simple* is taken from a work of considerable merit recently published (p. 232):—


"Simplicity (or indivisibility)—
As to Essence, when an entity (ens) is not made up of parts essentially diverse.
As to Extension or Entity, when an entity cannot be divided into parts entitatively different.
Negative, when an entity of itself has nothing that can be divided (e.g. whiteness or any quality.)
Positive, when an entity per se excludes division.
Merely Extrinsic, when the form of the totality is external (as in a mathematical figure or a word).
Intrinsic, when the ground of totality is internal.
Merely Natural, when the whole is in the whole and in each part 'exigitively' from internal connection.
Simply Entitative, when the whole is in the whole and in each part entitatively (as in the spirit).
Perfect, when the parts perfectly require each other (as in the horse).
Imperfect, when the parts imperfectly require each other (as in the tape-worm)."*

The soul is positively, intrinsically, and entitatively simple, so that the whole of it is in the whole and in each of the parts.* That this is true, is a matter of simple consciousness; indeed, were it not true, consciousness would not be possible. If the soul thought with one part and felt with another, or thought or felt one thing with one part and another with another, there would be required some still higher unity in which both these parts were at once present, otherwise there would be no unity of consciousness. And this higher unity would be the true soul, whatever the nature of its super-intelligent operations might be. It is easy to see that entitative simplicity is incompatible with materiality, at least as at present conceived. But, if the immateriality of the soul follows from its simplicity, from the former also follows its immortality.

* *Institutiones Philosophiæ Naturalis, secundum Principia S. Thomæ Aquinatis*, by Tilmann Pesch, S. J. Freiburg in Breisgau, Herder, 1880.

† Cf. *Die Einheit des Seelenlebens aus den Principien der Aristotelischen Philosophie entwickelt*, von J. H. Schell, Freiburg in Breisgau, 1873.

"If," says Rosmini, "the soul is a substance altogether different from the body, we cannot from the death of the body infer the death of the soul. Moreover, the word *death* means merely the cessation in the body of the acts of life and animation. Hence the word *death* refers only to the body, and could not be attributed without absurdity to that which is not body. . . . It might, however, be a matter of doubt whether man would retain a feeling of his own when he was deprived altogether of bodily feeling, and even of the body itself. This doubt arises from observing that nearly all the operations of human thought require images or other bodily feelings, so that these cognitions appear to be accompanied with a bodily feeling rather than to be sensible themselves. But we hold that even intellective operations are sensible in their essence, because we believe that the essence of man himself consists in feeling. . . . The objection, for the most part, disappears, when we observe that, if intellective operations were not sensible in their own way, they could not even become so though animal feelings were added to them, since animal sensibility presents to our perception nothing but itself. Now, we can most readily distinguish what animal sensibility, bound as it is to space, presents to us from what the sensibility of merely intellective operations, free altogether from space, presents. . . . If intellective operations are accompanied with sensibility, we must say that even the first of these, the immanent essential operation, which we have called the intuition of universal being, is sensible. Although, therefore, the soul were deprived of animal feelings, divested of the body, and reduced to a pure act intuiting being, it would, nevertheless, retain a feeling of its own. But we must take care not to form a false and impure concept of this spiritual feeling. We must not add to it anything of the nature of bodily feeling. We must, moreover, understand that the act of intuition does not at all extend beyond its object (being), so that it is, so to speak, a spiritual feeling of the object, revealing nothing but the object which is its term; but, being an activity, it has a principle different from the object to which it adheres in a

mode essential to it, so that it cannot separate from this without falling into nought. Thus the peculiar sensibility of this intuitive act is the consequence of the object intuited by it. Without the intuition of the object, this act would not be sensible, because it would not be at all. The sensibility, therefore, of primitive intuition arises from the object, as related to the subjective sentient principle. From this we may conclude that the human soul, even when separated from the body, retains a feeling of its own (although without reflection), and, therefore, retains its essence, which consists in feeling, and lives for ever" (*Psychology*, §§ 134–139).

This is not widely different from Aristotle's view, which is, that the intelligence generally is unconnected with the body (see *De Animâ*, i. 1, 9, 10; 403 a, 3 sqq.: iii. 5, 2; 430 a, 22 sqq.).

When Rosmini says, "The soul, being that which gives life, is life itself," the conclusion seems not to follow from the premise. It really does, however; for the soul is a principle, and a principle has nothing to give but what it is. Hence, if the soul gives life, it is life.

126.

In what sense the opinion of Plato, that the body is an obstacle to the soul, is false.

We have said that the soul is an intellective and sensitive principle, having by its nature the intuition of being and a feeling whose term is extended. The *being* intuited by the soul is altogether indeterminate, so that, unless the soul had something else, it would be unable to have any knowledge of a determinate thing, and its intellectual development would be impossible, not from want of power, but from want of material. The Creator has provided for this, by giving to the human soul that feeling whose term is the extended, by giving it space and a body. This

feeling, which has an extended term or *sensum*, capable of undergoing various modifications, supplies the mind with the original matter of all its intellective operations, from which it afterwards draws all its cognitions. In this way human knowledge unfolds itself. It was, therefore, an error on the part of Plato to look upon the body as a hindrance to the flight of the soul. The truth is that, considered in itself, it is the instrument whereby the soul develops and perfects itself. But Plato's view has its justification, if, instead of applying it to the nature of body, we apply it to the corruption entailed upon the animal nature by the first sin.

Human knowledge is a body of ideas or determinations of being, which man is enabled to make by means of sensations, that reveal to him reality. Any sensation or group or series of sensations, when objectified by means of being, produces an idea, eternal, universal, necessary. An idea is always a logically possible form of existence, and that which is once logically possible is eternally, universally, and necessarily so. Even Omnipotence cannot alter the logically possible.

127.

Let us now consider a little more attentively this extended term. It is double, *space* and *body*, the latter being a force which diffuses itself in a limited part of space. Space in itself is immovable, simple, illimitable, indivisible; body is movable, limited, divisible, and hence composite. In consequence of the variations which body

The extended term of feeling is double, *space* and *body*, and these have opposite characters.

continually undergoes, there takes place a continual variation in the term of the feeling, and hence the immense variety of sensations and perceptions, and the abundance of original material supplied to human cognition.

The soul, as intelligent, has an object, unextended and eternal; as sensitive, it has a double term, whose essential characteristic is extension, and one of whose parts is subject to change, and, therefore, not eternal. Of course, extension, being a primitive element of indefinable sense, does not admit of any definition, except a relative or negative one. We may say it is an element of the term or correlate of feeling, or we may say it is interminable, immeasurable, uninterrupted, that is, continuous; but we can do no more. And the reason of this lies in the nature of extension itself, which *is* merely relative and negative, relative to sense and negative to limits. Extension has no substance, no *noümenon*, of its own. Its substance belongs to *existing sensation*. It is, therefore, purely phenomenal. This by no means implies that it *is* not, or that it is delusive. On the contrary, it is of the very essence of reality. Its relativity, that is, its phenomenality, consists in this, that it is only a moment in an entitatively simple act, of which the other side is sensation. "Extension," says Rosmini, "is something in external objects [whose reality is feeling]. It is also something in the fundamental feeling, in which, and in respect to which, it has the nature of *matter* and term. Moreover, extension is common to our sensations and to external bodies [*i.e.* to sensations objectified]; but, in so far as it is in our sensations, we call it the *matter* of them; in so far as it is in external bodies, we call it the *external term*" (*New Essay*, vol. ii. § 822, n.).

"*Pure space* is the term, natural and not foreign, of the sensitive principle. It is the term in which its activity exhausts itself, and for this reason is called by us the *quiescent term*, although from it activity begins, when corporeal matter is added. We must observe that it is very

difficult to form a correct concept of pure space, because, in order to do so, we must abstract from all bodies and movements; we must think neither of limits nor of determinate places; we must forget our own bodies. The phenomenon of space which remains after this will appear to many a zero; but this is not really the case, because a subtraction does not leave a difference equal to zero, unless that which is subtracted is equal to that from which it is subtracted. Here, however, we have only subtracted bodies from the phenomenon and from total apprehension: hence there is left the remainder, space. At the same time, this phenomenon of residual space does not lend itself to the imagination, which deals only with bodies, nor to measurement, because all measure is posterior to it; nevertheless, it is something which, when compared to space measured and distinguished by means of bodies, seems a potential space. What renders it difficult to see that space is not something separate from its principle, but merely a natural appurtenance of it, merely its complement, is this: that our minds have a tendency to think the space which already clothes the foreign reality, internal or external, whereas, as we have said, we must look away from this reality, and conceive space pure. It is only then that we see it to be in itself nothing external, and to be most closely united to the principle which feels it. Furthermore, we must reflect that we, men, are not the principle of space, but are rational principles; whence it is no wonder that space appears to us as something different from us. Even the abstract animal is not the principle of space; but this principle exists in it. as the genus in the species; whence even the animal itself, in so far as it is species and individual, must feel in space something given to it, as a generic nature, and not something which itself produces, as the animating principle of its body.

"We therefore distinguish three things:

(1) *An end of activity*, the quiescent term.

(2) *A final activity*, the term which draws life from the activity of the principle.

(3) *A foreign term*, which can never be a quiescent term, but must always be an active one.

"Hence the space, which is conceived as the end of the activity of the sensitive principle, when this, having reached its extreme, comes to rest, and which, for this reason, is the proper term of that principle, being distinguished from it only by *hypothetical abstraction*, could never form the foreign real term of a principle of another nature, for the simple reason that it has no activity, other than that of its principle in which it terminates. On the contrary, the *final activity*, besides being the proper term of its own principle, can become the *foreign term* of a principle of another nature, because it has activity and reality and abstraction from the principle from whose act it proceeds. For this reason it can connect itself with the reality of another principle and communicate to it part of its power. Not every proper term, therefore, can become the foreign term of another principle, but only that which is a *final activity*, and not simply an *end of activity*. The latter, when separated from its principle, alone offers to the mind a negative and relative concept.

"The sensitive principle, therefore, is primarily constituted a subject-being by its entitative force, terminating in pure space, which is, accordingly, its primitive form. But the sensitive principle, in this form, is a *real indeterminate*. By this is not meant something in itself indeterminate, for nothing real can exist indeterminate, but a relative indeterminate, that is, indeterminate compared with other reals, such as, in the present case, the principles that animate matter. The *real indeterminate*, however, is merely a *real genus*, which in itself does not lack indetermination, but which exists identical, with other differences, in other reals. To this principle, so constituted, is united a second ulterior term—corporeal matter, which is what specifies it as an animating principle. Now, the foreign reality, uniting itself to the principle of space as its term, has to render it its term by feeling it, for the reason that the sensitive principle can have no term but the felt; whence the first felt thing which it produces in this term is space itself. Indeed, having space as the end of its activity and as its primitive form, it can feel nothing which is not in space.

The circumstance, therefore, that the foreign reality which becomes the term of the sensitive principle is extended, is due to *sentimentation*, that is, to the act of the principle of space, in which space it is obliged to feel all that it does feel, space being the end of its activity. This first corporeal term is what constitutes the body of the animate. That this body occupies a greater or less space, depends upon the number of its atoms; but the measure of the atom certainly is, and must be, dependent on the inner laws to which the activity of the sensitive principle of space is subject, in relation to the quantity of reality in the atom itself. To this relation between what we shall call the intensive quantity of the corporeal reality and the comparative quantity of extension with which the sensitive principle clothes it, is to be referred the origin of the first corporeal extension. But hence we gather that the *absolute extension* of a body is not cognizable, and, indeed, does not exist at all. The extension that exists is the *relative extension* of bodies and atoms to each other, the relation between the extension of body (relative extension) and the extension of pure space (absolute extension) being incommensurable. And there is lacking not only the *maximum measure* applicable to limited extension, but also the *minimum measure*, because there is no absolute minimum of extension that can serve to measure the extension of bodies themselves.

"The extension, therefore, which is felt in body through sensible touch, and which differentiates it from empty space, is the work of the sensitive principle having space for its essential term; it is the extended felt produced, in which extended felt is contained, as a *substratum*, a foreign reality. And this, indeed, is the origin of the concept of substratum, of which the ancients made so much use, extending it improperly to all substances, even spiritual ones. It is on account of this foreign reality contained in the term of our feeling, that the felt bodily term appears to us as double, that is, as subjective and as extra-subjective; and for the same reason that the same extension also presents itself as double—on the one hand, as subjective and belonging to the

felt, something of ours, that is, of the sentient subject's ; on the other, as extra-subjective and belonging to material body, something different from the sentient subject, from which we divide it by thetic abstraction, but which, in truth, does not present itself to us as existing, except as a foreign element existing inside feeling. Subjective extension is called *internal*, extra-subjective, *external extension*.

"Such is the origin of the wonderful phenomenon which is called *external world*—I mean the external world known and felt by ourselves. Indeed, if we were capable of removing from our minds the images of bodies, and retaining pure space alone, directing our attention only to it, we should readily convince ourselves that, in such a case, it would never enter our minds to say that space was something external rather than internal. This distinction would not exist for us. We should rather feel pure space united to us as our pure feeling, which constitutes us. No movement, nay, not even the possibility or impossibility of a movement, would enter our thoughts. But when we unite to space another term, viz., body, then new kinds of phenomena manifest themselves. On the one hand, this new reality given to the sensitive principle cannot be its term, unless this term renders it felt to itself ; on the other, this term cannot render it totally felt to itself, because it is a foreign reality, which cannot totally belong to it. But the part felt and the part not felt are indivisible. The former comes from the sensible action which the sensitive principle itself performs upon the foreign reality ; the latter, from the foreign principle to which said reality properly belongs, and which furnishes and, so to speak, yields it to the sensitive principle. The felt, therefore, contains a non-felt foreign element, and the sentient, not being able to feel it as a felt nature, nevertheless feels its existence as a refractory and opposing nature. Now, since the first law of the sentient is that it gives extension to what it feels, it clothes not only the felt, but also this diverse and refractory nature with the same extension. In this way, in so far as there exists a felt nature clothed with extension, the sentient recognizes the extension in its own proper feelings, that is, in the terms

which it feels; but in so far as the same extension clothes that nature which it feels as refractory—contained in its term of feeling, but resisting sentimentation—in so far it has the feeling or *perception* of an external world; that is, a world different from its own feeling, not existing purely through the act of feeling, but existing in the felt through some other cause, different from that of the act of its own feeling.

"Thus is explained the reason why, on the one hand, it seems that the soul is in the body, and on the other that the body is in the soul.* If we take the reality as felt, it can only be in the soul; but, if we consider the reality as something different from the feeling and impenetrable to it, it appears that this very reality as subject (and it is only a dialectical subject) receives the feeling, and, hence, the soul. It was this fact that induced Aristotle to say that the soul was an act of the body, as if the body were the subject of this act [see above, under § 124].

"In the same way is cleared up the great difficulty in which philosophers, especially modern ones, have involved themselves in order to discover the communication between the soul, which they considered as internal and having in it all feeling, and the external world, which they considered as a reality existing in itself and not felt. They did not observe that the non-felt external world, taken by itself, as outside the feeling, was a pure abstraction, and that the question must refer, not to this abstract entity, but to the true and real world. They did not observe that the true and real world, although, indeed, independent in its reality, which is foreign and refractory to the act of feeling, nevertheless exists nowhere but in the felt itself, as a content in a containing form, and that it is only because it is thus contained that we perceive it, as a refractory and opposing element, cognizing it thus and not otherwise. It is of this world contained in feeling that we have spoken; of no other could we speak, to no other even refer. . . .

"It is to be observed that the space with which the

* Cf. St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.*, i, q. 52, art. 1: "Anima enim est in corpore ut continens et non ut contenta."

animating principle clothes its felt terms appears as double; whence we have distinguished it as, on the one hand, internal and subjective, in which form it has relation to feelings, on the other as external and objective, in which form it has relation to reality considered in itself, and constitutes the external world. Moreover, this second space is always measured or measurable, whereas the first is in itself immeasurable, and receives measure only from the relation of identity which it has to the other. We have not, moreover, by nature, a feeling of measured space (and from measure it receives its externality to our body and that absolute mode in which it is considered, and which springs from the concept of reality considered solely in itself, as extraneous to the felt); but we acquire the feeling and the concept of measured space from sensible experience and from motion, as we have shown in the *Ideology* [§§ 872–873]. When, therefore, we clothe one of our own terms of feeling with external and measured space, then—

(1) We make use of a natural instinct, which induces us to clothe with extension all that we feel, because the principle of space is our generic nature.

(2) The space which we thus employ, in so far as it is external, is acquired.

(3) What guides us in applying this external measure of space to terms of feeling is habit and the similarity of cases. We learn from experience that such or such measure of external space corresponds to such or such term of feeling" (*Theosophy*, vol. iii. §§ 1449–1453).

128.

Connection of soul and body. The incomprehensibility of this connection does not give us the

But here naturally arises the question: How can an extended *sensum* be presented to the soul, which is a simple principle? Before answering this question, we must observe that the two clauses which form the terms of the proposition, viz., that the soul is a simple principle, and that

it has, as the term of its feeling, an extended, express indubitable facts. For this reason, even if we should be unable to explain how this can be the case, we should not be able to deny the fact, but should be obliged to confess that here was one of those many mysteries which it is given to few or none to penetrate.

right to doubt the fact.

The problem of the connection between mind and body has occupied the attention of thinkers from the days of Demokritos, and perhaps earlier, to our own. A list of the chief opinions entertained on the subject before Aristotle's time will be found in that philosopher's work *On the Soul*, Book i. Perhaps the most considerable attempt made in ancient times to clear up the matter was that of Plotinus (*Enn.*, i. 8 ; iv. 8, etc.). In modern times, the subject, though not dropped, has come to be included, along with the questions of free will, the origin of evil, and some others, in the list of insoluble problems, which only persons capable of attempting the quadrature of the circle will waste time on. Nevertheless, even those who most deprecate all attempts to fathom the nature of mind are obliged to admit that it is "one substance with two sets of properties, two sides, the physical and the mental—*a double-faced unity*," and that "the same being is, by alternate fits, object and subject, under extended and under unextended consciousness" (Alex. Bain, *Body and Mind*, pp. 138, 196).

"As soon," says Rosmini, "as it is known that the soul is not extended, and that it is not a mathematical point, there is no difficulty in conceiving that it does not occupy any place, or have one position rather than another. Hence, in the different parts of the body, we may observe the traces of its action, the various effects of its operation ; but itself we find in no part, either great or small, either in the whole body or in any point of it. The reason of this is, that its mode of being bears no comparison, proportion, or similitude to that of anything that is matter or a property of matter. It has with matter a relation of

action, of passion . . . and, strictly speaking, a relation of feeling and nothing more" (*Anthropology*, § 103; cf. *New Essay*, vol. ii. §§ 721, 988 sq.).

At present, the philosophy or science of unextended existence is so little developed, and, indeed, so little considered, that such doctrines as the above seem to hang in the air and make no impression. So much do we require space in order fully to grasp the nature of an idea or principle, that we are inclined to believe the truth of such idea or principle to depend upon space. We are never entirely sure of the truth of any intellectual entity until, in imagination at least, we have projected it, in some form or another, upon space and made a figurate concept of it, and we are, therefore, always somewhat sceptical and a little contemptuous in regard to entities which, like the soul, refuse to be, in any way, so projected. But the soul has to be accepted as a fact, and part of that fact is its non-extension, coupled with a relation of energy to the extended. Porphyry, who lived in an age when the science of the unextended was not in such a backward state as it is now, wrote: "Things essentially incorporeal are not locally present in things corporeal: they are present in them by an act of volition, tending toward them in the way wherein it is their nature to tend. Though not present in them locally, they are present in them by relation." *

129.

The sentient principle feels its own body with a passivity mingled with much activity.

Let us now take up the question of how the term of the unextended soul can be extended, and, leaving space out of view for the present, let us consider only bodies. It is plain that the fact to be explained is still twofold, inasmuch as we feel two kinds of bodies widely distinct from

* "Τὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἀσώματα, οὐ τοπικῶς παρόντα τοῖς σώμασι, πάρεστιν αὐτοῖς ὅταν βούληται, πρὸς αὐτὰ βέψαντα ἢ καὶ πέφυκε βέπειν. ἀλλὰ τοπικῶς αὐτοῖς οὐ παρόντα, τῇ σχέσει πάρεστιν αὐτοῖς" (*Sententiæ*, iii.; cf. iv–vii.).

each other. In the first place, we feel the body which we call our own and which accompanies the soul into whatever portion of space it transports itself; in the second, we feel bodies different from our own, and feel them, too, as foreign to us: we feel them because they abruptly modify our own bodies, which alone are continually felt. If, then, we could explain how the soul continually feels its own body, we should have no difficulty in explaining how it feels the external bodies which modify this same body of its own. Indeed, we must observe how the sensitive principle feels its own body. It feels it, not through simple passivity, but through a passivity mixed with a great deal of action. This is clear from the fact that feeling is not only an act of the sentient principle and a continuous act in respect to its own body, but is, moreover, an act so potent, that by means of it the sentient principle—that is, the soul—continually modifies and disposes its own body, and produces many movements and changes in it. Meanwhile, the body, as something inert, submits to this action of the sentient principle, in which consists the intimate union of said principle with the body. When we admit this, we can easily understand how, if there takes place in a body, under the control of the soul, a change independent of that soul, and even opposed to its continuous action, it should feel a resistance, a violence; in other words, a foreign body.

The sentient principle feels a foreign body, if in the body subject to its power there comes a change independent of and opposed to it.

130.

There would be no difficulty in understanding how the soul should feel external bodies, if we could understand how, being a simple principle, it can have an extended term.

From this fact we may deduce an ontological principle, which is, that a sentient principle, besides its own spontaneous feeling, also feels and receives into itself, without losing any of its own simplicity, a foreign force opposed to its instinctive and spontaneous action, and even aids it.

When we have explained how the soul feels within itself something foreign to it—that is to say, an activity which resists or even stimulates its own—then there is no difficulty in explaining the secondary qualities of external bodies, colours, tastes, odours, etc. Since all these belong to the soul's own body, as the term of its feeling, the only difficulty remaining is that of the *extension* of bodies; that is, the question which we first proposed: How can the soul, being a simple principle, have extension as its term?

All philosophers are agreed that the substance of the soul, however we may conceive it, must be simple and unchangeable, a something that remains identical in the midst of all change (see Herbert Spencer, *Psychology*, vol. i. pt. ii. cap. i. § 59). Even those who consider the soul to be merely, as Spencer puts it, "a circumscribed aggregate of activities," see that "the cohesion of these activities, one with another, throughout the aggregate, compels the postulation of a something of which they are the activities" (*ut sup.*, § 63). In other words, Spencer admits Rosmini's principle of substance or cause, as essential to the conception of activity.

131.

A close consideration of this question shows that the continuous does not lie in the single parts, but in a principle embracing them all at once, and hence that the continuous cannot exist, except as the term of the act of a simple principle.

The terms of this question, when closely considered, so far from containing the contradiction which at first sight they seem to imply, are the expression of the simple and only truth of the matter. The outcome of this truth is this: The continuously extended cannot exist save in a simple principle, as the term of its act. If the case were otherwise, there would be no ground for the continuity of the parts assignable in this extended term, since the existence of one part terminates with that part, and does not contain the ground of the other part which adheres to it. The ground of continuity, therefore, does not lie in the single parts, but in a principle, and that a simple one, which embraces all the parts at once. Moreover, but for this principle, the parts themselves, of which we suppose the continuous to be made up, would vanish the instant we tried to look for them; for, the extended being divisible *ad indefinitum*, the first parts of it could never be found, and, indeed, do not exist. It is not possible, therefore, to consider the continuous as an aggregate of parts, and yet every part of it assignable by thought is outside every other, and has an existence independent of every other. It is impossible, therefore, that the continuous, as a whole, should exist otherwise than by a single act in the simple principle which feels it.

This section expresses one of the important doctrines of Rosmini's system, viz., that the principle of all continuity is sensation; that even space is continuous only through and to something in which all the parts of it are at once present. That this something is not extended is clear. If it were, it would have to contain some higher principle in which all its parts were simultaneously present, and the same difficulty as before would occur. The only way, therefore, in which extension or space can be continuous, or in which each part can so involve the rest as to be separable from them only mentally, is that the unity of the parts shall be constituted by something having the form of sensibility, that is, something in which the whole is present in each assignable part. That space involves a sensitive principle is, therefore, manifest. We must not conclude, however, that this sensitive principle actually feels, as a sensitive principle connected with a body does; but merely that it is something which, if connected with a body, would feel. Neither must we conclude that space is simply the correlate or term of the various sensitive principles connected with bodies, as in men and animals, and, therefore, that there are as many spaces as there are such principles. On the contrary, it is perfectly plain that there is but one space, in and through which all sensitive principles communicate with each other. The truth is that the sensitive principle of space is the whole, whereof all other sensitive principles are but determinate parts, or, more correctly, embodied manifestations. When these other particular sensitive principles become disembodied, they return into their universal principle, except in so far as they are prevented from doing so by their union with something which has not space for its term, that is, with intelligence, whose object and form is being (cf. under § 127).

"I take as the object of my contemplation," says Rosmini, "any body, and I ask myself, What is the characteristic and essential property of this body? I reply, What forms the characteristic and essential property of this body, as I conceive it (and I always speak only of what I con-

ceive), is that every part of it is outside of every other. I see also that what I affirm of this body, I may affirm of every other body. Hence I conclude that body is a being of such essence that every part assignable in it by thought, whether great or small, is outside of every other.

"Having fixed this essential property of body, I wish now to see whether body can be the sentient principle itself, or whether to suppose so would involve contradiction. In order to arrive at clearness in this matter, I reason as follows :—Let it be supposed that sensitivity adheres to body as a property of it. Then, obviously, all the parts that I can assign in it will be sentient. But as every part of it is outside of every other part, through the essential nature of body, and no one goes beyond its own limits, it must follow, according to the supposition, that likewise the sensitivity adhering to these parts will not go beyond their limits, and hence the sensitivity of one part will be outside that of all the other parts. If this were the case, the sensitivity would no longer be truly a single sensitive principle; but there would be as many such principles as there were parts in the body in question, and each of these principles would not be able to feel the entire body, but each only its own part, not going beyond it to the others, for the reason assigned, viz., that each part to which the sentient principle adheres is outside of every other. Now, it is clear that the parts which may be thought and marked in a body may be divided and subdivided indefinitely, and that, however far we carry this division, each of the assignable parts of which the body is essentially composed is outside of the others. Consequently, the sensitivity of each of these minute particles will be outside of the sensitivity of all the other minute particles. Moreover, no particle can be rendered so minute that particles still more minute cannot be assigned in it; which is the same thing as saying that we may go on indefinitely assigning sensitive principles without ever arriving at an ultimate sensitive principle. Finally, we may make one or other of two suppositions—the one, that each particle always remains extended, and, therefore, with parts always located outside of each other; the other (which,

however, I have elsewhere shown to be absurd), that, by dint of division, each extended particle comes at last to be changed into simple points. In this second case, the sensitivity would adhere to simple points and would be incapable of feeling anything extended. In the other case, the true seat of sensitivity would never be found. In either case, the same consequence would follow: the particle remaining extended, and every point assignable in the extended being outside of every other, it would always result that the sensitivity adhering to each point could never go beyond such point, because the point does not go beyond itself. Therefore, once more, the sensitive principle would not be capable of feeling the extended.

"From this reasoning we derive a most important and undeniable truth, viz., that the extended cannot feel the extended. . . . Since extension, therefore, forms an essential property of bodies, it is clear that the essential properties of bodies contradict the essential properties of feeling. Feeling, therefore, cannot exist in the extended, but only in a perfectly simple subject, to which all the extended is simultaneously present" (*Psychology*, §§ 94–97).

In order to understand the following quotation it is necessary to know that, according to Rosmini, the ultimate elements of matter are animate; that each atom has, united with it and forming its unity or atomicity, a sensitive principle. He holds, moreover, that, when atoms chemically combine, their sensitive principles become one. With this view, he, of course, sees no difficulty in accepting the doctrine of spontaneous generation. It is, indeed, difficult to see what could form a unity in anything other than a principle having the form of sense, and existing altogether independent of space or extension (see *Psychology*, vol. i. §§ 500 sqq.).

"All the phenomena presented by bodily feeling presuppose that every sensitive soul has for its natural term *solid* space, or, if the expression be preferred, unmeasured space, within which the corporeal terms of feeling expand in a space limited and measured by determinate boundaries. If to this doctrine we add that of the animation of the

elements of matter, it will follow that the corporeal elements described by us resemble, in a certain way, the monads of Leibniz, which are representatives of the universe. Our elements, or, rather, our first sentient principles, would not, indeed, be representatives of the universe in the sense in which the monads of Leibniz were supposed to be, because that great man supposed these to represent the universe with all that it contains, corporeal as well as spiritual beings, whereas our sensitive principles embrace only unlimited, unmeasured space, in which corporeal beings subsist. . . .

"Having reached the result stated above, . . . we are now obliged to propose to ourselves the question: Can there be a sentient principle which feels nothing but solid, unlimited space; and if there were such, would it be an individual? . . .

"We say that the concept of such a principle involves no absurdity, and, if there were such a principle, it would certainly be an individual, on account of the simplicity and reality attached to the nature of principle and of such a principle. But hence there springs a consequence of some moment, which is, that there could only be one such individual. If two principles had an identical term, such as unlimited space, they could not in any way have a distinct reality, and hence they would not be two, but one; reality being the principle of individuation. Now, that such principles could not have a distinct reality, is proved in this way. Principles, as such, have no activity or reality but what they receive from their terms. If with the imagination we add any other reality to them, they will no longer be mere principles, as the hypothesis requires. If, therefore, the term is one and identical, the reality and activity of the correlative principle must likewise be one and identical. But solid, unlimited space is one and identical. Therefore the correlative principle of this term must also be one and identical. . . . If we admit this, what relation will such a single principle bear to the sensitive souls of bodies? These will rise and individuate themselves within this principle by means of new terms, that is,

corporeal ones.* This primitive principle might receive, in a certain improper sense, the name of *common soul*, or, more correctly, principle of sensitive souls (corporeal feeling). The individuality of these souls would remain intact; but they would have a common act and a special act. This special act would constitute their proper reality and substance, and hence their substantial difference, and this proper reality would be the principle of their individuation. This would agree with the doctrine of St. Thomas, that matter is the principle of the individuation of souls; although this would hold good only for purely sensitive souls. In this there seems to be no contradiction" (*Psychology*, §§ 554–559).

The doctrine which Rosmini here attributes to St. Thomas, and which the latter frequently repeats,† is, as every one knows, due to Aristotle, who says that "matter is chiefly and properly the subject of generation and the condition of decay" ("ἔστι δὲ ὕλη μάλιστα μὲν καὶ κυρίως τὸ ὑποκείμενον γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς δεκτικόν." *De Gen.*, i. 4; 320, a. 2 sq.). It is true that Aristotle does not say, in as many words, that matter is the principle of individuation; but it follows directly from the above statement. Specific differences and generic differences, of course, belong to species and genera (εἴδη καὶ γένη) themselves ("ἐπειδή ἐστι τὸ μὲν λόγος τὸ δ' ὕλη, ὅσαι μὲν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ εἰσὶν ἐναντιότητες εἴδει ποιοῦσι διαφοράν, ὅσαι δ' ἐν τῷ συνειλημμένῳ τῇ ὕλῃ οὐ ποιοῦσιν." *Metaph.* x. 9; 1058, a. 37 sqq.). Without matter, ideas, to use Rosmini's phrase, could not have subsistence. Each would remain a simple logical possibility, ideal, not real. Though the doctrine that individuation is the result of matter was not original with the Schoolmen, they derived from it another doctrine which, it must be admitted, Aristotle never dreamt of, viz., that the angels, being im-

* Cf. the lines of Tennyson (Epilogue to *In Memoriam*):—

"A soul shall draw from out the vast
And strike his being into bounds,

And, moved through life of lower phase,
Result in man, be born and think."

† E.g. *Sum. Theolog.*, i. q. 3, art. 3, concl.; q. 54, 3, 2; q. 56, 1, 2; q. 75, 4 and 5; q. 86, 1 and 3, concl., etc., etc.

material existences, and thus lacking the principle of individuation, are of necessity each a distinct species.* This doctrine, nevertheless, finds a parallel in Aristotle's theory that the stars are eternal and divine.†

132.

Pursuing these investigations further, we come to the following results :—

(1) That the sentient principle, or sentient soul, has for its first term pure extension, or unmeasured space. The first term of the sensitive soul is unmeasured space.

(2) That it has for its second term a limited force diffused in space. Though this force, accordingly, is a limited measure of space, space is not thereby sundered or made discontinuous. This force is the soul's own body, which is informed by it and is the seat of all its corporeal feelings. Its second term is the body which it informs.

(3) That the soul feels its own body with a fundamental feeling always identical, although susceptible of variation in its accidents. By means of this fundamental feeling no distinct limits are assigned to the body, which, accordingly, has no distinct figure in the feeling of the soul. Fundamental feeling.

(4) That this body is modified by the action of other bodies external and foreign to the soul. These modifications, in so far as they are felt, are called external sensations, and are of different External sensations.

* Vid. *Sum. Theolog.*, i. q. 50, art. 2 sq., etc., etc. Cf. *Sum. contra Gentes*, iii. ch. 43.

† Vid. *Metaph.*, xi. 8 ; 1073, a. 34 : sq. : *De Mundo*, 2 ; 391, b. 16 sq.

kinds, according to the different organs of the body. But all these sensations give us a feeling of extended surface only, and by means of these surface sensations our own bodies acquire limits and a determinate figure felt by the soul.

How measured space is presented to feeling.

(5) That our own bodies, as well as external bodies, occupy only one part of space, and are able to move in it, that is, to change place. These movements become the measure of so many parts of space, and thus there is presented to feeling, under certain conditions, a measured space, which may be indefinitely added to, since the possibility of movement is indefinite.

The *fundamental feeling*, which plays so conspicuous a part in Rosmini's theory of cognition, has already been alluded to (under § 80). It is the feeling which the soul at all times has of its body, and is the direct result and form of the combination of the two. It has its seat in the sensitive parts of the body, and is entirely distinct from life. It is, so to speak, the calm ocean of feeling, of which all particular feelings are so many ruffles or waves. "When we perceive our own bodies, through the fundamental feeling, which is given to us by our being alive, we perceive our bodies as one with us. They become in this way, through individual union with our spirits, part of the sentient subject" (*New Essay*, vol. ii. § 702). Of course such a feeling as this, if undisturbed and uninterrupted, is not likely to enter into consciousness. But "we must distinguish between the existence of a feeling in us and the attention we pay to it. We may very well experience a sensation or a feeling, without reflecting on it or being conscious of it; now, without reflecting on it and thereby acquiring consciousness of it, we should never be able to say to ourselves that we had experienced that feeling; nay, if we could not observe it, we might pertinaciously deny it.

. . . He who has not been able to distinguish *feeling* from the *consciousness of feeling*, has never come to understand the essential difference between *sensation* and *idea*. Sensation can never become aware of itself; it is the understanding that becomes aware of sensation. The consciousness which we receive of sensation is nothing but the intellective perception of it. . . . Although this feeling [the fundamental feeling] exists, it must be very difficult now to recognize and seize it, since we are not in the habit of attending to anything in us, except when we feel a change. Where no change takes place, there is no consciousness, no comparison, no reflection. At the same time, although a change is necessary in order to enlist our attention, it is not necessary, in order that we may *feel*. . . . The size and shape of our bodies, as perceived by vision and touch, are not included in the vital feeling of which we speak" (*New Essay*, vol. ii. §§ 710–712).

Herbert Spencer, from an entirely different point of view, acknowledges the existence of the fundamental feeling. He says, "It will be manifest that, besides the few distinct waves of nervous change working their distinct effects, there are multitudinous indistinct waves, secondary and tertiary, travelling in all directions, working their distinct effects. Since such reflected and re-reflected disturbances everywhere act as stimuli, we must *regard the entire nervous system as at all times discharging itself*" (*Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. pt. 1. cap. 4, §§ 38, 39). What is this general and continual discharge but the obverse of the fundamental feeling? The assumption of this feeling enables as to solve the much-vexed question whether the human mind is always conscious. It is not always conscious, but it has always a fundamental feeling, through a disturbance in which attention may be roused and, thereby, consciousness awakened (cf. *Psychology*, vol. ii. § 1367, n.; and *New Essay*, vol. ii. § 537).

As to the manner in which we become conscious of measured space, Rosmini forestalled by many years the doctrines of Bain, Spencer, and those who hold that it is acquired through the senses and the conscious movement of the

muscular system (*New Essay*, vol. ii. §§ 838, 839; cf. Spencer, *Principles of Psychology*, vol. ii. pt. vi. cap. xiv.).

According to Rosmini, then, "we form the idea of extension and space in two ways: *first*, through the fundamental feeling, accompanied by the faculty of spontaneous motion which our bodies have; *second*, through the sensation of touch aided by said faculty. Indefinite space, in the former way, is produced by a movement in all the directions of a solid space felt by us, that is, of the space of our own bodies. This movement we conceive as indefinitely possible. Indefinite space, in the second way, is produced by the possible movement of a felt superficies in all directions besides that of its own plane" (*New Essay*, § 839). According to this theory, space is at once subjective and extra-subjective. As subjective, it is known through the fundamental feeling; as extra-subjective, through touch and motion. In this way are reconciled the doctrine of Kant, who regarded space as merely subjective, and that of those psychologists who hold that it is an acquired perception, derived from the terms, or as they incorrectly say, the *objects*, of sense.

In regard to the mode in which external bodies are perceived, see under § 80.

133.

The soul exercises no action on its first term; but towards its second it is both passive and active.

In connection with its first term, that is, with unmeasured space, the sensitive principle exercises no activity. It merely has it for its term, without being able to cause any modification in it. In connection with its second term—that is, its own body—on the contrary, it is not only receptive or passive, but also active; and this passivity and activity, which are reciprocal and manifold, are governed by the most wonderful laws.

134.

Sensitivity and instinct.

The sensitive principle or soul, in so far as it is passive, is said to be endowed with the faculty of feeling or with *sensitivity;* in so far as it is active, it is said to be endowed with *instinct.*

135.

Instinct, sensual and vital. Origin of medicine.

The first act of instinct is that which produces feeling, and is called *vital instinct.* But every feeling roused in the soul produces in it a new activity, and this second activity which succeeds the feelings is called *sensual instinct.* With these three principles—*first,* the *vital instinct; second,* the *sensitivity;* and, *third,* the *sensual instinct*—we explain in a wonderful way the physiological, pathological, and therapeutical phenomena of the animal, and here the science of medicine finds its place.

"The spirit, devoid of ideas and furnished with only sensations, may, by itself, in virtue of instinct, attach itself to one or another sensation, in order the better to enjoy the pleasure of it. This is not, properly speaking, reflection, but a reinforcement of attention, and an attention not of the understanding, but of the sense. Indeed, instead of attention, we might more correctly call it an *application of the instinctive force of the animal,* naturally called forth and held by the pleasant sensation to itself" (*New Essay,* vol. ii. § 449).

It appears, from § 135, that the sensitive principle has one passivity, viz., sensitivity, and two activities or instincts, the vital and the sensual, or, as we might perhaps

better term it, the orectic. Enough has already been said about the sensitivity. It remains to consider the two activities of the sensitive principle. Of these the first is the *vital instinct*, or that instinct which co-operates with the sensible in the production of feeling; the second is that which operates in accordance with feeling already produced. "These are the two original and universal forces, from which proceed all the special active faculties and all the operations of the animal" (*Anthropology*, § 369).

As to the *vital instinct*, its point of departure is "that act in which the sentient principle co-operates in the production of the fundamental feeling" (*Ibid.*, § 371). This act is the production of life, which Rosmini defines as "the incessant production of all those extra-subjective phenomena which precede, accompany, and follow parallel with the corporeal and material feeling" (*Ibid.*, § 267). It is curious to compare this definition, which was written before 1846, with those more recent ones advanced by the most eminent biologists. The older one of Bichat, "La vie est l'ensemble des fonctions qui résistent à la mort," hardly deserves attention, as it is no definition at all, signifying merely, Life is resistance to death. As well might one define being as resistance to nought. Herbert Spencer (*Principles of Biology*, vol. i. ch. iv.) defines life "as the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations." Bastian (*The Beginnings of Life*, vol. i. p. 71) enlarges this definition into "Life is the definite combination of heterogeneous changes, both simultaneous and successive, in correspondence with external co-existences and sequences." It will be seen at a glance that, between these definitions and that given by Rosmini, there is only this difference, that the last is by far the most philosophical and best expressed. But to return to the vital instinct. According to Rosmini, it exists prior to the body, and is, indeed, the force through which the body is built up. "The co-operation of the soul in the production of animal feeling consists in an act anterior to that of the body, which act has the double effect of rendering the body active and itself passive to it. . . . The body cannot excite the feeling of the soul,

unless the soul itself, operating on the organized body, renders it capable of operating upon the soul itself, in that manner which is necessary in order to give birth to the feeling of excitation, which is the proper feeling of the animal. Thus action produces passion, and passion produces action—an incessant action and reaction, observable not in this case only, but in all nature. . . . Prior to the feeling of excitation, which requires some stimulus to move the sensitive body, whose corporeal soul it afterwards is, I hold that there is a feeling of the continuous, and the principle of this feeling, being stimulated, becomes capable of animating, when excited, the body organized and properly disposed" (*Anthropology*, §§ 382, 383).

In regard to the *sensual instinct*, Rosmini says, "The term of the fundamental feeling is modified, not only by the soul, but also by material forces. Hence the modifications of the fundamental feeling are the various acquired sensations. Experience shows that, given feeling and the special sensations, there is manifested a new activity of the soul, that which we call *sensual instinct.* In fact, what teaches the child to seek the light with its eyes but this instinct? Who teaches it to seek nourishment . . . from the breast of its mother or nurse? Who directs all its movements and the few actions of its infantile life? It is always this instinct which attracts it to agreeable feelings and withholds it from disagreeable ones. . . . Now, it is easy to see that this second activity of the soul is a kind of continuation of the first. *Sensual instinct* is a continuation of *vital instinct.* The vital instinct posits the first, the fundamental, feeling; the sensual instinct seeks other feelings. It is always to feeling that the activity of the soul tends. . . . Thus the primordial virtue of the soul is reduced to a unity. All its acts are virtually contained in that act whereby it first feels. Through this act it becomes, so to speak, a bent bow. Its virtue is ready. All that is required is the removal of impediments. Then it discharges itself, manifesting movements in its effect. Hence the soul might very properly be defined as "an individual being that, feeling, acts" (*Anthrop.*, §§ 385, 388). According to Rosmini,

- **VITAL INSTINCT.**
  - *Subjective effects*, which take place in feeling.
    - Functions.
      - (1) Animation and conservation.
      - (2) Diffusion.
      - (3) Excitation.
        - Stable excitative faculty, which produces the fundamental excitation.
        - Transient excitative faculty, which produces sensations.
          - Sensual instinct (subjective).
            - Functions.
              - (1) Sensual propensity.
              - (2) Sensual spontaneity.
              - (3) Sensual aversion.
              - (4) Sensual contra-spontaneity.
  - *Extra-subjective effects*, which manifest themselves in body and matter, *i.e.* produce movement.
    - Functions.
      - (4) Organization or faculty, which moves elements and molecules in order to organize them.
        - Moments.
          - Retention.
          - Assimilation.
          - Motive vitality.
          - Spontaneity.
      - (5) .....
        - Sensual instinct (extra-subjective).
          - Moto-sensual spontaneity.
            - Moments.
              - Concupiscent mobility.
              - Voluptuous mobility.
              - Reluctant mobility.
              - Aversive mobility.
              - Wrathful mobility.
              - Sympathetic mobility.

the medicative forces of nature are due to the vital instinct, and the perturbing forces to the sensual or orectic (*Anthrop.*, §§ 401, 414). The table on the preceding page will show the various functions of the vital and sensual instincts.

136.

Principle and term in the animal form a single being.

The union of the animal principle with its corporeal term is so close that the one is inconceivable without the other, and therefore, although the one is not the other, but, on the contrary, is opposed to the other, the two form one being, one animated whole, and when we make the term a being apart or entirely separate, it is nothing more than a mere product of abstraction.

137.

Three kinds of feeling in the animal corresponding to three conditions of the sensible term.

Nevertheless, in the term of the animal, we must distinguish three things, which give occasion to three kinds of feeling: *first*, the *corporeal continuous*—the term of the feeling of the corporeally extended; *second*, the *internal movement* of atoms or molecules, or of parts of the corporeally extended—term of the *feeling of excitation;* and, *third*, the *harmonious continuation* of said movement—term of the *organic feeling*.

In regard to the *Feeling of Continuity*, Rosmini says, "If we imagine a single element of matter, extended and perfectly hard, as we suppose the first elements to be, then, even although such an element were to fall under our senses (which it certainly never could on account of its smallness), it would give no sign of life, because it would be unable to

give to itself, or to receive within it, any movement. At the same time, its sentient principle would be simple; the term of this principle would be the minute space determined by the element. In this felt term there would be homogeneity and uniformity, supposing the matter of the element in question to be equally dense in all its parts; there would be difference of intensity, supposing the density variable in the different strata or points of the element. In this little life would be found, in its perfection, the characteristic of *continuity*" (*Psychology*, vol. i. § 535).

In a note on the above passage, the author says, "This difference of density in a perfectly hard continuous is barely conceivable. . . . If, making another hypothesis, we suppose that in every primitive element there is a kind of centre corresponding to Boscovich's simple points, from which emanates attraction or retention, and that this manifests its effect in a given ratio—for example, in the inverse ratio of the squares of the distances—it is true that the element would be more hard and more dense in proportion as the matter composing it was nearer to the centre; nevertheless, it will remain true that, if these elements are supposed of a given minimum size, they will in every part be so dense and so hard as to be indivisible by any external force, and, therefore, real atoms (physically indivisible). It is easy to understand the necessity of this effect when we consider that, at the smallest distances, attraction increases with a progression that surpasses all imagination, and in comparison with which mechanical forces are almost infinitesimal, while forces can be externally applied to the atom only to the most limited extent, on account of its smallness and lightness. In like manner, the physical and chemical forces are almost nothing, that is, if we suppose them all to operate (as we believe they do) according to the same laws that govern universal attraction, or to present the appearance of so operating. Inasmuch as these forces have to be applied to the atoms from without, the body applied to the atom is more distant from the centre of attraction of the atom than the matter forming the atom, and hence this body must exert a less force upon that matter than the

centre of the atom, supposed to be the centre of attraction. Moreover, if we suppose attraction to act at a distance (a notion irreconcilable with our mode of perception) it can exercise on the atom only that very small force sufficient to attract it; so that, although the whole atom, being as light as it is small, may be attracted by such forces, it can never be rent asunder by them.

"Through the condensation or attracting centre, supposed to exist in the atom, it seems possible to explain why atoms which are in contact with each other (a possible supposition) do not unite so as to become perfectly hard, but may still be sundered. Indeed, if there were not in the interior of the atom various degrees of condensation of matter, it would not be easy, without denying the contact of atoms, as some have done, or having recourse to a repulsive force, which would seem as if it must be derivative, to explain how atoms, although in contact, still remain distinct and separable. If, on the contrary, we suppose condensation of matter to increase towards the centre of the atom, we readily understand how the internal matter can be no further rarefied, and this for the simple reason that near the surface, at which the atoms touch each other, the matter, though continuous and impenetrable, is most rare, and, therefore, cannot condense itself there, being always held with greater force by the dense matter nearest to the centres of the two atoms that are in contact. It remains for the mathematician to submit these postulates to calculation, and to discover how small the primitive elements must be in order that they may be perfectly hard, that is, indivisible and distinct from each other, even admitting them to be in real contact." Difference of density in a continuous seems unthinkable; but difference of intensity of attraction will answer even better the ends of Rosmini's argument.

In regard to the *Feeling of Excitation*, Rosmini says, "If to the simple animate element [the atom] we add other elements likewise animate, we may readily conceive new phenomena. Let us suppose these elements to be of diverse forms. United together by their own attraction or

retention, they will form various polyhedrons, according to the forms of the elements which unite. If we suppose the forms of the elements regular, there will result regular polyhedrons. But these regular polyhedrons will differ from each other, not only in form, but also in density, and hence in specific gravity. The reason of this will be clear, if we consider that on the variety of form among the primitive combining elements these two accidents depend :

(1) Whether the surfaces in contact shall be greater or smaller, and, hence, whether the union of these elements shall be more or less firm.

(2) Whether there shall remain in the interior of the crystals larger or smaller intervals, on which, of course, would depend the greater or less specific gravity of these primitive crystals.

"Let the combining elements be only two. The bination even of the primitive elements must give us molecules having properties different from those of the primitive elements ; still more, of course, the ternation, quaternation, etc., of these elements. If we suppose that these first elements, even when they are in contact, do not unite with sufficient force to render the matter between the elements perfectly hard, we shall at once have new accidents. In these molecules the continuous term of feeling, to which corresponds a single sentient principle, is more extended than in that of the primitive elements. It is true that, if the particle were composed of only two or three elements, perpetual motion from within it could never begin, and hence vital movements would never take place. But, if the two or three elements, without separating, are moved by an external impulse, in such a way that their adhering faces slightly rub, then the uniform feeling diffused through said elements must necessarily receive an excitation, and, hence, it is not absurd to suppose that there arises in it a sensation, although this is evidenced by no extra-subjective manifestation. Moreover, if we suppose that the two elements, through the violence exerted on them, no longer have their centres of gravity in the greatest possible proximity, it is not absurd to imagine that they are impelled to restore the

primitive equilibrium of forces, by the activity of the feeling with which they are invested. The feeling diffused through the two elements is one, by reason of their continuity, and as it resists separation, so it tends to unite itself, and, hence, to hold the elements united and inosculated in the greatest possible number of points, through that moment of the organizing functions which we call retention, and of which we shall speak afterwards. Here then, besides the characteristic of *continuity*, we should have that of excitation ; but this would be momentary and accidental, having no system of stimuli succeeding each other, and keeping in continuous, regular and harmonious motion the elements composing the little group supposed." (*Psychology*, vol. i. §§ 536–540).

The *Feeling of Organization* Rosmini reaches in the following way :—"In the life of two or three, or, at least, of a few elements united in a single molecule, we have, (1) continuity, (2) possibility of excitation, which are two characteristics of life. But, as the excitation in such a case would depend upon the external force causing the elements, without separating, to slide upon and rub against each other, it would be momentary and would excite only a transient sensation, which the spontaneous activity of the sensitive principle would not be able to continue. It is impossible, therefore, to obtain the external phenomena of animal life, unless the living elements unite in a considerable number, a number sufficient to compose a machine more or less complicated—a machine so cunning in its structure that, through the reciprocal actions of organs, there are produced the stimuli which shall perpetuate the motion and, hence, the excitation of the feeling, so that the feeling, harmonically excited, shall both preserve the continuity of the parts and the unity of the organism, and that this, in its turn, shall excite the feeling and maintain it by its own proper excitation. It is plain, from these considerations, that *organization*, which itself is produced by feeling, gives occasion to the variety of natural beings and the diverse kinds of phenomena which present themselves to man. Hence—

"*First*, Compounds made up of few elements cannot

manifest any forces other than mechanical, physical, and chemical, and it does not seem unlikely that the true cause of these is the feeling inherent in the first elements, not having power to manifest itself otherwise for want of the proper organization.

"*Second*, in compounds made up of a larger number of elements, we ought to begin to observe a certain regularity of organization, such as we find in the minerals, and the similar aggregation which is remarked chiefly in the metals.

"*Third*, if the composition is more complicated, it ought to produce the organization of the vegetables, which are altogether destitute of organs similar to those with which man expresses pleasure, pain, his instincts, etc. But in this organization there is a system of self-reproducing stimuli. All that is wanting is the external signs of feeling felt and signified by man. We cannot, therefore, know what degree of unity, accentration and excitation there is in the feeling which may exist in vegetables.

"*Fourth*, with a more cunning organization we find manifested, besides these characteristics, the phenomenon of *irritability* or *contradistention*, which, though not capable of manifesting with certainty the existence of feeling, approaches feeling, through the similarity which the movements of such irritable or contradistensive bodies have to the spontaneous movements arising from feeling, and in their texture, which resembles that of felt organs.

"*Fifth* and finally, with an organization still more complicated and perfect than the preceding, there are manifested the extra-subjective phenomena, commonly called animal, which are properly those that certify to the presence of feeling, of the continuance of the term of feeling, of the unity of action in the feeling itself—a unity capable of dominating all movements, which, though not deriving their principle from it, owe to it their continuance and direction. These movements, again, produce the stimuli which re-excite the feeling, when its excitation flags, and restore it to its previous state" (*Psychology*, vol. i. §§ 541, 542).

138.

Now, the sensitive principle may be destitute of the last two kinds of feeling, but not of the first. If it has only the first and second kinds of feeling, it may be said to be *animate*, but not *animal*. The distinctive characteristic of the animal is the organic feeling, which requires a suitable organization. We may, therefore, say that the animal, but not that the animate, dies.

Difference between *animate* and *animal*.

Rosmini defines the *animate* as "an immediate extended term of a sentient principle." The *animal* he defines as "an individual being, endowed with material sense and instinct, with an organization and organico-excitatory movements" (*Anthropology*, § 45). Distinguishing between *elementary* and *organic* souls, he holds that the former cannot be destroyed by any natural force. His grounds for this opinion are two: *first*, that, since matter is inconceivable save as the term of a sentient principle or elementary soul, if the elementary souls were annulled, all matter would be annulled at the same time; *second*, that, the union between the sensitive principle and its term being immediate, nothing can either come between them, or act upon either of them, so as to withdraw the one from the other. "When the organic souls are redissolved into the elementary ones through the dissolution of the organized bodies, the existence of the souls does not cease, but is merely transformed" (*Psychology*, vol. i. §§ 663, 664). From this it will be seen that, according to Rosmini, the unit of natural existence is neither force nor matter, but sentience, and that through this all the material and dynamic phenomena of nature may be explained.

139.

Laws of essential changes which the animate undergoes in respect of its individuality.

Nevertheless, the latter undergoes essential changes in respect to its individuality. These changes may be summed up in the following laws :—

(1) Every continuous extended has a single sensitive principle of continuity. This law leads us to the conclusion that, when several atoms come in contact, so as to form a continuous whole, their sensitive principles unite and become one. This new principle contains all the activity of the previous ones, not cancelled but concentrated ; so that, when the one continuous is broken up into several, the principle multiplies itself into several sensitive principles. Here there is no *division* or *composition*, but only *multiplication* and *unification*.

(2) If the internal movement in a given continuous is partial, the principle of the continuous remains one, but the principles of feeling excited become as numerous as the systems of continuous movements.

(3) If the internal harmonic movement in the parts of a *continuous* embrace the whole *continuous*, this single harmony has a single sentient principle ; but, if the systems of harmonious movements in the same continuous are several, then there are several sentient principles, that is, as many as there are different systems, although, of course, they all have for their basis or first act the principle which embraces the whole of the continuous.

In regard to the multiplication of the sensitive principle, Rosmini says, "This multiplication of the sentient principle is difficult to understand, because our fancy readily imagines this principle to be a complete and subsistent being without the felt, a kind of minute corpuscle. But it is not so. We must destroy in our minds this fantastic being and concentrate our attention upon the nature of the thing. We must consider that in nature there exists only the felt, that with the felt, as such, there is necessarily united the sentient, and that this feels only the felt continuous, without feeling itself; for the reason that the animal *sensum* has no power of self-reflection, since, indeed, the monosyllable *self* is altogether inapplicable to it. If, therefore, this principle feels only the felt, and if it is sentient only in so far as it feels, it is surely clear that, if the felt be divided into two *continua*, the sentient will feel two *continua*, but, not feeling itself, it will not be able to maintain its identity in the two *sensa*, because they are divided. And this is what is meant by multiplication. We must, therefore, conclude that every sensitive soul is simple and *indivisible*, but that, nevertheless, it is multiplicable" (*Psychology*, vol. i. §§ 460, 461). "If the material of feeling divides itself without destroying itself, so that out of a single continuous there are formed two independent *continua* furnished with the conditions necessary to preserve continuity and organism, then also the sensitive principle becomes two. In other words, the animal multiplies itself through the multiplication of animate material. This . . . is what explains *generation* and furnishes the general formula under which are comprehended all the different modes of multiplication that are met with in the animal kingdom" (*Anthropology*, §§ 340, 341). "The perfection of an animal depends upon the variety, unity, and intensity of its feeling. . . . Hence the perfect animals have only one sensitive centre, and their multiplication can take place only through the formation in them of a new centre independent of the first" (*Ibid.*, § 342; cf. *Theosophy*, vol. v. § 331).

140.

The human soul, in so far as it is intellective, is united to its own body by an original, inborn perception of it.

But the human soul is not sensitive only; it is also intellective. It is a principle at once intellective and sensitive. In so far as it is sensitive, it has for its term its own body; but, inasmuch as the intellective principle is made one with the sensitive, so that the two are but one principle with two activities, the intellective and sensitive soul, or, in one word, the rational soul, has body for its term. In so far as it is sensitive, it has a *felt* term; in so far as intellective, an *understood* term. The body, therefore, is a felt-understood term of the human soul. There is, therefore, in the soul an *intellective* perception of its own body, primordial and immanent, and in this perception lies the *nexus* between the human soul and body.

"The body is in the soul, and the soul in the body. . . . Hence there is no difficulty in explaining their mutual action" (*Theosophy*, vol. v. p. 226, § 2). "Our extra-subjective-*real* body is known to us only as a force that modifies the soul by giving it extended sensations (as a sensiferous principle), and that modifies also the other similar forces, calculated to modify the soul. The extra-subjective-*vulgar* or anatomical body is the same force, not considered in its immediate action on the soul, but in its mediate action, and, besides, as invested with the so-called secondary qualities, colour, smell, etc. In so far, indeed, as the body acts immediately on the soul, it cannot be the object of anatomy or of the external senses, but is known only immediately by the feeling which it produces" (*Anthropology*, § 201). Rosmini devotes the third book of his *Psychology* (pp. 136–210) to a consideration of the union and reciprocal influence of soul and body.

141.

Hence there is a physical influence between soul and body.

The reciprocal influence of soul and body is thus explained. Every reality of the nature of a principle is, by nature, active, and, therefore, acts according to certain laws in its term. But since it cannot act in that term unless it has it as a term, and it cannot have it unless it is given to it, the principle must be receptive and passive, as well as active, with respect to its term and to that virtue which supplies, and that virtue which modifies for it, that term. It is, therefore, plain that between the human mind and its body there is communication or physical influence.

"In regard to this constant perception of the fundamental animal feeling, there must be no deception. Let us enumerate its characteristics.

"(1) By means of this perception, the soul does not perceive the extra-subjective and anatomical body, but perceives all the fundamental animal feeling, as it is, indivisible, continuous, harmonic, etc.

"(2) Hence, it does not perceive the principle alone without its term, because, without its term, the principle does not exist.

"(3) In the same way, it does not perceive the subjective body, which is the term of the feeling separated from its principle, because the mental separation of the term of the animal feeling from its principle is not made until a late stage of development, and only by means of reflection, which analyzes feeling; but there does not exist in itself a felt body separate from the sentient principle. Hence, this primitive natural perception is not sufficient by itself to give us the pure notion of subjective body, because in it this body is not isolated from its principle.

"(4) Much less does it perceive the parts of the body separated from the whole; it perceives the whole in its perfect simplicity and harmonic unity.

"(5) It perceives nothing extra-subjective, such as forms, sizes, limits.

"(6) Of the perception, such as it is at first, we have consciousness, because consciousness springs from reflection upon what goes on within us, and this perception is anterior to all reflection" (*Psychology*, vol. i. § 267).

142.

How the intellective and sensitive principles are one.

How the intellective and sensitive principles can be one it will be impossible to conceive, so long as we set out by gratuitously assuming that they are originally distinct, and then, going on to suppose that the sensitive principle, indivisible from its term, is given to the intellective principle to perceive, finally ask, What will then happen? We must reply that the intellective principle will never be able to perceive the sensitive, except by uniting itself intimately with it, that is, perceiving all it feels, since the very nature of the sensitive principle is wholly due to what it feels. Thus the two principles become one, without destroying each other's activity. Two principles, indeed, cannot be terms of each other, unless the one, that is, the perceiving term, acquire the activity of the perceived; for perception is a physical *nexus*, and one activity cannot have a physical *nexus* with another that is a principle, without uniting to itself that activity and that principle. Indeed, a term is separated from its principle solely by difference of nature, that is, because the term is extended and

the principle simple—because the term is object and the principle subject; but, if the nature of the two is the same, and both are subjective principles, the only conceivable way in which physical union could take place between them would be that the percipient principle should receive and appropriate the activity of the sentient principle perceived by it. It does not follow from this that the two activities are confounded in a third, but only that, though remaining distinct, they acquire a single principle, which is their common starting-point. And yet this common starting-point does not prevent the one from being subordinate to the other.

143.

If the sensitive activity be separated from the intellective percipient principle, as happens when its term, the body, is disorganized and leaves its sensitive principle without the organized term which is proper to it, it vanishes, and the individual dies. What is death?

In answer to the old and momentous question, What is death? Rosmini replies thus: "Common sense replies that death consists in the separation of the soul from the body, and the reply is most just; but in what does this separation consist? Having seen wherein the union of the soul with the body consists, we are able likewise to understand their disunion. Knowing the knot which forms human life, we know how it is untied and how life ceases. The knot of the intellective soul with the body was shown by us to consist in a natural and immanent

intellective perception of the fundamental feeling, and, hence, of the body. When this primitive perception of the fundamental feeling ceases, the human soul is loosed from the body, the human body is dead, the human being is dissolved" * (*Psychology*, vol. i. § 670). Of course, the dissolution of the body, that is, of the sensible term of the soul, does not involve the dissolution of the soul itself. Besides the body, the sentient soul has another and higher term, viz., universal being, which, from its very nature, cannot separate itself from anything to which it has once been attached as form. Hence the sentient subject, which has once had the intuition of being, once risen to intelligence, can never lose it. "By this progress, the sentient principle acquired a new term to its activity, a term superior to, and independent of, the body, a term which essentially is, which is ideality itself. But the nature of any active principle is determined by the nature of its term. Hence the sensitive principle, by acquiring this new term, changed its nature and put on one infinitely more noble, attained a perfect and divine form. . . . It is an ontological law that every being, through that virtue whereby it is, tends to preserve and perfect itself, and, therefore, no being has any virtue directed to its self-destruction. . . . If, therefore, no being, no nature, destroys itself, all destruction of beings comes from without, from some foreign activity. Again, every complete being is a simple principle, having a natural and immanent term. If the principle has its term, it is; if its term is taken from it, it ceases, because the natural and immanent term is the condition of the first act, whereby, according to the known law, the principle is. This principle, deprived of all its terms, remains a mere abstraction, a mere capacity, a being similar to the first matter [*πρώτη ὕλη*] of the ancients, which was supposed to be void of all form. . . . The destruction of a contingent being, therefore, takes place only through the destruction of the term in which its first act terminates. Now, what

* Porphyry says, "*Ψυχὴ καταδεῖται πρὸς τὸ σῶμα τῇ ἐπιστροφῇ τῇ πρὸς τὰ πάθη τὰ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ· καὶ λύεται δὲ πάλιν διὰ τῆς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἀπαθείας*" (*Sentent.*, vii.).

is the term of the being man? We have seen that he has two terms, the body and universal being. . . . The body of man, the one of these terms, is a complex of elements, organized in the most perfect specific manner, and thus individuated. Now, the forces of nature may dissolve this organization, and thereby destroy the animal feeling that is proper to man. But on universal being all the forces of nature exert themselves in vain, since it is impassible, immutable, eternal, and not subject to the activity of any (limited) being. Hence, that virtue whereby man intuites universal being cannot perish. But this virtue, this first act, is the intellective soul, which, therefore, cannot cease to exist in its own proper individuality. . . . The intellective soul of man, therefore, originally sprang from the womb of the sensitive soul and was a virtue of it; but this virtue became the principal act and acquired immortality, as soon as it rose to universal being, because this is altogether imperishable, unmodifiable, and eternal" (*Psychology*, vol. i. §§ 676–680).

144.

Second office of Psychology, to deduce and classify the faculties of the soul.

Psychology, after thus treating of the essence of the soul and the constitution of man, passes on to speak of the career and development of this essence itself, which distributes its activity among the various powers and operations which it displays. Coming to this subject, it proceeds to perform two operations, the one *analytic* and the other *synthetic*. In the former, it deduces the faculties of the soul from its essence, and distinguishes them, first from that essence, and then from each other, following them carefully into all their ramifications, which, like the branches of a tree, become more numerous the further they are from the stem; after which, it enumerates and

defines them systematically. In the latter, it codifies the laws or constant modes of operation of said faculties.

"We have seen that all the powers of the animal, all its activities, proceed from a first act of the sentient principle, in which that principle co-operates in producing the fundamental feeling. If, now, we apply a similar reflection to the intelligent principle, we shall find that all its powers, all the activities of man, in so far as he is a being endowed with intelligence, have their source in that first act, wherein the human spirit intuites being, and thus, along with and through being, co-operates in positing his own intelligence.

"Indeed, in regard to the order of mental operations, an accurate analysis of our thoughts brings us to this result, that any thought or mental operation, whereby we acquire a new cognition, is always reducible to the determination and limitation of a cognition previously possessed, to a learning explicitly of what was before known implicitly; so that an implicit cognition, from which all other cognitions evolve themselves as from a germ, necessarily precedes these. All other cognitions are but a limitation of this first one, a continuation, a greater actuation, of it. The spirit, by the same activity whereby it intuites universal being, likewise intuites every particular being, because everything is already contained in universal being. Nothing further is required than that this being should show itself more and more to him who looks at it. Thus, he who goes to the theatre sees with the same act with which he looks at the stage all that appears on the stage. The scene on which everything appears to our spirit is universal being, into which we naturally and immovably gaze. Our eye, therefore, is always in tension, always strained to see what appears on the scene; it cannot close, it cannot wink. In this way, by that same act whereby the spirit intuites universal being, is explained every intellective activity of the mind" (*Anthropology*, §§ 508, 509).

"The human spirit naturally intuites ideal being.

This is not a potentiality but an act [ἐνέργεια], an act essential to the spirit. It is the intellect, in so far as it goes to constitute an element of human nature. But if ideal being, naturally present to the human spirit, acquires a relation with the real world through sensations, then the intellect intuites being furnished with some determination, and toward this new act it is in a state of potentiality. This is what is called the potentiality of the intellect" (*Anthropology*, § 510). Cf. St. Thomas: "Intellectus dupliciter considerari potest. Uno modo secundum quod intellectus est apprensivus entis et veri universalis, alio modo secundum quod est quædam res et particularis potentia, habens determinatum actum" (*Sum. Theol.*, i. q. 82, art. 4).

145.

Questions that present themselves when we try to deduce the powers of the soul from its essence.

When we try to deduce the powers of the mind from its essence, we are inevitably met by such grave ontological questions as these: How can the unity of essence be reconciled with the multiplicity of powers? How can succession of powers consist with permanence or immutability of essence? How can the same essence have a variety of accidental states? etc., etc.

Rosmini, in his *Psychology* (vol. ii. §§ 735–740, 854–909) and *Theosophy* (vol. v. pp. 257–259), devotes considerable space to the consideration of these questions. It will not be difficult to divine the answers, if we remember that difference of act is determined by difference of term, and that the terms of intellective activity are all given. It is entirely indifferent to light what it illuminates.

146.

Three classes of laws to which the soul is subject in its operations: (1) psychological, (2) ontological, (3) cosmological.

Wonderful are the laws according to which the soul operates, whether immediately or mediately through its various powers. And, inasmuch as the soul is one and rational, it follows that all those faculties which we call human, as well as the laws of their operation, must emanate from the rational principle in its relations to its two terms. And thus we obtain three classes of laws—the *psychological*, the *ontological*, and the *cosmological*. The psychological laws are those which proceed from the nature of the soul itself as an active principle; the ontological, those that are imposed upon the soul by its higher, intellective term, which is being; and the cosmological, those that are imposed upon it by its lower term, the sensible world.

147.

The supreme ontological law is the principle of cognition.

The supreme ontological law is the principle of cognition, which is thus expressed:—The term of thought is being. It is incredible how fruitful and wonderful this law is in its applications.

148.

Cosmological laws are either *laws of motion* or *laws of harmony*.

Of the cosmological laws, some preside over the motion which the sensible term imparts to the human soul; others determine the quality of this motion. The former are called *laws of motion;* the latter, *laws of harmony*.

149.

Finally, the psychological laws, that is, those laws which spring from the force of the mind itself, are divided into two classes, corresponding to the ontological and cosmological laws.

Two classes of psychological laws, corresponding to the ontological and cosmological.

All these laws are considered by Rosmini in various chapters of his *Psychology*. From all it appears that the individual subject stands in a double relation to being. As ideal, being is presented to the subject as object; as real, it is presented to it as extra-subject. For the individual mind, therefore, the world of being is not divided into inner and outer in such a way that the former is subjective, the latter objective, but thus :—

$$\text{Being} \begin{cases} \text{Real} \begin{cases} \text{Subjective} \\ \text{Extra-subjective} \end{cases} & \text{Subject} + \text{Object} = \textit{Ego}. \\ \text{Ideal} - \text{Objective} & \text{Extra-subjective} + \text{Object} = \textit{Non-ego}. \end{cases}$$

(Subject + Extra-subject) + Object = *Ego* + *Non-Ego* = The Infinite.

The Infinite, when united to its own proper and necessary principle, the Absolute, is God.

150.

Finally, Psychology attempts to discover the destiny of the human soul. But it cannot accomplish this discovery by the mere use of natural reason or the mere examination of human nature. It may, indeed, by this examination, show whither human nature tends; but it fails to grasp that *plus*, which the free grace and munificence of the Infinite Being who created it holds in store for it. All, therefore, that we are able to arrive at through the examination of human nature is this: The first part of that nature is intelligence, and intelli-

The third and last aim of Psychology is to discover the destiny of the human soul.

The soul naturally tends to its own perfection,

which consists in the full vision of truth, full exercise of virtue, and full attainment of happiness.

gence is made for truth. The second part is will, and will is made for virtue. By his will man adheres to the truth, loves it in all things, and thus loves all things according to their truth. But this love, which seeks to satisfy itself in beings according to truth, desires complete possession of that which it loves, and which is its good, because it loves it. There is, therefore, a third part in human nature, and this is feeling, in the broadest sense of the term. Feeling is a tendency to enjoy. The will, therefore, which adheres to truth and is thereby virtuous, the will which loves all beings according to truth, desires that all beings should be given it to enjoy, since through enjoyment it completes its knowledge and its love of them. This is what is meant by the phrase, "seeking for happiness."

These three goods are but aspects of one and the same good.

From this we gather that the soul naturally tends to, and is destined for, perfection. This perfection consists in the full vision of truth, the full exercise of virtue, and the full attainment of felicity, a threefold end, a threefold destiny, which, nevertheless, forms a perfect unity, since no one of these three elements can exist in a complete form without the other two. The truth is not seen in its inmost recesses except by him who loves and enjoys it; no one fully loves the truth in the beings wherein it is actualized, unless he sees and enjoys it; no one has complete enjoyment of it or is happy, if he has not complete love for it and is virtuous, if he has not complete vision of it and is not wise. Each of these three goods implies

the other two; they are but three forms of one and the same good.

"In so far as man is an animal subject endowed with a corporeal sense, he is capable of adapting to himself and of enjoying only particular goods, that is, corporeal ones; but, in so far as he is an intellectual subject, he perceives all kinds of goods and enjoys all the kinds of good perceived by him. His intellect may even attain the absolute good, and, therefore, this alone can entirely and completely appease it. This is the supreme good of intelligences, in the enjoyment of which consists what is properly called *beatitude* or happiness—terms which in common parlance are entirely refused both to the blind momentary pleasure of animal life and to all perfection of sensitive things" (*Principles of Moral Science*, pp. 51, 52). In a note to this passage the author says, "Sensists, of necessity, confound *happiness* with *pleasure*, and measure degrees of happiness by pleasure; but they err. Happiness is certainly enjoyment, but not every enjoyment is happiness. Happiness is the enjoyment of the highest good. Now, between the enjoyment of the highest good and that of any other good there is a difference, not of degree, but of kind—an infinite difference, with no middle term to unite one extreme with the other."

151.

Religious tradition alone can free man from the doubts which arise from the sad spectacle of the present life, and man's higher destinies must

But, if human nature, when examined, shows that this is its destiny, how is this destiny to be reached? Here human reason stands dumb and in confusion, seeing that in the present life there is not a single condition of man that fully corresponds to that end to which he aspires. On the one hand, the nature of the human powers, when carefully studied, and the incessant cravings of the

be treated in a supernatural Psychology and Anthropology.

human heart reveal to reason the supreme aim of humanity; on the other, reason itself sees humanity on this earth for ever weltering in ignorance, tossed hither and thither by passions and vices, everywhere corrupt, everywhere unhappy; life transient as a flash, ever uncertain, ever a struggle, ever a sacrifice, and the death of every man that is born close this great tragedy. At this spectacle reason itself staggers, thinks it is dreaming, loses confidence in itself. At last, rousing itself by one effort, it reinvigorates itself with the consoling hypothesis of a future life. But human reason is not forsaken by God in its dark surmisings. Behold! God reveals to man the secret of His creative goodness, assures him that the theory inspired by feeling and found by reason, through study and meditation, neither lies nor deceives. It shall be realized, and to it the facts will accurately correspond in a yet higher mode of the same theory. All that upon earth appears as an obstacle to, and contradiction of, reason, finds its explanation in the manifestation of the entire design of the Creator, and even becomes, in this design, a necessary means and a confirmation of what reason itself teaches. The hypothesis of another life is converted into a certainty by an infallible testimony. That other life, which has no end, in which man no more dies, has in it an abundance of weal and of woe that will atone for all the inequalities, and correct all the irregularities, of this temporal life. But in this life itself God has given us a faint

outline of that future and eternal order, has granted us excellent and purely divine means whereby, if we will, we may rise to that sublime destiny which reason indicates darkly in the far distance. This part, therefore, of the destiny of the soul and of the entire man cannot be treated exhaustively in Natural Psychology or Anthropology, but in another Psychology and Anthropology which draw their doctrines from the mouth of God himself.

It does not enter into the scope of the present work to consider Rosmini's theological views; nevertheless, it may not be out of place here to state that, according to him, the light of grace alone can make us in any degree acquainted with the nature of God's reality. Human intelligence, with its infinite ideal term, is capable of reasoning with certainty to the fact of God's reality or subsistence; but only a direct presentation of that reality to feeling can in any way make us aware of its nature. Natural things are seen by natural light; supernatural things by supernatural light.

2. *Cosmology.*

152.

What is Cosmology?

Cosmology is the science of the world. We have included it among the sciences of perception, because the objects of perception are the human soul and the bodies of which the world is made up. Of course, in the great system of creation there are other beings which do not fall under sensible experience, and are reached only through inductive reasoning. Such are the pure spirits, the angels.

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Cosmology might be defined as the science of the extra-subjective, in contradistinction to Psychology, which is the science of the consubjective. The two, along with the inferential sciences of Ontology and Natural Theology, form the subdivisions of Metaphysics. Rosmini left no separate work on Cosmology, but the treatise on the Real, now printed as the fifth volume of the *Theosophy*, was intended to form part of such a work. According to the original design, the work on Cosmology was to be divided into the following chapters:—(1) The Metaphysical World—Finite Objective Being; (2) The Conditions of Finite Being—The Finite One; (3) Finite Triple Being—Creation; (4) The Universe—The Principle, Being—The Angels; (5) The First Created Intelligence; (6) The Soul of the World; (7) Man; (8) Time; (9) Space; (10) Matter; (11) Numbers; (12) Forms; (13) Laws, Final Grounds—Harmony—Beauty; (14) The End; (15) The Realization of the End.

This arrangement was subsequently modified somewhat. What was written is divided into two parts, the first of which treats of Essential Matter, the first element of Real Being; the second, of the Ontological Organism of Real Being.

153.

How Cosmology considers the world.

Cosmology considers the world (1) as a whole, (2) in its parts as related to the whole, and (3) in its order.

In other words, the divisions of Cosmology are Philosophy of Nature (*Naturphilosophie*), Natural Science, and Theology. Under the first will naturally fall the question respecting the origin of the world, whether it was created or existed from all eternity. This question can, of course, be answered only through the discovery of the true nature of the real as presented in the world, and its relation to the ideal, the only form in which we know the eternal. If

the real presents the same characteristics as the ideal, necessity, universality, eternity, etc., then it must have existed always; if, on the contrary, it is contingent, particular, temporal, it must have had a beginning. Under the second division will come all the experimental sciences, wherein, through the search for general laws, we try to reduce the phenomena of the world to a unity, and to show that they are due to a single principle. Under the third division will fall the question of the adaptation of means to ends. In whatever sense we use the term *end*, whether as conscious purpose or as actual result, it will always be true that the order and harmony of a natural organism will have a direct connection with that end, and will necessarily be expressed in terms of it. We cannot explain the construction and order of the eye without taking vision into account. As the Schoolmen said, Act follows being. Rosmini, of course, maintained the doctrine of final cause.

154.

First part of Cosmology.

Cosmology, as the doctrine of the whole, treats (1) of the nature of contingent real being, and (2) of its cause.

155.

First proof of the creation of the world.

Contingent real being has not within itself the ground of its own existence, and, therefore, requires a cause. Since, moreover, no part of contingent being, whether substantial or accidental, contains the ground of its own existence, it requires a creative cause. Contingent being, therefore, is, every moment, drawn out of nothing.

Compare with this Rosmini's definition of life as given under § 124. We cannot here quote all that Rosmini advances on the subject of creation; but the following passage may suffice to show the tendency of his doctrine. Speaking of the exemplar of the world, he says, "This exemplar is the work of the creative liberty of God. Creative liberty is a virtue, a power belonging to absolute being in its subjective form. Absolute being in its subjective form infinitely loves itself as understood in its objective form. Being infinitely loves being. This love leads it to love being in all the modes in which it is lovable, in which it can be loved. In order to love it in all its modes, it loves it not only as absolute and infinite being, but also as relative and finite being. This love is the creative act. It, therefore, creates for itself, through the expansion of love, a lovable finite object, and this is the world. In order to create this world, it must, *first*, *conceive* it, both because this creative principle is intelligence and because that cannot be loved which is not known; *second*, it must realize it, because if it were not real in itself, the object of love would not exist, but would merely be possible, and what is loved, seen in its possibility, is desired to exist. Hence the two elements of *essence* and *real*, born at one birth, and forming mundane things" (*Theosophy*, vol. i. § 460).

156.

Second proof.

A second proof of the creation of the world is drawn from the analysis of perception. This analysis shows us that everything that comes under feeling, *i.e.* ourselves and the world, would necessarily remain unperceived, that is, would not be being, if the mind did not see it united to the essence of being. It is this essence, therefore, that imparts to all things the act of being, lends it to them, as it were, creates them.

It follows from this that creation does not mean production from nothing, but from non-being. From absolute nothing, which is the negation not only of being, but of the possibility of being, even Omnipotence itself could not create being. Since being is cognizability, it follows that creation is the act whereby God knows the existent. This creative being, however, is not related to man in the same way as it is related to God. In God, this being is subject as well as object, whereas in man it is merely object. "The object of reason . . . may be communicated to created things, not in the sense that created things may also be that object which belongs to God alone, but in the sense that it may be intuited by them as something different from them. . . . It is communicable merely as object, and therefore initial being exists in the human mind in a different way from that in which it exists in the divine mind, from which it is undistinguished. If the *absolute object* were communicated to the creature, such creature would see the Divine Word [the λόγος], which is not possible in the order of nature, but only, through grace, in the supernatural order . . . Man seeing this initial being does not see God, although he sees in it an appurtenance of the divine essence" (*Theosophy*, vol. i. § 490).

157.

Third proof.

In our consciousness of ourselves, as well as of every sensation and perception, we find a third proof that contingent being is created. We feel that we subsist, but we do not feel the force that causes us to subsist. Therefore, we feel that we do not subsist through ourselves.

158.

The knowledge of the essen-

The nature of contingent being becomes more clear when we explain its essential *limitations*.

tial limitations of contingent being completes our knowledge of its nature.

From the study of these proceed most important corollaries, one of which is the doctrine of the possibility of evil.

The doctrine of limitations is considered by Rosmini in the first volume of the *Theosophy*, §§ 679–728. The following passage will give, perhaps better than any other, the gist of this doctrine :—"The principle of being is essentially simple and one, but it is determined variously according to its terms, which may be reduced to three supreme classes or categoric terms: (1) absolute being; (2) the felt; (3) the willed. This principle constitutes the finite being as one, a subject purely real, but determined by its relation to these categoric terms. The diversity of beings, however, arises from the diversity of terms, which, united with the real and proper principle, constitute the being. In order that these beings may be diverse, this diversity must exist from the first moment when the being begins to be, and must be such as potentially to contain all the accidental subsequent development of the being" (*Theosophy*, vol. i. § 722; cf. *Psychology*, vol. i. §§ 164–180). On the possibility of evil, see *Theodicy*, vol. i. §§ 169–203.

159.

Sublime questions to which the theme of creation gives occasion.

From the doctrine of the essential limitations of the universe, science passes to the most sublime questions. Do creatable or possible things exist distinct in God? If not, how do they come to be distinct outside of God? Are they finite or infinite? How was God moved to create? It is impossible to give a summary explanation of such lofty questions, with a solution of the difficulties to which they give birth in the mind.

We will not attempt what seemed impossible to Rosmini. A discussion of most of these questions will be found in the *Theosophy*, *Theodicy*, and *Psychology*. To one point we may advert, viz. the question whether the number of real beings—let us say, atoms—is infinite. Rosmini replies in the negative on the following grounds :—

"(1) If the number of possible limitations were infinite, inasmuch as they could not all be created, a selection would have to be made by the creator, and this selection would be impossible, . . . having to be made from an infinite number [cf. under §§ 26, II., and 103].

"(2) If the number of possible limitations were infinite, inasmuch as they could not all be created, because an infinite number of beings is a contradiction in terms, the power of God would be limited and exceeded by the sphere of possibility of things.

"(3) But beings in infinite number cannot even exist in the concept of the mind, because an infinite number is a contradiction in terms.

"(4) . . . The first substance from which all possible finite beings have to be drawn is a first finite. Therefore . . . it is evident that possible finite beings cannot be infinite, but are only finite, in number" (*Theosophy*, vol. i. § 723).

160.

Second part of Cosmology.

The second part of Cosmology divides up the universe into (1) pure spirits, (2) souls, (3) bodies, and treats each of these parts in relation to the whole.

161.

Third part of Cosmology.

Finally, in the third part, which deals with the order of the universe, we undertake to explain the cosmic laws, that is, the laws common to all con-

tingent beings, and thus we are able to conclude the argument, begun in the preceding parts, with reference to the goodness of the world and to its destinies.

This branch of cosmogony Rosmini treats in his *Theodicy*, in which, in a popular, rather than a scientific, style, he seeks "to justify the ways of God to man."

162.

Cosmology connected with Ontology and Theology.

But these indications show sufficiently that Cosmology cannot be fully treated except in connection with Ontology, and especially Theology. How, indeed, can we treat the nature of being as contingent and limited, without at the same time treating, or having previously treated, of necessary and unlimited being? How can we treat of the way in which the world began to exist without treating of the nature and operation of its author? How can we understand temporal things without understanding those that are eternal? How can we explain transient acts without having recourse to immanent acts? We, therefore, consider it impossible to make Cosmology a complete science by itself. I believe it can only be part of a higher science, which expounds the doctrine of being—being both as abstract and universal, and as, in its act, complete and absolute.

Sciences of Reasoning.

Ontological and Deontological Sciences.

163.

Sources of the principles and material of reasoning.

Intuition supplies the means of reasoning: intuition and perception together supply *its material.* There is no reasoning which does not at last draw its material from these two sciences. The sciences of intuition and perception are sciences of observation. They observe what presents itself to the intuition of the mind, what takes place in the mind itself, and what occurs in the body, in so far as it is an agent in feeling. These observations reflection turns over and over again, and, following the guidance of the principles supplied by the light of being, to which it refers everything, discovers new truths and even reasons to the existence of beings lying beyond the reach of both intuition and perception.

Reasoning, according to Rosmini, is "a continuous application of the light of reason," and implies "a duality: (1) the light which is applied; (2) that to which it is applied. That to which the light of intelligence is applied may either be (1) that light itself, or (2) other things different from that light. These other things are feelings, in themselves blind, or appurtenances of these feelings, *e.g.* matter, which is a term of animal feeling. When the intellectual light is applied to itself by means of a reflection, it performs at once two offices, that of light and that of object illuminated. . . . When it is applied . . . to feelings and all that they contain, it produces the *materiated sciences*" (*Logic*, § 8). Rosmini objects to the term *material sciences*, on the ground that material without form can never be the object of science.

164.

Two classes of sciences of reasoning.

The philosophical sciences of reasoning are divided into two classes. The one treats of beings as they are, and is called *Ontological;* the other of beings as they ought to be, and is called *Deontological.*

The Germans would say *Wissenschaften des Seienden* and *Wissenschaften des Seinsollenden.* It is hardly necessary to remark that Deontology must not be confounded with Morality or Ethics, which is merely a branch of it, as we shall see.

1. *Ontological Sciences.*

165.

Ontological science.

The Ontological Sciences are two: Ontology, properly so called, and Natural Theology.

A. *Ontology.*

166.

Ontology. The three forms of being: the ideal, the real, and the moral.

Ontology treats of being in all its extent, as known to man. It treats of being in its essence, and in the three forms in which its essence is—the *ideal form*, the *real form*, and the *moral form*.

167.

The essence identical, the forms utterly distinct.

In all these three forms, the essence is identical, while the forms themselves are most distinct and altogether incapable of interchange.

The first three volumes of the *Theosophy* are devoted to the subject of Ontology. In the first, the author considers the ontological problem in its various aspects, shows that the highest categories of being are ideality, reality, and morality, and treats of being in its unity. The second and third volumes deal with being in its triplicity. It would be impossible here to follow Rosmini into all the heights and depths of his ontological doctrines. Suffice it to say that, according to his arguments, being exists of necessity in three forms, perfectly distinct and inconfusible, but yet in such a way that each implies the other two. One of these forms, viz. the ideal, is presented as pure cognizability to human intelligence, which, by means of it, is able to reason to the existence of the other two, and to see that all three are truly forms of one identical being. These three forms have all the characteristics of true categories. They are predicates, first, fundamental, complete, and divided. Therefore the true categories of being are ideality, reality, and morality, and being itself is triune. Rosmini severely criticizes those who maintain the unity of being alone. He says, "The thought of all Unitarians, from Plotinus to Hegel, performs two operations. It goes from the many to the one, by the way of abstraction, and thus arrives at pure unity, which, as Plotinus says, has nothing in it but indefinite unity,* and is therefore exactly Hegel's naught (*nichts*); and it goes from the One to the Many by way of addition. Two ways powerless to annihilate or create, and merely capable of diminishing or destroying the objects before the mind of the philosopher" (*Theosophy*, vol. i. § 164). Rosmini's criticism of Plotinus and Hegel contains many profound and admirable thoughts.

168.

The ideal form cannot be conceived without the essence of being, for the plain reason that it is *the essence of being in so far as knowable;* but

Ideal form.

* "Οὐδὲν ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀλλ' ἕν τι" (*Enneads*, i. 9, 1, *ad init.*).

Real form. the real form may be conceived as not having in itself the essence of being. In this case, the real form does not obtain the name either of being or of object, and it is not conceivable unless there be added to it the essence of being, which imparts to it that act of being which it would otherwise lack. In this way is partly explained the origin, that is, the creation, of contingent being.

169.

Moral form. The moral form is the relation that real being holds to itself through the medium of ideal being.

"The law of perception is, that the limited being perceived in feeling shall be referred to ideal being and seen in it, so that there are in perception three things: (1) feeling or reality; (2) ideal being; (3) the (imperfect) relation of identity between the two. Ideal being is infinite and essentially complete. Hence, if real being is rationally perceived in relation with ideal being, there is perceived along with it its measure, because, when real beings are referred to the total of being, it is seen which of them has more, and which less, of being realized in it. Now, since the term of practical reason is being, as given by the theoretic reason* and by all its functions, this term includes perceived being. And since the act of the practical reason consists in adhering to its term, it must adhere to being in the shape in which it is perceived. But it is perceived as measured by ideal being, so that one perceived being is perceived as a larger being, another as a smaller being. Hence it is the law of practical reason that it adheres to beings according to their measure. And even when the subject perceives only one real being, it sees, by comparing it with ideal being, whether it is limited or unlimited, and must

* See below, under § 217.

adhere to it as it is, that is, with affection measured and proportioned to it. Now, this is the moral principle, 'the law of the moral order,' that affectionate recognition shall be distributed to known real beings in proportion to their measure, considered with respect to complete real being, and, if they are several, as compared with each other.

"Hence we draw another most important consequence—that moral good is infinite in its nature, having always infinite being for its object. Limited being is never seen by perception as alone and as having no relation but to itself, but always as united to the ideal, which is complete and infinite and which measures it. Thus the object of the practical reason never stops with the finite-real being, but always unites it to the infinite-ideal, and so converts it into its good [*ἀγαθόν*], adhering to it only in so far as ideal-universal being prescribes. Hence the act of adhesion obeys this ideal-universal being, as its supreme rule and norm, and, therefore, holds it in greater reverence than any finite real. And this is what constitutes the *essential* characteristic of what is moral—that it always embraces the WHOLE OF BEING, ends in this whole, regulates itself according to this whole. It is, therefore, a good of an *infinite nature*, not comparable with any finite good, such as eudæmonological good, which is severed from the moral and terminates in the finite" (*Psychology*, vol. ii. §§ 1419–1422).

170.

Properties of the three forms.

Being, in so far as *ideal*, has the property of being a light and of being an *object*.

In so far as it is real, it has the property of being force, of being an active, individual feeling, and hence a *subject*. But the sentient principle or subject may have as its term something which is not itself, as extension and body, and this term is neither *object* nor *subject*, but is outside the subject.

It is called *extra-subject*. But this extra-subject, as such, has an existence only in relation to the subject whose term it is. The modes, therefore, of real being are two—the *subjective* and the *extra-subjective*.

In so far as being is moral, it has the property of being an act which puts the subject in harmony with the object, of being a perfecting power, completing the subject by uniting it, and rendering it adequate to, the object-bliss of being.

Rosmini distinguishes between ideality as light and ideality as object, or rather he distinguishes ideal being, which is *per se* manifest, into being as manifesting and being as manifested. It is like light, which not only makes other things visible, but is visible itself. So long as we know ideal being merely as such, we have only an *anoetic* knowledge of it; whereas, when we know it as possessing the three attributes of manifest, manifesting, and manifested, we have a *dianoetic* knowledge of it. These terms *anoetic* and *dianoetic* are admirably adapted to distinguishing the two kinds of knowledge which it is possible to have of *unity: first*, as prior to multiplicity; and, *second*, as subsequent to multiplicity.

171.

The three forms are the foundation of the categories.

If we wish to classify, in the most summary way, the limited beings that come within the range of human knowledge, they may all be reduced to these three ultimate classes—*ideal beings*, *real beings*, and *moral beings*; so that the three *primordial forms* of being are also the foundation of the *categories*.*

* See above, under § 167.

172.

The *categories* are classes more extensive than genera. They are not genera, and much less are they species, since the same being which divides itself into genera and species belongs to all the three categories. The categories differ from genera and species.

Since it is the same identical being that appears in all the three categories, these categories, of course, cannot be genera or species, which do not distinguish aspects of the same thing, but include different things under one aspect. The categories are principles of plurality, whereas genera and species are principles of unity. The three categories, in a certain way, correspond to the three elements of the concept which forms the ground of the judgment. When I say, "Man is rational," the subject is real; the predicate, ideal; and the copula, moral. In other words, in making this affirmation, I set a reality, man, and an idea, rational, both at once against the background of being, which, therefore, at once measures both of them absolutely and relatively to each other. This measure expresses their absolute and relative moral worth.

173.

When we examine being in its full extent, we discover that it has an *internal order*, wonderful and unchangeable, supplying rich material to ontology. From this order we gather, among other laws, *the law of the synthesis of being*, which manifests itself in a thousand ways, but chiefly in the form of the truth:—Being cannot exist under one of its three forms without existing under the other two, although, to human thought, being, Law of the synthesism of being.

even under a single form, appears as standing alone and is perceivable in a distinct mode.

The section explains what may, at first sight, seem an obscurity, or even a paradox, in Rosmini's system. In the act of perception, *we* unite the essence of being, as intuited by us, to the feeling which constitutes the reality of the thing perceived, and yet no sooner have we done so than we see that the two are and were united independently of us. In other words, our consciousness consists in doing *for ourselves*, or with relation to ourselves, what is already done absolutely. In a certain sense, therefore, each man creates his own world; but every sane man knows perfectly that he does not create *the* world. The same strange phenomenon occurs in the case of the different senses. A table, as I know it, is made up of sensations that come through at least three senses and an unknown number of nerves. Yet, when these sensations are put together by the activity of my organism, I immediately recognize the result as something that was put together quite independently of them. Though, therefore, my senses (with the aid, of course, of intelligence) created the table for me, yet the table was created absolutely, perhaps, long before I was born.

174.

Ontology examines the recesses of being to find the reason for the distribution of being into genera and species.

Ontology not only gives us the theory of the three primordial forms of being and of the identity of being in all the three, but it also distributes the same identical being, in all its three forms, into *genera*, *species*, and *individuals*, and searches for the ground of this distribution in the recesses of being itself. It thus gradually comes to discover how being is susceptible of limitation, and paves the way for a doctrine of the origin of limited and contingent being—a doctrine which belongs to Cosmology.

175.

In like manner, it treats of the essential properties of being, deducing them from the principle of cognition, *Being is the object of thought*, which it applies to reasoning, by means of this other principle: If a being, when deprived of a given property, ceases to be thinkable, that property is essential to it. This is the principle of cognition itself, expressed in ontological form. Hence it deduces the ontological properties which limited beings must necessarily share, in order to be possible. This doctrine is also necessary to Cosmology.

It also seeks the essential properties of being by the light of cognition.

For example, since matter cannot be thought except as extended, extension is essential to it. Rosmini would also say that since God cannot be thought except as real, reality is one of His essential attributes, and, therefore, He is not a mere ideal postulate of the reason, but a subsistent reality.

B. *Natural Theology.*

176.

But human thought does not totally comprehend being as it is in itself. This is the subject of Theology. Theology, therefore, is the science which treats of being as it is in itself, that is, in so far as our minds discover that being extends far beyond that part which is manifested to us; in a word, it treats of Absolute Being, of God.

Natural Theology.

Natural Theology, called by the Greeks *θεολογία*, is the third of the sciences included under Theosophy, Cosmology and Ontology being the other two.

177.

The idea we have of God is not positive, but negative.

The being which falls naturally under the *intuition* of the human mind, because it is the very essence of being, is unlimited; nevertheless it is not absolute being, since intuition catches the essence of being under only one of its three forms, the ideal. The being which falls under our perception is only a partial realization of being, a realization distinct from the essence of being; while feeling, which is the material of perception, is only the real form of being; so that the understanding, if it wishes to perceive it, has to compound it with the essence of being, although this essence, being eternal, does not properly belong to contingent feeling. Hence the materials at our disposal for reasoning out a complete science of being are imperfect and defective. Being, therefore, in its totality and fulness, is not granted to human experience. We cannot know *how it is*, although we may know that it is in a mode going beyond the reach of human intelligence. This sort of cognition is called *negative*,* and is the only sort possible in Natural Theology, which treats of being in its absoluteness, of being, not as it is known to man, but as it is in itself.

* See below under § 182.

178.

Natural Theology, in the first place, demonstrates the existence of God. Of the many arguments by which it does this, the principal may be reduced to four.

The first it derives from the *essence of being* which we intuite, proving that it is not nothing, but something eternal and necessary. Now, it could not have these attributes, if it did not subsist identical under the other two forms of reality and morality. But the essence of being is infinite, and, existing under all three forms, it is being in every way infinite and absolute; it is God. First proof of the existence of God.

It is plain enough that the ideal being which we intuite, being essentially objective, involves subjective, that is, real being, as well as a relation between itself and such real being. This relation is moral being.

179.

The second proof of God's existence is derived from the *ideal form* of being. This ideal form is the light which creates intelligence; it is eternal light and *eternal object*, hence there must be an eternal mind, an *eternal subject*. This light is unlimited: hence this subject must have infinite wisdom, and its knowledge must not be a transient act; in it everything must be known through itself. A *subject* which, at the same time, Second proof.

exists as an *infinite object* is the most perfect possible union of the two, and hence it is the *infinite act of goodness* or moral perfection that constitutes the third primordial form of being. This being is, therefore, absolute—is God.

180.

Third proof.

The third proof is derived from *real being*, given to us in perception. This is the proof above referred to, in which the mind rises from the contingent to the necessary, to the first cause and ground of all (§ 103).

181.

Fourth proof.

The fourth proof is derived from the *moral form* known to man. Infinite and irresistible is the authority of the moral law, infinite the excellence of virtue and the ignobleness of vice. This binding force, this dignity of the moral law, is not nothing, and must, therefore, be eternal, necessary, absolute. But it would be nothing, if it did not exist in an absolute being. The essence of holiness belongs to the essence of being, and is its last complement; it belongs to the essence of being as much as the other two forms do. There is, therefore, an absolute being, God.

This section recalls to one's mind Kant's Categorical Imperative, which that philosopher considered the foundation of all morality, and upon which he based the three necessary convictions of freedom, immortality, and the existence of God. Rosmini's view, however, is very dif-

ferent from Kant's. According to the latter, the moral principle is a mere empirical command whose ground is not seen, but which compels us ideally to postulate freedom, immortality, and God. According to the former, the ground of morality is given in the clear intellectual intuition of being, which being enables us to infer the real existence of those things which Kant regarded as mere ideal postulates. See under § 115.

182.

Considering the manner in which we know God, we may call our knowledge of him negative-ideal.

Having proved the existence of God, Natural Theology must seek to determine precisely in what manner, without going beyond the limits of nature, we may know God. It shows that we can know Him only through reasoning. Being unable either to intuite or to perceive God naturally in this life, we require reasoning to enable us to discover His existence. We do so, as we have seen, by comparing those beings which we intuite and perceive with the essence of being, and observing, on the one hand, that they do not exhaust it, and, on the other, that it must be exhausted, fully realized, and completed. This we know from the inherent necessity of the very essence of being which we intuite. But of this absolute being, which we neither intuite nor perceive, we can know no more than is shown us by the necessity of the essence of being, the object in the idea. This is the limit of the knowledge which we can have of God in the natural order, and hence our knowledge of the divine nature may be called a negative-ideal knowledge.

Those who accuse Rosmini of Ontologism, that is, of claiming that we see God naturally, only show that they either have not read, or not understood, his philosophy. No thinker ever more pointedly denied to man the direct vision of God than Rosmini. In this he goes even beyond St. Thomas, who says, "*Intellectus separatus, secundum fidei documenta, est ipse Deus, qui est creator animæ, et in quo solo beatificatur. . . . Unde ab ipso anima humana lumen intellectuale participat*" (*Sum. Theol.*, i. q. 79, art. 4. concl.), and still further beyond St. Augustine, who writes: "*Solus Deus dat intellectum; Deus enim per se ipsum, quod lux est, illuminat pias mentes*" (*Enarrat. in Psalm cxviii.*, vers. 73).

The following declaration expresses Rosmini's true view: "Is initial being God Himself? I answer, No, because it lacks something which belongs to the divine essence. It lacks term, completion, which is equivalent to saying that it lacks *self-subsistence*, reality, and, if the object of *conception* lacks anything, be it what it may, the thing perceived is not God, since, as Sebadius excellently says, '*Non proprium Dei, nisi plenum et perfectum*,' that is, that being which is deficient in anything is not God. At the same time, if being should complete itself, that is, if we should see being, not initially but completely, then what we should see would deserve the name of God. To the being, therefore, which we see naturally, the name of God does not belong, because things are named in so far as they are conceived. The object of conception changes essentially, according to the different modes of conceiving it, and hence receives different names.

"Is the initial being which we see a created being? I answer that it may be called *created*, in St. Thomas's sense, not because it is in itself created, but because it is created in us, that is, in so far as it is shown to us and seen by us. In so far as it is limited by the imperfection of our seeing, in so far it is created.

"Is initial being numerically the same in all men? Yes, and it is for that reason that the human race is one. It does not follow from this that all men have one intellect, as the Arabs erroneously held, any more than it follows that

they all have one pair of eyes, because they all see one sun. The seeing principle and the seen object are different: the seeing principles are many; the object seen by them is one. Hence arise agreement in truth and the possibility of human society and of union with God." (From a letter written by Rosmini in 1834, printed in *La Sapienza*, vol. i. pp. 321 sqq., and in *Del Lume dell' Intelletto*, pp. 424 sqq.)

In regard to negative cognition, Rosmini says, "Negative cognition differs from positive cognition in this, that instead of *perception*—that is, instead of sensation or the traces which sensation leaves in us—there is in negative cognition only a sign, an indication of the thing. We must explain, with all clearness, this important difference. In order that I may say, in my inner thought, A thing exists, and so have a persuasion of its real subsistence, I must in some way think this thing to which I apply the predicate of existence, and this thought of the thing is the subject, so to speak, in the judgment in question. Now, I may, in some way, think a thing—I may, in some way, have a *subject* of which I *predicate* existence—even if I have not perceived that thing, even if that thing has not acted directly upon me and thus revealed itself to me. It is sufficient that I have some indication of this object, inducing me to fix my attention on it, without its being necessary that this indication should reveal to me anything beyond its mere existence. For example, if some one should hold up to me his closed hand and tell me there was something inside it, this affirmation, if I believed it, would be to me an indication making me think of something inside that closed hand, even although I did not see it, even although it were not there, and I knew nothing more about it.

"In order to make this more clear, let us first analyze positive cognition, and then mark the difference between it and negative cognition. In positive cognition, we observe that sensation (or the traces which it leaves in us) does three things in us: (1) it gives us a ground which persuades us that a being subsists; (2) it determines a fixed point on which we shall direct our attention, so that our minds may distinguish that being which we have found to subsist from

all other beings; and (3) it enables us to have a *vision* of that being (if I may be allowed to use such an expression), that is, an example of its immediate influence on us, an effect which shows us the nature of that operating cause, and shares with us that activity whereby it subsists. Now, this third effect of sensation is that which gives light to the perception of the thing, and which renders our cognition of it clear, in such a way that we are able to affirm a great deal in regard to its *mode of existence*, in a word, is what produces that cognition of the thing which I call positive. But, even without this clearness of cognition or thought, we may have a kind of thought, a kind of cognition; that is, we may think that a thing subsists, from merely having a rational ground or an indication of it, provided this indication be such as to determine it and distinguish it from other things. And does not this happen in the case of every thing which is not seen by us, but whose existence we, nevertheless, affirm, because there exists a certain effect of it, whose cause is altogether veiled from us and in no manner perceived by us? Such a cognition is blunt and blind, so to speak, because it wants vision, wants that light which springs from the immediate and adequate impression of the thing upon us, in our feeling; but still it is something, and this cognition is that which, in order to distinguish it from the others, we have thought might be called *negative*.

"*Negative cognition*, therefore, also comprehends three parts, which are the following:—(1) a ground from which I argue that a being exists, and hence affirm it; (2) an indication or sign which is always a relation between this being not perceived by me, and other beings which are perceived by me, which relation determines this being for me, and distinguishes it from others; (3) finally, the result of this determining relation, which is, that I am able to deny, if not to affirm, many things with regard to this being; that is, to deny that it is any of the things perceived by me. From this last step, by which I am able to say what the thing known negatively is not, arises the term *negative cognition*, by which it is called.

"And such is the cognition which man naturally has of God in this life. The first two parts of this cognition merge into one, because the ground upon which I infer that God *subsists* is the relation which God has with the universe, as its author and principle. But I divide this relation into two parts, because it may be considered under two aspects; that is, either as a *ground* enabling me to infer the subsistence of a being, or as a *determination* of that being, enabling me to know it as a being which must be the principle of all things, and, hence, must be different from all other things. And for this distinction into two parts, which I think it well to make, of the relation between perceived things and God, there is a second rational motive in this, that, from considering the universe of created things as a whole requiring a cause, I am able to infer that God subsists. When, on the other hand, I come to determine this being as the cause of all things, the determination becomes all the more perfect, the more carefully I analyze the universe and distinguish the ultimate essences of which it is made up, those essences which cannot be confounded together in a *real* genus, and therefore I consider God apart, as cause and principle of each of these essences.

"It follows from this that, in our own knowledge and judgment concerning the existence of God, the sign which performs the part of subject, and to which I apply *ideal being*, is not a perception or vision of the real thing, but is itself a complex of ideas. Relations are only so many ideal beings, which can exist nowhere except in the mind. Nor is it by any means absurd that purely mental beings (*esseri*), though each by itself does not determine an individual, but only genera and species, should, when taken together, determine a single being. This is exactly what happens commonly in algebra, in which, although all the letters and signs taken separately are indeterminate, and hence do not express any particular number, yet, when combined according to the conditions of the problem, they give a determinate result in all those problems which are called determinate, and indicate and fix a single number, which

alone satisfies the conditions of the problem. In the same way, in the notion of God, although the ideas of cause and all other ideas which form part of it are generic and specific, and, therefore, indeterminate, yet, when put together, these ideas determine the being which they are meant to express, in such a way that no other can answer to them, and thus God becomes determined, so to speak, by a certain sign and character.

"Moreover, those ideas which give rise, so to speak, to the sign or determination whereby the mind thinks God, are of such a kind, and united in such a manner, that they form a ground for inferring the real subsistence of the divinity. They, therefore, not only perform the part of *proper names* . . . which can only direct the attention of the mind by means of a sensible sign, in which, so to speak, the mind sees the possible thing without inferring or believing in its subsistence; but they have in them a force which compels the mind to believe in the existence of God. At the same time, these ideas which mark the divine essence, and likewise convince us of the necessity of His subsistence, are not the divine being itself; they only contain the proof of it. This being still remains concealed behind a veil: we do not perceive it. The concept of God is, therefore, only a sign, an indication of Him; such is the nature of negative cognition. In a word, the *name* of God, that name which in the Holy Scriptures is frequently taken for God Himself,* as being all that in this life is manifest to us of God, is only this intellectual *name* of which we are speaking. It is not God Himself.† In the concept, there-

* Cf. Zechariah xiv. 9: "In that day shall there be one Lord, and His name one."

† One is here naturally reminded of Herakleitos' *Logos*, of which it is said, "Although the *Logos* always speaks, yet men are without understanding for it, both before they hear it, and at first, even after they have heard it. For though all things have birth in accordance with this *Logos*, men seem to be unaware of it" (Bywater, *Heraclitii Ephesii Fragmenta*, p. i.). St. Thomas agrees exactly with Rosmini: "Cum demonstratur causa per effectum, necesse est uti effectu definitionis causæ ad demonstrandum causam esse, et hoc maxime contingit in Deo: quia ad probandum aliquid esse, necesse est accipere pro medio quid significet nomen, non autem quod quid est, quia quæstio, *quid est*, sequitur quæstionem, *an est*. Nomina autem Dei imponuntur ab effectibus, ut

fore, which we can have of God, *perception* or *vision* is replaced by this intellective *name* of which we speak, a name resulting from a complex of ideas expressing relations to the universe, which determine and mark a being outside of all, who is called God. This intellective name of God, this concept, this complex of ideas, is, as it were, the subject of the following judgment:—God exists; and the predicate in this judgment is the idea of *existence*, that is, universal being, which we apply to this subject conceived by us and determined in a manner purely ideal. In the same way, if a person worthy of belief tells me that there is something behind a curtain, I have not the perception or vision of this thing, because it is cut off from me by the curtain which covers it, and yet I have a certain conception of it in my mind, made up of ideas, that is, of the idea of a particular indeterminate being, and of the relation of place which this being has with the curtain behind which it is hidden; and this concept is sufficient to determine my attention to think a thing, although it be unknown, and it is a sign to me, a name of the thing, to which I then direct the judgment, that this thing, however thought in this concept of mine, really exists. In this judgment I apply the idea of existence to the thing thus ideally conceived, as a predicate to a subject.

"Nevertheless, we must note the very great difference that exists between the negative cognition which we have of finite things—as, for example, of the unknown thing hid from us behind a veil—and the negative cognition which we have of God. This difference consists in two things. In the first place, the hidden finite thing has, in every case, some resemblance to other things perceived by us, a resemblance either generic or specific, and, hence, we may imagine something about it—for example, that it is some body or another—according to the indications given us; we may imagine that generic or specific essence which it has in common

postea ostendetur. Unde demonstrando Deum esse, per effectum, accipere possumus pro medio quid significet hoc nomen *Deus*. . . . Sic, ex effectibus Dei potest demonstrari Deum esse, licet per eos non perfectè possimus eum cognoscere secundum suam essentiam" (*Sum. Theol.*, i. q. 2, art. 2, *ad fin.*; cf. *Sum. contra Gentes*, i. capp. x.–xii.).

with other things previously perceived by us. On the contrary, God has no essence, generic or specific, in common with other things. We can only say that, in a certain sense, He has, in common with other things, the universal essence or *being*, inasmuch as *being* is the only thing that can be predicated of God and of created things in the same sense, or, as the Schoolmen said, *univoce*.* Hence the concept of God which we can have, and which takes the place of perception, or of subject in the judgment which pronounces His existence, can have no other element than being, and no other idea or essence, generic or, *à fortiori*, specific; so that all the relations which we can find between God and other things give us only a certain increase of light and distinctness in our conception of being, and nothing more. This distinctness and light arise from the community of ideal being between the created things which participate in it and their cause, which is being itself. Indeed, if there were no such community, there would be no vehicle or

* Rosmini here appends the following note:—"This does not mean that God and created things have being in the same manner; but it is the same being that we predicate of God and of created things, although in a different manner. Created things HAVE being; God IS being. Creatures, inasmuch as they have being, have it only in part: God, being being, is all being, being itself. Being, before it is predicated, is common to God and created things; but being, after it is predicated, becomes proper, so that the being of created things is altogether different from that of God, and that of the former can in no way be confounded with that of the latter." Aristotle saw this truth clearly, when he denied that being was a genus: "*ἐπεὶ τἀγαθὸν ἰσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι . . . δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινόν τι καθόλου καὶ ἕν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐλέγετ' ἐν πάσαις τοῖς κατηγορίαις, ἀλλ' ἐν μιᾷ μόνῃ*" (*Eth. Nik.*, i. 4; 1096 a, 23 sq.; cf. *Metaph.*, iv. 10; 1018 a, 35, and Brentano, *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles*, pp. 4 sq., 85 sqq.) Had Hegel seen this, it would have saved him the trouble of writing his *Logic*.

There is a good deal of difficulty about the expression "Created things *have* being." If that which has is different from that which is had, it is clear that being cannot be predicated of the former as such. It must, therefore, be a *non-ens*, a *μὴ ὄν*, and this Rosmini frankly admits (see under § 26). Cf. Buroni, *Dell' Essere e del Conoscere*, p. 96, where we read, "Non-being (*non ens*) is not *nothing*; on the contrary, it is *the thing which is*, or the *felt real*. This concept of not-being (*μὴ ὄν*) is the great discovery, so to speak, which the immortal genius of Plato made in philosophy, the addition which he made to the *being* of the Eleatics." This is entirely true, if *being* be taken to mean *being an object*, as it ought to be. Buroni speaks of the *chiaroscuro* of perception (*Ibid.*, p. 95 sq.). What is meant by saying that created things have being might be expressed in Greek by saying, "*Τὰ ὄντα ἐστὶ τὰ τοῦ εἶναι μετέχοντα.*"

passage whereby the mind of the creature could rise to a determinate concept of the Creator. This first difference between the negative cognition of a finite thing and the negative cognition of God has reference to the concept expressed in the word GOD, which plays the part of subject in the judgment: God exists. The second difference has reference to the predicate expressed by the word *exists*, and is this. When I say a finite thing exists, I give, by my affirmation, to this thing an existence such as it has, that is, a participated and partial existence. On the contrary, when I affirm the existence of God, I give to God all existence, all possible being, because such and so great is the existence that belongs to him. Hence a singular thing happens in the judgment whereby we affirm that God exists, viz. that subject and predicate are identical. The ideal concept of God is entirely composed of pure being, and not of any other idea, generic or specific; so that all the notions which enter into that concept are only being itself, analyzed and distinguished, without ever going beyond universal being; and the predicate, that which is affirmed, is also the same being. The only difference is, that the *being* which forms the subject of the judgment is still *ideal*, while that *being* which forms the predicate is posited as *real*. Hence, when we say: God exists, we mean: Being exists, or more fully, The Being which I conceive is a real, subsistent being; and this proposition, this definition of God, is the principle of Natural Theology.

"Let us conclude: (1) We have, therefore, a concept of God, ideal indeed, but determinate and not going beyond that of being. (2) We affirm the real subsistence of this being so conceived. In the divine nature we affirm to ourselves nothing *real* but being—the initial act of being. The thing of which we affirm being is known to us only by a purely ideal concept. If, then, we should wish to present in another manner the analysis of our cognition of God, we might divide it as follows:—(1) *a positive part*, comprehending the affirmation of pure subsistence (predicate); (2) an *ideal part*, comprehending the concept which we have of God, and which determines for us the divine being;

(3) a *negative part*, comprehending all that we can deny of God, when, with such negations, we distinguish Him from all other things. The first of these three parts does not, properly speaking, form a cognition, and cannot receive this name, but only that of affirmation, of assent given to cognition, and hence of persuasion arising in us. Our cognition of God, therefore, properly so called, is drawn from the other two parts, and hence the cognition which, with the natural light, we can have in this life of the Supreme Being, may very properly be called ideal-negative cognition" (*La Sapienza*, vol. ii. No. 7, pp. 410 417).

In saying that *being* may be predicated of God and of created things *univoce* (συνωνύμως, as Aristotle would say), Rosmini stands in apparent contradiction with St. Thomas, and, indeed, with the Schoolmen generally. St. Thomas devotes a whole chapter of his *Summa contra Gentes* to proving that "*Nihil de Deo et rebus aliis univoce prædicatur*" (i. cap. xxxii.). The contradiction, however, is much more apparent than real. When Rosmini says that being is predicated of God and created things in the same sense, but not in the same mode, he means exactly the same thing as St. Thomas does when he says, "*Quod ea quæ dicuntur de Deo et creaturis analogice dicuntur*" (*Ibid.*, cap. xxxiv.). The being of God has the same relation to His reality that a man's being has to his. This principle is universal. Being cannot be predicated even of any two created things *univoce*, but only *analogice*. The being of a horse is not the being of a dog; nor is the being of one horse the being of another. In the real world there is no universality.

"To predicate existence univocally," says Rosmini, "means to predicate existence of different things, using the word in the same signification. Although, however, the word *existence* is predicated of God and of every created being in the same sense, and hence univocally, it must not be supposed that it is predicated of the two in the same mode, because to predicate means to unite or attribute something to a subject. Now, the mind, which considers created things as beings, does not attribute existence to them in the same mode in which it attributes it to God;

but it attributes existence to God as something essentially belonging to Him; to created things, as something participated: to God as essential and necessary; to created things, as accidental. It unites being with God, by identifying it with Him; to created things, by distinguishing it from them. Created things are known to exist by means of the idea of existence, whereas God is not only known to exist by means of this idea, but He is identical with this idea, that is, with the essence whereby He is intuited" (*Theosophy*, vol. iv. p. 468). In other words, God is *esse*, εἶναι, *Sein*, whereas created things are only *entia*, ὄντα, *Seiende*. It is unfortunate that this distinction cannot be brought out in English (or French) by means of inflectional forms. *Being*, in English, is both the verbal noun expressing the essence of being, the gerund expressing the act of the same, and the participle expressing participation in the same. The Italian "*L'essere, essendo ente*," is, in English, "*Being, being being*." On the meaning of the participle (μετοχή), see *Grammar of Dionysios Thrax*, in Bekker's *Anecdota Græca*, vol. ii. pp. 369 sqq. (or my translation of the same, *Journal Spec. Philos.*, vol. viii. [1874] pp. 326 sqq.); Lersch, *Die Sprachphilosophie der Alten*, vol. ii. pp. 93, 130; Schmidt, *Beiträge zur Gesch. der Grammatik des Griech. und des Latein.*, pp. 449 sqq.; Steinthal, *Gesch. der Sprachwissenschaft bei den Griechen und Römern*, pp. 659.

183.

Two ways in which our minds rise to the Absolute Being.

This necessity proves to us two things: *first*, that the defects and limitations of the beings which we know cannot belong to God; *second*, that all the perfections of the beings which we know must belong to God, although not in the way in which they are in the beings known to us, for the reason that in these beings they are either contingent or limited or divided (in a word, essentially subject

to some limitation or division), whereas, in the Supreme Being, they must necessarily exist without division or limit, that is, in a mode altogether different, or rather, without mode. These two ways of knowing the Absolute Being are usually called *Via Exclusionis* and *Via Eminentiæ*.

184.

Theology must supplement what was said in the Cosmology of the divine operations *ad extra*.

Having discovered the ways in which our thought shapes the doctrine concerning God, we must pass on to set forth that doctrine which contemplates God in Himself, and as the author of the world, in relation to created things, and complete, in this second part, what was said of the divine operations *ad extra* in the Cosmology.

185.

Of the divine essence.

God, as considered in Himself, is the subject of that part of Natural Theology, which treats of the divine essence. It begins by explaining the attributes of this essence.

Rosmini treats this subject in many parts of his *Theosophy*, particularly in the second, third, and fourth volumes.

186.

Can the human intelligence, fortified by revelation, know that the divine

It then examines whether the human intelligence, developed and rendered potent by revelation, can know that the divine essence must be in three Persons. This question it answers in the

affirmative, as, indeed, it was answered by two modern theologians, Fathers Ermenegildo Pini and Mastrofini. It is, nevertheless, certain that the knowledge of the Trinity accessible to reason is merely negative-ideal.

essence must exist in three Persons?

Ermenegildo Pini was born in 1739, and died in 1825. He was the author of a work called *Protologia*, in which he sought to discover what in thought was the first *per se*. He also wrote *Dialogues on Architecture*. The Abbé Mastrofini was born in 1763 and died in 1845. He wrote a work of much merit entitled *De Deo Uno et Trino*, published in 1815, and another called *Metafisica Sublime*.

187.

In treating of God as the author of things, Theology deals mainly with the relation in which the creative act stands to the act of the divine essence and to the act of created things themselves, as existing.

On the creative act.

188.

Applying, then, to the Creator of the Universe the attributes of infinite power, knowledge and goodness already spoken of, we enter upon the very extensive subject of the conservation and government of the universe, and of its predestined end and aim. This part of Theology, which contemplates the marks of God's attributes in the world—that is, the providence which guides events according to an eternal design, the power which conducts them to the fulfilment of that design

The exposition of divine attributes leads to Theodicy, which deals with the power, wisdom, and goodness of God as displayed in the world.

without trenching upon the liberty of intelligent creatures, and the goodness, holiness, and blessedness bestowed on these creatures in the greatest possible measure (without prejudice to the divine attributes), which bestowal is the final aim of the whole—is properly denominated *Theodicy*.

These questions are all treated in Rosmini's *Theodicy*, the second book of which was published as an *Essay* as early as 1826, and the first and second together in the Milan edition of his *Opuscoli Filosofici* (1827-28). The third book was not written until 1844. The work, therefore, shows some unevenness of style. The first book, which "is *logical*, proposes and prescribes the rules which human thought ought to follow in its judgments regarding the dispensations of divine providence." The second book, which is *physical*, "is a continued meditation on the laws of nature, on the essential limitations of the created, and on the concatenation of causes." The third book is *hyperphysical*, and treats of "the manner in which the action of God intervenes in nature, and the laws which it follows in acting, in consequence of His divine attributes." The three books combat respectively—(1) errors arising from logical ignorance; (2) errors arising from physical ignorance; and (3) errors arising from teleological ignorance (Preface to *Theodicy*).

2. *Deontological Sciences.*

189.

Deontological Sciences.

The Deontological Sciences are all those that treat of the perfection of being and the way in which this perfection may be acquired or produced or lost.

190.

Deontology is either *general* or *special*. *General Deontology* treats of the perfectibility of beings in general; *Special Deontology*, which is divided into several sciences, of the perfection possible for each species of beings.

Deontology general and special.

A. *General Deontology.*

191.

Beings may be considered in the great unity which they form through their mutual relations of perfection. If these relations are classified according to the categories, they will fall into three great classes: (1) *relations of perfection proper to moral beings;* (2) *relations of perfection proper to intelligent beings;* and (3) *relations of perfection proper to real beings, whether sensitive or extra-subjective.* We have said "relations proper to intelligent beings" instead of "relations proper to ideal beings," because ideal being is properly one and simple; hence, apart from intelligent subjects and real beings, it has no intrinsic relations.

General Deontology. Three classes of relations of perfection.

192.

The *relations of perfection* thus classified, if looked at as they exist in the Supreme Being, are immutable; but, if they are considered as they exist in contingent being, they are susceptible

These relations are immutable and complete in the Supreme

Being. In contingent being they are more or less realized.

of various degrees of quantity and realization. Their greater or less realization determines the greater or less perfection of the beings between which the relations in question exist. Hence, in the Supreme Being there is complete and immutable perfection, because therein all the relations of perfection are immutably and completely realized. Contingent being, on the other hand, is susceptible of imperfection, and of greater or less perfection, according to the higher or lower realization of the relations mentioned.

193.

Perfection real, intellectual, and moral.

If the relations proper to real, intelligent, and moral beings are fully realized, they produce, respectively, real, intellectual, and moral perfection.

194.

The relations of perfection have a double exigence.

These relations, upon whose realization the perfection of a being depends, have, therefore, objectively considered, one exigence in themselves, and, subjectively considered, another exigence in view of the beings that are subjects of perfection or imperfection.

The Italian word *esigenza* I have been obliged to render by its etymological equivalent *exigence*, for the reason that in English there is no word that exactly corresponds to it. *Exigence*, it is true, is hardly used in the sense here implied; but its meaning is clear enough from the context.

195.

Objective exigence.

By *objective exigence* is meant that which the mind conceives, when it considers being in itself, without attending to its relation to any particular real subject.

196.

Subjective exigence.

Subjective exigence is that which the mind conceives in the particular real subject, when it observes that the perfection of it requires the realization of a given relation.

197.

Meaning of "exigence."

The word "exigence" expresses the necessity which belongs to the conditions necessary for the attainment of an end, and which derives its character from that end.

198.

The exigences, or necessities, in virtue of which the relations peculiar to the various classes of beings claim realization.

Now, there is a real or physical necessity, and this is the exigence in virtue of which the relations peculiar to real beings peremptorily demand realization, in order that real or physical beings may attain their perfection.

There is an intellectual necessity, and this is the exigence in virtue of which the relations peculiar to intellective beings peremptorily de-

mand realization, in order that they may attain their perfection.

There is a moral necessity, and this is the exigence in virtue of which the relations peculiar to moral beings peremptorily demand realization, in order that they may attain their perfection.

199.

Physical, intellectual, and moral necessities have each two forms, an ontological and a deontological.

These are the three *deontological necessities*. They differ from *ontological necessities* in this, that the former are necessary to the perfection of beings, the latter to their existence. There is, therefore, an ontological and a deontological physical necessity, an ontological and a deontological intellectual necessity (in the former of which is included logical necessity), and an ontological and a deontological moral necessity. This distinction is not found in God, because in Him, from the excellency of His nature, the deontological necessity is ontological.

200.

Perfection, being a form, may be either objective or subjective (§ 35).

But, since perfection is a form, and there are, as we have seen, *subjective forms* and *objective forms*, there are also *subjective perfections* and *objective perfections*.

201.

Moreover, some subjective forms have a reality distinct from the subject which they inform; others are only a constituent element of the informed subject itself. Now, the same distinction must be made respecting the perfections of beings. In fact, all real beings have one perfection which belongs altogether to themselves, and another which they receive from their interaction, and which corresponds to their nature. From this union and interaction springs, in all cases, the perfection of composite beings.

The form which perfects real being is subjective, and is either a constituent element of that being or a distinct reality.

202.

As the form which causes intelligences to exist is an object, so also the form which perfects them is objective.

The form which perfects intelligent beings is objective.

203.

But the form which perfects moral beings, that is, beings endowed with will and rational affection, is *subjective-objective*, for the reason that the perfection of the will consists in loving all beings, the totality of being, and distributing this affection according to the nature of the object, or, which is the same thing, according to the quantum of entity which we find in it, when we measure it by the essence of being, which manifests itself to the mind, and which is at once the

The form which perfects moral beings is subjective-objective.

object of the mind and the *universal measure.* Intuited being measures all particular beings, and the will feels the exigence wherein they claim to be recognized as what they are. The will must not oppose itself to the understanding, but must accept the truth cognized by it. All beings are, by nature, goods for the will; they are naturally lovable to it. But the will, being free, may place itself in opposition to this law of nature, and may substitute false for true entities, as objects of its love; it may enhance or depreciate entities for itself, and, hence, place its goods in opposition to their true being. In so doing it contradicts the truth, lies, makes war on entity, and is, therefore, unrighteous; it corrupts the natural law existing between it and real beings — is, therefore, disordered and perverted. The internal lie, unrighteousness, voluntary disorder, is moral evil; the opposite is moral good.

It is unnecessary to say that the word *good* is used here in the sense of the Greek ἀγαθόν, that which completes or perfects. Καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τἀγαθόν, οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται, says Aristotle, in the opening of the *Nikomacheian Ethics.*

204.

What is moral obligation?

Evil must be avoided, good sought. *Obligation* is only the concept of moral good and evil manifesting to the soul its own necessity. Of all goods, that which presents itself with the greatest clearness and completeness to the mind is *obedience*

to the Supreme Being; of all evils, disobedience to the same. Truth and entity, therefore, are the first spring and the first proclaimer of obligation. Beings, in relation to the will, have moral exigence.

205.

Difference between moral perfection and that of real and intellectual beings.

Moral exigence or necessity is, therefore, widely different from that exigence which the relations of perfection peculiar to real and intellectual beings carry with them, inasmuch as the perfection of these latter is not the perfection of a will. Moral perfection, on the contrary, is the perfection of a will, and is effected by will.

206.

Second difference.

Now, will is the essence of personality, and *person* alone is the true cause of actions, and the one to which alone they can be imputed. Although, therefore, real being may be more or less perfect, still, this perfection is not imputed to real being, which is its subject and not its cause, but is merely contemplated by the intellect as a perfection of that being. The same may be said with respect to the perfections of intellectual being. They are perfections of nature, and not of person.

207.

Third difference.

Hence, in connection with the perfection of real and intellectual beings, there is but one

exigence, which says, "In order that real or intellectual beings may be perfect, they must be so or so." On the contrary, the perfection of moral being brings with it two exigences. The one springs from being, considered in itself, and says, "Entity, truth, must be recognized by the will." The other arises from the nature of the will itself, and says, "If the will does not recognize entity and truth, it has not perfection." The first is the obligation imposed upon the person by the exigence of the beings known to it (objective exigence); the second is the exigence of the will itself, considered as a nature susceptible of perfection (subjective exigence).

208.

Three parts of the doctrine of the perception of being.

The doctrine of the perfection of beings may be divided into three parts. The first describes the *archetype* of every being, that is, the condition of the being that has reached its highest perfection. The second describes the *actions* whereby the perfections of beings may be produced. The third describes the *means* whereby the art of performing these actions may be acquired.

209.

Nature of the object of each of these parts.

The *archetype* of being, or ideal perfection, is the example and guide of all the arts; the *actions*, whereby the perfections of beings are produced, include all the arts, mechanical, liberal, intellectual,

moral; the *means*, which lead to these arts, constitute special *education*, or the school of these arts.

B. *Special Deontology.*

210.

Vastness of Special Deontology.

This shows the vast extent of *General Deontology*. *Special Deontology* is vaster still, since there is one for every kind of being, and not only for *natural*, but also for *artificial beings*. And among those whose author is man, one of the first places belongs to those whose aim is to produce beautiful objects. Each of the *fine arts* has its own science, and all these sciences presuppose a science of the beautiful in general. This science we may term *Callology*. A special division of it, that which treats of *the beautiful as seen in the sensible*, we call Æsthetics. But Callology and Æsthetics belong, first of all, to General Deontology, and especially to that part of it which describes the archetypes of beings.

Rosmini has left no special treatise on Callology or Æsthetics; but his various utterances upon these subjects, scattered through his different works, have been collected in two volumes under the title of *Literature and the Fine Arts*. According to his view, beauty is a relation of which the principle is a mind and the term an object. It is, therefore, like truth, an objective relation, not a subjective one, like the good. We may, therefore, say that the true and the beautiful are attributes of objects, while the good is an attribute of subjects. The beautiful, however, differs from the true, implying, besides truth, four other elements—

unity, multitude, totality, and mental applause. Of this mental applause Rosmini says, "Approval or applause is, therefore, a natural affection excited in the intelligent subject at the sight of the identity discovered to exist between two terms, which the mind compares and which seem most different: these are the *theme* or idea, and the work actually executed or accomplished" (*Theosophy*, vol. ii. § 1135). "The beautiful most proper to human nature is that which is found realized in the world, because man himself is made up of an animated body and an intellective soul, and the latter, by nature, intuites only the idea of being, which is the *universal* theme, the most virtual of all and not yet beauty. The works executed in accordance with this theme man must gather from his own modifications, that is, from the finite terms of feeling. The only real accessible to man being the finite, he must draw from it the real and effectual spur of his actions, as well as his determinate ideas, and, therefore, also the archetype of that beauty upon which he can spend his admiration. . . . But he demands the divine real" (*Ibid.* § 1139). When beauty goes beyond the measure of human imagination, it becomes sublimity, and the action it then arouses in the human soul is no longer *applause*, but *enthusiasm*. It is interesting to compare these views with those of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, and Plutarch. See Plato, *Phaidros*, pp. 245 sqq., 250 sqq.; Aristotle, *Poetics*, cap. iv. 1448 b, 15 sqq.; *Rhetoric*, i. 11; 1371 b, 5 sqq.; Plotinus, *Enneads*, i. 6; Plutarch, Πῶς δεῖ τὸν νέον ποιημάτων ἀκούειν cap. iii. pp. 17, 18. Rosmini's whole doctrine of beauty very closely resembles that of Plotinus, down even to the view that the subject or principle of beauty is determined by its object: "Τὸ γὰρ ὁρῶν πρὸς τὸ ὁρώμενον συγγενὲς καὶ ὅμοιον ποιησάμενον δεῖ ἐπιβάλλειν τῇ θέᾳ. Οὐ γὰρ ἂν πώποτε εἶδεν ὀφθαλμὸς ἥλιον ἡλιοειδὴς μὴ γεγενημένος, οὐδὲ τὸ καλὸν ἂν ἴδοι ψυχὴ μὴ καλὴ γενομένη. γενέσθω δὴ πρῶτον θεοειδὴς πᾶς, εἰ μέλλει θεάσασθαι θεόν τε καὶ καλόν" (*Enneads*, i. 6, 9). Goethe's paraphrase of this passage will occur to every one:

> "Wär' nicht das Auge sonnenhaft,
> Wie könnten wir das Licht erblicken?

Lebt' nicht in uns der Gottheit eig'ne Kraft,
Wie könnte uns die göttliche entzücken ?"

Rosmini so thoroughly believed in the power of the object to form the subject that, in his earlier life, he surrounded himself with numerous objects of art. In his palace at Rovereto there are still some twenty thousand engravings, many of which he collected. Rosmini's theory of the beautiful is worked out at length in the second volume of his *Theosophy*, book iii. § 4, cap. 10. It is practically summed up in the beautiful lines of Michael Angelo :—

"Amore è un concetto di bellezza
Immaginata, cui sta dentro al core,
Amica di virtute e gentilezza."

Cf. Dante's "Amor e cor gentil sono una cosa" (*Vita Nuova*, § 20).

211.

Human Deontology.

We will not stop here to classify all the special deontological sciences, but will limit our discourse to Human Deontology, *i.e.* the science of human perfection.

212.

The doctrine of moral perception implicitly contains the whole doctrine of human perfection.

Man is a being real, intellectual and moral, and, therefore, shares in the perfection proper to the three modes of being. Since, however, moral perfection completes the other two, and alone is personal perfection, for that reason the doctrine of *moral perfection* implicitly contains the whole doctrine of human perfection.

213.

Doctrine of human perfection embraces three parts —*archetype, actions, means.*

The doctrine of human perfection presents to the mind those same three parts into which we have said that general deontology is divided: (1) the doctrine of the *human archetype*, to which every man must seek to approximate; (2) the doctrine of those *actions* whereby man approximates and conforms to that archetype; and (3) the doctrine of the *means* and aids by which man is stimulated and strengthened to these actions.

(α) Teletics.

(β) Ethics.

The first of these doctrines may be called *Teletics*, the second *Ethics*, and the third, that is, the doctrine of means, is divided into several sciences.

(γ) Ascetics.

A man may acquire these means and apply them to himself: the science of this may be called *Ascetics*.

(δ) Education.

Or he may apply them to his fellow-men, encouraging and aiding them to acquire human perfection: the science which teaches the manner of this application is called *Education* or *Pædagogics*.

(ε) Economy.

The science which teaches how to apply them to the family, so that it, being rendered good, may exert itself to render good the individuals that compose it, may be called *Economy;* that which teaches how to apply it to civil society, so that it, being rendered good, may improve its

(ϛ) Politics.

members, is termed *Politics;* and, finally, that which teaches how to apply them to the theocratic

(ζ) Cosmopolitics.

community of the human race may be called *Cosmopolitics*.

214.

(α) *Teletics.* The archetype of man, both in the natural and supernatural orders, is Jesus Christ.

The science which describes the perfect archetypal man has not been written or even attempted, and it cannot be worked out until all the sciences relating to man are fully developed. And even then the science would not be complete. The truth is, that man is at present fallen, and that he was never left in a state of mere nature. Nor was it fitting that he should be so left. Hence his nature has always been mixed up with the divine and supernatural, and what man may become in the double order of the natural and supernatural is a problem that surpasses and eludes human thought, and, therefore, can never be completely solved by human philosophy. But, instead of having this archetype described in words and consigned to the dead letter of a book, we have the living archetype presented to us by God Himself in Jesus Christ, the Head and Lord of the human race.

215.

(β) *Ethics.*

Man must be good and not evil. The goodness of man consists in the goodness of his will, since it is clear that he who has a will perfectly good is a good man. Now, the goodness of man, and not the goodness of his belongings, is called *moral goodness*, and that quality of the human will whereby a man is good is called *moral goodness* or

virtue. This good forms the subject of Ethics, which is therefore the science of virtue.

This is exactly Aristotle's doctrine: "Πάντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ψέγομεν εἰς τὴν προαίρεσιν βλέποντες μᾶλλον ἢ εἰς τὰ ἔργα" (*Eth. Eud.*, ii. 11; 1228 a, 12 sqq.).

216.

Ethics includes three parts corresponding to its three offices.

The moral philosopher does three things: (1) he analyzes the concept of virtue, distinguishing its elements, and then gathers them all up into a scientific definition; (2) he tries to ascertain in what mode, that is, by what voluntary and free acts, and by what habits, a man may attain to virtue, and, on the contrary, in what mode and by what actions he loses it and becomes wicked; and (3) he endeavours to estimate the excellence and preciousness of virtue, without which all other goods are valueless to man. Hence Ethics has three parts: the first treats of the *nature of virtue*,

(*a*) General Ethics.

and is denominated *General Ethics*, because it does not descend to any of those special habits or acts into which virtue enters, but deals with that condition which all habits and acts must possess in order to be virtuous; the second treats of the

(*b*) Special Ethics.

modes of virtue, and is called *Special Ethics*, because it considers the special habits and acts which contain virtue; the third treats of the

(*c*) Eudæmonology.

excellence of virtue, and is called *Ethical Eudæmonology*, because we discover the excellence of virtue only by seeing how it renders the intelligent and volitional nature perfect and happy.

Rosmini has left three important works on Ethics: (1) *A Treatise on the Moral Consciousness;* (2) *Principles of Moral Science;* and (3) *A Comparative and Critical History of the Systems which have been propounded with regard to the Principle of Morality.* These are all very remarkable works, and the last is the most exhaustive treatise on the subject in existence.

217.

(a) General Ethics treats of the essence of virtue. First element of moral good is the will.

The first part of Ethics, then, having to treat of virtue, investigates its elements, which are three: (1) will and liberty; (2) law; (3) conformity of liberty and will to law. In treating of will, Ethics makes use of that part of Anthropology or Psychology which considers the power of the will over the other faculties of man, the limits of this power and of the liberty which renders it the responsible cause of actions.

Second element of virtue is law.

Speaking of law (Nomology), it first defines it in the largest sense as the *principle of obligation.* It then inquires what is the first of all laws; that is, it seeks for the first principle of obligation, couched in a formula logically prior to all others, a formula expressing the *essence* of obligation itself in the first act in which it reveals itself to man, and not requiring any ulterior ground to account for it. And, inasmuch as the light of human reason and will is *being*, it is plain that the first self-evident formula of obligation is:—Follow the light of reason, or, Recognize being. To cognize is an act of the reason, and always belongs to the theoretic order; to recognize is often the corre-

sponding act of the will, and belongs to the practical order. But being has in itself an intrinsic order, according to which certain beings are greater and more excellent than others and have greater dignity. This order is what must be recognized by the will, and, hence, the universal formula of obligation, the principle of Ethics, may be expressed thus: Recognize being as it is in its order.

It will be observed that Rosmini does not allow to man any *special* moral faculty, whose function is to cognize and adhere to the good. In this he differs from both Aristotle and Kant. Both these thinkers endow man with a practical reason (πρακτικὸς νοῦς, *praktische Vernunft*), though by that term they mean very different things. As to Aristotle's meaning, see Walter, *Die Lehre von der prakt. Vernunft in der griech. Philosophie*, and the severe, but just, criticism of it by Teichmüller, in his *Neue Studien zur Gesch. der Begriffe*, Heft. iii. In reference to Kant's view, Rosmini says, "Man is a cognitive and active being; hence human life is naturally divided into theoretical and practical. The same cannot properly be said of Philosophy. Philosophy is not an action, but always a contemplation, whatever its subject be. . . . We will not, therefore, divide philosophy into theoretical and practical, as has been done heretofore; but we will set out with two theories, the one of which is destined to show us how beings *are* and how they act, the other to instruct us how we ourselves *ought* to act. . . . These two great branches of philosophy have no formal difference, that is, no difference in regard to their mode of being, such as exists between contemplation and action. Both are contemplative, and . . . differ only in the objects of their contemplation. Nor is the contemplative faculty different in the two cases, as was maintained by Kant, who made the Theoretic Reason and the Practical Reason two distinct faculties. It is one and the same faculty applied

to different materials. What, then, is the principle according to which philosophy is divided into the two theories indicated? . . . Things may be considered . . . either simply as they are or as they ought to be. This would seem the first and most obvious division of philosophy; yet it is not the one we are in search of. What we call the *Theory of Practice* does not go so far as to determine how all things ought to be, but only how the actions of men ought to be" (Introduction to *Principles of Moral Science*).

218.

What part of human action is moral in itself, and what by participation.

In the act of practical recognition we form an estimate of being proportionate to its grade. This estimate is followed by an equal degree of love, which also diffuses itself on all beings in degrees proportionate to their grade of being. This love again is succeeded, either with or without express decrees of the will, by external actions ordered in conformity with that love and rendering the whole life of the virtuous man beautiful and harmonious.

219.

A man is not completely virtuous until he refers every action to God as his ultimate aim.

But among beings, God is absolute beginning and end of all. He is, therefore, the final aim of the virtuous man's will and of its acts, the final aim to which tend all recognition, all estimation, all love, all human action. Hence comes Religion, in which, as being morality perfected and raised to the highest degree of completeness, every duty becomes sacred and every virtue holiness. Since then all beings proceed from God through creation,

and are dependent on Him for preservation, so they must all be led back to Him, and all conformed to the divine will.

220.

God's will is the source of divine positive law.

And the will of God becomes the source of positive legislation, that is, of those laws which are positively revealed by God to man. Ethics points out the difference between the *natural* and the *positive law*, and shows that respect for the latter proceeds from respect for the former.

221.

Why there are duties toward human nature, which is contingent and limited.

Next to our duties to God come our duties to created intelligences, the duties which each man has toward his fellows. Although these are subordinate to our duties toward God, as created things are subordinate to the Creator; yet men also are objects of moral duties, as beings who are aims in themselves. And their existence has an aim, because they are intelligent, and in intelligence is ideal being, which is a divine element. In fact, the will, which is the active faculty of the intelligence, must have, as its end and good, something infinite and divine. Hence the aphorism: The moral always embraces in some way the totality of being.

222.

Special Logic of Ethics.

Developing the second element of moral good, viz. law, Ethics teaches how to apply it to special cases. Hence arises the Special Logic of Ethics, which deals chiefly with the moral consciousness. In it rules are given for the application of the laws to particular actions, and especially to cases in which the law is doubtful. The principal law to be applied in these cases is the following: —"If there is doubt respecting the existence of the positive law, and the doubt cannot be resolved, the law is not binding; and if there is doubt in a matter appertaining to the natural law and relating to an evil inherent in action, the risk of this evil must be avoided."

This law was the source of a long controversy between Rosmini and the Jesuits, who have their own views in regard to obligation toward a doubtful law. See Bibliography of Rosmini's Works, Class iii.

223.

Third element of moral good is the relation between will and law.

Coming at last to the third element, that is, to the relation between will and law, Ethics sets forth all the modes in which this relation may vary, describing the various states, good and bad, into which human will and liberty enter, and man himself as affected by such variations.

224.

(*b*) Special Ethics. Treats of the special forms of moral good and evil.

The second part of Ethics, or Special Ethics, treats of the special forms of moral good and evil, and begins by distinguishing between *act* and *habit* [ἕξις], showing the various *forms* of morality of which each is susceptible. It then goes on to set forth our special *duties* to divinity and humanity. As regards the latter, a man must respect and honour human nature in himself and in his fellows; he must respect it in individuals and in the societies, natural or artificial, in which men unite themselves. All social relations give occasion to the existence of moral duties. Next, it treats of *habits*, and so of all the special *virtues* and *vices*. Furthermore, it considers the means by which evil may be avoided and moral good attained. To this part of Ethics, as we have seen, the name of *Ascetics* may be given.

225.

Eudæmonology shows the beauty of moral good and the turpitude of moral evil in themselves and in their effects.

Eudæmonology, the third part of Ethics, considers the excellence of moral good and the turpitude of moral evil. It shows that both are infinite. It describes the dignity and joy of the virtuous soul, and the ignobleness and misery of the vicious soul. It shows that no truly virtuous man is unhappy, and no wicked one happy. It thus wakes the confidence and trust which slumber in the human heart, that virtue will meet with an eternal reward, and vice with

an eternal punishment. It proves this from the divine attributes. The wise philosopher, after having, as a pedagogue, led man thus far, consigns him to the hands of a more sublime teacher—Revelation.

226.

Rational Right.

From Ethics proceeds the very extensive science of Rational Right. It arises from the protection which Ethics, or the moral law, affords to the *useful good*, or, more generally, to all the eudæmonologic goods which man can enjoy. In fact, it is one of man's ethical duties that he shall not injure his neighbour. This the Roman lawyers expressed by their formula *Neminem lædere.* No one, therefore, may interfere with the good possessed by his neighbour. Now, a man who has a good which, in virtue of the moral law, must not be interfered with by any one, is said *to have a right.* If the man, possessing this right, had not the power to make it useful to himself, it would no longer be either a good, the object of right, or a right itself. Right, therefore, considered subjectively—that is, in relation to the subject possessing it—is an eudæmonological faculty, protected by the moral law. From being thus protected by the moral law, this eudæmonological good acquires a certain moral dignity, and he who possesses it acquires the power to protect it against any one who would take it from him or depreciate it.

Rosmini has left a very voluminous treatise on the *Philosophy of Right*, which, though it contains many antiquated notions, is still well worth a careful reading.

227.

Sphere of the science of right.

The Science of Right undertakes (1) to classify all those goods which may be the object or material of right; (2) to determine what protection the moral law accords to them, and how far and under what conditions it may be extended; (3) to decide the doubtful ones, that is, those which arise from the apparent collision of rights; (4) to determine in how far the defence extended to rights is sanctioned by the moral law itself, and under what circumstances and conditions it is legitimate; and (5) to settle the satisfaction and damages due for violated rights, and, hence, for losses and injuries.

228.

Fundamental division of a man's rights in relation to other men.

All the goods and rights which a man possesses in his relations with his fellow-men come under two forms, which constitute the basis of the fundamental classification of these rights themselves—*freedom* and *property*.

229.

What is *freedom?*

Freedom is the power which each man has to use all his faculties and resources, so long as he

does not thereby encroach upon the rights of others, that is, so long as he does not interfere with the goods of his fellow-men.

Aristotle defines the free man as the man who exists for his own sake and not for the sake of others ("ἐλεύθερος ἄνθρωπος ὁ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου ὤν." *Metaphys.* i. 2; 982 a, 26). Hegel says, "The existence of free will is Right" (*Philosophie des Rechts*, Einleitung, § 29). By *existence* (*Daseyn*), Hegel means "being with a determination, which, as an immediate and being (*i.e.* existing) determination, is—quality" (*Encyclop.*, pt. i. § 90).

230.

What is *property?*

Property is the union of goods with man. This union is based upon a psychological law, in virtue of which a man may unite to himself things different from himself, in somewhat the same way as his body is united to his soul. This permanent union takes place through feeling and intelligence. Through feeling even the lower animals unite external things to them—their young, the food they collect, their nests, habitations, and other things, which they sometimes defend even with their lives. Thus they have a certain property, but not a moral or legal one. Man unites things to himself both by the natural bond of feeling, and also by the bond which intelligence adds to the other, a bond in virtue of which he lays claim to many external things, and reserves them for future use. This also is a kind of property, but not that property which constitutes a right. When, however, the *bonds of feeling and intelli-*

gence are supplemented by the *moral bond*, then property is converted into right. Now, this bond consists, as we have said, in the protection which the moral law accords to the other two bonds, by imposing upon other men the obligation to respect them. Moral reason imposes this obligation when the first two bonds between men and things have been formed through lawful liberty, that is, without separating the things appropriated from other men to whom they may have been united. The origin of this obligation is this. To separate from a man that which he has united to him by affection and intelligence is to cause him pain, to do him evil. But we may not do evil to others in order to do good to ourselves. Therefore, moral reason forbids us to injure the property of others.

231.

Two parts of the science of right.

The subject of rights may be either the *individual man*, considered in relation to his fellow-men, or the *social man*. Hence the science of right has two parts, *individual right* and *social right*.

232.

Subject of Individual Right.

Individual Right treats of three things: (1) of natural and acquired rights, describing their nature and conditions, their titles and modes of acquisition; (2) of the transmission of rights and the modifications which they undergo in this

transmission ; (3) of the changes which take place in the rights of others, and of the obligations and modifications of reciprocal rights which follow therefrom.

233.

Social Right based on Individual Right.

Social Right has its origin in Individual Right. It springs from the fact of association, and the freedom to form honourable associations is the natural right of every individual. It is limited only by the principle that a new association must not interfere with an old one already in possession.

234.

Social Right universal or particular.

Social Right is *universal* or *particular*.

235.

Universal Social Right is either internal or external.

Universal Social Right considers the duties and rights which have their origin in the fact of association generally. This right is of two kinds, *internal* and *external*. The first regards those rights and duties that exist between the members of any society ; the second, those that exist between one society and another, or between a society and individuals outside of it.

236.

Internal Right is divided into Signorial, Political, and Communal Right.

Internal Right naturally divides itself into three parts, which treat respectively of (1) *Signorial Right* as connected with governing right; (2) *Political*, or governing, *Right*, that is, the rights and obligations of those who govern a society and administer its affairs; and (3) *Communal Right*, or the rights and obligations common to all the members of a society.

237.

Particular Social Right arises from the application to particular societies of the principles of universal social right. Three societies necessary to the human race.

This same division applies to *Particular Social Right*, since these three kinds of rights and obligations belong to every society. And there may be innumerable societies, each of which has its own right, resulting from an application of the principles set forth in *Universal Social Right;* but there are three societies necessary for the existence and organization of the human race, societies which, when perfected, must restore the human race to its primitive unity and render it one great, well-ordered family. These societies are—(1) the *Theocratic*, or natural-divine; (2) the *Domestic*, which is based on human nature alone, and divides itself into the *Conjugal* and the *Parental;* and (3) the *Civil*, which is artificial, indeed, but necessary for the well-being of the human species. The particular rights belonging to these three societies furnish subjects for three treatises of the highest importance.*

* Cf. the first chapters of Aristotle's *Politics*.

238.

Theocratic Right either initial or perfect.

Theocratic Society is either *initial*, binding men together through natural morality and natural religion, or *perfect*, appearing in the form of the Catholic Church, and binding men more closely together by the positive bonds of a revealed, supernatural morality and religion. Here also there are three forms of right—*Signorial, Governmental*, and *Communal.*

239.

Domestic Right twofold, *Conjugal* and *Parental.*

Domestic Right is, as we have said, twofold, *Conjugal* and *Parental.* The former treats of the relations between husband and wife, the nature and conditions of matrimony, and the mode of contracting it, as well as of the rights and obligations of the contracting parties. The latter deals with the reciprocal rights and corresponding obligations of *parents and children*, with special regard to their moral bearings.

240.

There may be a *general* as well as a *special* theory of *civil society.*

Civil Right sets forth the nature and origin of civil society, and, hence, of its three parts, *lordship*, *government*, and *citizenship*, assigning to each its rights and obligations. Inasmuch as civil society may be constituted in various forms and furnished with various organs and

functions, there may be formed a general theory of natural right for all civil societies, taking account only of that which is essential and common to them all, and a theory of right for each different form that the civil body may assume.

Rosmini attempted to define the limits of civil right in his famous political pamphlet, *Constitution according to Social Justice.* His *Five Wounds of Holy Church* had a similar purpose.

241.

The supreme problem of the Science of Right.

But a still higher question is raised when it is asked, Supposing a multitude, not yet organized into a civil society, should commission a philosopher to frame a constitution for them, what sort of constitution ought he, having regard only to principles of justice and leaving entirely out of view all political considerations, give them? Such are the virtue and fertility of the principles of justice, that if we should deduce from them their natural consequences (to do which would certainly require a master mind), these alone would supply us with all the political laws even necessary for the organization of a nation in such a way as to give it the best chance of concord and prosperity. And here comes in the connection between the *judicial* and *political sciences.*

242.

Finally, External Right, whether universal or particular, is only an application of individual right to societies, considered as so many individuals. Wherein consists External Right.

Doctrine of Means.

243.

Ascetics cannot form a science apart from Ethics, for the reason that the subject of Ethics is moral obligation and virtue, not merely in their universal concepts, but also in their more special acts. Hence, it is obvious that the means and aids to virtue are matters of obligation, and that the acquisition and proper use of them are virtuous acts—acts to which certain virtues have reference. (γ) *Ascetics.*

244.

Pedagogics treats of the art of human education. Man is educated partly by himself, partly by the institution of the family, whose duties are sometimes in part assumed by special instructors cooperating with the parents, partly by the influence exercised upon him by the civil society in which he is born, and partly by the influence of theocratic society. Hence this science has many branches, such as *Self-Education, Domestic Education, Pro-* (δ) *Education.*

fessional Education, *Civil Education*, and *Ecclesiastical Education*. These various branches of Education must be supplemented by another which has a very grand subject. We mean *Providential Education*, that process whereby God, ordering and disposing events, has educated, and is still educating, the human race and the individuals that compose it.

Rosmini has left an excellent work on Education, entitled, *On the Supreme Principle of Method and Some of its Applications to the Purposes of Human Education*. There hardly exists a work which offers to the practical teacher more valuable hints than this, or that would better repay a careful study. One of its chief merits lies in the fact that it devotes special attention to the order in which intelligence, beginning with intuition and sensation, naturally developes itself.

245.

Three parts of Education.

Each of these branches naturally divides itself into three parts, corresponding to the three parts of man susceptible of education—the moral, the intellectual, and the physical.

246.

Physical and intellectual must be made subordinate to moral education.

But the education of the individual must have a perfect unity, and it is a great mistake to believe that physical, intellectual, and moral education are three separate and independent things. Hence the first law of education is that of *unity*. The human good to which education must tend is one

and moral. Such is the end and aim. Intellectual and physical education, therefore, must not be sundered from moral education, but must be given as means to it, so that no intellectual cognition or gift and no bodily faculty may be developed without being rendered subservient to the end of moral perfection. All the efforts of the educator and all the means he uses must, with perfect coherence and consistency, contribute to this end. Such is the principle of pedagogy.

247.

(ε) *Economy.*

Economy treats of family government, shows its constitution and the real—we might almost say, mechanical—laws of its movement forward to, or backward from, perfection—laws which have their origin in its natural constitution.

248.

Conditions necessary for the prosperity of the family.

The family has certain elements essential to its existence. Besides these, it has elements necessary to its prosperity, elements flowing from the same laws of which we have spoken. One of these is the following principle :—There must be an equilibrium between the number of persons who compose the family and its means of subsistence.

249.

The government of the family tends to bring the members of a family nearer the aim of existence.

Economy likewise sets forth the principles of the art by which a family must be governed, in order that it may prosper. And this prosperity itself must be such as to bring the members of a family nearer to human perfection and happiness.

250.

Nature and limits of family governments.

The government of the family treated of in Economy is that which is based on the use of the means supplied by the domestic society, and particularly by the power proper to family government.

251.

Vices belonging to domestic society.

The governor, that is, the father, of the family must look beyond the limits of the family itself, and endeavour to form its members, so that they may be in harmony with other domestic societies, as well as with civil and theocratic society. One of the vices of this society is *family egoism;* the opposite vice is *individualism.* The family affected with the former becomes quarrelsome, and exposes itself to the risk of strife, which may either destroy it or place it in a position of authority over others. The family affected with the latter dissolves and perishes through internal discord. Economy points out the characteristics

of such vices, and shows how the vices themselves may be avoided.

It need hardly be remarked that the word *Economy* is used here in its old, original sense of family government. Aristotle says, "Τρία μέρη τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἦν" (*i.e.* we have seen that there are), "ἓν μὲν δεσποτική . . . ἓν δὲ πατρική, τρίτον δὲ γαμική" (*Polit.* i. 12; 1259 a, 37 sq.).

252.

Politics is the science of the art of civil government. A distinction must be made between *particular political sciences* and the *Philosophy of Politics*. Each of the former treats of one of the elements or means by which civil society is governed; the latter looks for the ultimate grounds of the art. (τ) *Politics.*

Rosmini's work on *The Philosophy of Politics*, although it contains elements not strictly philosophical, is, nevertheless, a work of great profundity and importance. It consists of two parts, entitled respectively, *The Main Cause whereby Human Societies stand and fall*, and *Society and its End*. The latter is divided into four books, of which the first treats of *Society*, the second of *The End of Society*, the third of *How the Proximate End of Civil Society, though indeterminate in Theory, is determined in Fact*, and the fourth of *The Psychological Laws according to which Civil Societies approach their End or recede from it*. The work closes with four appendices, in the form of essays—the first on *Statistics*, the second on *Communism and Socialism*, the third on *the Definition of Riches*, and the fourth on *Public Amusements*. The last two are particularly deserving of attention.

253.

Political rules.

The ultimate grounds are, in the first place, the *political rules;* in other words, the highest precepts which instruct us how to estimate the true value of all the means and expedients to which the statesman has recourse in the government of civil society.

254.

Four sources of political rules.

Political rules are divided into four classes, which arise from considering civil society as a body to be propelled to a given end. In connection with this propulsion four elements must be considered: (1) the end toward which said body is to be impelled; (2) the nature of the body itself; (3) the laws of its movement; and (4) the forces calculated to impel it.

255.

The *end* of civil society.

The philosophy of politics must first of all consider the end toward which civil society must continually move. This end is public prosperity, which depends upon *justice* and the *concord of the citizens.* Hence the political rules deducible from the end of civil society are these two: (1) Direct your government so as to maintain and strengthen that main force on which the existence of your society rests, and, since this force changes according to the different periods of the life of civil

First Source.

society, learn and follow the theory of these changes; in other words, Take care of the substance of society and leave the accidents to take care of themselves; (2) Direct your government so that your citizens may attain temporal prosperity in accordance with the principles of morality, or so that human prosperity may produce the good proper to human nature, which alone satisfies man. Citizens, when satisfied, are quiet and harmonious.

256.

Second source.

In the second place, the philosophy of politics must investigate the nature and natural constitution of civil society, and thence deduce this rule: That policy which brings civil society near to its natural and normal constitution is good; that which does the opposite is bad. The natural constitution of civil society is based upon the following five equilibriums: (1) equilibrium between population and wealth; (2) equilibrium between wealth and the civil power; (3) equilibrium between the civil power and material force; (4) equilibrium between the civil and military powers and knowledge; and (5) equilibrium between knowledge and virtue. The political rules of this class may be summed up in this formula: All those political means which bring civil society nearer to the five equilibriums above enumerated are good; all those that do the opposite are bad.

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257.

Third source.

In the third place, the philosophy of politics must, through the study of history, seek to obtain a knowledge of the laws according to which civil societies move. This thought is due to Giambattista Vico,* who merely indicated it, without being able sufficiently to develop it, being unable to devote to it that profound study of the transformations undergone by all the peoples of the earth, which is necessary in order to give it colour and form. Hence arise political rules which may be reduced to this formula: The political means which harmonize with the laws of the natural movement of civil society are good; the others, as being contrary to nature, are bad.

258.

Fourth source.

In the fourth place, the philosophy of politics must estimate the forces by which civil society is impelled towards the good. To make this estimate requires a good deal of sagacity and a great power of abstraction, for the reason that there are *direct forces* and *indirect forces*, and the latter, though they produce the greatest effects, are just those that escape attention. The rules deducible from this source may be summed up in this formula: The political means which, with the

* For an account of Vico, see *The Philological Museum*, vol. ii. pp. 626–644.

smallest outlay of property and action, produce the greatest amount of social good are the best.

259.

The Catholic religion is the most powerful political means, the one which tempers and harmonizes all the rest.

Having discovered the fundamental rules of politics, which form the ultimate grounds of this art and constitute *Civil Philosophy*, we must next apply them, that is, we must seek, by means of them, to estimate the respective values of all the political means supplied by the special political sciences. By doing so we arrive at this result: Religion, and especially Catholicism, is the most valuable of political means, the one which tempers and harmonizes all the rest.

Many will, doubtless, dissent, as the writer does, from this last conclusion; but it must be remembered that Rosmini was, above all other things, a Christian and a sincere Catholic. It must ever be a matter of regret that so powerful a thinker never had a fair opportunity of studying the action and effects of governments not influenced by Catholicism.

260.

(ζ) *Cosmopolitics.*

Cosmopolitics is the theory of the government of theocratic society, that society in which alone the unity and organization of the human race attain completeness.

261.

End and fruit of philosophy.

Philosophy continues all these investigations until the human mind finds complete satisfaction and repose. The mind finds repose when it has succeeded in discovering the ultimate grounds accessible to it and is fully persuaded that these are really and truly the last, and that it cannot go beyond them. These ultimate grounds, then, when found, satisfy the utmost needs of the human soul.

262.

The true philosopher's self-surrender to God.

Such is the outcome of philosophy. If the end of philosophy is to find rest and repose for the curiosity of the mind, its still more precious fruit is, that it assures the human soul that all its desires may yet be satisfied, removes from it all uncertainty, and points out to it the safe way by which it may reach the heights to which it tends. This way leads it to God, to whom the consummate philosopher yields himself up, to be instructed as a pupil and perfected as a creature.

263.

Philosophy a school of humanity.

Such is the end of philosophy; such are its fruits. But if, instead of considering philosophy as a *science*, we look upon it as a *school*, then it becomes the true *education of the human*

spirit—of the mind, which it conducts to a more complete science, and of the heart, to whose affections it reveals the perfect good. It was as a school of humanity that philosophy was conceived by Plato.

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ERRATA.

Page 11, line 25, *for* vol. ii. § 398, *read* vol. i. § 304 n.
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,, 294, *for* { Motive vitality. / Spontaneity. } *read* Motive vital spontaneity.

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